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Natterjak
June 14, 2025, 09:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901298 |
If this is correct, does it point more towards the engines having been erroneously shut down earlier, rather than a fuel starvation or contamination issue?
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MaybeItIs
June 14, 2025, 12:04:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901413 |
My next question, again I believe not discussed, is what do the 787 Fuel Cutoff switches actually do? Obviously, they cut off the fuel supplies to the engines - pretty important in engine fire and other scenarios, but goes without saying. The real question is, what do they activate (or deactivate)? I'm assuming a simple solenoid valve, which is open when powered and closed when unpowered, but of course, there will (certainly) be Electro-Mechanical or Solid-State (Electronic) relays between the switches and the (solenoid valves).
I guess the next obvious question is, is there anything else that can turn off those Fuel Cutoff Valves - a computer condition for example. I'm assuming not, but I think it needs to be considered. Taking each switch individually, next, since this is part of an electrical circuit, and of necessity must include Electrical Relays, there is certainly at least one and in all probability two electric Power Sources involved in this circuit. One supply which passes through the switch to activate the relay, and, I'm assuming, a second, higher current and probably higher voltage supply which drives the (solenoid?) valve. As I see it, interrupting either supply will have the same effect - if the system is wired in the Positive-Postive sense, meaning a current through the switch causes the relay to pass a current through the (solenoid). If either of these supplies is cut, the Fuel Shutoffs will shut off the fuel. So, the question is, where do these supplies come from, and under what circumstances could they be cut off? Sure, it looks to some (myself included) like a near simultaneous cutoff of both engines, but that doesn't have to have been caused by either of the pilots. I know there is huge redundancy built into the 787 Electrical Systems, but some of the evidence is suggesting that there was something not right with the plane's electrical system. I'm also fairly sure that there will be parts and places where certain faults can take the system down, despite the redundancy. I can't say where, but it's very difficult to design a perfect system, especially where there has to be transfers between multiple potential supplies and single actuators, motors or valves. Having spent years repairing electrical and electronic systems, I know that the most difficult of all electrical faults are the intermittent ones. And I suspect that this is at the root of this crash. An intermittent or faulty AOA sensor has "caused" (provoked) multiple famous crashes... Can't find the one I'm looking for (pre-1980, I think) as the Max AOA issues dominate. I can cite a very personal example, which involved the electrical supply to my house. I had several computers running 24x365 so of course, ran them off a UPS, which turned out to be a very good thing. I started to notice that at certain times, the UPS would activate - it would cut in and take over the computer loads, its alarm would go off to indicate a power fault. But the power was still on! This carried on for weeks and I initially blamed the UPS. Then, I noticed that it only happened on very hot afternoons... Long story short, the fault was caused by an electrical linesman, probably 30 years earlier, failing to tighten up a joint clamp on the phase wire to our house, across the street. Heating caused expansion then movement, and the power would momentarily go off then back on, and the UPS detected this. I note that this crash was on a hot day, and maybe this plane (which I believe was repositioned for the flight), had not been operating in such high temperatures recently, meaning the problem went unnoticed. |
OPENDOOR
June 14, 2025, 12:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901451 |
Even though there is no point speculating about the cause of this accident, it is the nature of the beast to have questions. As pilots (most of us at least), we do have an inquiring mindset.
My initial thoughts were an inadvertent flap retraction. But with the ‘evidence’ that has been presented over the last 48 hours, I think we can safely discard that option. What we think we know is: - RAT was deployed (highly possible) - Gear was selected up, but did not operate (bogey tilted, doors remained closed) - APU was ‘on’ (APU door open on after crash pictures) - Flight path Any of these observations, alone, would mean very little. However, in combination, they all point to a dual engine flameout just at/after the rotation. The aircaft has enough kinetic energy to reach roughly 150ft altitude, end then starts a shallow descent at ‘alpha max’ into the buildings ahead. The RAT deployed, APU attempted auto-start, gear was unable to retract. I only wonder why the engines spooled down. Bird strike seems to be out of the question, so that leaves us with only a very few options, which include a software bug or a suicidal pilot (not a popular option, I understand, but we have to take all options into account). What I don’t believe is incorrect FCU selections, since that would not explain the high AOA on impact. It also would not explain the RAT, no gear retraction or the APU inlet flap open. Another thing that is highly unlikely is any switching done by the pilots, especially RAT etc.. These airborne time is just too little, pilots usually don’t take any action below approximately 400ft, and these switches are so ‘underused’ that a pilot would not find them instantaneously in a high stress situation. For me, a dual engine flameout seems the only possible explanation, now we only have to wait for its cause. ![]() Last edited by Senior Pilot; 14th June 2025 at 19:08 . Reason: Double posting of image |
sTeamTraen
June 14, 2025, 12:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901460 |
I asked this yesterday, and was told no. You have to pull them out before you can move them up or down. So you can't operate them if, say, your hand slips violently off the throttle lever and drops down into the switches.
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MaybeItIs
June 14, 2025, 13:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901468 |
This crash reminds me of the crash of a 747 Military Transport plane at an airbase in Afghanistan.
Shortly after TO, the cargo shifted, the plane became very tail heavy and stalled a few hundred feet in the air. It was the weirdest sight. For what seems a few seconds, the plane just seemed to hang there, presumably on engine thrust. In this crash, the problem also seems to occur soon after rotation, as if something inside moved in response to its change in attitude. Maybe a loose connection on a main bus cable that moved... Maybe only a millimetre. Or a tool left inside an electrical cabinet slid somewhere it shouldn't. The possibilities are numerous, and without a lot more information, there's no way to know what caused this. I suspect a major electrical fault, probably intermittent. How long would it take to restart those engines after a Fuel Cutoff flame out? Is that what happened, just before impact? |
Alty7x7
June 14, 2025, 13:40:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901495 |
Fuel cutoff switches
My next question, again I believe not discussed, is what do the 787 Fuel Cutoff switches actually do? Obviously, they cut off the fuel supplies to the engines - pretty important in engine fire and other scenarios, but goes without saying. The real question is, what do they activate (or deactivate)? I'm assuming a simple solenoid valve, which is open when powered and closed when unpowered, but of course, there will (certainly) be Electro-Mechanical or Solid-State (Electronic) relays between the switches and the (solenoid valves).
I guess the next obvious question is, is there anything else that can turn off those Fuel Cutoff Valves - a computer condition for example. I'm assuming not, but I think it needs to be considered. Taking each switch individually, next, since this is part of an electrical circuit, and of necessity must include Electrical Relays, there is certainly at least one and in all probability two electric Power Sources involved in this circuit. One supply which passes through the switch to activate the relay, and, I'm assuming, a second, higher current and probably higher voltage supply which drives the (solenoid?) valve. As I see it, interrupting either supply will have the same effect - if the system is wired in the Positive-Postive sense, meaning a current through the switch causes the relay to pass a current through the (solenoid). If either of these supplies is cut, the Fuel Shutoffs will shut off the fuel. So, the question is, where do these supplies come from, and under what circumstances could they be cut off? Sure, it looks to some (myself included) like a near simultaneous cutoff of both engines, but that doesn't have to have been caused by either of the pilots. I know there is huge redundancy built into the 787 Electrical Systems, but some of the evidence is suggesting that there was something not right with the plane's electrical system. I'm also fairly sure that there will be parts and places where certain faults can take the system down, despite the redundancy. I can't say where, but it's very difficult to design a perfect system, especially where there has to be transfers between multiple potential supplies and single actuators, motors or valves. Having spent years repairing electrical and electronic systems, I know that the most difficult of all electrical faults are the intermittent ones. And I suspect that this is at the root of this crash. An intermittent or faulty AOA sensor has "caused" (provoked) multiple famous crashes... Can't find the one I'm looking for (pre-1980, I think) as the Max AOA issues dominate. I can cite a very personal example, which involved the electrical supply to my house. I had several computers running 24x365 so of course, ran them off a UPS, which turned out to be a very good thing. I started to notice that at certain times, the UPS would activate - it would cut in and take over the computer loads, its alarm would go off to indicate a power fault. But the power was still on! This carried on for weeks and I initially blamed the UPS. Then, I noticed that it only happened on very hot afternoons... Long story short, the fault was caused by an electrical linesman, probably 30 years earlier, failing to tighten up a joint clamp on the phase wire to our house, across the street. Heating caused expansion then movement, and the power would momentarily go off then back on, and the UPS detected this. I note that this crash was on a hot day, and maybe this plane (which I believe was repositioned for the flight), had not been operating in such high temperatures recently, meaning the problem went unnoticed. |
Wannabe Flyer
June 14, 2025, 13:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901499 |
Reports coming in that Indian regulator has sent out a note for inspection of all GenX engines on the 787
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Alty7x7
June 14, 2025, 14:09:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901517 |
Max EGzt and autorelight
Combining all the bits and pieces of info from this thread so far, IMO we can theoretically sequence it thus using the video from the left:
00:18 Rotation. Normal takeoff config. 00:24 Gear up starts. per Raffael with FF. ......... FR24 ADSB last transmission (71ft, 172kt) just before runway threshold. Matches with video aircraft altitude at 1/2 wingspan. ......... ? Full power flameout leaves N2 ~ 60%; Airspeed < 200k so N2 will decay to 15% in 8-10s? ......... ? Takeoff EGT of 900C needs 25-35s to fall below 250C ? 00:27 Gear up stops. per Raffael with FF. Bogies tilted. ......... ? APU starts. 20-55s to 95%N? ......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates Fuel Cutoff and Run. 00:28 Visible loss of thrust. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure. ......... Matches with eyewitness "within 5-10s ... it was stuck in the air". ......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates RAT Switch for 1s. Whether auto or manual, the RAT initiates. ......... RAT "bang" heard by survivor ......... RAT coming online accounts for eyewitness "lights started flickering green and white". ......... Per 787 QRH below 1000ft, PF makes no change to Main Landing Gear and flaps, aircraft pointed straight for best glide. 00:31 Descending visibly, somewhere beyond the runway threshold. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure. ......... ? Because EGT > 250C FADEC blocks fuel (T-HOT hot restart inhibit?) so no relight though N2 > 15% ? ......... 787 glide ratio between 16:1 to 25:1 with MLG down, Flaps 5. About 15-20s and 3-5000ft of glide from 200ft? ......... Some flap accounts for the ground pictures. 00:34 ? N2 has presumably decayed to 15%, FADEC flips to X-START: airspeed outside envelope? No hope of relight now. ......... PM/PF transmits Mayday? ......... Video showing RAT deployed. 00:46 APU reaches some fraction of 95%N (APU sound accounting for survivor's perception of thrust?). 00:48 Impact. 4200ft from descent start, 3990ft from airport boundary road. 17s from visible descent start. if this is a valid sequence, the only remaining question is why the dual-engine failure at ~200ft agl? with condolences to the families and people affected. In-flight, the Autorelight function should attempt to restart the engine as soon as a flameout is detected, and for an engine flaming out at high power it might catch it before it even goes sub-idle. Generally, Autorelight will continue attempting until some cutoff N2 at which time it will stop attempting, or if the pilot move the fuel switch to Cutoff. And while the EEC is still powered (via its own PMA) down to roughly 10% N2, the ignition exciters required for Autorelight do get their power from the airplane. |
Compton3fox
June 14, 2025, 17:53:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901693 |
I have seen your previous posts about this, and I happen to agree. Visually, as a lay man non visuals expert, I am in your \xabcamp.\xbb
However, the rat is small, and the artifacts are plentiful. Small sensor, compressed video, compressed upload, zoom, it is in short an awful source. However, the RAT is a much better noisemaker, and the audio signature is much more obvious than it\x92s visual appearance in this case, and though the recording isn\x92t fantastic quality, there was more than enough information there to objectively conclude the RAT is out. And that is my professional, on the weekend, opinion. I want to ask a pretty frank question for all of you, and I hope it is ok, from an audio specialist non-pilot: Provided the engines spooled down. Provided the RAT is out. (There are no explosions, no bird strikes.) Isn\x92t software and previous electrical failures a red herring too?Would anything but a complete fuel shut off lead to this result? That still leaves everything from the Fate is the Hunter plot, to Airbus A350 center consoles and Alaska 2059 open as root causes. |
appruser
June 14, 2025, 18:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901720 |
There should not be a max pre-start EGT limit in-flight - that should only occur on the ground for a pilot-initiated Autostart where the starting EGT redlines are lower than for in-flight.
In-flight, the Autorelight function should attempt to restart the engine as soon as a flameout is detected, and for an engine flaming out at high power it might catch it before it even goes sub-idle. Generally, Autorelight will continue attempting until some cutoff N2 at which time it will stop attempting, or if the pilot move the fuel switch to Cutoff. And while the EEC is still powered (via its own PMA) down to roughly 10% N2, the ignition exciters required for Autorelight do get their power from the airplane. Could this mean that because there doesn't seem to have been any recovery once descent started, there was no fuel flow to support autorelight? Or that there was fuel flow and autorelight may have succeeded but there wasn't enough thrust generated before impact? From the video total descent time was only 17-20s. I guess what I'm asking is what would be the total cycle time if the first autorelight succeeded: flameout -> autorelight -> useful thrust? And if the PM executed dual-engine fail memory item fuel cutoff to run, how would that change the sequence? |
tdracer
June 14, 2025, 20:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901821 |
Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods
![]() "Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight. Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring). As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level. Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC). The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight. Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident: 1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines or 2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated. I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios. In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive. |
DaveReidUK
June 14, 2025, 21:27:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901855 |
Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods
![]() "Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight. Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring). As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level. Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC). The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight. Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident: 1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines or 2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated. I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios. In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive. |
BrogulT
June 14, 2025, 22:17:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901893 |
Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines or 2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated. I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios |
framer
June 14, 2025, 22:34:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901910 |
Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines or 2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated. I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios. Am I right in saying, from a mathmatical perspective, that dual engine flame out due biocide overdose would be more likely than a TCMA activation shutting down the engines? Considering we have examples of engines reducing to idle within seconds of each other in the past, but we have no examples of airborne TCMA issues I would have thought this to be the case. Likewise, nefarious intent also appears more likely statistically than a TCMA issue. I have high-school level statistics under my belt so I pose that as a question for people much smarter than myself. |
fdr
June 14, 2025, 23:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 11901949 |
... The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight. Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident: 1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines or 2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated. I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios. In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) ... |
MaybeItIs
June 15, 2025, 00:54:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902008 |
I think it needs to be said again that pretty much anything can happen to the aircraft systems and the engines will carry on running - this is by design as they have independent FADEC and power supplies and at sea level fuel will get through without boost pumps. You could almost saw the wing off the fuselage and the engine would still produce thrust, TCMA notwithstanding.
Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can. You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve? Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so. ![]()
We don\x92t know yet what actually triggered the RAT from the relatively short list but every item on it means there is a serious/critical failure(s). The flight path suggests that it was a double engine failure or shutdown (commanded or uncommanded) as anything else should have left the aeroplane in a poor state but able to climb away.
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TheFlyingNosh777
June 15, 2025, 01:35:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902035 |
Hello,
I joined today to comment on this thread. I have read about 90% of the posts. Not 100%--apologies if I repeat somthing already discussed. My daily driver is a 777. --All of discussion regarding the previous leg and IFE / pack issues is highly unlikely to be related to the accident. IFE is installed in such a way it is isolated from AC systems (unless AI had it installed in the same manner as SwissAir 111) The AC may have been hot and possibly 1 pack was inop. (Could have been other reasons for warm interior temps) bMEL requires 1 of 2 operational. The previous sector people were breathing so 1 pack was working. Again, a pack issue is unlikely to be related to the accident. --Fuel cut offs / possibly intentional? --Please refrain from "any pilot would have firewalled the throttles, no pilot would ever...." There are so many accidents where pilots did things which are unfathomable. AirFlorida 90--if the thrust had been simply increased the plane would have flown normall / the Aeroflot crashes when the pilot allowed his teen son to play pilot, another where one pilot dared the other he could land with his eyes closed (or blind folded) / the airliner.that made a complete take off with the configuration horn blaring from the start of the TO run / Colgan 3407 stickshaker and stall but the Capt commands full up elevator / i could go on and on --APU on for every TO. NO!!! Waste of fuel, higher maintenance costs due to more run time ect. Partnair 394 crash due to APU running in flight (lots of swiss cheese--too much to go over here) Last edited by T28B; 15th June 2025 at 03:02 . Reason: the s word |
Someone Somewhere
June 15, 2025, 02:36:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902060 |
Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).
Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..first it bangs for awhile, then it burns itself up, then ...
Thanks for answering the question I hadn't yet asked but wanted to confirm!
I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions. As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load. If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault. Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature. Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking. As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it. It's going to be difficult to prove though. In addition, the 787 has four main generators and I believe the switching is segregated into at least two controllers, on top of the four separate generator control units. And again, electrical failure should not cause engine failure - consider QF32 where the wiring to the engine was mostly severed and they had to drown it with a fire truck.
Best post until now in my view. We will find out very soon I think. Gear up command triggered the instant lack of fuel to both engines. I'm not sure on how the fuel flow is dependant on the power supplies on the 787 but I genuinely believe you are very very close to what might have happened here.
Yes, thanks, I've seen a few comments to this effect, and I have to accept most of what you say. I understand that they have their own dedicated generators and local independent FADECs (or EECs), but I'm trying to use what I do know to attempt to figure this out. I know that there are Fuel Cutoff switches in the cockpit. Somehow, if switched to Off, these will cut off the fuel to the engines, "no matter what". Of course, even that's not true, as the Qantas A380 engine burst apparently (comment in this thread) showed.
Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can. You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve? Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so. ![]() The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...
What\x92s the usual time frame for the release of preliminary data and report from the FDR and CVR? Is it around 6 months?
I guess if no directives come from Boeing or the FAA in the next 2 weeks, it can be presumed that a systems failure from which recovery was impossible was unlikely. |
MaybeItIs
June 15, 2025, 04:00:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902086 |
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I believe the valves are almost all bi-stable power-open power-close. When not powered, they remain in the last commanded position.
The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story... |
tdracer
June 15, 2025, 04:04:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902089 |
I don't think this test is ever done during normal operations or maintenance (at least not on purpose) as it is very abusive to the engine driven fuel pump - the sort of cavitation that this causes rapidly erodes the pumping surfaces (it's SOP to replace the engine driven fuel pump after such a test). |
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