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Mrshed
July 18, 2025, 05:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924844 |
Apologies for the delay in responding to your posts. I see that you and others have stepped in, thanks.
I think for various reasons the ADSB data's absolute values are offset by some amount, for possibly all of the parameters. But there should be consistency in the deltas for the timestamp (by receiving station), the raw baro altitude, the Flightradar24 AGL values, and the airspeed. Flightradar24 themselves note that for altitude " ... the data is not above ground level, but it is consistent to itself." 08:08:46.55 ... 575ft ... 21ft ... 184kt 08:08:48.14 ... 600ft ... 46ft ... 179kt 08:08:48.61 ... 600ft ... 46ft ... 177kt 08:08:49.01 ... 600ft ... 46ft ... 177kt 08:08:49.46 ... 625ft ... 71ft ... 177kt 08:08:49.92 ... 625ft ... 71ft ... 174kt 08:08:50.39 ... 625ft ... 71ft ... 174kt 08:08:50.87 ... 625ft ... 71ft ... 172kt From the Preliminary Report's airport cctv picture, the RAT was seen deployed at, by my estimate here , 150ft baro altitude, between 4-7 seconds after rotation. So the ADSB readings have to be prior to that. What's interesting is that the ADSB data covers: - 4-5 seconds of time (let's approximate 4 seconds from 46.55 to 50.55, ignoring the 0.32s for the moment) - 50ft of altitude gain - Declining airspeed from the 1st reading to the last in this final segment from the runway. Big questions in my mind: 1. If the loss of ADSB corresponds to the E1/E2Fuel Cutoff switches being moved from RUN -> CUTOFF, why is the airspeed declining for the prior 4 seconds? 2. In 4 seconds, why is there only 50ft of altitude gain? that seems odd. 3. To account for only 50ft of alt gain, if we assume the 1st reading is on the runway just before rotation, the intermediate +25ft alt gain is at rotation (Nose up but MLG still on the runway), and the last 4 readings are in the air (nose up an additional 25ft), that means that 1 second or less after lift-off, ADSB was lost - this is before E1/E2 FCO RUN-> CUTOFF. It's just weird . 2 users liked this post. Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
Musician
July 18, 2025, 05:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924846 |
Thank you for your reply,
appruser
, and apologies fur cutting most of it:
Big questions in my mind:
1. If the loss of ADSB corresponds to the E1/E2Fuel Cutoff switches being moved from RUN -> CUTOFF, why is the airspeed declining for the prior 4 seconds? 2. In 4 seconds, why is there only 50ft of altitude gain? that seems odd. 3. To account for only 50ft of alt gain, if we assume the 1st reading is on the runway just before rotation, the intermediate +25ft alt gain is at rotation (Nose up but MLG still on the runway), and the last 4 readings are in the air (nose up an additional 25ft), that means that 1 second or less after lift-off, ADSB was lost - this is before E1/E2 FCO RUN-> CUTOFF. It's just weird . 2. Altitudes are rounded, so this could be close to 75 feet gain‐‐or a gain and decline, if the data covers the top of the trajectory. 3. The first reading is definitely in the air, after rotation. FR24 does not report the altitude when the ADS-B data indicates that the aircraft is on the ground, and their data download confirms that. The best bet to establish timing is to use rotation as datum, and then match the altitude/time estimates from the CCTV with position/time from the ADS-B and the estimated ground speed of the aircraft. The fact that the ground speed is declining throughout the data sequence strongly suggests that it begins some time after the point, or at the point, when thrust was lost. And we know that didn't begin to happen until the aircraft was 3 seconds into the air. Last edited by Musician; 18th July 2025 at 05:38 . Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
Senior Pilot
July 20, 2025, 18:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 11925921 |
The full Flight Global article; those here who chose to put PPRuNe and themselves at risk of legal action by their accusations and emotive language may like to reflect and be more accurate in their contributions to this professional pilots forum in future.
US safety chief supports India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau in urging media to avoid ‘premature narratives’ about the 12 June disaster that killed 260 people
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB). “Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.” Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with. In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved. A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal. Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario. ![]() NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground. The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s. The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so. Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing. The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”. Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says. The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”. On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”. “Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.” Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”. The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over. ![]() A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown. Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”. The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”. Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
Senior Pilot
July 24, 2025, 01:01:00 GMT permalink Post: 11927536 |
Further update:
https://www.airindia.com/in/en/newsr...spections.html
PRESS RELEASE
STATEMENT ON COMPLETION OF FUEL CONTROL SWITCH INSPECTIONS JUL 22, 2025 ANNOUNCEMENTS. July 22, 13:20 hours Air India has completed precautionary inspections on the locking mechanism of Fuel Control Switch (FCS) on all Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 aircraft in its fleet. Boeing 737 aircraft are part of the fleet of Air India Express, Air India’s low cost subsidiary. With this, the two airlines have complied with the directives of the DGCA issued on July 14, 2025. In the inspections, no issues were found with the said locking mechanism. Air India had started voluntary inspections on 12 July and completed them within the prescribed time limit set by the DGCA. The same has been communicated to the regulator. Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members.
‘No issues’ found after fuel-switch lock checks on Air India 787 fleet
By David Kaminski-Morrow 23 July 2025 Air India states it has found no issues with the fuel-control switch locking mechanisms on its Boeing 787 fleet, after inspections prompted by the crash at Ahmedabad last month.Preliminary findings from the inquiry had noted a US Federal Aviation Administration safety bulletin from 2018 referring to the possibility that fuel-control switches had been installed on various models – including all 787 variants – with the locking feature disengaged. This lock prevents the switches being inadvertently moved to the ‘cut-off’ position, which would halt the fuel-flow to the aircraft’s engines. Given that the initial inquiry findings point to activation of both the left- and right-hand fuel switches, the status of the lock on the 787 involved in the 12 June accident has been a subject of uncertainty. While investigators have yet to disclose details of the switch locks on the crashed aircraft, Air India has found “no issues” with the mechanism on remaining 787s – or the Boeing 737s of Air India Express – after completing precautionary inspections. This reduces – although does not eliminate – the probability of inadvertent activation, as outlined in the FAA bulletin, given that it would require a highly-unusual slip on the only aircraft with a faulty switch. The inspections mean the two carriers have complied with an Indian DGCA regulatory directive issued on 14 July. “Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members,” says the airline. ![]() Source: AirTeamImages Air India initiated checks on its 787s and 737s after investigators highlighted a potential fuel-switch lock issue The Federation of Indian Pilots has rejected the possibility of the crew’s involvement, insisting that transitioning both switches sequentially to the ‘cut-off’ position within 1s – as the inquiry states – would be “humanly impossible”. “Attributing such a catastrophic engine shutdown sequence to deliberate pilot action, while ignoring manufacturer-documented vulnerabilities, is unwarranted and unjust in the absence of incontrovertible evidence,” said the federation’s president, CS Randhawa, in a 16 July communication to the Indian ministry of civil aviation. It argues that a potential software fault or sensor anomaly could “simulate pilot action” and trigger an automated engine shutdown. The federation refers to the 787’s thrust-control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) system, which is designed to prevent uncommanded high-thrust activation while on the ground by reducing engine power. Although the federation uses an All Nippon Airways 787’s dual-engine shutdown after touchdown at Osaka to justify its concerns, the protective system is designed to activate only on the ground, under specific circumstances, with checks on air-ground status, engine speed and thrust-lever position. The ANA aircraft was also fitted with Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines, while the Air India 787 had GE Aerospace GEnx-1B powerplants. Boeing discovered a logic error in the GEnx-1B version of the TCMA system prior to the ANA occurrence, mentioned in an FAA document of September 2016. This stated that Boeing planned to address the error – limited to a “certain single failure” – by the end of 2018, implementing it into production aircraft and issuing retrofit instructions. While the Federation of Indian Pilots has offered little direct evidence that a software issue might have contributed to the Ahmedabad crash, it says the inquiry “must include all plausible failure paths” and avoid “premature attribution of motive or intent” until system malfunctions – including problems with the fuel-control switch locks – are “conclusively ruled out”. Last edited by Senior Pilot; 24th July 2025 at 01:04 . Reason: URLs again Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
Pilot DAR
July 25, 2025, 04:24:00 GMT permalink Post: 11928035 |
A report of the FAA Administrator saying that the fuel cutoff switches were not defective:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/faa-ai...rash-1.7593295
The head of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said on Thursday the fatal crash last month of an Air India Boeing 787 jet does not appear to have been caused by a mechanical issue or inadvertent movement of the fuel control unit or switches.
"We can say with a high level of confidence is it doesn't appear to be a mechanical issue with the Boeing fuel control unit," Bryan Bedford, the FAA's administrator, told reporters on the sidelines of an air show in Wisconsin. He said FAA employees had taken the units out, tested them and had inspectors get on aircraft and review them. "We feel very comfortable that this isn't an issue with inadvertent manipulation of fuel control," he said. The probe into the Air India crash, which killed 241 of the 242 people on board and 19 on the ground, is focused on the fuel control switches of the Boeing 787 jetliner. Boeing and Air India did not immediately comment. The switches control fuel flow to aircraft engines, allowing pilots to start or shut them down on the ground, or manually intervene during in-flight engine failures. Air India said on Tuesday it has completed precautionary inspections of the fuel control switch locking mechanism on all 787 and 737 aircraft, with no issues detected. A preliminary report from India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau earlier this month found the switches had almost simultaneously flipped from "run" to "cutoff" shortly after takeoff, causing the engines to lose power. Reuters reported last week, citing a source, that the cockpit recording on the Air India flight from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick suggested the captain cut fuel to the engines. Earlier this month, the FAA and Boeing privately issued notifications that the fuel switch locks on Boeing planes were safe. Last edited by Senior Pilot; 25th July 2025 at 04:31 . Reason: Add quote Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
T28B
July 25, 2025, 14:53:00 GMT permalink Post: 11928262 |
https://aviationweek.com/air-transpo...N1000041876164
From the article by Guy Norris of Aviation Week... Air India 787 Crash Being Investigated As ‘Criminal Act,’ Says Safety Expert Guy Norris July 23, 2025
LAS VEGAS—India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is now looking into the June 12 crash of an Air India
Boeing
787-8 as an intentional act, says
veteran safety consultant and former NTSB investigator Greg Feith
. The AAIB’s preliminary report on July 12 revealed that fuel cutoff switches for the 787’s two GE Aerospace GEnx-1B engines were transitioned from “run” to “cutoff” around three seconds after takeoff from Ahmedabad Airport. Although both fuel switches were turned back on within a further 14 sec., the aircraft was too low to recover and impacted trees and buildings, killing 241 of 242 occupants on the 787 and 19 on the ground.The AAIB has criticized subsequent western media reports as “irresponsible” for indicating the fuel cutoff switches were likely deliberately moved by one of the pilots.
However, Feith says: “It has become very apparent, especially now with information I know and what's come out about the cockpit voice recorder—where the question is heard ‘why did you cut off the fuel?’—[that] somebody had to have seen that action to make that statement. You just wouldn’t have a dual-engine failure.” Speaking at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Aviation forum here in Las Vegas, Feith says: “Something had to prompt that type of comment. Now we get into the psychology part of it, and that's really where this investigation is going to go. “And oh, by the way, it's no longer an accident. It's investigated as a criminal event, just like EgyptAir, just like Germanwings, just like SilkAir. These are criminal events—intentional acts,” he adds, referring to three fatal crashes deemed to have been deliberately caused which occurred in 1999, 2015 and 1997 respectively. Feith, who participated in the investigation into the SilkAir crash—where a Boeing 737-300 traveling from Jakarta to Singapore was downed—says other theories continue to persist in the face of contradictory evidence provided by the AAIB. “To this day, people are still talking about this as a dual-engine failure, despite the fact that the AAIB came out with a preliminary report which gave some initial findings. They said at this stage of the investigation, there are no recommended actions for the 787-8 or the engines. They just exonerated the airplane. They just exonerated the engines.” “The junior investigators and the trolls are still making a big deal about engine failure, software issues, FADEC problems. They're not part of the process,” Feith continues. The AAIB “had a team of subject matter experts dissecting all of this in that 30-day period. You think they didn't look at that? It makes no logical sense,” he adds. “The fact is that now we have people all spooled up looking at the wrong thing instead of looking at, 'is this an isolated problem or a systemic event?' It's the first major accident for a brand-new airplane [type]. This is the kind of controversy that gets stirred up and distracts us from really looking at where we need to be and what we need to be doing to enhance aviation safety,” Feith says. Referencing the SilkAir accident, he says: “I've been down this road. I spent two years working on SilkAir in Palembang, Sumatra. I took a team of investigators over with me from Boeing and the engine manufacturer, the FAA and a variety of others, and we determined in concert with their National Transportation Safety Committee, that this was an intentional act.” Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
fdr
August 06, 2025, 15:02:00 GMT permalink Post: 11934214 |
Our training assumes that we always act in the manner that we trained, and that is an optimistic view of life. A review of most serious incidents and accidents leaves an impression that we are all subject to error and action slips. It is also quite true that in more events, the human is the variable that is able to adapt due to the ability to apply heuristics and occasionally intuitive responses to a condition that is outside of their training. Those are the saves, and they tend to be overlooked in our rush for judgement and certainty, and to have some level of assurance that an event cannot occur to us. The defence against error is monitoring system performance, to confirm that when we turn off a say, fuel pumps on an A340-300 to balance fuel (needless action, but sometimes eyepleasing is assumed to be better than leaving stuff alone) and accidentally turn off the HYD pumps, leading to a wild ride, our deliberate actions and cross checking of our movement of any switch, lever, coffee cup etc., is followed by the correct response. All of that is fine, until we do not have time to correct an accidental movement of a system control. FCS are considered to be "irreversible" due to the time to correct an action, and the criticality of the response to the system change, and so we have great checklists and design to ensure that procedurally we check before actioning a switch. That kind of works for engine failure and fire checklists, it gives little comfort to the case of selecting the gear up instead of flaps up, etc., and here is my concern with our assumption of intent from evidence of action. It may well be that the investigation provides irrefutable and overwhelming proof that the FCS were placed to cutoff. That is looking likely. That in itself does not give the reasoning as to why that occurred. Collectively we have been flicking the wrong switches (A340 wild rides) and levers, (DC8 etc.,) with lousy outcomes, for quite some time, presumably that is why we take inordinate efforts to check/verify actioning of irreverible systems, and yet, we also misplace keys, put wallets into fridges, etc as we are human. It is one thing to be human, most (not all of us) are, but it is another to understand what the intent of the person involved was, and that means we are a long way from assuming malfeasance or deliberate aforethought. I do a fair amount of flight testing, and that involves some odd activity, and I don't trust myself to not make slips or errors, to the extent that for one aircraft, I carry a tennis ball that fits neatly over the end of the emergency shutdown handle of the engines that I am not intending to shutdown and subsequetly relight. I don't expect that alone stops making an error, it is simply a procedural step and an opportunity to differentiate between systems that may be worthwhile. We have had similar guards on FCS in the past, due to congnitive lapses leading to red faces, the P3 fuel and ignition switches being an elegant example. The intent of a guard that takes deliberate action is to increase the time available to comprehend what is about to occur, just as putting a post-it note over the LEM jettison is not a bad idea for the late senator of Colorado to have done on Apollo 13. Just because something happened, doesn't give the reason why, and without that, there can be no "mens rea". It is appropriate to work to understand the why, that is the whole intent of Annex 13. 16 users liked this post. Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
tdracer
August 06, 2025, 19:01:00 GMT permalink Post: 11934341 |
T
I do a fair amount of flight testing, and that involves some odd activity, and I don't trust myself to not make slips or errors, to the extent that for one aircraft, I carry a tennis ball that fits neatly over the end of the emergency shutdown handle of the engines that I am not intending to shutdown and subsequetly relight. But even Flight Test pilots can have a brain fart. Didn't happen to me, but it did happen to one of my best friends. They were doing in-flight start testing of the 757/RB211-535 (and the Rolls engine is a bit notorious for being a fickle in-flight starter). They were doing a corner point condition when the test engine went into a hot start. One of the observers said something like 'it's gone hot, shut it down'. The left seat pilot calmly reached down and shutdown the good engine ![]() I was told the Flight Test pilot in question was immediately demoted from "Experimental Flight Test" to "Production Flight Test" (where they do routine shakedown flights of new production aircraft prior to delivery). 5 users liked this post. Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
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