Posts about: "Fuel (All)" [Posts: 1028 Pages: 52]

The longer it takes before an investigative body (aaib, police) starts looking into both pilot\x92s motives for a possible maliscious intent, the more time there is to erase evidence, or to cover up something.
I am not saying there is any evidence pointing to this, but the clock is ticking.

I find this newly announced probe into the fuel control switches quite surprising. I dont expect anything to be found.

Not a B787 pilot but many hours on its wide body predecessors.

It is conceivable that you could notice hand movement around the throttle quadrant in your peripheral vision (noone's hands are on the thrust levers between V1 and shortly after takeoff), however even if you didn't, you'd immediately notice the loss of performance. The instinctive reaction is big loss of performance -> quick glance across at instruments -> why are they winding back? Also if the fuel control switches were moved to cutoff you'd suddenly get EICAS messages saying the engines were shutdown. So there are immediate clues and it's only a minor head movement to see where the fuel control switches are because they're right down there behind the thrust levers. Then the immediate action for a dual engine failure, which would by then likely be obvious with both sets of instruments showing everything winding back, is "fuel control switches cutoff, then run". There is no significant pause in that action because it's only to reset the electronic engine controls, so the 10 second gap between setting them back to "run" is not explained by the dual engine failure procedure but perhaps by a startle factor. One way or another, your eyes are going to end up checking where those switches are.

Display and Crew Alert (DCA)/EICAS would indeed receive signal about Fuel Cutoff switches (L&R) position and written to EAFR (source:
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...man-Master.PDF )

Having seen it today, fuel control switch to cut off produces a L/R ENG SHUTDOWN EICAS message almost immmediately or ENG SHUTDOWN if both. No aural warning. Generators instantly off line therefore it is likely all FO instruments blanked. Definitely a startle event for the PF in this case.

Surprising from a technical pov, yes, but not from a political pov; it was initiated by India\x92s Directorate General of Civil Aviation. Better for them to imply Boeing's switches were to blame than something closer to home. They must be worried.

Yes - an airline I am familiar with is currently formulating an inspection procedure, (despite every pilot and engineer in contact with an aircraft or simulator having given every fuel switch 'a good tug' today). We're not expecting findings....
But we will be able to say we've inspected.

I've been 'arm chair' flying this scenario and I imagine (for me) the sequence would go something like this.

I'm pilot flying, so my gaze and attention is firmly out the front rotating to the planned takeoff attitude.

Initially and in no particular order:
- I would feel the loss of thrust as a sudden loss of acceleration.
- There would be a significant nose down pitch trim change that I would feel through the yoke.
- There would be lots of audio cues: Changes in engine and air conditioning noises. Lots of click-clacking as electrical relays change state with the loss of electrical power.

My eyes would be drawn inside. I would notice blanking of some of the displays and then look to the EICAS display. My first thought would be probably that we have suffered a major electrical malfunction. There would be lots of messages. I'm not B787 endorsed, but presumably close to the top of the messages would be ENG SHUTDOWN. This message is shown when 'Both engines were shut down by the fuel control switches or the engine fire switches.'

I think I would then look at the fuel control switches and seeing them both in the cutoff position I would say 'why did you cutoff' or stronger words to that effect.

After that it all depends on the response of the other pilot. If they are uncooperative, I would be putting the fuel control switches back to run. All whilst frequently checking and adjusting my flight path.

Reuters, July 14 2025
Amid Air India probe, US FAA, Boeing notify fuel switch locks are safe, document, sources say

WASHINGTON/NEW DELHI/MONTREAL, July 13 (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing (BA.N), have privately issued notifications that the fuel switch locks on Boeing planes are safe, a document seen by Reuters showed and four sources with knowledge of the matter said.

The FAA's Continued Airworthiness Notification on July 11 came after a preliminary report into Air India's Boeing 787-8 crash, which killed 260 people last month, raised questions over engine fuel cutoff switches.

The FAA's notification to Civil Aviation Authorities, seen by Reuters, said: "although the fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models, the FAA does not consider this issue to be an unsafe condition that would warrant an Airworthiness Directive on any Boeing airplane models, including the Model 787."

When asked for comment, the FAA said it did not have anything to add beyond the notification.

Boeing also referred to the FAA notification in a Multi-Operator-Message sent to the airlines in the past few days, which said the planemaker is not recommending any action, two of the sources with direct knowledge said.

When asked for comment, Boeing referred Reuters' questions to the FAA.

The preliminary investigation report into the crash by India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), referred to a 2018 FAA advisory, which recommended, but did not mandate, operators of several Boeing models, including the 787, to inspect the locking feature of the fuel cutoff switches to ensure it could not be moved accidentally.

The report said Air India had said it had not carried out the FAA's suggested inspections as the FAA 2018 advisory was not a mandate. But it also said maintenance records showed that the throttle control module, which includes the fuel switches, was replaced in 2019 and 2023 on the plane involved in the crash.

The report noted "all applicable airworthiness directives and alert service bulletins were complied on the aircraft as well as engines."

ALPA India, which represents Indian pilots at the Montreal-based International Federation of Air Line Pilots\x92 Associations, in a statement on Saturday rejected the presumption of pilot error and called for a "fair, fact-based inquiry."

"The pilots body must now be made part of the probe, at least as observers," ALPA India President Sam Thomas told Reuters on Sunday.

ALPA India, in a letter posted on X, said the preliminary investigation report referred to the 2018 FAA advisory "concerning the fuel control switch gates, which indicates a potential equipment malfunction."

In the flights final moments, one pilot was heard on the cockpit voice recorder asking the other why he cut off the fuel. "The other pilot responded that he did not do so," the report said.

It said fuel switches had almost simultaneously flipped from run to cutoff just after takeoff. The report did not say how the switches could have flipped during the flight.

Two U.S. safety experts said on Saturday they backed ALPA India's request to be observers in the probe, but said the investigation report did not suggest a bias toward pilot error.

John Cox, a pilot and former ALPA U.S. representative, said AAIB's report seemed objective and fair.

Should FCO require action from both pilots?

With all the ‘experts’ swimming about on this thread, I’m very loathe to dip my toes in the water for fear of sharks but…

Having read the vast majority of postings here on this accident, plus the prelim report, I can’t see how anyone could dispute that ‘someone selected both FCS’s to cutoff Immediately after lift off and before gear retraction’. Which, as all have said, begs the question, was it intentional? A brain fart? Or a “I gotta do this now because of a perceived problem”? I can’t think of any other option.

Like all Boeing pilots (current or retired) we’ve all had a quick and dirty education on a system called MCAS - which is of course a 737 Max issue, but…one does wonder.

The accident aircraft had a stabilizer snag on the previous flight. The accident crew would’ve noted it in the log. Is there a chance that, just at lift off the EICAS stab warning/caution reappeared and the PM thought it would be pre-emptive to turn off the stab trim switches? BUT…muscle memory, startle factor, etc, he grabbed the wrong (but more familiar) nearby switch(es) and selected them. In the ensuing maelstrom, the gear was forgotten, the PM desperately tried to put the FCS’s back to RUN, the PF was struggling with a blank panel but it was too late airspeed and altitude were heading south and… they flew directly to the crash site.

Grasping at straws, I toss this hypothetical scenario into the pool - probably because I just can’t get my head around the ‘intentional’ option.

Now…where did I put the shark repellant.

Requiring the throttle lever to be at idle seems like a good idea.

This seems to quite clearly answer the question: (from the prelim report)

That's the Embraer option.

The other option I can imagine is a mechanical stop with an override button, like the landing gear lever. Can't switch the fuel levers off unless you're slow and on the ground, the engine is failed or on fire, or you push override.

bluemic

How\x92s the water in that shark infested sea?

When I read that on the previous sector the aircraft had a stab issue written up I wondered the same thing. It\x92s a fanciful theory but they all are. I\x92m leaning towards the action slip \x93brain fart\x94 although why might always be the subject of speculation. Assuming that the captain did place the fuel control switches to cutoff just after rotation then whatever the explanation will most likely defy logic.

Incidentally this tragic accident wasn\x92t discussed that much in my company even though it operates the 787. I think there\x92s a realisation that it would be pointless speculation until there is the final report. What was noticeable early on is that we\x92re no maintenance actions mandated by Boeing, GE, the FAA etc. Equally nothing from a flight ops perspective.

No! I can think of 2 occasions when there will be only one pilot on the flight deck, in the case of incapacitation there would be no way to shut the engines down.
I would be more inclined to go with a guarded switch so that there are 3 intentional movements to shut an engine down, that's probably still an overkill.

Perhaps thrust lever must be at flight Idle.

The report makes no comment on how the handling pilot determined fuel was cut off, the assumption is he eyeballed the switch.
But, is it feasible that the handling pilot was well aware of fuel issue (loss of thrust, decreasing engine sound, instrumentation) without requiring a scan of the fuel cutoff switches, certainly if the non handling pilot said he hadn\x92t touched the switches and that the handling pilot had his hands full, low level and descending?

The problem with the switches with hinged covers is that they have a single, "safe" position when they're covered. But the fuel switch is safe at CUTOFF when parked, and safe at RUN when the aircraft is operating, so that won't work.

In the last 48 hours I have personally placed four (4) B787 fuel control switches from RUN to CUTOFF.
And as I did so, I had to think of this accident.
I struck me that in my personal way of operating in a cockpit environment, the switching of these fuel control switches is SO deliberate.

Even for me, a regular airline commander. It struck me that I simply can not fathom or believe the scenario wherein a collegue of mine can \x93accidentally\x94, as a slip of mind, place those switches in a position they don\x92t belong.
And I don\x92t buy the failure of one switch, or it\x92s wiring, on the most critical moment in flight.
Let Alone Both At The Same Time.

There are ways to have gates that can be closed in either position (and are perhaps spring-closed), but either they are going to be left open, are a PITA to operate a switch single-handedly, or operating the guard will become part of the muscle memory for operating the switch.

I would agree but what do you imply then?

They are usually such nice sharks.

What is known so far certainly does defy logic but I struggle with the brain fart idea. Firstly (noting that the initial report does not mention positive rate or gear up calls) I can’t see any action cue for the PM to do anything at all at the time the switches were moved to CUTOFF. If some sort of random disorientation action is postulated then you’d have to ask why did it occur at that critical moment and not 30 seconds earlier or 30 seconds later?

Secondly, I can’t be the only one who has operated a control and then perceived an unexpected set of visual, audible or physical responses from something unrelated and instantly thought WTF have I just done followed by an immediate re-check of that action? Although the initial report is notable for what it does not say I can’t see the flat denial of any action is what would be expected given the plethora of cues in that cockpit following the operation of the switches.