2025-06-13T14:18:00
permalink Post: 11900557
One has to assume that, given the seeming lack of lateral deviation from the flight path, and with no obvious yawing or rudder input visible on the videos, there's only two realistic conclusions here? Simultaneous dual engine failure of unknown cause if the RAT was indeed deployed; or flaps reduced too early leading to a stall if the RAT wasn't deployed.
Evidence in this thread would lean me toward the RAT deployed and therefore dual engine out scenario. As for the cause of that, well, only a couple of likely scenarios exist that could cause simultaneous shutdown of both engines, including mistaken or intentional use of the fuel cutoff levers.
Evidence in this thread would lean me toward the RAT deployed and therefore dual engine out scenario. As for the cause of that, well, only a couple of likely scenarios exist that could cause simultaneous shutdown of both engines, including mistaken or intentional use of the fuel cutoff levers.
Hutch
11 users liked this post.
2025-06-13T18:58:00
permalink Post: 11900812
OK, another hour spent going through all the posts since I was on last night...
I won't quote the relevant posts as they go back ~15 pages, but a few more comments:
TAT errors affecting N1 power set: The FADEC logic (BTW, this is pretty much common on all Boeing FADEC) will use aircraft TAT if it agrees with the dedicated engine inlet temp probe - but if they differ it will use the engine probe . The GE inlet temp probe is relatively simple and unheated, so (unlike a heated probe) a blocked or contaminated probe will still read accurately - just with greater 'lag' to actual temperature changes.
TCMA - first off, I have to admit that this does look rather like an improper TCMA activation, but that is very, very unlikely. For those who don't know, TCMA is a system to shutdown a runaway engine that's not responding to the thrust lever - basic logic is an engine at high power with the thrust lever at/near idle, and the engine not decelerating. However, TCMA is only active on the ground (unfamiliar with the 787/GEnx TCMA air/ground logic - on the 747-8 we used 5 sources of air/ground - three Radio Altimeters and two Weight on Wheels - at least one of each had to indicate ground to enable TCMA). TCMA will shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection - nearly instantaneous. For this to be TCMA, it would require at least two major failures - improper air ground indication or logic, and improper TCMA activation logic (completely separate software paths in the FADEC). Like I said, very, very unlikely.
Fuel contamination/filter blockage: The fuel filters have a bypass - if the delta P across the filter becomes excessive, the filter bypasses and provides the contaminated fuel to the engine. Now this contaminated fuel could easy foul up the fuel metering unit causing a flameout, but to happen to two engines at virtually the same time would be tremendous unlikely.
Auto Thrust thrust lever retard - the TO lockup in the logic makes this very unlikely (it won't unlock below (IIRC) 400 ft., and even that requires a separate pilot action such as a mode select change or thrust lever movement). And if it did somehow happen, all the pilot needs to do is push the levers back up.
Engine parameters on the FDR: I don't know what exactly is on the 787 FDR with regards to engine parameters, but rest assured that there is plenty of engine data that gets recorded - most at one/second. Getting the FDR readout from a modern FDR is almost an embarrassment of riches. Assuming the data is intact, we'll soon have a very good idea of what the engines were doing
I won't quote the relevant posts as they go back ~15 pages, but a few more comments:
TAT errors affecting N1 power set: The FADEC logic (BTW, this is pretty much common on all Boeing FADEC) will use aircraft TAT if it agrees with the dedicated engine inlet temp probe - but if they differ it will use the engine probe . The GE inlet temp probe is relatively simple and unheated, so (unlike a heated probe) a blocked or contaminated probe will still read accurately - just with greater 'lag' to actual temperature changes.
TCMA - first off, I have to admit that this does look rather like an improper TCMA activation, but that is very, very unlikely. For those who don't know, TCMA is a system to shutdown a runaway engine that's not responding to the thrust lever - basic logic is an engine at high power with the thrust lever at/near idle, and the engine not decelerating. However, TCMA is only active on the ground (unfamiliar with the 787/GEnx TCMA air/ground logic - on the 747-8 we used 5 sources of air/ground - three Radio Altimeters and two Weight on Wheels - at least one of each had to indicate ground to enable TCMA). TCMA will shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection - nearly instantaneous. For this to be TCMA, it would require at least two major failures - improper air ground indication or logic, and improper TCMA activation logic (completely separate software paths in the FADEC). Like I said, very, very unlikely.
Fuel contamination/filter blockage: The fuel filters have a bypass - if the delta P across the filter becomes excessive, the filter bypasses and provides the contaminated fuel to the engine. Now this contaminated fuel could easy foul up the fuel metering unit causing a flameout, but to happen to two engines at virtually the same time would be tremendous unlikely.
Auto Thrust thrust lever retard - the TO lockup in the logic makes this very unlikely (it won't unlock below (IIRC) 400 ft., and even that requires a separate pilot action such as a mode select change or thrust lever movement). And if it did somehow happen, all the pilot needs to do is push the levers back up.
Engine parameters on the FDR: I don't know what exactly is on the 787 FDR with regards to engine parameters, but rest assured that there is plenty of engine data that gets recorded - most at one/second. Getting the FDR readout from a modern FDR is almost an embarrassment of riches. Assuming the data is intact, we'll soon have a very good idea of what the engines were doing
2025-06-13T19:02:00
permalink Post: 11900815
1) Incorrect flap retraction causing the aircraft to lose lift and unable to recover the energy in time. (Not unheard of and plenty of reports where this has happened - albeit usually not to a crash).
2) Loss of engine thrust backed up two potential pieces of evidence that back up the RAT was deployed (apparent RAT sound, potential RAT seen on low res video).
It is impossible to know which of these is the case. Considering this summary of memory items is there the potential for a combination of both theories to have taken place?
Inadvertant flap retraction by PNF leading the PF to sense a sink and loss of lift. Pushes the thrust levers forward to the firewall and still the aircraft sinks. PF looking through the HUD and so very much 'outside focused' and doesn't realise that PNF has instead moved the flaps. PF defaults to memory items for loss of thrust on both engines before PNF can realise or communicate to PF what they've done, start switches are cut off which drops the RAT and from that point they're only heading one way. This would satisfy the strongly held belief that the RAT was extended, whilst also following the more likely initial cause of an action slip by PNF starting the sequence, rather than a dual engine failure.
4 users liked this post.
2025-06-13T19:42:00
permalink Post: 11900845
2025-06-13T19:45:00
permalink Post: 11900847
3 users liked this post.
2025-06-13T20:04:00
permalink Post: 11900854
Question is why both engines lost power . Foreign object ingestion , contaminated fuel or both cutoff levels operated ? We do not know .
Any autothrust discussion is misleading since every pilot in that situation will firewall the levers whatever thrust reduction was selected for TO . the same is true for the RAT discussion- if enough hydraulic pressure was generated or not . The plane pitched up last second so there obviously was control until the end . Of course , without energy pulling alone will not bring you anywhere .
Why did both engines fail the same second as they would be cut off ???
Any autothrust discussion is misleading since every pilot in that situation will firewall the levers whatever thrust reduction was selected for TO . the same is true for the RAT discussion- if enough hydraulic pressure was generated or not . The plane pitched up last second so there obviously was control until the end . Of course , without energy pulling alone will not bring you anywhere .
Why did both engines fail the same second as they would be cut off ???
Actually not true. Remember the 737 with iced up itt probes that hit the Washington bridge?
a simple \x93yugga\x94 on the power levers would have prevented disaster.
probably irrelevant to this topic however
2025-06-13T20:50:00
permalink Post: 11900886
We're all shouting each other down with two main different theories on why the aircraft lost lift so shortly after takeoff.
1) Incorrect flap retraction causing the aircraft to lose lift and unable to recover the energy in time. (Not unheard of and plenty of reports where this has happened - albeit usually not to a crash).
2) Loss of engine thrust backed up two potential pieces of evidence that back up the RAT was deployed (apparent RAT sound, potential RAT seen on low res video).
It is impossible to know which of these is the case. Considering this summary of memory items is there the potential for a combination of both theories to have taken place?
Inadvertant flap retraction by PNF leading the PF to sense a sink and loss of lift. Pushes the thrust levers forward to the firewall and still the aircraft sinks. PF looking through the HUD and so very much 'outside focused' and doesn't realise that PNF has instead moved the flaps. PF defaults to memory items for loss of thrust on both engines before PNF can realise or communicate to PF what they've done, start switches are cut off which drops the RAT and from that point they're only heading one way. This would satisfy the strongly held belief that the RAT was extended, whilst also following the more likely initial cause of an action slip by PNF starting the sequence, rather than a dual engine failure.
1) Incorrect flap retraction causing the aircraft to lose lift and unable to recover the energy in time. (Not unheard of and plenty of reports where this has happened - albeit usually not to a crash).
2) Loss of engine thrust backed up two potential pieces of evidence that back up the RAT was deployed (apparent RAT sound, potential RAT seen on low res video).
It is impossible to know which of these is the case. Considering this summary of memory items is there the potential for a combination of both theories to have taken place?
Inadvertant flap retraction by PNF leading the PF to sense a sink and loss of lift. Pushes the thrust levers forward to the firewall and still the aircraft sinks. PF looking through the HUD and so very much 'outside focused' and doesn't realise that PNF has instead moved the flaps. PF defaults to memory items for loss of thrust on both engines before PNF can realise or communicate to PF what they've done, start switches are cut off which drops the RAT and from that point they're only heading one way. This would satisfy the strongly held belief that the RAT was extended, whilst also following the more likely initial cause of an action slip by PNF starting the sequence, rather than a dual engine failure.
As has been said many times as well, the landing gear retraction process appears to start as the bogies tilt, and then suddenly stops. Which rather suggests they did pull the gear lever. Based on the videos and the amount of speed the plane lost in the very brief sequence ovents, I'd say that the plane lost power a lot earlier than it would have in your theory.
Last edited by neila83; 13th Jun 2025 at 21:03 .
3 users liked this post.
2025-06-13T20:55:00
permalink Post: 11900891
The aircraft as I understand was on a turnround. Is there any element that a ground engineer would have adjusted or checked incorrectly in that standard turnround check, that may have led to duel fuel starvation, or similar issue end up with a unrecoverable loss of power. Obviously I\x92m assuming that involves the time taken for start, pushback, taxiing and TO roll before it manifests itself.
(bio many years in airport ops/atc, and watched an a/c trash engines as it rolled for TO. Reason, equipment was left in an intake that gently moved into the engine after start/push/taxi and commenced roll)
(bio many years in airport ops/atc, and watched an a/c trash engines as it rolled for TO. Reason, equipment was left in an intake that gently moved into the engine after start/push/taxi and commenced roll)
2025-06-13T21:30:00
permalink Post: 11900926
Having read all the posts, watched the videos and with a 30 year background interest in air safety, I have a nagging feeling that the engine fuel cut off switches were pulled just after take-off. I am not saying this with the intention of idle speculation, it is just that to me nothing else seems to make sense. To anyone disagreeing with this, I really hope you are right and I am wrong.
2025-06-13T21:33:00
permalink Post: 11900929
Something I've been wondering about this accident is the phase of the flight where the apparent power loss happened. It seems like the engines were running normally through the takeoff, until the aircraft lifted off the ground. After that the loss of power seemed to happen very quickly.
Could there be a scenario where aircraft's fuel supply is interrupted by change in aircraft's attitude (for example faulty pumps, partially contaminated fuel)? Frankly I have no idea how 787's fuel pumps operate, or if fuel contamination could happen in a way that blocks the flow only when aircraft reaches certain nose-up attitude.
Could there be a scenario where aircraft's fuel supply is interrupted by change in aircraft's attitude (for example faulty pumps, partially contaminated fuel)? Frankly I have no idea how 787's fuel pumps operate, or if fuel contamination could happen in a way that blocks the flow only when aircraft reaches certain nose-up attitude.
2025-06-13T21:51:00
permalink Post: 11900947
The probability of something (or maybe several somethings) being a primary cause of this crash is near unity. The question, what possible causes are likely?
To take a specific item of speculation that might case dual engine rollback, fuel contamination was suggested. I don't remember all the points made in this context, but some were: no other aircraft presumably using the same fuel supply had issues; why would both engines apparently fail near simultaneously?; why would they fail just after rotation?; and so on. The consensus seemed to be, not impossible, but unlikely (presumably in the sense I just described).
Accidental (or even deliberate) fuel shutoff was also suggested. Again, the consensus seemed to be, possible, but unlikely for this type, since previous ergonomic causes of such accidental shutoff had long since been addressed.
2025-06-13T21:57:00
permalink Post: 11900954
At this stage, at least two scenarios seem highly plausible:
1. Technical issue
Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate.
There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly.
Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.
2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff
This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode.
There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions.
If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding.
Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit.
If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough.
1. Technical issue
Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate.
There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly.
Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.
-
On the ground
, if the aircraft is incorrectly in
air mode
, some systems may be unavailable—such as wheel brakes, reverse thrust, or ground spoilers.
-
In the air
, if the aircraft is mistakenly in
ground mode
, flaps might auto-retract, and various layers of system protection may be disabled.
2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff
This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode.
There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions.
If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding.
Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit.
If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough.
3 users liked this post.
2025-06-13T22:13:00
permalink Post: 11900962
At this stage, at least two scenarios seem highly plausible:
1. Technical issue
Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate.
There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly.
Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.
2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff
This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode.
There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions.
If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding.
Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit.
If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough.
1. Technical issue
Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate.
There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly.
Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.
-
On the ground
, if the aircraft is incorrectly in
air mode
, some systems may be unavailable—such as wheel brakes, reverse thrust, or ground spoilers.
-
In the air
, if the aircraft is mistakenly in
ground mode
, flaps might auto-retract, and various layers of system protection may be disabled.
2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff
This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode.
There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions.
If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding.
Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit.
If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough.
On item 2, the video shows no asymmetry at any time, so there is only a symmetric failure of the engines possible. Back on a B747 classic, you could chop all 4 engines at the same time with one hand, on a B737, also, not so much on a B777 or B787. I would doubt that anyone used two hands to cut the fuel at screen height. Note, there was a B744 that lost one engine in cruise when a clip board fell off the coaming. Didn't happen twice, and it only happened to one engine.
Yes indeed, the moment they pulled the gear lever, as we see the gear begin the retraction process, and then suddenly stop. Almost as if they suddenly lost power.
We can see the landing gear retraction process begin. We see the bogies tilted in the second video. We can hear the RAT. We can see the RAT. We can see the flaps extended in the video and at the crash site. There isn't actually a single piece of evidence the flaps were raised, it's just a conclusion people jumped too before evidence began to emerge.
The crazy thing is, when the report comes out and there is no mention of flaps none of the people who have been pushing the flap theory will self reflect or learn anything. They'll think those of us who didn't buy into it were just lucky, rather than it being down to use of fairly simple critical thinking.
We can see the landing gear retraction process begin. We see the bogies tilted in the second video. We can hear the RAT. We can see the RAT. We can see the flaps extended in the video and at the crash site. There isn't actually a single piece of evidence the flaps were raised, it's just a conclusion people jumped too before evidence began to emerge.
The crazy thing is, when the report comes out and there is no mention of flaps none of the people who have been pushing the flap theory will self reflect or learn anything. They'll think those of us who didn't buy into it were just lucky, rather than it being down to use of fairly simple critical thinking.
Neila83 is correct, the gear tilt pre retraction is rear wheels low, and at the commencement of the selection of the retraction cycle (generally),
There is enough in the way of anomalies here to end up with regulatory action, and airlines themselves should/will be starting to pore over their systems and decide if they are comfortable with the airworthiness of the aircraft at this moment. A latent single point of failure is not a comfortable place to be. Inhibiting TCMA might be a good interim option, that system could have been negated by having the ATR ARM switches....(Both)... ARM deferred to the before takeoff checks. The EAFR recovery should result in action within the next 24-48 hours. Boeing needs to be getting their tiger teams warmed up, they can ill afford to have a latent system fault discovered that is not immediately responded to, and the general corporate response of "blame the pilots" is not likely to win any future orders.
I think we are about to have some really busy days for the OEM.
Not sure that Neila83 is that far off the mark at all.
Last edited by fdr; 14th Jun 2025 at 01:21 . Reason: corrected for B788 by Capt Bloggs!
8 users liked this post.
2025-06-13T23:21:00
permalink Post: 11900993
Combining all the bits and pieces of info from this thread so far, IMO we can theoretically sequence it thus using the video from the left:
00:18 Rotation. Normal takeoff config.
00:24 Gear up starts. per Raffael with FF.
......... FR24 ADSB last transmission (71ft, 172kt) just before runway threshold. Matches with video aircraft altitude at 1/2 wingspan.
......... ? Full power flameout leaves N2 ~ 60%; Airspeed < 200k so N2 will decay to 15% in 8-10s?
......... ? Takeoff EGT of 900C needs 25-35s to fall below 250C ?
00:27 Gear up stops. per Raffael with FF. Bogies tilted.
......... ? APU starts. 20-55s to 95%N?
......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates Fuel Cutoff and Run.
00:28 Visible loss of thrust. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure.
......... Matches with eyewitness "within 5-10s ... it was stuck in the air".
......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates RAT Switch for 1s. Whether auto or manual, the RAT initiates.
......... RAT "bang" heard by survivor
......... RAT coming online accounts for eyewitness "lights started flickering green and white".
......... Per 787 QRH below 1000ft, PF makes no change to Main Landing Gear and flaps, aircraft pointed straight for best glide.
00:31 Descending visibly, somewhere beyond the runway threshold. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure.
......... ? Because EGT > 250C FADEC blocks fuel (T-HOT hot restart inhibit?) so no relight though N2 > 15% ?
......... 787 glide ratio between 16:1 to 25:1 with MLG down, Flaps 5. About 15-20s and 3-5000ft of glide from 200ft?
......... Some flap accounts for the ground pictures.
00:34 ? N2 has presumably decayed to 15%, FADEC flips to X-START: airspeed outside envelope? No hope of relight now.
......... PM/PF transmits Mayday?
......... Video showing RAT deployed.
00:46 APU reaches some fraction of 95%N (APU sound accounting for survivor's perception of thrust?).
00:48 Impact. 4200ft from descent start, 3990ft from airport boundary road. 17s from visible descent start.
if this is a valid sequence, the only remaining question is why the dual-engine failure at ~200ft agl?
with condolences to the families and people affected.
00:18 Rotation. Normal takeoff config.
00:24 Gear up starts. per Raffael with FF.
......... FR24 ADSB last transmission (71ft, 172kt) just before runway threshold. Matches with video aircraft altitude at 1/2 wingspan.
......... ? Full power flameout leaves N2 ~ 60%; Airspeed < 200k so N2 will decay to 15% in 8-10s?
......... ? Takeoff EGT of 900C needs 25-35s to fall below 250C ?
00:27 Gear up stops. per Raffael with FF. Bogies tilted.
......... ? APU starts. 20-55s to 95%N?
......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates Fuel Cutoff and Run.
00:28 Visible loss of thrust. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure.
......... Matches with eyewitness "within 5-10s ... it was stuck in the air".
......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates RAT Switch for 1s. Whether auto or manual, the RAT initiates.
......... RAT "bang" heard by survivor
......... RAT coming online accounts for eyewitness "lights started flickering green and white".
......... Per 787 QRH below 1000ft, PF makes no change to Main Landing Gear and flaps, aircraft pointed straight for best glide.
00:31 Descending visibly, somewhere beyond the runway threshold. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure.
......... ? Because EGT > 250C FADEC blocks fuel (T-HOT hot restart inhibit?) so no relight though N2 > 15% ?
......... 787 glide ratio between 16:1 to 25:1 with MLG down, Flaps 5. About 15-20s and 3-5000ft of glide from 200ft?
......... Some flap accounts for the ground pictures.
00:34 ? N2 has presumably decayed to 15%, FADEC flips to X-START: airspeed outside envelope? No hope of relight now.
......... PM/PF transmits Mayday?
......... Video showing RAT deployed.
00:46 APU reaches some fraction of 95%N (APU sound accounting for survivor's perception of thrust?).
00:48 Impact. 4200ft from descent start, 3990ft from airport boundary road. 17s from visible descent start.
if this is a valid sequence, the only remaining question is why the dual-engine failure at ~200ft agl?
with condolences to the families and people affected.
4 users liked this post.
2025-06-14T00:49:00
permalink Post: 11901040
Default setup is left tank left engine, right tank right engine. Each engine also has two redundant pumps feeding it, meaning it can operate fully and normally on one operational engine fuel pump.
Furthermore, the engines cannot run from the center tank. There's no such thing. The center tank transfers to the outer tanks, when necessary or when running low or to resolve imbalances, either automatically or manually initated by the pilot for whatever reason. The engine fuel pumps only ever draw from their respective tank.
It is as thus impossible for the center tank being empty to cause engine shutdown unless the main tanks were also empty, in which case we would: be in a lot of trouble, shouldn't be taking off, and wouldn't have a massive orange fireball.
Furthermore, the engines cannot run from the center tank. There's no such thing. The center tank transfers to the outer tanks, when necessary or when running low or to resolve imbalances, either automatically or manually initated by the pilot for whatever reason. The engine fuel pumps only ever draw from their respective tank.
It is as thus impossible for the center tank being empty to cause engine shutdown unless the main tanks were also empty, in which case we would: be in a lot of trouble, shouldn't be taking off, and wouldn't have a massive orange fireball.
https://kb.skyhightex.com/knowledge-...7-fuel-system/
Can you state the source of your information? I have no way of independently verifying what I've provided. According to that, however, the two center tank pumps are higher pressure than the L/R tank pumps and will override them if both are activated. So the center tank fuel is used first, then the L/R tank pumps. If no pumps are operating, the engines can suction fuel from their respective L or R tanks provided there's enough atmospheric pressure. The end result is still that an empty center tank cannot cause an engine shutdown absent some other malfunction.
3 users liked this post.
2025-06-14T00:55:00
permalink Post: 11901047
Default setup is left tank left engine, right tank right engine. Each engine also has two redundant pumps feeding it, meaning it can operate fully and normally on one operational engine fuel pump.
Furthermore, the engines cannot run from the center tank. There's no such thing. The center tank transfers to the outer tanks, when necessary or when running low or to resolve imbalances, either automatically or manually initated by the pilot for whatever reason. The engine fuel pumps only ever draw from their respective tank.
It is as thus impossible for the center tank being empty to cause engine shutdown unless the main tanks were also empty, in which case we would: be in a lot of trouble, shouldn't be taking off, and wouldn't have a massive orange fireball.
Furthermore, the engines cannot run from the center tank. There's no such thing. The center tank transfers to the outer tanks, when necessary or when running low or to resolve imbalances, either automatically or manually initated by the pilot for whatever reason. The engine fuel pumps only ever draw from their respective tank.
It is as thus impossible for the center tank being empty to cause engine shutdown unless the main tanks were also empty, in which case we would: be in a lot of trouble, shouldn't be taking off, and wouldn't have a massive orange fireball.
11 users liked this post.
2025-06-14T01:11:00
permalink Post: 11901053
A long while ago I posted on the Rumour thread about a ban on drinks on the flight deck sent to a BA, A350 mid Atlantic. It was prompted by 2 separate instances of uncommanded unrecoverable engine shut downs due to drink spills across the fuel cut off switches. It was widely mocked by the professional pilots on here until proven to be absolutely factually correct. If we are into speculation why not a drink left on the flight deck tips on aircraft pitch up and spills across both fuel cut-switches. Just sayin
Hutch
Hutch
Last edited by T28B; 14th Jun 2025 at 01:43 . Reason: Bold is not necessary
1 user liked this post.
2025-06-14T01:16:00
permalink Post: 11901055
Trying repeatedly to follow the whole thread plus updates but loading on the iPhone constantly jumps backwards and forwards making it a struggle to cover everything.
Two points which may or may not have relevance. One is just before the final crash, a dark-looking cover(?) flies up into the air. Could this be the first contact with sound that the surviving passenger alleges he heard?
Secondly the cost of aviation fuel seems to be comparatively more expensive in India than either Japan (leg before) or the UK (following leg). Would this effect refuelling procedures within India, supposing a company directive to save when possible?
(Frequent long-haul passenger.)
Two points which may or may not have relevance. One is just before the final crash, a dark-looking cover(?) flies up into the air. Could this be the first contact with sound that the surviving passenger alleges he heard?
Secondly the cost of aviation fuel seems to be comparatively more expensive in India than either Japan (leg before) or the UK (following leg). Would this effect refuelling procedures within India, supposing a company directive to save when possible?
(Frequent long-haul passenger.)
But let’s run with it. Less fuel = lighter load. So…how does that make lift off/climb a more difficult procedure??? It shouid have been easier. How does that result in rapid loss of lift? Did they finish their tablespoon of fuel?
Or - if you are hinting at fuel contamination by being “watered down” somehow…why were no other aircraft affected? You might wish to consider Cathay Pacific flight 780, which suffered a serious fuel contamination incident. The problem was not initialiy detectable, but some engine underperformance was noted in one engine fairly early into the flght. The problems compounded during the flght from Surabaya to Hong Kong, culminating in complete engine shutdown. Fortunately, due to the experience and skill of Captain and Copilot, they just - only just - managed to land safely in Hong Kong. Point is - a crash scenario did not unfold in seconds.
Last edited by Blake777; 14th Jun 2025 at 01:48 .
2025-06-14T03:05:00
permalink Post: 11901101
Miscellaneous comments:
I have seen in manuals for other airliners that because the bogie tilt is by a hydraulic actuator, gravity deploying the gear means the gear doesn't tilt to landing position.
With the loss of centre-system pressure*, would you expect the bogies to tilt naturally? I.e. spring pressure holds the gear in the stowed tilt, a hydraulic cylinder pushes the gear to the landing tilt. No pressure means the gear returns to the 'stowed' tilt.
The tilt actuator is designed to be overridden when the bogie hits the ground, so perhaps it has some kind of intentional bypass and doesn't stay in place without continually applied hydraulic pressure.
If so, that would also point towards total loss of electrics and no attempt to raise the gear.
* 787 centre system is powered by two electric pumps, plus the RAT. The RAT hydraulic pump only powers flight controls, not the landing gear.
Electric loss:
Surely even total AC power loss shouldn't result in engine loss, even if the RAT doesn't come online. The FADECs have their own alternators, bare minimum flight control computers and actuators are available on battery (though probably result in some equivalent of Direct Law), and boost pumps are unnecessary at low altitude. Left/right EDPs will remain active if the engines are running at any serious speed; providing flight controls.
Poor crew reaction to ending up in direct law is possible but it's hard to see the electrical issues as a cause, not a symptom.
Anti-terrorism squad looks to be doing an excellent job (/s) and recovered a convenience-store-grade CCTV recorder, probably from somewhere on the campus it crashed into:
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com.../121823103.cms
With the loss of centre-system pressure*, would you expect the bogies to tilt naturally? I.e. spring pressure holds the gear in the stowed tilt, a hydraulic cylinder pushes the gear to the landing tilt. No pressure means the gear returns to the 'stowed' tilt.
The tilt actuator is designed to be overridden when the bogie hits the ground, so perhaps it has some kind of intentional bypass and doesn't stay in place without continually applied hydraulic pressure.
If so, that would also point towards total loss of electrics and no attempt to raise the gear.
* 787 centre system is powered by two electric pumps, plus the RAT. The RAT hydraulic pump only powers flight controls, not the landing gear.
Electric loss:
Surely even total AC power loss shouldn't result in engine loss, even if the RAT doesn't come online. The FADECs have their own alternators, bare minimum flight control computers and actuators are available on battery (though probably result in some equivalent of Direct Law), and boost pumps are unnecessary at low altitude. Left/right EDPs will remain active if the engines are running at any serious speed; providing flight controls.
Poor crew reaction to ending up in direct law is possible but it's hard to see the electrical issues as a cause, not a symptom.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com.../121823103.cms
2025-06-14T03:12:00
permalink Post: 11901105
Ex petroleum lab technician and tank farm sampler here. We would occasionally get fuel samples from crashed aircraft to test for contamination. One test was for water and sediment/microorganism sludge.
In this accident, fuel contamination continues to be dismissed as a cause, because no other aircraft have reported issues. But there has been no discussion regarding the airport's fuel storage, transfer, or filtration systems. Water and sediment naturally settles at the bottom of fuel storage tanks. If this aircraft received fuel drawn from the bottom of a storage tank, in the absence of a proper filtration system, it’s possible that it was contaminated. The next aircraft may have received fuel from a different storage tank with good fuel.
In this accident, fuel contamination continues to be dismissed as a cause, because no other aircraft have reported issues. But there has been no discussion regarding the airport's fuel storage, transfer, or filtration systems. Water and sediment naturally settles at the bottom of fuel storage tanks. If this aircraft received fuel drawn from the bottom of a storage tank, in the absence of a proper filtration system, it’s possible that it was contaminated. The next aircraft may have received fuel from a different storage tank with good fuel.
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