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C2H5OH
2025-06-15T20:06:00 permalink Post: 11902782 |
As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level.
So I wouldn't vouch for the FADECs if there was catastrophic problem with the power distribution in the aircraft. 1 user liked this post. |
Alty7x7
2025-06-15T20:23:00 permalink Post: 11902791 |
Engine failure with electrical power loss
We agree that there was a lack of thrust. Possibly caused by a dual engine failure. But the sharpest frames in the video do NOT show the RAT and this is counter evidence to the RAT theory. If there were substantial technical failures who knows what sounds could be generated. I find the evidence weak at best. And we immediately get into a chicken-egg problem: did some power issue of unknown nature cause an engine failure or did a dual engine failure occur, resulting in a power loss? Both are extremely unlikely and need to be backed by quality evidence. The video is not it, in my opinion. I don't know the APU intake mechanism and whether it could open after the impact.
Tdracer earlier confirmed that an airplane electrical power loss would allow engines to keep running , because 1) engines are fully-capable of suction feed operation in takeoff envelope (if boost pumps lost), and 2) the EECs are powered by their own PMAs when running and to substantially below idle (I recall roughly 10% N2). Airplane powers the EEC for ground starts, prior to PMA coming online, and as backup to the PMA after that. Related: Engine igniters are powered by the aircraft. So theoretical full loss of aircraft power would disable Autorelight upon a flameout. Ignitors typically don't make the cut for most-essential battery-only loads because it would also take an engine flameout, and the airplane past V1 in ground roll can fly fine on one engine that can achieve takeoff thrust. Autorelight is relevant - if there was a single-engine failure post V1, autorelight will attempt to relight the engine, so there is no need for a pilot to try to cycle the fuel switch to reset the EEC (potentially grabbing the wrong one), or to otherwise intervene. In such a circumstance, they need to trust their training. I've heard accounts that the most likely pilot instinct in such a situation would be to push the throttle(s) forward. Finally - there was talk earlier about accidentally cutting the fuel switches - and it was duly noted that they have to be pulled out over the detent, so very unlikely. The same cutoff effect could be achieved with the engine fire handle(s), right behind the fuel switches on the pedestal - though they are an upward pull, so also not subject to inadvertent or accidental engagement. |
adfad
2025-06-15T21:51:00 permalink Post: 11902879 |
It is similar to the 248-day continuous power software bug on the 787. In both cases a counter in the software would overflow after an amount of time that would be proportional to something like the number of seconds, milliseconds or other unit.
The 248 day bug would cause the PCU to trigger ALL 4 AC generator control units to shut down. The fact that this is even possible in software alone is remarkable and should make any engineer concerned. The fact that this was only fixed in software with no redundant physical system (e.g. 1 or more AC units being independent of this system) is concerning. The fact that Boeing had a second software overflow error causing the 51 day directive should really have everyone discussing software as a possible cause for this crash. People may say that the engine driven pumps / suction feed / gravity feed would continue to power the engines but my understanding is the aircraft attitude and high fuel flow at takeoff could potentially mean less thrust than was needed if all 4 AC generators disconnected and stopped all AC fuel pumps during rotation. 3 users liked this post. |
Captain Fishy
2025-06-15T21:56:00 permalink Post: 11902882 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬 A loss of lift AND thrust at this critical juncture could have had caused this awful disaster. I think the data recorders have already revealed the cause but If it's this, then I don't think we will hear much anytime soon. |
F-flyer
2025-06-15T23:39:00 permalink Post: 11902970 |
Water ingress into the E/E bay is a serious issue. The B744 had this issue in the past causing serious problems, one of which was fortunate to not lead to a loss of the aircraft, on a B744F. The B744 pax aircraft had a number of water problems related to the toilets and the galley. The forward galley on the B742/3s had many issues.
Any large aircraft going through maintenance is interesting to observe the extent of corrosion that occurs near toilets and galleys, and from water lines. Water accumulations on the B744 came to light at rotate, and took out a lot of electrical services. My suspicion is some cause such as this will come to light shortly. Both of the E/E bays contain stuff that is nice to keep dry and operating, and prior events have shown that multiple system failures can and have occurred when a flood is added to all the black boxes sitting innocently on their racks. The ADs are not necessarily directly related to the specific cause, they highlight the potential for water damage and that bad stuff happens. In two cases I investigated, the event occurred at rotate. Both were B744's one pax, one F. Compound, unrelated system failures at rotate? Single cause? Water in the E/E bay. "System malfunctions Between 0846 and 0852, 4 after passing FL 100 and when the aircraft was turning onto an extended left downwind leg for runway 01 Right (01R), the EICAS, flight displays and automated systems showed faults of numerous electrical and other aircraft systems, including: \x95 AC buses 1, 2 and 3 not powered \x95 autothrottle disconnected \x95 autopilot disengaged \x95 some fuel pumps not operating \x95 weather radar not operating \x95 automatic cabin air conditioning and pressurisation system not operating \x95 right (FO\x92s) displays blanked \x95 between three and five pages of messages on the EICAS display \x95 lower EICAS display blanked. The CSM contacted the flight crew and advised that the cabin lighting had failed." "Origin of Generator Control Unit (GCU) faults Post-incident examination of the GCUs revealed corrosion of the internal circuit boards in all three of the GCUs that shut down. Analysis of the corrosion materials observed in GCU 3 showed evidence of long-term exposure to water, including evidence of acids and carbohydrates that are present in beverages such as coffee, fruit juice and soft drinks. Those findings indicated a fluid source originating from the aircraft\x92s galley drains or from spilt liquids in the cabin, and also suggested that liquid ingress had been occurring over an unknown, but extended period of time." https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/defaul.../ao2008003.pdf This link to the report includes diagrams of where the 747 forward galley was located, directly above the Main Equipment Centre and the E1/E2 racks. The phtographs show how ineffective the dripshield was in protecting the electrical equipment and the extent of corrosion and damage. The aircraft was 17 years old at the time of the incident and had completed a C-check approximately three months before the incident. As FDR notes, this issue seems to have carried over to the 787-8 with Airworthiness Directive AD 2016-14-04 ( https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExte...A0058AF6B.0001 ) "We are issuing this AD 2016-14-04 to prevent a water leak from an improperly installed potable water system coupling, or main cabin water source, which could cause the equipment in the EE bays to become wet, resulting in an electrical short and potential loss of system functions essential for safe flight" AD 2016-14-04 mirrors precisely what occurred to the Qantas 747 on 7 January 2008. It is possible something similar may have occurred on take-off of AI171, with water causing the equipment in the EE bays to become wet resulting in electrical short and potential loss of system functions 6 users liked this post. |
mechpowi
2025-06-16T06:11:00 permalink Post: 11903125 |
Without any 787 knowledge, I would assume two discreet signals from respective Engine Fuel Switch to each FADEC channel, possibly with other redundancies. Or other solution that is at least as robust. |
bakutteh
2025-06-16T06:41:00 permalink Post: 11903143 |
Fuel Cavitation/Vapour block?
If decrease in thrust not by transition to climb thrust due to early inadvertent flap retraction and pilot action on fuel control switches from accomplishing dual engine failure memory items, then fuel cavitation /fuel fumes lock may be a cause. Just saying.
1 user liked this post. |
lighttwin2
2025-06-16T08:51:00 permalink Post: 11903270 |
If TCMA cut fuel flow while still on the runway the aircraft would have been decelerating from the moment it lifted off, which is not what the ADS-B data indicates. The kinetic energy in the rotating parts of the engine wouldn't add much speed to the aircraft as the engines run down with no more energy being added via fuel.
In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread: If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground. As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems. Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not). Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact. In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms. In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known. Thank you to the mods for an excellent job. 3 users liked this post. |
Pinkman
2025-06-16T09:17:00 permalink Post: 11903301 |
With the information we have accumulated so far, is the following a possible scenario? Normal departure up to VR, then a total electrical failure at lift off (possibly as the ground/air logic switches to air.) All hydraulics lost and cabin lights flicker plus RAT deploys. All fuel boost pumps fail so engines only have suction feed. Engines roll back. The aircraft seems to me to have gone too far to have suffered a total loss of thrust at lift off. There must have been some energy being provided by the engines? Such a system failure "can't happen", of course but nothing is impossible!
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pampel
2025-06-16T09:39:00 permalink Post: 11903323 |
I'm not convinced the RAT is deployed. If it has deployed it could've been a last ditch effort for the crew to bring the fuel control switches from RUN to CUTOFF & back to RUN believing they've had a dual engine failure. This would account for the RAT if it did deploy.
There just isn't enough time for the RAT to be deployed as a result of any action by the crew, IMHO. And to demonstrate how long 7 seconds is - that's enough to say 20 words, assuming no interruptions . 1 user liked this post. |
Compton3fox
2025-06-16T09:41:00 permalink Post: 11903328 |
The PF could've been task focused flying manually, following the FD's and not expecting the sinking feeling of losing the lift. The PM has made the mistake without knowing. ie. he/she has selected the flaps all the way to UP believing that the gear was now retracting. Both pilots now think the gear is retracting, they have full thrust but are sinking into the ground. "Professional crews" like Air France for eg. have made way worse decisions. Slats are extended because they are the last to retract. I'm not convinced the RAT is deployed. If it has deployed it could've been a last ditch effort for the crew to bring the fuel control switches from RUN to CUTOFF & back to RUN believing they've had a dual engine failure. This would account for the RAT if it did deploy. The APU inlet door could've been open as well because they were carrying out an APU to Pack takeoff.
Once the aircraft is airborne and the
weight-on-wheels (WOW) switches indicate air mode
, the main gear
bogies automatically tilt to the neutral position
before retraction. Also when the flaps passed the last takeoff position on the quadrant, the Landing gear configuration warning horn would've sounded further confusing the pilots.
The RAT was almost certainly deployed. 4 different sources. The Flaps were not retracted. Visible at the accident site plus many other sources agreeing they were indeed down. APU will autostart when all engine power is lost. Potentially explaining why the inlet door was open or partially open at the accident site. Mentioned in several previous posts On a 787-8, the main bogies tilt as the 1st action of the gear retract sequence. As stated in previous posts. I don't think this happens unless gear is selected up. So the conclusion was, gear was selected up. One caveat, IIRC, there was some discussion around a failure could have caused the bogies to tilt without Gear up being selected but I don't recall the outcome. As for the Air France remark, un-necessary IMHO. Let's respect the crews please. 5 users liked this post. |
tdracer
2025-06-12T22:02:00 permalink Post: 11903414 |
Air India Ahmedabad accident 12th June 2025 Part 2
OK, I promised some informed speculation when I got back, so here goes:
Disclaimer: never worked the 787, so my detailed knowledge is a bit lacking. First off, this is perplexing - especially if the RAT was deployed. There is no 'simple' explanation that I can come up with. GEnx-1B engines have been exceptionally reliable, and the GE carbon composite fan blades are very robust and resistant to bird strike damage (about 15 years after the GE90 entry into service, I remember a GE boast that no GE90 (carbon composite) fan blades had needed to be scrapped due to damage (birdstrike, FOD, etc. - now that was roughly another 15 years ago, so is probably no longer true, but it shows just how robust the carbon composite blades are - far better than the more conventional titanium fan blades). Not saying it wasn't somehow birdstrike related, just that is very unlikely (then again, all the other explanations I can come up with are also very unlikely ![]() Using improper temp when calculating TO performance - after some near misses, Boeing added logic that cross-compares multiple total temp probes - aircraft TAT (I think the 787 uses a single, dual element probe for aircraft TAT, but stand to be corrected) and the temp measured by the engine inlet probes - and puts up a message if they disagree by more than a few degree tolerance - so very, very unlikely. N1 power setting is somewhat less prone to measurement and power setting errors than EPR (N1 is a much simpler measurement than Rolls EPR) - although even with EPR, problems on both engines at the same time is almost unheard of. The Auto Thrust (autothrottle) function 'falls asleep' at 60 knots - and doesn't unlock until one of several things happens - 250 knots, a set altitude AGL is exceeded (I'm thinking 3,000 ft. but the memory is fuzzy), thrust levers are moved more than a couple of degrees, or the mode select is changed (memory says that last one is inhibited below 400 ft. AGL). So an Auto Thrust malfunction is also extremely unlikely. Further, a premature thrust lever retard would not explain a RAT deployment. TO does seem to be very late in the takeoff role - even with a big derate, you still must accelerate fast enough to reach V1 with enough runway to stop - so there is still considerable margin if both engines are operating normally. That makes me wonder if they had the correct TO power setting - but I'm at a loss to explain how they could have fouled that up with all the protections that the 787 puts on that. If one engine did fail after V1, it's conceivable that they shut down the wrong engine - but since this happened literally seconds after takeoff, it begs the question why they would be in a big hurry to shut down the engine. Short of an engine fire, there is nothing about an engine failure that requires quick action to shut it down - no evidence of an engine fire, and even with an engine fire, you normally have minutes to take action - not seconds. The one thing I keep thinking about is someone placing both fuel switches to cutoff immediately after TO. Yes, it's happened before (twice - 767s in the early 1980s), but the root causes of that mistake are understood and have been corrected. Hard to explain how it could happen (unless, God forbid, it was intentional). 13 users liked this post. |
tdracer
2025-06-13T02:18:00 permalink Post: 11903415 |
Determined to be an ergonomics problem with the switch layout in the flightdeck. Early 767s (JT9D and CF6-80A) had a supervisory "EEC" (Electronic Engine Control - Boeing still uses "EEC" to identify what most people call the FADEC on modern engines). The procedure if an EEC 'failed' was to switch both EECs off (to prevent excessive throttle stagger - unlike FADEC, the engine could operate just fine with a supervisory EEC failed). Problem was that the EEC ON/OFF switch was located on the aisle stand - right above the fuel cutoff switches. Turned out 'muscle memory' was when the pilot reached down there, it was usually to turn the fuel ON or OFF - which is what they did. Fortunately realizing what he'd done wrong, the pilot quickly restored the switches to RUN and both engines recovered. And yes, they continued on to their destination (RAT was still deployed since there is no way to retract it in-flight). Previous event was with JT9D engines (United IIRC). In that case, only one engine recovered (second engine went into an unrecoverable stall), they simply came back around and did a single engine landing. Realizing the ergonomic issue, the EECs were relocated to the pilot's overhead (retrofit by AD). To the best of my knowledge, there hasn't been a repeat of an inadvertent dual engine shutdown since the EEC switches were relocated. It's also very difficult to 'accidentally' move the switches as there is a locking detent - the switch must be pulled out slightly before it can be moved to CUTOFF. 3 users liked this post. |
fdr
2025-06-13T22:13:00 permalink Post: 11903712 |
At this stage, at least two scenarios seem highly plausible:
1. Technical issue Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate. There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly. Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.
2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode. There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions. If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding. Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit. If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough. On item 2, the video shows no asymmetry at any time, so there is only a symmetric failure of the engines possible. Back on a B747 classic, you could chop all 4 engines at the same time with one hand, on a B737, also, not so much on a B777 or B787. I would doubt that anyone used two hands to cut the fuel at screen height. Note, there was a B744 that lost one engine in cruise when a clip board fell off the coaming. Didn't happen twice, and it only happened to one engine.
Yes indeed, the moment they pulled the gear lever, as we see the gear begin the retraction process, and then suddenly stop. Almost as if they suddenly lost power.
We can see the landing gear retraction process begin. We see the bogies tilted in the second video. We can hear the RAT. We can see the RAT. We can see the flaps extended in the video and at the crash site. There isn't actually a single piece of evidence the flaps were raised, it's just a conclusion people jumped too before evidence began to emerge. The crazy thing is, when the report comes out and there is no mention of flaps none of the people who have been pushing the flap theory will self reflect or learn anything. They'll think those of us who didn't buy into it were just lucky, rather than it being down to use of fairly simple critical thinking. Neila83 is correct, the gear tilt pre retraction is rear wheels low, and at the commencement of the selection of the retraction cycle (generally), There is enough in the way of anomalies here to end up with regulatory action, and airlines themselves should/will be starting to pore over their systems and decide if they are comfortable with the airworthiness of the aircraft at this moment. A latent single point of failure is not a comfortable place to be. Inhibiting TCMA might be a good interim option, that system could have been negated by having the ATR ARM switches....(Both)... ARM deferred to the before takeoff checks. The EAFR recovery should result in action within the next 24-48 hours. Boeing needs to be getting their tiger teams warmed up, they can ill afford to have a latent system fault discovered that is not immediately responded to, and the general corporate response of "blame the pilots" is not likely to win any future orders. I think we are about to have some really busy days for the OEM. Not sure that Neila83 is that far off the mark at all. |
wonkazoo
2025-06-14T07:44:00 permalink Post: 11903717 |
Sometimes complex sequences can have very simple causalities. A lot of complex speculation in this thread so far focused on highly technical things. Yet the basic fundamentals of powered flight have not changed (despite our attempts to do so) over the past 100 years.
Fact 1: The airplane stopped going up because it lacked excess thrust necessary to sustain the climb, and; Fact 2: The airplane’s airspeed decreased constantly because they were trying to maintain either altitude or the climb, but lacked the thrust to do so, and; Fact 3: If they had prematurely raised the flaps, the climb rate would have decreased/possibly turned negative, but the airplane would have continued to accelerate. So where did the thrust go? Fact 4: There is no adverse yaw seen in any of the videos, so wherever it went the loss of thrust occurred (nearly) simultaneously in both engines. Fact 5: The only way to stop a jet engine from thrusting (sorry) is by either blowing it up or removing the fuel supply. If it blows up- like from birds trying to become a fuel source, there will be evidence. (See Jeju Air for a good example.) Fact 6: There is (so far) no evidence of either engine blowing up. (I’m deliberately using highly technical terms here…) Fact 7: There is unmistakably clear audible evidence of the RAT being deployed on the raw video from the right rear quarter of the airplane. Near supersonic propellor blades are an unmistakable sound- the RAT was definitively deployed no matter how much people want to argue to the contrary. Fact 8: In the same video there is silence from the engines when they should be thundering at full (or nearly full) power. (Yes, I know that isn’t a thing- I am a simple man alas.) Thus the only possible conclusions are (cringes as he waits for fdr to rip him a new ah):
There are a very finite number of possibilities to that answer- and I do have my suspicions, but I lack the qualification to opine on that one. I’ll leave the rest to the more experienced folk here. Warm regards- dce 5 users liked this post. |
KSINGH
2025-06-14T08:43:00 permalink Post: 11903718 |
I’m not a 787 driver so for fear of looking dumb in front of those that are this still confuses me. Even IF they’ve mis-selected the flap setting (I still don’t think it’s been cemented on here that there is in fact a FMS/flap setting disagreement warning but i believe there is), had the wrong de-rated take off settings, selected flaps instead of gear up the 787 with massive high bypass engines, FBW and full envelope protections surely cannot let itself be put in such a low energy/high alpha regime as we saw in the videos IF it has both fans functioning normally, surely? the pilots may have messed up royally and numerous times so those holes lined up but the plane is the final block in the chain and a 21st century all digital entirely clean sheet design was sold as being immune to such catastrophic outcomes from a few minor (consequential yes) and fairly common errors- aren’t all the protections and our procedures designed after decades of mistakes? im having a hard time squaring how a fully functioning modern bird like this could allow for this outcome and almost whatever the pilots did outside of unbelievable inputs and the pilots are are a bit of a red herring IMO ![]() Dale Winsley @Winsleydale No. The LE slats are deployed therefore the flaps are as well. This is an automatic linkage. The flaps are set at Take-Off. Hard to see from the angle but they are...if slats are out (easy to see) then flaps are set. Looks like Flaps 5. Also, the 787 has the highest Thrust-to-Weight ratio of any airliner on Earth. The change in Alpha and lift is a trifling matter for it, at these settings (1-5). It will fly out of it easily, even at that density altitude. The attitude change is - in the circumstances I describe, consistent with a massive power loss (both sides). I believe based on probability that simultaneous mechanical failure is not the cause. Fuel contamination or starvation is likewise unlikely based on the 787 fuel system. The common element is the FADEC/Autothrottle/TOGO. However, each engine FADEC is dual redundant two channels. So any such common failure must happen further upstream. From a design perspective, that would be unthinkable. But this is Boeing. Given what I can see with my own eyes, I believe the flap issue is a non-starter. Also, re the landing gear: Clearly the Positive Rate challenge would be met based on normal rotation and fly-off at V2. But since we know the flaps were set correctly, that rules out an "oopsie" moment. Just as likely there was at the challenge moment an indication that something was amiss, and the Gear Up call was not made. They see both N1s unwinding and it takes a second to get past the WFT factor. They cross-check and see the airspeed also unwinding. Then they unload the Alpha and pitch to gear down Vy. And they had another 6 seconds. Whatever it was, it was not a flap, mechanical or fuel issue. We will know soon enough. But this is Boeing. My gut says "software". All 787s worldwide need to be grounded, now. 6:10 AM \xb7 Jun 14, 2025 \xb7 53.8K Views |
Kraftstoffvondesibel
2025-06-14T16:39:00 permalink Post: 11903679 |
This is a screen shot taken from the Video thats posted on the BBC Verify website, that they have verified as authentic.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c626y121rxxo I still can't see a RAT deployed. However, the rat is small, and the artifacts are plentiful. Small sensor, compressed video, compressed upload, zoom, it is in short an awful source. However, the RAT is a much better noisemaker, and the audio signature is much more obvious than it’s visual appearance in this case, and though the recording isn’t fantastic quality, there was more than enough information there to objectively conclude the RAT is out. And that is my professional, on the weekend, opinion. I want to ask a pretty frank question for all of you, and I hope it is ok, from an audio specialist non-pilot: Provided the engines spooled down. Provided the RAT is out. (There are no explosions, no bird strikes.) Isn’t software and previous electrical failures a red herring too?Would anything but a complete fuel shut off lead to this result? That still leaves everything from the Fate is the Hunter plot, to Airbus A350 center consoles and Alaska 2059 open as root causes. 2 users liked this post. |
tdracer
2025-06-14T20:48:00 permalink Post: 11903420 |
Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods
![]() "Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight. Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring). As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level. Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC). The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight. Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident: 1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines or 2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated. I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios. In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive. 7 users liked this post. |
tdracer
2025-06-14T23:05:00 permalink Post: 11903421 |
I am curious to learn what power source drives the high-pressure fuel pumps in the engine. If there is such a thing, I suppose there would.
Gearbox? This is at odds with a possible cascading electric failure that (might have) caused a loss of engine fuel feed. To my understanding on my ancient plane and engine design, the HP pumps that feed the nozzles are driven mechanically, which enables gravity feeding among other scenarios, but also assures the fuel supply is independent of whatever happens upstream of the nacelle. Except for LP/fire shut-off cocks. Engine driven fuel pump failures are very rare, but have happened (usually with some 'precursor' symptoms that were ignored or mis-diagnosed by maintenance). It would be unheard of for engine driven fuel pumps to fail on both engines on the same flight. As I've repeatedly posted, even a 100% aircraft power failure would not explain both engines quitting, at least without several other existing faults. Again, never say never, but you can only combine so many 10-9 events before it becomes ridiculous... TCMA doesn't know what V1 is - it's active whenever the air/ground logic says the aircraft is on-ground. 4 users liked this post. |
tdracer
2025-06-15T04:04:00 permalink Post: 11903423 |
I don't think this test is ever done during normal operations or maintenance (at least not on purpose) as it is very abusive to the engine driven fuel pump - the sort of cavitation that this causes rapidly erodes the pumping surfaces (it's SOP to replace the engine driven fuel pump after such a test). 1 user liked this post. |
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