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Feathers McGraw
2025-06-21T13:50:00 permalink Post: 11907772 |
Hello, this is my first post on pprune; as a 787 pilot I’m also puzzled by this accident. All seem to agree that for some reason there was a complete electrical failure and RAT deployment. With a complete electrical failure all six main fuel pumps fail. Each engine also has two mechanically driven fuel pumps. On takeoff, if there is fuel in the center tank, it will be used first, pumped by the two center tank pumps.
My airline’s manuals don’t go into much detail, but I read on another site that if both the center tank pumps fail, the engine driven pumps aren’t able to suction feed well enough from the center tanks to sustain engine operation. If there was fuel in the center tanks, a complete electrical failure would soon lead to center tank fuel pumps failure (all fuel pumps failure as stated previously) and fuel starvation of both engines. A rescue from this situation would be an immediate selection of both center tank fuel pumps OFF (not if my airline’s non-normal checklists) and waiting for successful suction feed from the L and R main tanks to occur, this would take a number of seconds. Further up the thread one of the posters mentions that it is very unlikely that any crew action (checklist, QRH) would have got anywhere near to changing a fuel pump switch position. |
Capn Bloggs
2025-06-21T15:02:00 permalink Post: 11907823 |
Originally Posted by
Feathers MGraw
Is this something that you train for in your airline? Am I correct that to do this requires making the needed switch selections on the overhead panel?
Further up the thread one of the posters mentions that it is very unlikely that any crew action (checklist, QRH) would have got anywhere near to changing a fuel pump switch position. Your comment:
​​​​​​​
it is very unlikely that any crew action (checklist, QRH) would have got anywhere near to changing a fuel pump switch position.
5 users liked this post. |
GroundedSpanner
2025-06-21T15:24:00 permalink Post: 11907841 |
Resubmitting following some Mod Feedback and a significant re-write. Yes, it is speculative
I have a theory that I'd like to share. It brings together various pieces of known information, along with 30+ years of my experience as an aircraft engineer that forms a plausible (IMO) explanation of what may have happened. We Know - From the Video's and the ADSB Data: That up to and for the first few seconds after take-off appears relatively normal. The AC appears to lose thrust without e.g. birdstrike or other spectacular smoke /fire producing event. That the RAT deployed. That the pilot reported 'Thrust not achieved' [Edit - We dont 'know' this - it is heavily reported] We can see that the AC had a relatively busy schedule in the few days prior to the accident flight, so there was no significant downtime for maintenance activities that could have caused incident. The AC flew DEL-CDG on 11 Jun with quite a racy turnaround in CDG of 1h12m. The centre tank would have been empty at CDG on arrival, and would have been partially filled for the return CDG-DEL. CDG-DEL Arrived 01:47 am IST. Again the Centre Tank would have been empty. But quite a bit of fuel in the wings. 8 Hrs later, at 09:48 am IST the AC departed DEL-AMD. For such a short-hop, Fuel upload would have been minimal, merely a 'topping up' if at all. Certainly nothing into the Centre Tank. DEL That night was fairly hot and humid - 57% at 02:30, 54% at 05:30, 44% at 08:30. That wing tank fuel could have picked up a fair amount of water. The flight DEL-AMD would have only used the wing pumps. Thus any water in that 'overnight' fuel would have been vigorously stirred and evenly suspended. At concentrations that would cause no ill-effect at all. The AC was on the ground at AMD for 2 Hrs, from 11:17am to 1:17 pm IST. The AC would have re-fuelled, first filling up the wing tanks to the top, then filling the centre-tank to whatever quantity necessary. There was enough time for water in the wing tanks to settle out. The B787 Fuel system has pumps in the wing tanks, and pumps in the centre tanks. The Centre Tank pumps are also known as 'override' pumps because they output a higher pressure than the wing tank pumps, thus ensuring that with all pumps running, the centre tank fuel is used first. Should the centre tank pumps stop, due to either filure or running out of fuel to pump, the wing tank pumps then produce the pressure. In the event that all pumps stop running (e.g. an electrical failure), the engines will suck the fuel from the wing tanks. The 'sucked' fuel comes from a dedicated pipe in each tank through the 'Suction Feed Check Valve' (so that pumped fuel doesn't just exit through the suction tube). The suction tube pickup is in a slightly different position to the wing pump pickups. It is conceivable to me that the suction tube pickup could have been immersed in water, settled out from the fuel in the wing tanks. Then - at start-up of the aircraft in AMD, The engines would have been supplied with fuel from the centre tank. Fresh Fuel. All OK. Wing pumps running and doing not much. But, I speculate, the suction pick-ups immersed in water. Waiting. Start up and taxi out was all normal. Runway acceleration up to v1 appears normal. V1 - Rotate - (positive rate - Gear up? - Not my debate). But somewhere around that time, I speculate that a significant electrical failure occurred. Enough for the RAT to deploy. Enough for the fuel pumps to stop. I'll not speculate on the cause. We know that it can occur, that's why the RAT was designed to operate. The engines at that point were at TOGA thrust. In a significant electrical failure, the engines will keep on doing what they were last told. Keep that thrust stable. So the AC climbed for a few seconds more. The pilots did what they were trained to do for a power failure, manage that, thankfully the engines were still going well... But there was only so much 'good' fuel in the lines. The engines sucking fuel themselves, the fuel would now be coming from the suction pickups, a different supply. A supply likely heavily water contaminated. It would take a few seconds for that contaminated fuel to actually reach the engines, but when that contaminated fuel hit, Thrust would have been significantly reduced. The EEC's would have been doing their best to maintain the thrust, firewalling the throttles would probably have little effect at that exact moment. The engines would have likely worked through that bad fuel in a shortish period of time, but a period of time that our crew did not have. A fully loaded aircraft producing less than take-off thrust, is not sustaining enough thrust for continued flight. The rest - is down to the skill of the crew in deciding exactly where to hit the ground within the very narrow range of choice they had. Last edited by GroundedSpanner; 21st Jun 2025 at 17:52 . Reason: Thrust not achieved comment is not proven. 14 users liked this post. |
violator
2025-06-21T15:42:00 permalink Post: 11907854 |
Resubmitting following some Mod Feedback and a significant re-write. Yes, it is speculative
I have a theory that I'd like to share. It brings together various pieces of known information, along with 30+ years of my experience as an aircraft engineer that forms a plausible (IMO) explanation of what may have happened. We Know - From the Video's and the ADSB Data: That up to and for the first few seconds after take-off appears relatively normal. The AC appears to lose thrust without e.g. birdstrike or other spectacular smoke /fire producing event. That the RAT deployed. That the pilot reported 'Thrust not achieved' We can see that the AC had a relatively busy schedule in the few days prior to the accident flight, so there was no significant downtime for maintenance activities that could have caused incident. The AC flew DEL-CDG on 11 Jun with quite a racy turnaround in CDG of 1h12m. The centre tank would have been empty at CDG on arrival, and would have been partially filled for the return CDG-DEL. CDG-DEL Arrived 01:47 am IST. Again the Centre Tank would have been empty. But quite a bit of fuel in the wings. 8 Hrs later, at 09:48 am IST the AC departed DEL-AMD. For such a short-hop, Fuel upload would have been minimal, merely a 'topping up' if at all. Certainly nothing into the Centre Tank. DEL That night was fairly hot and humid - 57% at 02:30, 54% at 05:30, 44% at 08:30. That wing tank fuel could have picked up a fair amount of water. The flight DEL-AMD would have only used the wing pumps. Thus any water in that 'overnight' fuel would have been vigorously stirred and evenly suspended. At concentrations that would cause no ill-effect at all. The AC was on the ground at AMD for 2 Hrs, from 11:17am to 1:17 pm IST. The AC would have re-fuelled, first filling up the wing tanks to the top, then filling the centre-tank to whatever quantity necessary. There was enough time for water in the wing tanks to settle out. The B787 Fuel system has pumps in the wing tanks, and pumps in the centre tanks. The Centre Tank pumps are also known as 'override' pumps because they output a higher pressure than the wing tank pumps, thus ensuring that with all pumps running, the centre tank fuel is used first. Should the centre tank pumps stop, due to either filure or running out of fuel to pump, the wing tank pumps then produce the pressure. In the event that all pumps stop running (e.g. an electrical failure), the engines will suck the fuel from the wing tanks. The 'sucked' fuel comes from a dedicated pipe in each tank through the 'Suction Feed Check Valve' (so that pumped fuel doesn't just exit through the suction tube). The suction tube pickup is in a slightly different position to the wing pump pickups. It is conceivable to me that the suction tube pickup could have been immersed in water, settled out from the fuel in the wing tanks. Then - at start-up of the aircraft in AMD, The engines would have been supplied with fuel from the centre tank. Fresh Fuel. All OK. Wing pumps running and doing not much. But, I speculate, the suction pick-ups immersed in water. Waiting. Start up and taxi out was all normal. Runway acceleration up to v1 appears normal. V1 - Rotate - (positive rate - Gear up? - Not my debate). But somewhere around that time, I speculate that a significant electrical failure occurred. Enough for the RAT to deploy. Enough for the fuel pumps to stop. I'll not speculate on the cause. We know that it can occur, that's why the RAT was designed to operate. The engines at that point were at TOGA thrust. In a significant electrical failure, the engines will keep on doing what they were last told. Keep that thrust stable. So the AC climbed for a few seconds more. The pilots did what they were trained to do for a power failure, manage that, thankfully the engines were still going well... But there was only so much 'good' fuel in the lines. The engines sucking fuel themselves, the fuel would now be coming from the suction pickups, a different supply. A supply likely heavily water contaminated. It would take a few seconds for that contaminated fuel to actually reach the engines, but when that contaminated fuel hit, Thrust would have been significantly reduced. The EEC's would have been doing their best to maintain the thrust, firewalling the throttles would probably have little effect at that exact moment. The engines would have likely worked through that bad fuel in a shortish period of time, but a period of time that our crew did not have. A fully loaded aircraft producing less than take-off thrust, is not sustaining enough thrust for continued flight. The rest - is down to the skill of the crew in deciding exactly where to hit the ground within the very narrow range of choice they had. |
JPI33600
2025-06-21T15:52:00 permalink Post: 11907864 |
Some assumed numbers about normal biotreatment.
https://www.biobor.com/wp-content/up...ation-IATA.pdf If we assume 50 tonnes fuel load a 100ppmw biotreatment will be 5kg of biocide total in all tanks. The GEnx-1B will burn about 4,5kg/s fuel each on a take off run (give or take a bit) so 9kg/s in both donks for about 20s until rotate. So the total nominal biocide dose could be pumped in about half a second through both engines on take off power if it where not mixed at all and arrives in both engines at the same time. This gives you an idea that with the nominal amount of biocide dose not much could have happened. If biocide is the source of this dual EFATO than an extreme overdose in addition to wrong application preventing mixture with the fuel had to be the case. First, the problem involves the valves (notably but not exclusively FMV and FSV), not the combustion of the product:
It is highly probable that Residue primarily composed of magnesium salts accumulated in FMV spool and FSV spool, which meter engine combustion fuel, restricted movement of spools, caused inadequate fuel metering, thereby led to engine rpm oscillation that occurred from the first flight after conducting biocide treatment.
Investigation into similar cases revealed that there were six cases reported in which both engines could not start in twin engine aircraft, and one case each in which all engines could not start in four-engine aircraft and engine thrust could not be adjusted. Any of these cases were presumed to have been caused by concentration ratio of biocide (Kathon FP1.5) that was set at higher values (about 1,000 ppm) than specified ones during biocide treatments.
From the biocide test result, it is probable that Magnesium salts contained in biocide did not dissolve in fuel, but dissolved in water contained in fuel and were accumulated in spools as crystals through the engine fuel system.
![]() ![]() These "rpm oscillations", leading to substantial loss of thrust, could as well have occurred simultaneously, and 81 seconds (for the RH engine) is an awfully long time. According to the report, Kathon FP1.5 is not used anymore for biocide treatment, but another contributor ( nachtmusak , who seems to be a petrol specialist) suggested that other products may have similar effects . Therefore, regarding the case we are discussing at large (thanks again, mods!), I think we shouldn't overlook the hypothesis of fuel contamination by biocide, since it is a single point of failure (among a very limited number of SPoFs) from a system analysis point of view. 2 users liked this post. |
GroundedSpanner
2025-06-21T17:11:00 permalink Post: 11907910 |
Yes - Yes it does.
However, that water scavenge works by picking up fluid from just next to at aft boost pump inlet, and dripping it into the aft boost pump inlet. Powered by the motive flow of the aft boost pump. Whereas the suction feed inlet, is - although not far away - in a different location that could itself be sitting in water. After a good look at the SDS - It seems like the system is assuming a small amount of water, with fuel flowing. But when the centre tank override pumps are doing all the supply, its the same fluid being circulated in the same bay. If there is a 'lot' of water, then the aft boost pump is just circulating water (or very water rich fuel). I think the key point of my post was that in an significant power failure, when the pumps stop working, the fuel supply is changed from centre to wing tanks, that it will take a few seconds from after the pumps stop working, to the fuel being received at the engines to be coming from a different source. That source being the bottom of the wing tanks. If the fuel quality is very different in the 2 different locations, the engines are going to struggle. 1 user liked this post. |
Shep69
2025-06-21T18:58:00 permalink Post: 11907986 |
I would take that post by Crossky with a grain of salt. No part of his post made sense and I can only assume he is not a 787 pilot despite claiming to be. "Fuel starvation if pumps aren't turned off, not in my manual but I read about a procedure on the Internet", it's loony stuff.
. |
ignorantAndroid
2025-06-21T19:33:00 permalink Post: 11908002 |
If we now consider the ‘worst case scenario will be preferred’ concept that apparently applies to the TCMA design so as to achieve redundancy, the number of sensor inputs it’s monitoring to decide whether, and can change its decision whether, the aircraft is on the ground, becomes a very important matter. The TCMA is only supposed to save the day on the ground, if the pilots select idle thrust on a rejected take off but one or both of the engines fail to respond. In the ‘worst case’ (in my view) scenario, both TCMA channels on both engines will be monitoring/affected by
every
WoW sensor output and
every
RADALT output data and, if
any one of them
says ‘on ground’, that will result in
both
engines’ TCMAs being enabled to command fuel shut off, even though the aircraft may, in fact, be in the air.
For the sake of argument, imagine if every air/ground sensor had to say 'ground' to enable TCMA. That should still meet the 'no single failure' requirement since you'd need at least 2 failures to get a runaway engine: the original thrust control problem, and a faulty air/ground sensor. IIRC, he said that the 747-8 looks at weight on wheels, gear truck tilt, and radio altimeters. At least one of each has to say 'ground' for TCMA to be enabled. 1 user liked this post. |
sycamore
2025-06-21T20:32:00 permalink Post: 11908032 |
It would be nice if there were some `cutaway` drawings of the centre tank,not generic` block `diagrams,and it`s venting/pressurising system..If anyone has such or knows where it can be found ,I`d be grateful..I presume it is a metal `box`,but sealed,not with an internal Bag-tank...How often are they internally inspected? Presumably by a `robot`...? Is there a `procedure`,either by aircrew or engineering to check that the `suction` system works..ever.ie after landing are all the fuel pumps turned off,(each engine /not together),or engine `run-ups` after a big `maintenance ` job...?...I have a vision of a `hissing Sid` finding a nice vent to get into..not that uncommon in the tropics...
1 user liked this post. |
ignorantAndroid
2025-06-21T20:40:00 permalink Post: 11908039 |
Without going round the hamsterwheel again does anyone have an actual reference for this? Because I've gone back through each of tdracer's very informative posts about this
see here
and there is a discrepancy in the two points he makes below in adjacent posts. Is tdracer talking about the same HPSOV valves? Can anyone confirm that with both AC power loss and and a temporary DC power loss there are no critical engine related shutoff valves that will fail safe (unpowered) in a closed position?
The HPSOV is made up of 2 parts which I'll call the main valve and the pilot valve. The pilot valve is actuated by a solenoid and supplied with fuel from the high-pressure side. The main valve is held shut by a spring. As long as the pilot valve is open and the high-pressure fuel pump is operating, fuel flows through the pilot valve, then pushes and holds the main valve open. The pilot valve and solenoid are 'latching,' i.e. they maintain their position until electrical power is applied. However, a certain pressure still has to be provided by the pump in order to hold the main valve open. Note that when I say 'high-pressure fuel pump,' I'm referring to the one that's mechanically driven by the engine's high-pressure shaft, not any of the electric pumps. ![]() Note: The HPSOV is mistakenly labeled as 'PSOV' in this diagram. 7 users liked this post. |
TryingToLearn
2025-06-21T23:11:00 permalink Post: 11908143 |
I read the whole threads, keeping my hands on the mousewheel so far since I'm not a pilot, just a EE / safety / systems engineer.
The hamsterwheel ist spinning a lot here, and of course it could be anything including some VHDL FPGA code line or a broken RAM cell in a cheap memory bar within the computer it was compiled with. Anything is possible, but to be honest: development processes, if followed, are usually pushing the probability to a level where it becomes pure theory. BOSCH uses FPGA+\xb5C on the brake control box of cars. They sold 100 millions of those, used 4000h each (car lifetime) without error, with less strict development process. Most errors are made on requirement level, not code. Also, so far there is no evidence I've seen regarding the 'chicken-egg' problem, did the engines fall below idle (fuel, stall...) and this caused an electrical blackout (-> battery, RAT...) or did an EE problem cause the engines to reduce thrust (FADEC, SW bug...). And where is the common cause in all this? There has to be a systematic error common to both engines, an external failure affecting both or a dependent fault with one affecting the other within seconds. This is the only thing I think everyone agrees here. And I refuse to beleave the external failure or dependent fault was sitting in the cockpit. I think it is something not common to every aircraft type for the last 50 years. So I started searching and found a candidate. I read myself into the EE architecture of this unique 'bleed-less' design and it's megawatt powergrid since this is the part where I may be able to contribute (and I'm most curious about). Generators on the 787 are >250kW instead of <100kW each and there are two per engine instead of just one. In fact, they can go up to 516 kW and shear off the gearbox at >2200Nm (equal to >2 MW, per generator). https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/7641/en (page 11) So while on any other aircraft the generator is more like the dynamo on your bicycle, those generators are massive (x10). The gearbox is connected to the HP shaft (N2) on the GEnx. I learned from Wikipedia that RR moved this gearbox to the IP shaft on the Trend 1000. And RR is happy that the A330neo Trend 7000 uses bleed air and less load on the gearbox, since this maintains stability on the HP shaft at light load (also Wikipedia). Those generators are not in phase and frequency sync, or in other words: If you parallel them, they fight each other, it's like a short. They will almost block if this is not handled by the control box if possible (or some melting fuse blows at some point). 787 electrical system - variable frequency generators? Somehow I find it hard to believe that they are not able to disturb the engines despite that everyone here so far is claiming that there is no way an electrical problem could influence them because FADEC has it's own supply. I read that one is sufficent to start the engine, usually both are used. In my mind I find lot's of ways this could influence both engines simultanously. If just the BTBs on the 230V grid got some humidity (hot, no AC, water cooling...) and went up in one big arc (I think they made them semiconductor relays, too). Could those gearboxes and engines handle 4500Nm / almost 5 MW on each HP shaft, applied within a fraction of a second without any problem? Or if the engines were in a condition not far from compressor stall, one was stalling and 400kW load jumped from one engines generators to the other... I did some rough estimation and one of the generators could push N2 below idle in a second or less without fuel just with its normal 250kW load (just inertia). This is one point which is unique to this airplane model, so maybe worth a closer look. I know that those engines are burning at >100MW at full power, but how fragile in the balance between compressor load and this one turbine stage on the HP shaft / N2, without the inertia of a 2.8 meter fan? This is just out of my background, any thermodynamic expert here? Of course I also have no insight in SW and communication within the control boxes, how much they are talking to each other, delaying/ramping load redistribution etc. If FADEC recognizes a flameout, could it instantly command the generators to cut the load, even above idle rpm? I would assume that some fuel contamination, valve blockade, even compressor stall would pop up slower. But such a generator could kick in within milliseconds. As a safety guy I learned that one tends to look first at things one is familiar with (SW, HW, mechanics, pilot behaviour, maintainance, depending on one's profession) and in the end it's often the interface and dependent faults within which are not carefully considered (e.g. takeoff situation vs. thermodynamics vs. mechanics vs. power generation vs. humidity vs. generator control...) together with transient behaviour. It was the same with MCAS (safety culture vs. pilot training vs. SW design (repeated action) vs. single AOA input vs. bird strike probability close to ground vs. trim loading/blockade vs. stickshaker noise/distraction). In fact, I was trying to find information on all those systems and directly found slides on how the engines and generators could be simulated and the power grid tested in a HIL (hardware in the loop) environment. My experience from automotive is that such simulated environments are often far from reality and HIL environment programming finished after the product is already at the customer. But of course its far easier and cheaper to apply and test faults there. But then, some programmer programms what he thinks the reaction of the engine would be. This 'bleed-less' design was some massive change in airplane EE architecture with hugh consequences on the whole airplane design and extremely hard to fully analyze. I'm just asking questions and hope that we all learn a lot and this was fully considered or just not an issue. It's just an aspect I found worth mentioning and not only spinning the wheel. PS: I doubt it was TCMA. The air/ground decision is done in a different box, evaluating 5 inputs in a 1/3 and 1/2 decision according to this discussion. This is then safely sent to the FADEC (as one input) and combined with the thrust lever position and N2. But if the thrust lever position is sensed (redundant and direct) close to idle, you do not need TCMA or ground mode to expect reduced thrust. 4 users liked this post. |
Mechta
2025-06-21T23:23:00 permalink Post: 11908147 |
It would be nice if there were some `cutaway` drawings of the centre tank,not generic` block `diagrams,and it`s venting/pressurising system..If anyone has such or knows where it can be found ,I`d be grateful..I presume it is a metal `box`,but sealed,not with an internal Bag-tank...How often are they internally inspected? Presumably by a `robot`...? Is there a `procedure`,either by aircrew or engineering to check that the `suction` system works..ever.ie after landing are all the fuel pumps turned off,(each engine /not together),or engine `run-ups` after a big `maintenance ` job...?...I have a vision of a `hissing Sid` finding a nice vent to get into..not that uncommon in the tropics...
The tank is unpressurised. It is vents to atmosphere throughout the flight. There is a fuel tank inerting system which feeds nitrogen-enriched air into the ullage (air space above the fuel). On the 787 it does this on all tanks. Other airliners only do it on the centre wing tank (and any other fuselage tanks if fitted). Entry to the tanks once they have had fuel in, generally needs breathing apparatus once it has been in service. Pictures of the inside of a completed 787 Centre Wing Tank aren't easy to find. This shows either the upper or lower skin with its stringers. ![]() 2 users liked this post. |
GroundedSpanner
2025-06-22T00:15:00 permalink Post: 11908173 |
I don't want to refute your theory, but given your 30 years of experience---presuming it is relevant--I'd ask you to clarify a few things.
First, water in fuel is not a novel concept and I would presume that the designers of the 787 knew about it. You've simply stated that water might collect and settle out, but how much water might you expect under those conditions (57% humidity doesn't seem terribly high to me) and what features and procedures are already there to mitigage water contamination issues? Your theory would imply that there basically aren't any. IDK how the tank venting system works, but the idea that some huge amount of water could have condensed in the tank from the outside seems preposterous. Second, how much water do you think it would take to cause a sustained flameout in one of those engines? Remember that they have automatic continous relight, so you're going to have to sustain your flame suppression long enough for them to wind down completely. I think those engines were probably using something like 2 gallons per second of fuel along with 250lbs of air heated to over 1100F. Any fuel in the mix would burn and the water would be converted to steam so you'd need mostly water for a long time. So if you think a hundred gallons of water could have gotten into each tank then perhaps I'd buy your theory--which, btw, does fit the known facts pretty well. But I think that short of some woeful neglect, Boeing and AI already know about and have methods of dealing with water contamination. At least I hope so. Experience. Without wishing to dox myself, I've worked in engineering at a major airline from apprentice through (in no particular order) Line Maintenance, Heavy and Light Maintenance, to technical support and maintenance control on both Boeing and Airbus products, with various qualifications and authorisations along the way. [Hmm - Scrap this sentence?]On the day 9/11 occurred, I should have been making modifications inside a fuel tank instead of staring at the TV with mouth on the floor. However, I would describe my experience as broad, yet shallow in respect to this incident. Some of my fleet I know every rivet. Some of my fleet I've only ever seen from a distance. I don't touch airplanes for a living any more. B787 though - is not my area of specialty. I'll dig in, but am not the expert. I am not a systems design engineer, so precise numbers and flow rates, are not what I do. But what the systems do, how they operate, what they look like, smell and taste like... yeah, I'm not a muggle. And I do have access to all the manuals and know how to use them. And - let me be clear, I am speculating. I was advancing a theory. It WILL be some flavour of wrong. The investigation will reveal all. I Agree, Water in fuel is not a novel concept. Aircraft fuel tanks attract water - fact. How much? It varies. I've sumped tanks and got no water, I've seen drops of water beading about in the bottom of a gallon jug, I've seen gallons of water. I've been so covered in fuel I cant smell it or think straight and taken gallon after gallon not being able to tell if its fuel or water. I also agree that 57% humidity doesn't seem particularly high - its not south east Asian jungle levels - but I'm not an expert at humidity, 32Deg c at 57% humidity at 02:30 am is not going to be comfortable for me though. I looked at recent weather in DEL, and those values were at the higher end of the range. Further, I believe the prevailing weather conditions on the ground are less important when it comes to the volume of water getting in. Fuel is cold, or gets damn cold during a 9 Hr flight. Fuel Temperature Management is an issue for our Drivers. So as the fuel is used at altitude, Air enters the tank through NACA Ducts in the outboard end of the wing. Its beneficial to maintain a slight positive pressure, amongst other things to reduce evaporation. (Added complication, there is also the Nitrogen Enrichment system due to TWA800 - but that's more about processing the air in the tank to change the properties and make it non-explosive). Then as the aircraft descends, more air enters as the air pressure increases. Its the humidity of that air in the descent that is going to determine the volume of water entering the tank and potentially the fuel. The water in the air condenses on the sides of the tank because of the cold post-flight fuel. It doesn't dissolve into the fuel, but sinks to the bottom. Ground temperature / humidity and time will likely affect how much water condenses out of that air while on the ground. There won't be a huge amount of air exchange on the ground. Likely if the AC landed at 2am, then from sunrise as the tank warmed up, there would actually be a flow out of the vents. What Features and procedures are there to mitigate Water? I apologise if my post gave the impression that there are no mitigation processes. There are. Water is well understood in the industry. Well for a start, Features / Design. The Aircraft has a water scavenge system. Water doesn't mix with fuel, it sinks to the bottom being about 20% denser than fuel, so at the very lowest point in the tank, the water scavenge system (Powered by the Aft Fuel Pump through a jet pump, a venturi like system) will suck up the 'fluid' at the very lowest point, where the water would collect and in Boeings words 'drip' that fluid into the path of the pump pickup inlet (but I'd describe it more as a 'squirt'). The idea being that a small amount of water injected into the fuel will be consumed by the engines harmlessly. There is also agitation. The wing tank pumps are pretty much running constantly, from before engine startup to after engine shutdown. The pumps are quite violent to the fuel and supply more pressure then the engine could ever need. Any excess pressure is dumped right back into the tank, quite close to the pump, in a direction that would further stir up the fuel and help break up any water into suspended droplets. This all works if there is a small amount of water in the fuel. The water scavenge pickup is right next to the pump inlet, but a bit lower. Little bits of water get managed. Looking at the pictures of the system, I'd say a couple of gallons of water would do no harm at all. But if there was significantly more water in that tank. Guessing 10-30 + gallons, then the pump would be circulating water, or highly water rich fuel. Then there's the suction pickup. Its in the same 'bay' as the aft fuel pump and located a little 'higher' than the pump inlet and water scavenge inlet. But also located between stringers that can separate out the settled water ( I wish I could share the pictures, but more than my job is worth ) I can imagine the suction pickup being in a pool of 'stagnant' water. I also saw a post from Metcha about the scavenge system blocking with Algae - I don't know about that (B787 not my fleet). But possible that could aggravate things. There's also the reports of the Indian AAIB looking at the Titan Biocide incident. Its possible that might be related and could modify the theory. Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury. Except when there's more. Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water. Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel. By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector. But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time. Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water. How much water would cause a sustained flameout? I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling. I think the engines were running, albeit badly. Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow. I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high perrcentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel? There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet. The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure. That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine. Ive written enough and am tired. Must stop now. 11 users liked this post. |
Lonewolf_50
2025-06-22T00:41:00 permalink Post: 11908191 |
Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury.
Except when there's more. Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.
Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector. But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time. Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water. How much water would cause a sustained flameout? I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling. I think the engines were running, albeit badly. Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow. I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high percentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel? There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet. The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure. That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine. Not sure if you are right, and not familiar enough with 787 to check the fuel flow logic, but a friend of mine dead-sticked a single engine trainer into a field due to water in the fuel ... 20 minutes after takeoff. It could have happened earlier. 2 users liked this post. |
mh370rip
2025-06-22T10:03:00 permalink Post: 11908402 |
SLF Engineer (electrical - not aerospace) so no special knowledge
Perceived wisdom may be applicable in normal circumstances but not when all the holes line up. For example I've seen it quoted many times that the engine FADECs are self powered by the engines, the TCMAs-whether part of the FADEC or a separate unit, similarly self contained within the engine. The perceived wisdom seems to be that there is no common single fault which can take out both engines. And yet we're also told that the TCMA function can only function in ground mode and receives ground-air signals from a combination of inputs from Rad Alts and WOW sensors. There is therefore a connection from the central EE bay to the engine. Yes I'm sure the Rad/Alt and WOW sensor processing will use different sensors for each side and powered from different low voltage buses. However as an analogy, in your house your toaster in the kitchen may be on a separate circuit from the water heater in the bathroom, each protected by a fuse at the main switchboard. In normal operation a fault in one cannot affect the other. However a lightning strike outside the house can send much higher voltages than normal operation throughout the entire system and trash every electrical appliance not physically disconnected at the time. Now I'm not suggesting the aircraft was hit by lightning but FDR has proposed a single event, buildup from a water leak entering one of the EE bays at rotate. It would be possible for one or more of the HV electrical buses to short so that all the low voltage buses go high voltage. I have no knowledge of how the FADEC / TCMA systems connect to or process the Ground-Air signals but there is a single fault mechanism whereby high voltage could be simultaneously and inappropriately applied to both engine control systems. It would be unfortunate if this failure mechanism did cause power to be applied to drive the fuel shut off valve closed. Since the likelihood is that we're looking at a low probability event then perceived wisdom about normal operations and fault modes might not be applicable. 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-22T11:01:00 permalink Post: 11908441 |
Always possible, however since a pilot made a radio call there was some
emergency leve
l power available, which suggests the EAFR would be powered.
The Jeju recorders were okay if I recall correctly, they just had no input, was that the case? Somoeone made a good point above about the German Wings FDR/CVR being available the next day after the aircraft was aimed at the ground like a missile. These things are built tough, as you know, this may be type specific but…. ![]() (from the online 2010 FCOM) ![]() (from the maintenance training ) The 787 battery fire report says the two recorders are on the left and right 28VDC buses. I don't think those get powered on RAT by the looks of it. I would wager you get whatever is on the 235VAC 'backup bus', plus the captain's and F/O's instrument buses via C1/C2 TRUs. You won't get all of that (like the F/O's screens) because the 787 energises/de-energises specific bits of equipment, not just whole buses. Losing recorder power looks entirely expected.
SLF Engineer (electrical - not aerospace) so no special knowledge
Perceived wisdom may be applicable in normal circumstances but not when all the holes line up. For example I've seen it quoted many times that the engine FADECs are self powered by the engines, the TCMAs-whether part of the FADEC or a separate unit, similarly self contained within the engine. The perceived wisdom seems to be that there is no common single fault which can take out both engines. And yet we're also told that the TCMA function can only function in ground mode and receives ground-air signals from a combination of inputs from Rad Alts and WOW sensors. There is therefore a connection from the central EE bay to the engine. Yes I'm sure the Rad/Alt and WOW sensor processing will use different sensors for each side and powered from different low voltage buses. However as an analogy, in your house your toaster in the kitchen may be on a separate circuit from the water heater in the bathroom, each protected by a fuse at the main switchboard. In normal operation a fault in one cannot affect the other. However a lightning strike outside the house can send much higher voltages than normal operation throughout the entire system and trash every electrical appliance not physically disconnected at the time. Now I'm not suggesting the aircraft was hit by lightning but FDR has proposed a single event, buildup from a water leak entering one of the EE bays at rotate. It would be possible for one or more of the HV electrical buses to short so that all the low voltage buses go high voltage. I have no knowledge of how the FADEC / TCMA systems connect to or process the Ground-Air signals but there is a single fault mechanism whereby high voltage could be simultaneously and inappropriately applied to both engine control systems. It would be unfortunate if this failure mechanism did cause power to be applied to drive the fuel shut off valve closed. Since the likelihood is that we're looking at a low probability event then perceived wisdom about normal operations and fault modes might not be applicable. Weight on wheels appears to go into data concentrators that go into the common core system (i.e. data network). Presumably there is a set of comms buses between the FADECs and the CCS to allow all the pretty indicators and EICAS alerts in the cockpit to work. The WoW sensors might flow back via that, or via dedicated digital inputs from whatever the reverse of a data concentrator is called (surely they have need for field actuators other than big motors?). Either way, left and right engine data should come from completely different computers, that are in the fwd e/e bay (or concentrators/repeaters in the wings, maybe) rather than in with the big power stuff in the aft e/e bay. 8 users liked this post. |
MaybeItIs
2025-06-22T23:35:00 permalink Post: 11908907 |
That\x92s the nature of a common mode bug. If the software was vulnerable to Mars being in the house of Uranus, the scent of lilacs and the DOW being less than 42,000 then you\x92d expect the failure to occur everywhere when these conjoined. Same when an aeroplane\x92s systems and/or the environment present data that triggers an unplanned/unforeseen response in something like an EEC/FADEC. The experts still appear to think that this is unlikely but we have been presented with an unlikely occurrence...
Yes, there may be (let's assume is) "identical" FADEC/TCMA hardware and firmware on both engines, but if the Left Engine is subject to Mars in the house of Uranus (wink wink), then the Right Engine cannot be, maybe it's Venus in the same House. This is simply because the Left engine TCMA 'contraption', I'm going to call it, is monitoring Left Engine Conditions (Shaft Speed, T/L setting / position data - Right or Wrong, and calculating and comparing accordingly against its internal map) while the opposite TCMA "device" is monitoring and calculating etc, Right Engine Conditions. There are some things in common, but (I say) it's virtually impossible for the Engine Conditions being individually monitored to be identical in both engines. The Thrust Levers are electro-mechanical devices, almost certainly at this stage pushed by a somewhat squishy human hand, likely with a slight offset. What is the probability that those two levers are in identical positions, and even if they are, that the calibration (e.g. "zero points") of both levers are identical, and that the values they output (response slopes/curves) are exactly matching in every matching point in their individual travels? That's just one aspect, but consider the engines. They are different ages. Have different amounts of wear. They have separate fuel metering valves (or other names), separate HP Fuel pumps (and, I guess relief valves?), all also subject to wear), and each has a host of other, correspondingly paired, sensors, (maybe of different makes and certainly of different ages and different calibrations and response curves) from which each FADEC, supposedly independently of the TCMA, adjusts the fuel metering device settings and resulting engine power, and shaft RPMs follow in some other slightly non-matching way. Sure, I would completely agree that the two engines and their calculated Throttle Lever positions to Shaft RPMs are always going to be similar during normal, matched operation, and they will very likely dance with each other, maybe one 'always' (75% of the time, say) leading during one dance (TO, say) with the other leading in dancing to a different tune (descent, say). To me, the fact that this appears to have been an almost simultaneous dual engine failure, pretty much, for me, rules out a FADEC/TCMA firmware bug, especially as there don't seem to be any reports of even a single engine mid-air TCMA shutdown. HOWEVER, and I want to stress this, that doesn't rule out the possibility that both TCMAs shutdown their respective engines simultaneously. Any lack of simultaneity observed would be due to those slight differences in other pieces of hardware, such as the time for one Shutoff valve to close versus the other. As far as I know, there isn't enough information on what's actually inside those TCMA Black Boxes to say anything for sure, but here's a thought, which I think has been alluded to, or the question asked, here in one or other thread, earlier. What does the TCMA firmware do when an engine is already running at a high power setting and TWO things occur in quick succession? I suspect this kind of event is a highly probable cause, but these two events have not occurred close enough together, or ever, before. Imagine this: Plane taking off, Throttle Levers near Full Power, Engines performing correctly, also near Full Power, Rotation etc all normal, plane beginning to climb, positive rate achieved. Pilot calls GEARUP. GearUp, activated. The Gear Retract sequence begins. Due to some unforeseen or freshly occurring (maybe intermittent short or open circuit) linkage between the gear Up sequence and the WOW or Air/Ground System, the signal to both TCMAs suddenly switches to GROUND. All "good", so far, as the engine RPMs match the Throttle Lever settings and TCMA doesn't flinch. The plane could be in a Valid Takeoff sequence, so it had better not! But it does make a bit of sense. How is WOW / Air/Ground detected? Somewhere near the Landing Gear, I assume. HOWEVER, now, a moment later, and perhaps due to a related system response, the Thrust Levers suddenly get pulled back to Idle, whether by man or Machine. What would you expect the TCMA system to do? I would guess, fairly soon thereafter, two, independent, Fuel Cutoffs... Though I fully admit, I'm guessing based on a severe lack of knowledge of that Firmware. Ok, no need for further explanation on that point, but I did refer to TCMA unflatteringly as a contraption, earlier. Last night (regrettably, before bed) I started looking at the TCMA Google Patent. Let's just say, so far, I'm aghast! My first impressions are bad ones. How did this patent even get approved? What I suspect here, now, is not a Firmware bug, but a serious Logic and Program Defect. But we'd have to see what's inside the firmware. When I get more time, I'll dig deeper. 1 user liked this post. |
AAKEE
2025-06-29T16:25:00 permalink Post: 11913116 |
Murlidhar Mohol Interviewed (Civil aviation minister)
This is some news:
we will be able to ascertain if it was an engine problem or fuel supply issue or why both the engines had stopped functioning.
|
EDLB
2025-06-29T17:02:00 permalink Post: 11913128 |
From the link above:
The minister called the crash a "rare case". "It has never happened that both engines have shut down together," he said So they have no clue even with both recorders read out, why both engines shut down at the same time. Sabotage on the electrical fuels shut down: Would require detailed knowledge about the wire routing, which is independent for both engine sides, so any "device" would be difficult to get into the electric harness. I would rule that out, unless they find foreign devices wired in on the wreck, because there are way simpler methods to get an airliner down. Fuel contamination: There is no smoke, no puff, nothing visible on the exhaust. Both engines went from clean burning to immediate shut down at the same time within less than a second. I think that is close to impossible with any method of fuel contamination you can come up with. There ist always some mixture you would burn and the less perfect burn rate would show as smoke. At take off you have something around 5kg per second fuel burn rate per engine, so you have to come up with non combustible "fuel" in this rate on the exact time on both engines. Highly improbable. I find it very disconcerting that with downloaded recorders the investigators seem to have no clue how and why the dual engine shut down happened. How can they be sure that this unrecoverable problem was/is limited to the AI171 flight. |
Kraftstoffvondesibel
2025-06-29T17:40:00 permalink Post: 11913148 |
Sabotage on the electrical fuels shut down: Would require detailed knowledge about the wire routing, which is independent for both engine sides, so any "device" would be difficult to get into the electric harness. I would rule that out, unless they find foreign devices wired in on the wreck, because there are way simpler methods to get an airliner down. . |
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