2025-06-14T20:52:00
permalink Post: 11901823
Each time I look at the video it strikes me as a flap retraction below clean climb speed. It looks as if the rate of pitch change and extreme nose high occurred gradually and at a rate which could be the pilot input for deteriorating climb rate based on the corresponding change in wing lift coefficient. I would assume also he was not instantly aware the flaps had been reselected to zero and if he became aware it was only a few seconds from impact. As far as my theory goes I would assume either the Captain commanded "FLAPS UP" erroneously or if he commanded "GEAR UP" the F/O just brain glitched without taking normal care in the cockpit with things like that. A normal procedure but with the same consequences of dealing with an engine fire after V1 IF you misidentify the switch or handle. Thats my opinion. As far as the crew experience it can be recognized the F/O was the weakest link in experience. Nothing new or different than that unless his training show deficiencies managing that cockpit.
2 users liked this post.
2025-06-14T21:04:00
permalink Post: 11901829
Each time I look at the video it strikes me as a flap retraction below clean climb speed. It looks as if the rate of pitch change and extreme nose high occurred gradually and at a rate which could be the pilot input for deteriorating climb rate based on the corresponding change in wing lift coefficient. I would assume also he was not instantly aware the flaps had been reselected to zero and if he became aware it was only a few seconds from impact. As far as my theory goes I would assume either the Captain commanded "FLAPS UP" erroneously or if he commanded "GEAR UP" the F/O just brain glitched without taking normal care in the cockpit with things like that. A normal procedure but with the same consequences of dealing with an engine fire after V1 IF you misidentify the switch or handle. Thats my opinion. As far as the crew experience it can be recognized the F/O was the weakest link in experience. Nothing new or different than that unless his training show deficiencies managing that cockpit.
The gear and flap controls are not easily confused in the 787. They look nothing alike and are not near each other.
2025-06-14T22:08:00
permalink Post: 11901884
Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).
Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..
Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..
Anyway, let's say we know what's supposed to happen when an engine-driven generator (or its GCS) quits. (Which incident do you refer to?) That's what all the redundancy is designed to address. And maybe that's exactly what did happen - a generator / GCS failed at high load in a high ambient temperature. But possibly the failure then highlighted a pre-existing but undetected fault in the switching system itself. With the generator working normally for (months?), everything seemed fine. Sadly, there are always possibilities that the designers don't consider, or are too hard (too expensive, etc) to address.
1 user liked this post.
2025-06-15T02:13:00
permalink Post: 11902053
Pprune Mind Traps from overwhelming posts
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬
Last edited by bakutteh; 15th Jun 2025 at 09:18 .
11 users liked this post.
2025-06-15T02:29:00
permalink Post: 11902059
This applies equally to a normal gear retraction: the centre hydraulic pumps must have stopped very early for the trucks to be in that position on an "interrupted" gear retraction, with the main gear doors still closed (and presumably locked). Seems unlikely.
I did raise this earlier... FCOMs say that the bogies remain in the stowed tilt after a gravity drop, but I don't know if that's because the gear has springs to hold it that way without hydraulics, or just they close the valves on the hydraulics so it stays in the last commanded position without pressure.
Alternate extension appears to rely on the truck positioner remaining in its previously "positioned" state - stowed - where it has been sitting cold, unloved and unpowered since the gear was previously retracted. Like other Boeing types, the wheel well has some bars to stop the truck moving while it's up and stowed.
It's remotely possible the main gear priority valves may have prevented more gear movement in the absence of good hydraulic pressure - however this wouldn't stop the nose gear from operating, so not likely.
Last edited by Lifer01; 15th Jun 2025 at 02:39 .
1 user liked this post.
2025-06-15T02:36:00
permalink Post: 11902060
Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).
Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..first it bangs for awhile, then it burns itself up, then ...
Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..first it bangs for awhile, then it burns itself up, then ...
Thanks for answering the question I hadn't yet asked but wanted to confirm!
I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions.
As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load.
If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault.
Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature.
Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking.
As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it.
It's going to be difficult to prove though.
I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions.
As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load.
If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault.
Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature.
Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking.
As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it.
It's going to be difficult to prove though.
In addition, the 787 has four main generators and I believe the switching is segregated into at least two controllers, on top of the four separate generator control units.
And again, electrical failure should not cause engine failure - consider QF32 where the wiring to the engine was mostly severed and they had to drown it with a fire truck.
Best post until now in my view. We will find out very soon I think. Gear up command triggered the instant lack of fuel to both engines. I'm not sure on how the fuel flow is dependant on the power supplies on the 787 but I genuinely believe you are very very close to what might have happened here.
Yes, thanks, I've seen a few comments to this effect, and I have to accept most of what you say. I understand that they have their own dedicated generators and local independent FADECs (or EECs), but I'm trying to use what I do know to attempt to figure this out. I know that there are Fuel Cutoff switches in the cockpit. Somehow, if switched to Off, these will cut off the fuel to the engines, "no matter what". Of course, even that's not true, as the Qantas A380 engine burst apparently (comment in this thread) showed.
Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can.
You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve?
Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so.
Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can.
You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve?
Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so.
The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...
What\x92s the usual time frame for the release of preliminary data and report from the FDR and CVR? Is it around 6 months?
I guess if no directives come from Boeing or the FAA in the next 2 weeks, it can be presumed that a systems failure from which recovery was impossible was unlikely.
I guess if no directives come from Boeing or the FAA in the next 2 weeks, it can be presumed that a systems failure from which recovery was impossible was unlikely.
1 user liked this post.
2025-06-15T04:00:00
permalink Post: 11902086
I accept it as a fact.
I believe the valves are almost all bi-stable power-open power-close. When not powered, they remain in the last commanded position.
The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...
The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...
2025-06-15T06:48:00
permalink Post: 11902156
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬
However, I think their reaction would likely be to apply more power. I know mine would be. But anything is possible!
2025-06-15T08:22:00
permalink Post: 11902223
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬
This is a very plausible scenario. Above 400 ‘ AGL, memory items.
4 users liked this post.
2025-06-15T08:54:00
permalink Post: 11902253
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬
Am slightly puzzled as to why if flap reduction triggering climb thrust is part of the standard logic (and presumably clean-up technique) then partial dual thrust loss wouldn\x92t be immediately recognised as the classic symptom of gear / flap retraction handling error? I presume Boeing pilots / air India are just as aware of this it as everyone else, strikes me as odd that one would immediately go into full dual EF mode. My instinctive reaction without knowing the Boeing would be to firewall both TLs, would this have worked in the early flap retraction logic scenario? Many thanks all
2025-06-15T09:46:00
permalink Post: 11902300
Something rather relevant has not yet been shown on this thread: a performance calculation.
Could somebody with access to a 787 performance calculator please show realistic figures for this type out of Ahmedabads runway 23?
Weather at the time of the accident:
VAAH 120830Z 24003KT 6000 NSC 37/17 Q1000 NOSIG=
VAAH 120800Z 25007KT 6000 NSC 37/16 Q1001 NOSIG=
With 240 souls on board, a payload of 20-22 tons might be a ballpark figure, and a fuel load of about 50 tons was claimed as realistic in earlier posts.
An appropriate flap setting, a flex temperature, V1, Vr, V2, flap retraction and green dot speed (or its Boeing equivalent), a climb gradient after departure, and some distances might be of interest, I\xb4d think.
Could somebody with access to a 787 performance calculator please show realistic figures for this type out of Ahmedabads runway 23?
Weather at the time of the accident:
VAAH 120830Z 24003KT 6000 NSC 37/17 Q1000 NOSIG=
VAAH 120800Z 25007KT 6000 NSC 37/16 Q1001 NOSIG=
With 240 souls on board, a payload of 20-22 tons might be a ballpark figure, and a fuel load of about 50 tons was claimed as realistic in earlier posts.
An appropriate flap setting, a flex temperature, V1, Vr, V2, flap retraction and green dot speed (or its Boeing equivalent), a climb gradient after departure, and some distances might be of interest, I\xb4d think.
Last edited by Tu.114; 15th Jun 2025 at 10:50 .
1 user liked this post.
2025-06-15T09:56:00
permalink Post: 11902306
(Sorry, Airbus here and not familiar with Boeing) Flap 5 to 1 reduction on the Boeing triggers autothrust reduction, is that correct? If so, are there any other conditions that need to be met for this to happen like being in some kind of takeoff mode? Just thinking whether this would have potential otherwise in other regimes to cause issues, discontinued approach perhaps.
Am slightly puzzled as to why if flap reduction triggering climb thrust is part of the standard logic (and presumably clean-up technique) then partial dual thrust loss wouldn’t be immediately recognised as the classic symptom of gear / flap retraction handling error? I presume Boeing pilots / air India are just as aware of this it as everyone else, strikes me as odd that one would immediately go into full dual EF mode. My instinctive reaction without knowing the Boeing would be to firewall both TLs, would this have worked in the early flap retraction logic scenario? Many thanks all
Am slightly puzzled as to why if flap reduction triggering climb thrust is part of the standard logic (and presumably clean-up technique) then partial dual thrust loss wouldn’t be immediately recognised as the classic symptom of gear / flap retraction handling error? I presume Boeing pilots / air India are just as aware of this it as everyone else, strikes me as odd that one would immediately go into full dual EF mode. My instinctive reaction without knowing the Boeing would be to firewall both TLs, would this have worked in the early flap retraction logic scenario? Many thanks all
Last edited by sorvad; 15th Jun 2025 at 10:15 .
6 users liked this post.
2025-06-15T11:32:00
permalink Post: 11902384
So for those getting in the weeds with one in several trillion (or lower) probabilities of systems failures have you considered that that improper RTOW (with or without improper flap setting), flap retraction / climb thrust trigger, is of much higher probability and has actually happened ?
Anyway I think we’ll find out soon if a systems failure was involved.
The FLCH Hold thing (Asiana) was never an issue and well known (at least on our line). And for a crew of 3 (or 4) to press a destabilized approach getting 40-ish knots too slow (!) isn’t a systems problem — it’s a breach of basic airmanship.
Anyway I think we’ll find out soon if a systems failure was involved.
The FLCH Hold thing (Asiana) was never an issue and well known (at least on our line). And for a crew of 3 (or 4) to press a destabilized approach getting 40-ish knots too slow (!) isn’t a systems problem — it’s a breach of basic airmanship.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 15th Jun 2025 at 11:49 . Reason: Edit
3 users liked this post.
2025-06-15T12:39:00
permalink Post: 11902431
So for those getting in the weeds with one in several trillion (or lower) probabilities of systems failures have you considered that that improper RTOW (with or without improper flap setting), flap retraction / climb thrust trigger, is of much higher probability and has actually happened ?
Anyway I think we’ll find out soon if a systems failure was involved.
The FLCH Hold thing (Asiana) was never an issue and well known (at least on our line). And for a crew of 3 (or 4) to press a destabilized approach getting 40-ish knots too slow (!) isn’t a systems problem — it’s a breach of basic airmanship.
Anyway I think we’ll find out soon if a systems failure was involved.
The FLCH Hold thing (Asiana) was never an issue and well known (at least on our line). And for a crew of 3 (or 4) to press a destabilized approach getting 40-ish knots too slow (!) isn’t a systems problem — it’s a breach of basic airmanship.
2025-06-15T14:35:00
permalink Post: 11902509
My first post here...I feel I need to, due to some posts I have read. As a 787 pilot who has flown Embraer, Airbus, 767 and the 787-8/-9, I am saddened by many of the posts on this thread.
Some of you should be ashamed.
Blaming the pilots before anyone has any idea what transpired.Short takeoff, improper flap/no flap setting, retracting the flaps instead of the gear, shutting down the wrong engine. In ANY other situation these actions would be laughable, and an insult to proffessional pilots the world over. Some commenting about the flaps even after pictures have shown that the flaps are extended. Also numerous people posting regarding shutting the wrong engine being shut down without any evidence to back this up. Videos clearly showing that the RAT was extended indicates that something very serious/catastrophic happened prior to this hull loss. People...this is the Proffessional Pilot's Rumour Network...Not the National Enquirer!!! I would urge everyone to WAIT for the report. Unbelievable.
Some of you should be ashamed.
Blaming the pilots before anyone has any idea what transpired.Short takeoff, improper flap/no flap setting, retracting the flaps instead of the gear, shutting down the wrong engine. In ANY other situation these actions would be laughable, and an insult to proffessional pilots the world over. Some commenting about the flaps even after pictures have shown that the flaps are extended. Also numerous people posting regarding shutting the wrong engine being shut down without any evidence to back this up. Videos clearly showing that the RAT was extended indicates that something very serious/catastrophic happened prior to this hull loss. People...this is the Proffessional Pilot's Rumour Network...Not the National Enquirer!!! I would urge everyone to WAIT for the report. Unbelievable.
11 users liked this post.
2025-06-15T21:56:00
permalink Post: 11902882
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬
A loss of lift AND thrust at this critical juncture could have had caused this awful disaster. I think the data recorders have already revealed the cause but If it's this, then I don't think we will hear much anytime soon.
2025-06-15T22:45:00
permalink Post: 11902924
Experienced 777 driver. Have tried to solve the puzzle. Looked carefully at the video in this article many times - see below and use full screen.
I might see a small puff of smoke and a smoke-ring just before they pass the shed. Indications of en enginefailure. I also see the wings tilt briefly - a few degrees - towards left. Correct procedure after enginefailure is to tilt the wings about 3 degrees toward the engine that is still running. I also see them climb at a - it seems - too high angle for the actual conditions if engine has failed. That will kill the nescessary engineoutspeed in a few seconds and be hard to recover from. If - and I say if - they in this stressed situation managed to shot down the wrong engine following the engineout procedures the RAT would come out. That would probably preoccupy them so much they forget everything about gear and flaps.. It is a situation I believe most experienced 777 / 787 pilots would recognise as a possibility and would explain everything. But this is pure speculation. Lets wait and see what the investigation teams find out...
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/a...w-so-far-crash
I might see a small puff of smoke and a smoke-ring just before they pass the shed. Indications of en enginefailure. I also see the wings tilt briefly - a few degrees - towards left. Correct procedure after enginefailure is to tilt the wings about 3 degrees toward the engine that is still running. I also see them climb at a - it seems - too high angle for the actual conditions if engine has failed. That will kill the nescessary engineoutspeed in a few seconds and be hard to recover from. If - and I say if - they in this stressed situation managed to shot down the wrong engine following the engineout procedures the RAT would come out. That would probably preoccupy them so much they forget everything about gear and flaps.. It is a situation I believe most experienced 777 / 787 pilots would recognise as a possibility and would explain everything. But this is pure speculation. Lets wait and see what the investigation teams find out...
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/a...w-so-far-crash
3 users liked this post.
2025-06-16T00:11:00
permalink Post: 11902995
Experienced 777 driver. Have tried to solve the puzzle. Looked carefully at the video in this article many times - see below and use full screen.
I might see a small puff of smoke and a smoke-ring just before they pass the shed. Indications of en enginefailure. I also see the wings tilt briefly - a few degrees - towards left. Correct procedure after enginefailure is to tilt the wings about 3 degrees toward the engine that is still running. I also see them climb at a - it seems - too high angle for the actual conditions if engine has failed. That will kill the nescessary engineoutspeed in a few seconds and be hard to recover from. If - and I say if - they in this stressed situation managed to shot down the wrong engine following the engineout procedures the RAT would come out. That would probably preoccupy them so much they forget everything about gear and flaps.. It is a situation I believe most experienced 777 / 787 pilots would recognise as a possibility and would explain everything. But this is pure speculation. Lets wait and see what the investigation teams find out...
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/a...w-so-far-crash
I might see a small puff of smoke and a smoke-ring just before they pass the shed. Indications of en enginefailure. I also see the wings tilt briefly - a few degrees - towards left. Correct procedure after enginefailure is to tilt the wings about 3 degrees toward the engine that is still running. I also see them climb at a - it seems - too high angle for the actual conditions if engine has failed. That will kill the nescessary engineoutspeed in a few seconds and be hard to recover from. If - and I say if - they in this stressed situation managed to shot down the wrong engine following the engineout procedures the RAT would come out. That would probably preoccupy them so much they forget everything about gear and flaps.. It is a situation I believe most experienced 777 / 787 pilots would recognise as a possibility and would explain everything. But this is pure speculation. Lets wait and see what the investigation teams find out...
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/a...w-so-far-crash
4 users liked this post.
2025-06-16T01:18:00
permalink Post: 11903027
Originally Posted by
Seven-Five
I might see a small puff of smoke and a smoke-ring just before they pass the shed. Indications of en enginefailure. I also see the wings tilt briefly - a few degrees - towards left. Correct procedure after enginefailure is to tilt the wings about 3 degrees toward the engine that is still running. I also see them climb at a - it seems - too high angle for the actual conditions if engine has failed. That will kill the nescessary engineoutspeed in a few seconds and be hard to recover from. If - and I say if - they in this stressed situation managed to shot down the wrong engine following the engineout procedures the RAT would come out. That would probably preoccupy them so much they forget everything about gear and flaps.. It is a situation I believe most experienced 777 / 787 pilots would recognise as a possibility and would explain everything.
Originally Posted by
T28
In that poster's defense, you will find that they joined PPRuNe in 2002, and their original profile entry was 767.
The upgrade to 777 between then and now is within reason.
The upgrade to 777 between then and now is within reason.
Increasingly, the posts in this thread are becoming more ridiculous as time goes on. The hampsterwheel bearings will soon explode. IMO it should be locked.
6 users liked this post.
2025-06-16T03:43:00
permalink Post: 11903084
Experienced 777 driver. Have tried to solve the puzzle. Looked carefully at the video in this article many times - see below and use full screen.
I might see a small puff of smoke and a smoke-ring just before they pass the shed. Indications of en enginefailure. I also see the wings tilt briefly - a few degrees - towards left. Correct procedure after enginefailure is to tilt the wings about 3 degrees toward the engine that is still running. I also see them climb at a - it seems - too high angle for the actual conditions if engine has failed. That will kill the nescessary engineoutspeed in a few seconds and be hard to recover from. If - and I say if - they in this stressed situation managed to shot down the wrong engine following the engineout procedures the RAT would come out. That would probably preoccupy them so much they forget everything about gear and flaps.. It is a situation I believe most experienced 777 / 787 pilots would recognise as a possibility and would explain everything. But this is pure speculation. Lets wait and see what the investigation teams find out...
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/a...w-so-far-crash
I might see a small puff of smoke and a smoke-ring just before they pass the shed. Indications of en enginefailure. I also see the wings tilt briefly - a few degrees - towards left. Correct procedure after enginefailure is to tilt the wings about 3 degrees toward the engine that is still running. I also see them climb at a - it seems - too high angle for the actual conditions if engine has failed. That will kill the nescessary engineoutspeed in a few seconds and be hard to recover from. If - and I say if - they in this stressed situation managed to shot down the wrong engine following the engineout procedures the RAT would come out. That would probably preoccupy them so much they forget everything about gear and flaps.. It is a situation I believe most experienced 777 / 787 pilots would recognise as a possibility and would explain everything. But this is pure speculation. Lets wait and see what the investigation teams find out...
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/a...w-so-far-crash
I originally wondered about that ... until an old colleague sent me this short clip of a triple kicking up dust rotating in the same location
For your consideration: (20 second clip)
1 user liked this post.