July 13, 2025, 17:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921459
Just to endorse CaptainBiggles101 post #557. Speculation based on this preliminary report should not start encouraging the simplistic mass media attitude of \x93we don\x92t know what happened so it must be pilot initiated\x94, Don't put together complicated theories about potential sequences of crew actions to give that an air of authority.
We have a very limited initial report which meets the ICAO requirement to produce one. It may or may not be written in the investigators and/or authors\x92 native language, and will have been the subject of considerable \x93negotiation\x94 before release as to its contents. While the bald facts are stated, some cannot be taken at face value without much more context. For example the use of the word \x93transitioned\x94 rather than \x93moved\x94 or \x93placed\x94 in regard to the fuel switches positions may be significant.
There is a summary of only two elements of intra-crew voice communications, which again may or may not be in the right language, and one radio message, as yet unattributable to individuals. Everyone here should know that there are many missing elements which could be just as significant.
It\x92s highly regrettable that even \x93reputable\x94 media use such summaries and extracts in headlines and jump to simplistic conclusions. The complete story may be totally different and follow an extremely improbable sequence of events. This is nothing new - for example forty years ago the BBC\x92s first broadcast report of the crash of JAL 123 B747 included a statement that first information indicated it to be \x93almost certainly the result of pilot error\x94. I was the ranking IFALPA spokesman at the time and quickly got this removed from their reports with a later apology from the head of BBC news. The accident was actually due to catastrophic structural failure following an inadequate repair of a tail-strike 7 years earlier, and the crew had struggled heroically for 30 minutes to keep an a physically unflyable aircraft airborne.
I mention it simply to illustrate that professionals here should do as little as possible to feed unverifiable conclusions, and follow the mods guidance. Rant over.
Steve
We have a very limited initial report which meets the ICAO requirement to produce one. It may or may not be written in the investigators and/or authors\x92 native language, and will have been the subject of considerable \x93negotiation\x94 before release as to its contents. While the bald facts are stated, some cannot be taken at face value without much more context. For example the use of the word \x93transitioned\x94 rather than \x93moved\x94 or \x93placed\x94 in regard to the fuel switches positions may be significant.
There is a summary of only two elements of intra-crew voice communications, which again may or may not be in the right language, and one radio message, as yet unattributable to individuals. Everyone here should know that there are many missing elements which could be just as significant.
It\x92s highly regrettable that even \x93reputable\x94 media use such summaries and extracts in headlines and jump to simplistic conclusions. The complete story may be totally different and follow an extremely improbable sequence of events. This is nothing new - for example forty years ago the BBC\x92s first broadcast report of the crash of JAL 123 B747 included a statement that first information indicated it to be \x93almost certainly the result of pilot error\x94. I was the ranking IFALPA spokesman at the time and quickly got this removed from their reports with a later apology from the head of BBC news. The accident was actually due to catastrophic structural failure following an inadequate repair of a tail-strike 7 years earlier, and the crew had struggled heroically for 30 minutes to keep an a physically unflyable aircraft airborne.
I mention it simply to illustrate that professionals here should do as little as possible to feed unverifiable conclusions, and follow the mods guidance. Rant over.
Steve
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July 13, 2025, 17:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921462
A purely speculative technical question.
If you were faced with that scenario (assuming accidental cut-off of both engines) if you shoved the nose down and retracted the gear would it buy you enough time for at least one engine to have come back online sufficiently to save the day or was a crash innevitable?
If you were faced with that scenario (assuming accidental cut-off of both engines) if you shoved the nose down and retracted the gear would it buy you enough time for at least one engine to have come back online sufficiently to save the day or was a crash innevitable?
Given a different set of circumstances at some point the situation is unrecoverable and you become \x93dead man walking\x94.
Stalls, spins, unusual attitude recovery, MCAS events, they all become unrecoverable below a certain altitude.
If I had to take a guess I would say 2500-3000\x92 AGL and this could have been recoverable.
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July 13, 2025, 17:37:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921474
A bit of psycology. If one were intent on crashing the plane and did switch to cut off, they would most likely fight like hell to keep them off.
Kudos to the crew for trying to re-light the engines so quickly.
My 10 cents is on the switches and there is not a aireworthiness directive out there for nothing.
Kudos to the crew for trying to re-light the engines so quickly.
My 10 cents is on the switches and there is not a aireworthiness directive out there for nothing.
edit: Sorry, didn't see Andy S post.....
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July 13, 2025, 17:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921477
Hi,
I have a couple of questions. Forgive me for being late into this thread if any of them is already discussed:
1) I just read this in a Boeing manual:
2) Looking at the incident timeline, one of the pilots takes corrective action to reswitch to RUN position 10 seconds after maximum air speed is reached and 5 seconds after RAT is deployed. Is this normal?
It's not clear however that whether their conversation is after or before the RAT is deployed.
(No visual or auditory cues in the cockpit for a critical fuel switch action? Not hearing the engines shutting down?)
3) The same pilot that turns on Engine 1's fuel switch, turns on Engine 2's switch 4 whole seconds later. Why not consecutively, right one after the other, just like they were turned off one second apart?
If only he had done so the second engine might have recovered in time as well.
4) This aircraft's TCM has been replaced in 2019 and 2023, not related to a fuel switch issue. And there had been no fuel switch defect reports since 2023. One begs to ask if there had been a fuel switch defect report back in 2023 and what was the nature of it?
Are TCM's replaced as a whole, including the switches, twice? If so, why wouldn't they install a TCM version at least in 2023 with redesigned switches (w/ enhanced locking mechanism) mentioned in the FAA SAIB? Have they installed old/used TCM's manufactured prior to 2018 SAIB?
Please note that the RH and LH GE engines of the aircraft were only installed in March 2025 and May 2025 respectively, but they were used and dating from 2013 and 2012. Is this normal for a 12 year old Boeing aircraft to change so many mission critical components?
Electronic parts somehow, but how durable are those GE engines?
Thanks,
C.A.
I have a couple of questions. Forgive me for being late into this thread if any of them is already discussed:
1) I just read this in a Boeing manual:
The fuel control switches send signals to open or close fuel valves to operate or shutdown the engines.
- They send signals to the remote data concentrators (RDC) and the spar valve start switch relays.
- The spar valve start switch relays use these signals to control the spar valve and the high pressure shut off valve (HPSOV) in the fuel metering unit (FMU).
- The RDCs send the signals to the common data network (CDN) and then to the electronic engine control (EEC) to operate the FMU fuel valves (FMV and HPSOV).
The fuel control switches have 2 positions:
- RUN
- CUTOFF.
You must pull the switch out of a detent to select a position.
There seems to be RDC's (remote data concentrators) and CDN (common data network) between those fuel switches and the fuel valves. Is there any possibility that there may have been an electronic control module or sensor fault to generate such a signal rather than mechanical switch movements?
- They send signals to the remote data concentrators (RDC) and the spar valve start switch relays.
- The spar valve start switch relays use these signals to control the spar valve and the high pressure shut off valve (HPSOV) in the fuel metering unit (FMU).
- The RDCs send the signals to the common data network (CDN) and then to the electronic engine control (EEC) to operate the FMU fuel valves (FMV and HPSOV).
The fuel control switches have 2 positions:
- RUN
- CUTOFF.
You must pull the switch out of a detent to select a position.
2) Looking at the incident timeline, one of the pilots takes corrective action to reswitch to RUN position 10 seconds after maximum air speed is reached and 5 seconds after RAT is deployed. Is this normal?
It's not clear however that whether their conversation is after or before the RAT is deployed.
(No visual or auditory cues in the cockpit for a critical fuel switch action? Not hearing the engines shutting down?)
3) The same pilot that turns on Engine 1's fuel switch, turns on Engine 2's switch 4 whole seconds later. Why not consecutively, right one after the other, just like they were turned off one second apart?
If only he had done so the second engine might have recovered in time as well.
4) This aircraft's TCM has been replaced in 2019 and 2023, not related to a fuel switch issue. And there had been no fuel switch defect reports since 2023. One begs to ask if there had been a fuel switch defect report back in 2023 and what was the nature of it?
Are TCM's replaced as a whole, including the switches, twice? If so, why wouldn't they install a TCM version at least in 2023 with redesigned switches (w/ enhanced locking mechanism) mentioned in the FAA SAIB? Have they installed old/used TCM's manufactured prior to 2018 SAIB?
Please note that the RH and LH GE engines of the aircraft were only installed in March 2025 and May 2025 respectively, but they were used and dating from 2013 and 2012. Is this normal for a 12 year old Boeing aircraft to change so many mission critical components?
Electronic parts somehow, but how durable are those GE engines?
Thanks,
C.A.
When reading any of the data when it comes out, pay some attention to the sampling rate of the data being provided, it is quite possible to make erroneous assumptions where that is not taken into consideration. The data buses used to get data from the aircraft system to the recorder, and the recorders themselves use sequential sentences, and varyious rates.
IMHO.
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July 13, 2025, 17:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921482
- They send signals to the remote data concentrators (RDC) and the spar valve start switch relays.
- The spar valve start switch relays use these signals to control the spar valve and the high pressure shut off valve (HPSOV) in the fuel metering unit (FMU).
(snip)
There seems to be RDC's (remote data concentrators) and CDN (common data network) between those fuel switches and the fuel valves. Is there any possibility that there may have been an electronic control module or sensor fault to generate such a signal rather than mechanical switch movements?
- The spar valve start switch relays use these signals to control the spar valve and the high pressure shut off valve (HPSOV) in the fuel metering unit (FMU).
(snip)
"They send signals to the remote data concentrators (RDC) and the spar valve start switch relays."
Nothing in what you quoted says or implies that the RDC is in the fuel valve control path.
Edit to add - The RDC is in the path that feeds fuel switch position to the flight data recorder. Any error in that path could make the recorded switch position disagree with the actual switch position. It cannot change the state of the fuel valves and it cannot cause the engines to stop producing thrust.
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July 13, 2025, 18:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921493
Electrical effects of engine rollback
As I understand it from previous discussions, without the APU, all electrical power except for that DC power provided by battery to essential systems would have been lost.
With the copilot as PF, would he have lost his instrument displays? If so, possibly additional startle effect and workload for him.
Why did the ADS-B information keep going on for so long? My understanding from previous threads was that loss of ADS-B was considered an indication of loss of electrical power.
What else would be expected with loss of power?
Some general speculation: I find it hard to understand the long delay from what must have been the onset of obvious issues to the time the first engine is set to "RUN". I wonder if much more cockpit dialog intervened, e.g. PF requesting PM to turn the fuel switches back on (since he had his hands full), and eventually operating the switches himself, with the delay and time gap between the two switches being turned to "RUN" being attributable to being preoccupied with flying the aircraft under trying conditions.
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July 13, 2025, 18:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921494
It would have been useful if more of the CVR data had been released so as to see the crew interaction. Also the language used on what was released seems to refer to a third person.
However, from an operator perspective. Captain PM, FO PF. PF selects TOGA and follows the thrust levers, Captain confirms Thrust Set and replaces FO hands on the Thrust Levers. 80Kt call by PM, acknowledged by PF. Aircraft calls V1, Captain should withdraw hands from Thrust Levers and calls Rotate at Vr. PM is looking for confirmation the aircraft is climbing and calls Positive Rate. PF confirms and calls Gear Up. At this point the PF will be looking through the HUD looking to follow the flight director, the PM would be checking LNAV had engaged and at 400\x92 checking THR REF and VNAV SPD. However, at this point a loss of thrust occurred. So how was this apparent to the PF who would have been looking out with both hands on the control wheel. Reduction in pitch? GPWS call-out? Decreasing N1 on the engine instruments? EICAS ENG SHUTDOWN? What did the PM see? Who called out the situation? Were any actions called for? At some point as the generators went off line all the FO instruments would have blanked. Did the Captain assume control? I don\x92t think I would have been thinking about the Fuel Cut-Off switches at that point, yet they were specifically mentioned which does mean the switches were moved and it wasn\x92t some internal fault.
Hopefully, as the CVR is further analysed some more information will come to light.
However, from an operator perspective. Captain PM, FO PF. PF selects TOGA and follows the thrust levers, Captain confirms Thrust Set and replaces FO hands on the Thrust Levers. 80Kt call by PM, acknowledged by PF. Aircraft calls V1, Captain should withdraw hands from Thrust Levers and calls Rotate at Vr. PM is looking for confirmation the aircraft is climbing and calls Positive Rate. PF confirms and calls Gear Up. At this point the PF will be looking through the HUD looking to follow the flight director, the PM would be checking LNAV had engaged and at 400\x92 checking THR REF and VNAV SPD. However, at this point a loss of thrust occurred. So how was this apparent to the PF who would have been looking out with both hands on the control wheel. Reduction in pitch? GPWS call-out? Decreasing N1 on the engine instruments? EICAS ENG SHUTDOWN? What did the PM see? Who called out the situation? Were any actions called for? At some point as the generators went off line all the FO instruments would have blanked. Did the Captain assume control? I don\x92t think I would have been thinking about the Fuel Cut-Off switches at that point, yet they were specifically mentioned which does mean the switches were moved and it wasn\x92t some internal fault.
Hopefully, as the CVR is further analysed some more information will come to light.
Interestingly ENG 1 was cut off first\x85
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July 13, 2025, 18:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921497
I find it ironic I got shut down by mods here fur posting about suicide on the AI tech thread.
Where some very fanciful idea as about AG logic where being trotted out etc .
How about suicide by FCS and use the CVR to blame the other guy ? Doesn\x92t seem so far fetched now
Where some very fanciful idea as about AG logic where being trotted out etc .
How about suicide by FCS and use the CVR to blame the other guy ? Doesn\x92t seem so far fetched now
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July 13, 2025, 18:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921502
You are desperately trying to make the scenario fit . Things aren\x92t left on the FCS . I\x92ve tried knocking em off in the sim doesn\x92t work .
Have you ever moved a set of them ? I\x92ve been moving them for 23 years on Boeings from 757 to 787. If they were really set to cutoff at the end of the runway it\x92s deliberate .. BUT we need more info \x85
FO was flying \x85 Capt moves them and then says \x93 why did you .. etc \x93 , Poor FO doing his best to stay in the air
Have you ever moved a set of them ? I\x92ve been moving them for 23 years on Boeings from 757 to 787. If they were really set to cutoff at the end of the runway it\x92s deliberate .. BUT we need more info \x85
FO was flying \x85 Capt moves them and then says \x93 why did you .. etc \x93 , Poor FO doing his best to stay in the air
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July 13, 2025, 18:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921509
You are desperately trying to make the scenario fit . Things aren\x92t left on the FCS . I\x92ve tried knocking em off in the sim doesn\x92t work .
Have you ever moved a set of them ? I\x92ve been moving them for 23 years on Boeings from 757 to 787. If they were really set to cutoff at the end of the runway it\x92s deliberate .. BUT we need more info \x85
FO was flying \x85 Capt moves them and then says \x93 why did you .. etc \x93 , Poor FO doing his best to stay in the air
Have you ever moved a set of them ? I\x92ve been moving them for 23 years on Boeings from 757 to 787. If they were really set to cutoff at the end of the runway it\x92s deliberate .. BUT we need more info \x85
FO was flying \x85 Capt moves them and then says \x93 why did you .. etc \x93 , Poor FO doing his best to stay in the air
If you\x92ve ever moved those switches you know how they work and you know it\x92s impossible for anything to knock them or move them out of the detent.
Over the years there have been many \x93slips\x94 that have led to accidents, I\x92m yet to come across one which involved both FCS inadvertently being cutoff. The design works, believe it or not.
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July 13, 2025, 18:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921522
I would like to raise a subject that I don't believe has been discussed here since the Preliminary Report was published, namely what happened to the aircraft's electrical systems as a consequence of the dual engine rollback and thereafter (RAT deployment, partial engine recovery, etc.). Apologies if I've missed posts on this topic here, but I have tried to review all of this thread quickly after previously reading most of it in detail.
As I understand it from previous discussions, without the APU, all electrical power except for that DC power provided by battery to essential systems would have been lost.
With the copilot as PF, would he have lost his instrument displays? If so, possibly additional startle effect and workload for him.
Why did the ADS-B information keep going on for so long? My understanding from previous threads was that loss of ADS-B was considered an indication of loss of electrical power.
What else would be expected with loss of power?
Some general speculation: I find it hard to understand the long delay from what must have been the onset of obvious issues to the time the first engine is set to "RUN". I wonder if much more cockpit dialog intervened, e.g. PF requesting PM to turn the fuel switches back on (since he had his hands full), and eventually operating the switches himself, with the delay and time gap between the two switches being turned to "RUN" being attributable to being preoccupied with flying the aircraft under trying conditions.
As I understand it from previous discussions, without the APU, all electrical power except for that DC power provided by battery to essential systems would have been lost.
With the copilot as PF, would he have lost his instrument displays? If so, possibly additional startle effect and workload for him.
Why did the ADS-B information keep going on for so long? My understanding from previous threads was that loss of ADS-B was considered an indication of loss of electrical power.
What else would be expected with loss of power?
Some general speculation: I find it hard to understand the long delay from what must have been the onset of obvious issues to the time the first engine is set to "RUN". I wonder if much more cockpit dialog intervened, e.g. PF requesting PM to turn the fuel switches back on (since he had his hands full), and eventually operating the switches himself, with the delay and time gap between the two switches being turned to "RUN" being attributable to being preoccupied with flying the aircraft under trying conditions.
There seems to be a period around second 12/13 post V1 where engines are (or should) be likely below idle, but prior to RAT power generation.
Note that the report explicitly states the RAT started providing hydraulic power 5 seconds after engine shutdown commenced. It doesn't reference electrical power. So we don't know whether this was at the same time - others may clarify re: RAT operation.
But either way, it would appear there would be a gap in power (which, incidentally, would tie in with the survivor commentary). But yet ADS data continued.
If in fact there was a momentary loss of power then that would contribute heavily to the startle and "delay" in refiring (although comments here make me think there wasn't really such a delay anyway).
(And incidentally would make what appears to be a really rather valiant attempt to save the aircraft even more impressive)
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July 13, 2025, 18:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921525
If the intent was suicide, in order to make the situation unrecoverable, pulling both fire handles would be the next item to ensure the engines would not restart in the time available, therefore if only the run/cutoff switches were moved to cut off, then the situation was not foreseeably unrecoverable and can only questionably be construed as a suicide.
The evidence shows 2-3 extraordinary possibilities all full of caveats, and since nothing else has been issued it seems incredibly unlikely that anyone involved in the investigation is concerned that there is a chance of accidental cutoff from the switch, electronics, software or cockpit design.
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July 13, 2025, 18:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921526
Former Boeing Engineer on the 787 (prob should put this in my profile at some point but newbie on the forum), but personally flown nothing bigger than a 172.
Longer I think about this the more I lean towards purposeful but not intentional action slip cutoffs by the captain. Some people have commented on sim training captains doing this to reset quicker (i wouldn't know).
We know FO was flying and initial cut offs are 1 then 2, which to me says CAPT did it. But also relights were 1 then 2 which tells me CAPT also did that one most likely.
Also comments around 10 seconds of delay being a long time, that's REALLY fast in my opinion especially considering, 1. this is a situation that is never trained for and 2. All sorts of lights changing, displays flickering, whole right side of the cockpit basically turning off and 3. Your really close to the ground and transitions (from takeoff to climb) lend themselves hard things to break your mind out of. That has to be a very jarring experience that needs likely a few seconds just to re-orient themselves. I'm honestly impressed they got them re-lit that fast, but assuming training with engine out and re-start procedures likely gave them a hint fuel switches from the EICAS messages.
Very confident Boeing FlightOps engineers and training captains have run through this in the sim quite a few times now.
Longer I think about this the more I lean towards purposeful but not intentional action slip cutoffs by the captain. Some people have commented on sim training captains doing this to reset quicker (i wouldn't know).
We know FO was flying and initial cut offs are 1 then 2, which to me says CAPT did it. But also relights were 1 then 2 which tells me CAPT also did that one most likely.
Also comments around 10 seconds of delay being a long time, that's REALLY fast in my opinion especially considering, 1. this is a situation that is never trained for and 2. All sorts of lights changing, displays flickering, whole right side of the cockpit basically turning off and 3. Your really close to the ground and transitions (from takeoff to climb) lend themselves hard things to break your mind out of. That has to be a very jarring experience that needs likely a few seconds just to re-orient themselves. I'm honestly impressed they got them re-lit that fast, but assuming training with engine out and re-start procedures likely gave them a hint fuel switches from the EICAS messages.
Very confident Boeing FlightOps engineers and training captains have run through this in the sim quite a few times now.
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July 13, 2025, 19:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921543
"This" apparently meaning that the Captain deliberately and with evil intent moved the FCS switches to CUTOFF and then accused the FO of doing it.
Of course we can't accept it as fact. There's no credible evidence indicating that it happened, much less dispositive evidence.
Of course we can't accept it as fact. There's no credible evidence indicating that it happened, much less dispositive evidence.
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July 13, 2025, 19:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921545
I've been following this with interest from the start. My very first reaction when I saw it was that it was a double-engine failure, clearly I was intrigued to know whether it was pilot or system initiated.
I don't think from what we've told that you can draw a conclusion either way. The data shows that the FDR recorded both fuel switches being off, then back to on. The crucial piece here is that it's only a signal from the system, not a physical check of switch position, that provides the signal.
It's entirely possible that the physical switches were not moved. The CVR recording of the other pilot stating that he didn't move them is fascinating in this context.
I don't think from what we've told that you can draw a conclusion either way. The data shows that the FDR recorded both fuel switches being off, then back to on. The crucial piece here is that it's only a signal from the system, not a physical check of switch position, that provides the signal.
It's entirely possible that the physical switches were not moved. The CVR recording of the other pilot stating that he didn't move them is fascinating in this context.
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July 13, 2025, 19:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921567
10 seconds to respond is a long long time if you\x92ve just made a silly mistake, you\x92d have those switches back on in a second. The startle factor isn\x92t really a factor here, because you
know
what just happened.
What is also unusual to me is the 4 second gap between moving Eng 1 fuel switch from cutoff to run, and moving Eng 2 fuel switch from cutoff to run.
One would imagine that in this situation, speed of response would have been critical. Why the slow, deliberate \x91reaction\x92?
What is also unusual to me is the 4 second gap between moving Eng 1 fuel switch from cutoff to run, and moving Eng 2 fuel switch from cutoff to run.
One would imagine that in this situation, speed of response would have been critical. Why the slow, deliberate \x91reaction\x92?
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July 13, 2025, 19:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921572
That totally clears up any doubt then, because a media interview where claims are made without any substantive evidence at all are clearly to be taken as gospel.
What I found interesting when viewing the Captain's background, was that he was a long-time carer for his aging father, and had called home before the flight to confirm that he would be in contact again once arrived in London. Also that he was highly respected with no history of difficult personal interactions, and had passed all medical clearances.
I'm sure we're all open to actual evidence though.
What I found interesting when viewing the Captain's background, was that he was a long-time carer for his aging father, and had called home before the flight to confirm that he would be in contact again once arrived in London. Also that he was highly respected with no history of difficult personal interactions, and had passed all medical clearances.
I'm sure we're all open to actual evidence though.
It certainly is very puzzling though.
Could it be that the one who cut off the fuel control switches was the one who said \x93why did you cut off the fuel switches\x94, hence the reply \x93I didn\x92t\x94 as the other guy didn\x92t actually do it?
Could that be an attempt to manipulate the CVR?
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July 13, 2025, 19:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921583
Is there? Is there evidence for the scenario that you have endorsed, that the Captain deliberately, intending to crash the airplane, moved the fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then accused the FO of doing that? What is that evidence?
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July 13, 2025, 19:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921587
Not sure how much more evidence you need to start a discussion.
We as operators are trying to put ourselves in that situation and describe likely outcomes based on present experiences. The most likely event is the PM orchestrating this, the Captain in this case. This however is up for debate\x85 the debate we should be having\x85 not APU doors.
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July 13, 2025, 19:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921588
It was working as per the conditions absolutely, but those conditions meant it wasn't available immediately.
I hardly think that the single sole relevant learning from an event such as this, and hence the sole discussion point, is around the trigger of the event. Yes, very relevant, but plenty of other areas to understand further as well (for example how a dual engine failure at such altitude could be adjusted in future process). If you aren't interested in that discussion that's ok of course, but it doesn't make it irrelevant.
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