Posts about: "Fuel Cutoff" [Posts: 181 Pages: 10]

Compton3fox
2025-06-14T17:53:00
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Post: 11901693
Originally Posted by Kraftstoffvondesibel
I have seen your previous posts about this, and I happen to agree. Visually, as a lay man non visuals expert, I am in your \xabcamp.\xbb

However, the rat is small, and the artifacts are plentiful. Small sensor, compressed video, compressed upload, zoom, it is in short an awful source.

However, the RAT is a much better noisemaker, and the audio signature is much more obvious than it\x92s visual appearance in this case, and though the recording isn\x92t fantastic quality, there was more than enough information there to objectively conclude the RAT is out. And that is my professional, on the weekend, opinion.

I want to ask a pretty frank question for all of you, and I hope it is ok, from an audio specialist non-pilot:
Provided the engines spooled down. Provided the RAT is out. (There are no explosions, no bird strikes.)
Isn\x92t software and previous electrical failures a red herring too?Would anything but a complete fuel shut off lead to this result? That still leaves everything from the Fate is the Hunter plot, to Airbus A350 center consoles and Alaska 2059 open as root causes.
That leads to the next question.. Is there any system on the 787 that CAN shutdown the engines. We know there is at least one... But the A/C needs to be ground mode. However, if would not be the 1st time a system that should not deploy when the A/C is airborne, does! LaudaAir out from BKK is one example...

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appruser
2025-06-14T18:43:00
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Post: 11901720
Originally Posted by Alty7x7
There should not be a max pre-start EGT limit in-flight - that should only occur on the ground for a pilot-initiated Autostart where the starting EGT redlines are lower than for in-flight.

In-flight, the Autorelight function should attempt to restart the engine as soon as a flameout is detected, and for an engine flaming out at high power it might catch it before it even goes sub-idle. Generally, Autorelight will continue attempting until some cutoff N2 at which time it will stop attempting, or if the pilot move the fuel switch to Cutoff. And while the EEC is still powered (via its own PMA) down to roughly 10% N2, the ignition exciters required for Autorelight do get their power from the airplane.
Thank you for the correction.

Could this mean that because there doesn't seem to have been any recovery once descent started, there was no fuel flow to support autorelight? Or that there was fuel flow and autorelight may have succeeded but there wasn't enough thrust generated before impact? From the video total descent time was only 17-20s. I guess what I'm asking is what would be the total cycle time if the first autorelight succeeded: flameout -> autorelight -> useful thrust? And if the PM executed dual-engine fail memory item fuel cutoff to run, how would that change the sequence?
Shep69
2025-06-14T19:26:00
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Post: 11901751
Originally Posted by go-around flap 15
We're all shouting each other down with two main different theories on why the aircraft lost lift so shortly after takeoff.

1) Incorrect flap retraction causing the aircraft to lose lift and unable to recover the energy in time. (Not unheard of and plenty of reports where this has happened - albeit usually not to a crash).

2) Loss of engine thrust backed up two potential pieces of evidence that back up the RAT was deployed (apparent RAT sound, potential RAT seen on low res video).

It is impossible to know which of these is the case. Considering this summary of memory items is there the potential for a combination of both theories to have taken place?

Inadvertant flap retraction by PNF leading the PF to sense a sink and loss of lift. Pushes the thrust levers forward to the firewall and still the aircraft sinks. PF looking through the HUD and so very much 'outside focused' and doesn't realise that PNF has instead moved the flaps. PF defaults to memory items for loss of thrust on both engines before PNF can realise or communicate to PF what they've done, start switches are cut off which drops the RAT and from that point they're only heading one way. This would satisfy the strongly held belief that the RAT was extended, whilst also following the more likely initial cause of an action slip by PNF starting the sequence, rather than a dual engine failure.
This to me makes more sense; perhaps I`ve got it wrong but in the video the trailing edge flaps definitely look up. Maybe there`s more and they weren`t.

On a flap 5 takeoff the FMS could be programmed to select climb power at flaps 1 which would seem like an apparent loss of thrust. Same as for F15 to F5 or further.

I`m not sure if they would have cycled the FCS switches or not. But the airplane certainly would have experienced a loss of lift would the flaps been inadvertently retracted. As well as perceived loss of thrust.

OTOH any castastophic failure which left the gear down would have essentially left the flaps where they were. They are hydraulically activated with electrical backup but it`s wayyyyy slow.
tdracer
2025-06-14T20:48:00
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Post: 11901821
Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods ). A few more comments:

"Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight.

Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring).

As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level.

Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC).

The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight.

Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios.

In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive.

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DaveReidUK
2025-06-14T21:27:00
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Post: 11901855
Originally Posted by tdracer
Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods ). A few more comments:

"Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight.

Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring).

As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level.

Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC).

The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight.

Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios.

In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive.
A TCMA bug just doesn't bear thinking about, I really hope that doesn't turn out to be the case.

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BrogulT
2025-06-14T22:17:00
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Post: 11901893
Originally Posted by tdracer
Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios
Thank you for your qualified input! I had asked a question about the ability of the engines to suction fuel if the fuel pumps were inop. Specifically, I wanted to know whether that is ever tested and if so how often and by who. IOW, if due to wear, a maintenance mistake or whatever, if the engines were in fact NOT able to suction fuel, since the SOP is to run all of the pumps would that problem ever be noticed in normal operations? If not, then if both engines had that problem (imagine a faulty maintenance procedure that somehow caused this to happen to a lot of engines) then a sudden, complete collapse of the electrical system would cause the pumps to stop--and thus the engines. If any of that is even a possiblity then all of the other AI 787s should be checked.
framer
2025-06-14T22:34:00
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Post: 11901910
Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios.
I\x92d like to give you another option to consider in what must be a worrying time;
Am I right in saying, from a mathmatical perspective, that dual engine flame out due biocide overdose would be more likely than a TCMA activation shutting down the engines? Considering we have examples of engines reducing to idle within seconds of each other in the past, but we have no examples of airborne TCMA issues I would have thought this to be the case. Likewise, nefarious intent also appears more likely statistically than a TCMA issue.
I have high-school level statistics under my belt so I pose that as a question for people much smarter than myself.
fdr
2025-06-14T23:20:00
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Post: 11901949
Originally Posted by tdracer

... The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight.

Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios.

In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) ...
TD, in this case, the RT call suggests we are a grand total of 1 choice, and that goes to a fair likelihood that a fleet wide grounding is in the offing. Adding system complexity dependent on sensor reliability has bitten us all in the past and will do again, and I have a bad feeling that is where we are at with this. The SSA guys will be working overtime, but this has had the hall marks of being a bad sensor/system event from the outset. Am laying bets that there will be a fleet wide grounding in the next 3-4 days, if not sooner. Inadvertent GA thrust after landing has occurred before, (had it on a B744 myself), and it is curious but straightforward to handle.

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MaybeItIs
2025-06-15T00:54:00
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Post: 11902008
Originally Posted by FullWings
I think it needs to be said again that pretty much anything can happen to the aircraft systems and the engines will carry on running - this is by design as they have independent FADEC and power supplies and at sea level fuel will get through without boost pumps. You could almost saw the wing off the fuselage and the engine would still produce thrust, TCMA notwithstanding.
Yes, thanks, I've seen a few comments to this effect, and I have to accept most of what you say. I understand that they have their own dedicated generators and local independent FADECs (or EECs), but I'm trying to use what I do know to attempt to figure this out. I know that there are Fuel Cutoff switches in the cockpit. Somehow, if switched to Off, these will cut off the fuel to the engines, "no matter what". Of course, even that's not true, as the Qantas A380 engine burst apparently (comment in this thread) showed.

Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can.

You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve?

Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so.

Originally Posted by FullWings
We don\x92t know yet what actually triggered the RAT from the relatively short list but every item on it means there is a serious/critical failure(s). The flight path suggests that it was a double engine failure or shutdown (commanded or uncommanded) as anything else should have left the aeroplane in a poor state but able to climb away.
100%

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TheFlyingNosh777
2025-06-15T01:35:00
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Post: 11902035
Hello,

I joined today to comment on this thread. I have read about 90% of the posts. Not 100%--apologies if I repeat somthing already discussed.

My daily driver is a 777.

--All of discussion regarding the previous leg and IFE / pack issues is highly unlikely to be related to the accident. IFE is installed in such a way it is isolated from AC systems (unless AI had it installed in the same manner as SwissAir 111) The AC may have been hot and possibly 1 pack was inop. (Could have been other reasons for warm interior temps) bMEL requires 1 of 2 operational. The previous sector people were breathing so 1 pack was working. Again, a pack issue is unlikely to be related to the accident.

--Fuel cut offs / possibly intentional?

--Please refrain from "any pilot would have firewalled the throttles, no pilot would ever...." There are so many accidents where pilots did things which are unfathomable. AirFlorida 90--if the thrust had been simply increased the plane would have flown normall / the Aeroflot crashes when the pilot allowed his teen son to play pilot, another where one pilot dared the other he could land with his eyes closed (or blind folded) / the airliner.that made a complete take off with the configuration horn blaring from the start of the TO run / Colgan 3407 stickshaker and stall but the Capt commands full up elevator / i could go on and on

--APU on for every TO. NO!!! Waste of fuel, higher maintenance costs due to more run time ect. Partnair 394 crash due to APU running in flight (lots of swiss cheese--too much to go over here)


Last edited by T28B; 15th Jun 2025 at 03:02 . Reason: the s word

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bakutteh
2025-06-15T02:13:00
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Post: 11902053
Devil Pprune Mind Traps from overwhelming posts

Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:

PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.

There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬

Last edited by bakutteh; 15th Jun 2025 at 09:18 .

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-15T02:36:00
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Post: 11902060
Originally Posted by BugBear
Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).

Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..first it bangs for awhile, then it burns itself up, then ...
Originally Posted by MaybeItIs
Thanks for answering the question I hadn't yet asked but wanted to confirm!

I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions.

As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load.

If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault.

Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature.

Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking.

As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it.

It's going to be difficult to prove though.
Gear and flaps are both hydraulic, and the hydraulic pumps typically act as effective fault-containment - a hydraulic failure or excess load doesn't result in excess demand on the electric side; the pump just starts to run out of output flow/pressure.

In addition, the 787 has four main generators and I believe the switching is segregated into at least two controllers, on top of the four separate generator control units.

And again, electrical failure should not cause engine failure - consider QF32 where the wiring to the engine was mostly severed and they had to drown it with a fire truck.

Originally Posted by ILS27LEFT
Best post until now in my view. We will find out very soon I think. Gear up command triggered the instant lack of fuel to both engines. I'm not sure on how the fuel flow is dependant on the power supplies on the 787 but I genuinely believe you are very very close to what might have happened here.
It's not. Boost pumps should be more-or-less unnecessary at sea level.

Originally Posted by MaybeItIs
Yes, thanks, I've seen a few comments to this effect, and I have to accept most of what you say. I understand that they have their own dedicated generators and local independent FADECs (or EECs), but I'm trying to use what I do know to attempt to figure this out. I know that there are Fuel Cutoff switches in the cockpit. Somehow, if switched to Off, these will cut off the fuel to the engines, "no matter what". Of course, even that's not true, as the Qantas A380 engine burst apparently (comment in this thread) showed.

Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can.

You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve?

Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so.
I believe the valves are almost all bi-stable power-open power-close. When not powered, they remain in the last commanded position.

The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...

Originally Posted by lucille
What\x92s the usual time frame for the release of preliminary data and report from the FDR and CVR? Is it around 6 months?

I guess if no directives come from Boeing or the FAA in the next 2 weeks, it can be presumed that a systems failure from which recovery was impossible was unlikely.
A Prelimnary Report must be prepared within 30 days, but does not need to be public. May or may not have CVR/FDR data.

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BrogulT
2025-06-15T03:21:00
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Post: 11902071
Question

Originally Posted by bakutteh
Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.
I keep reading this theory and I'm baffled. You think the PF is going to attempt a dual engine shutoff and relight during the initial climb based on a hunch that the engines have quit, all without even a sideways glance to see what N1 is or a short word with the PM?

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MaybeItIs
2025-06-15T04:00:00
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Post: 11902086
Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
Gear and flaps are both hydraulic, and the hydraulic pumps typically act as effective fault-containment - a hydraulic failure or excess load doesn't result in excess demand on the electric side; the pump just starts to run out of output flow/pressure.
Ok, thanks for clarifying. Of course, an overload will simply cause the hydraulic pressure relief valves to activate. There will be a moderate increase in motor current when bypassing, but the electrical side should be fully able to cope with that. Should be! I'm suggesting here that there was a fault somewhere in the electrical supplies that effectively derated some part of it, and that maybe the GearUp load was too much for it on this occasion.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
In addition, the 787 has four main generators and I believe the switching is segregated into at least two controllers, on top of the four separate generator control units.
Thanks for confirming the 4 gens. So there's probably quite a bit of switching required. Not sure how that's done, but I guess robust contactors are required. And even these can fail. Systems usually cannot tell that a contactor has failed on the open side until it's switched. So, a switchover may have been done, but a failed contact meant the backup generator wasn't connected. Who knows, so many possibilities.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
And again, electrical failure should not cause engine failure - consider QF32 where the wiring to the engine was mostly severed and they had to drown it with a fire truck.
Sure, I agree, absolutely shouldn't. Yeah, the A380... Possibly (I suggest likely), the A380 uses different logic from the B787. In the Airbus case, maybe they prioritised keeping the fuel on over shutting it off in emergency. So, severing the Airbus Cutoff signal leaves the fuel on. Boeing may use the opposite priority, that Emergency Shutdown takes precedence over Engine Running, so cutting the signal turns the engine off. I don't know, but don't think the Airbus incident necessarily applies here.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
It's not. Boost pumps should be more-or-less unnecessary at sea level.
I don't think either of us was debating that. I accept it as a fact.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
I believe the valves are almost all bi-stable power-open power-close. When not powered, they remain in the last commanded position.

The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...
Okay! Many thanks for that! Of course, it very much complicates the picture, and I'm very puzzled as to how the Fuel Cutoff Switches and Valves operate. Apparently, the TCAM system shuts off an errant engine on the ground at least, but my concern is not with the software but the hardware. It obviously has an Output going into the Fuel Shutoff system. If the TCAM unit loses power, can that output cause the Cutoff process (powered by the engine-dedicated generator) to be activated? I guess that's the $64 billion question, but if MCAS is any example, then: Probably!
tdracer
2025-06-15T04:04:00
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Post: 11902089
Originally Posted by BrogulT
Is the ability of an engine to run using only suction feed ever actually checked or tested during operations or maintenance procedures?
A flight test (at least one - it's often duplicated) is performed as a basic part of aircraft/engine certification. One engine with all boost pumps off and on 'suction' feed - the other engine with normal aircraft boost pump operation (for what should be obvious reasons). Start, taxi, takeoff, and climb in that configuration until the test engine quits due to fuel starvation as a result of the engine fuel pump cavitation (done using "unweathered" fuel - once fuel has been at altitude for a period of time (hours or more - i.e. 'weathered'), most of the dissolved gases in the fuel have vented off, and suction feed works far better - often up to cruise altitudes).
I don't think this test is ever done during normal operations or maintenance (at least not on purpose) as it is very abusive to the engine driven fuel pump - the sort of cavitation that this causes rapidly erodes the pumping surfaces (it's SOP to replace the engine driven fuel pump after such a test).

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tdracer
2025-06-15T04:19:00
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Post: 11902094
Originally Posted by MaybeItIs

Okay! Many thanks for that! Of course, it very much complicates the picture, and I'm very puzzled as to how the Fuel Cutoff Switches and Valves operate. Apparently, the TCAM system shuts off an errant engine on the ground at least, but my concern is not with the software but the hardware. It obviously has an Output going into the Fuel Shutoff system. If the TCAM unit loses power, can that output cause the Cutoff process (powered by the engine-dedicated generator) to be activated? I guess that's the $64 billion question, but if MCAS is any example, then: Probably!
I hate to disappoint you, but the people (like me) who design, test, and certify aircraft are not idiots. We design for failures. Yes, on rare occasion, something gets missed (e.g. MCAS), but we know that aircraft power systems sometimes fail (or suffer short term interuptions) and we design for that. EVERY VALVE IN THE FUEL SYSTEM MUST BE POWERED TO CHANGE STATE!!!! If electrical power is lost, they just stay where they are. The engine fuel valve must be powered open, and it must be powered closed. Same with the spar valve. The pilot moves a switch, that provides electrical signals to the spar valve and the engine fuel valve to open or close. It's not complicated and has been in use for decades.
TCMA (not TCAM) - Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation - is a FADEC based system. It's resident in the engine FADEC (aka EEC) - the ONLY inputs from the aircraft that go into the TCMA is air/ground (to enable) and thrust lever position (to determine if the engine is doing what it's being commanded to do. The FADEC has the ability to shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection system - this is separate from the aircraft run/cutoff signal, although it uses the same HPSOV to effect the shutdown. That same system is used by TCMA to shutoff fuel if it determines the engine is 'running away'.

Hint, you might try going back a few pages and reading where all this has been posted previously.

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Someone Somewhere
2025-06-15T04:53:00
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Post: 11902102
Originally Posted by MaybeItIs
Ok, thanks for clarifying. Of course, an overload will simply cause the hydraulic pressure relief valves to activate. There will be a moderate increase in motor current when bypassing, but the electrical side should be fully able to cope with that. Should be! I'm suggesting here that there was a fault somewhere in the electrical supplies that effectively derated some part of it, and that maybe the GearUp load was too much for it on this occasion.
This is a constant-pressure hydraulic system, not a little hydraulic ram on a logsplitter. While I assume there are some overpressure relief valves, they're not relevant here.

It uses a variable displacement pump to maintain 5000PSI constant pressure. The swashplate angle is varied to adjust pump output flow: more devices consuming fluid, more flow to keep the pressure up. If the pumps cannot deliver enough fluid, the swashplate reaches the full flow position and the output pressure decreases until flow consumed equals flow produced. Very much like a constant-current constant-voltage power supply.

Running in that area of maximum flow is 100% expected under some conditions, especially if an engine or EDP fails and the electric demand pump is supplying a whole hydraulic system sized for the larger EDP (although I think this would be less of an issue on the 787 as the L/R systems don't do much, but the same variable-displacement pump design has been around for a LONG time including on the 737).

And again, there's a VFD between the aircraft electrical bus and the pump motor, because the pump is 400Hz and the aircraft is wild-frequency. VFDs are very very good at isolating faults unless you are actually looking at a sustained overload on one of four generators .


Thanks for confirming the 4 gens. So there's probably quite a bit of switching required. Not sure how that's done, but I guess robust contactors are required. And even these can fail. Systems usually cannot tell that a contactor has failed on the open side until it's switched. So, a switchover may have been done, but a failed contact meant the backup generator wasn't connected. Who knows, so many possibilities.
Virtually every bus will have a feed and one or more cross-ties or back-feeds. A failed contactor is 100% designed for and with possibly the sole exception of RAT-only flight, entirely designed around. Plus, of course, flight on batteries only or PMGs.

No bus is essential on a modern aircraft.

Boeing treats everything electric as a black box but the A380 has this beautifully overkill drawing - given both have 4x generators, 2x APU generators, and a RAT, it should not be entirely dissimilar levels of redundancy:

Note that the reason for some links having two contactors in series (e.g. BTC5/6 or BTC7) is because this is spread across two separate units, so that a fire and total loss of one leaves ~half the aircraft powered and totally flyable.


Okay! Many thanks for that! Of course, it very much complicates the picture, and I'm very puzzled as to how the Fuel Cutoff Switches and Valves operate. Apparently, the TCAM system shuts off an errant engine on the ground at least, but my concern is not with the software but the hardware. It obviously has an Output going into the Fuel Shutoff system. If the TCAM unit loses power, can that output cause the Cutoff process (powered by the engine-dedicated generator) to be activated? I guess that's the $64 billion question, but if MCAS is any example, then: Probably!
As per TDR, built into the FADEC logic.

Power-open power-close is very common in commercial/situations where you don't want to be wasting energy 24/7 and don't have a defined position for the valve/damper in case of power loss. Done a bunch of them in ductwork and electrically operated windows - your car likely has them, for example.

Last edited by Someone Somewhere; 15th Jun 2025 at 05:08 .

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MaybeItIs
2025-06-15T06:09:00
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Post: 11902135
Originally Posted by Icarus2001
No evidence of engine failure

No evidence of RAT deployment from a poor image.

No evidence of electrical failure.

The teams of lawyers in the UK representing 53 grieving families will be working over the weekend to sign up said families to a class action.

​​​​​​​This is going to get messy.
​​​​​​​
I guess it all depends on what you mean!

If the fuel supplies were cut off, causing the engines to stop, is that engine failure ? I'd say not, nothing wrong with the engines until they impacted the buildings etc.

No evidence of RAT deployment - but you're specifically restricting "the evidence" to a blurry amateur video. That alone is not great evidence, but why does that video exist at all? When they lift the relevant section of fuselage, RAT deployment or not is going to be fairly apparent. And Circumstantial evidence is still evidence, no?

No evidence of electrical failure? Do you know that from the downloaded Flight Data?

Icarus2001
2025-06-15T06:31:00
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Post: 11902144
I guess it all depends on what you mean!

If the fuel supplies were cut off, causing the engines to stop, is that engine failure ? I'd say not, nothing wrong with the engines until they impacted the buildings etc.

No evidence of RAT deployment - but you're specifically restricting "the evidence" to a blurry amateur video. That alone is not great evidence, but why does that video exist at all? When they lift the relevant section of fuselage, RAT deployment or not is going to be fairly apparent. And Circumstantial evidence is still evidence, no?

No evidence of electrical failure? Do you know that from the downloaded Flight Data?
A thrust reduction is not an engine failure. Engine shutdown due to an action of crew (or inaction) is not a failure.

There is no evidence of an electrical failure. What evidence? A surviving passenger thought he saw flickering lights? Give me a break.

The word evidence in English has a very specific meaning.

Look for the simplest explanation here and then ask why the worldwide B787 fleet is still flying with no urgent inspection requirements from Boeing or GE. Think about that "evidence".

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MaybeItIs
2025-06-15T06:47:00
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Post: 11902155
Originally Posted by tdracer
I hate to disappoint you, but the people (like me) who design, test, and certify aircraft are not idiots. We design for failures. Yes, on rare occasion, something gets missed (e.g. MCAS), but we know that aircraft power systems sometimes fail (or suffer short term interuptions) and we design for that. EVERY VALVE IN THE FUEL SYSTEM MUST BE POWERED TO CHANGE STATE!!!! If electrical power is lost, they just stay where they are. The engine fuel valve must be powered open, and it must be powered closed. Same with the spar valve. The pilot moves a switch, that provides electrical signals to the spar valve and the engine fuel valve to open or close. It's not complicated and has been in use for decades.
TCMA (not TCAM) - Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation - is a FADEC based system. It's resident in the engine FADEC (aka EEC) - the ONLY inputs from the aircraft that go into the TCMA is air/ground (to enable) and thrust lever position (to determine if the engine is doing what it's being commanded to do. The FADEC has the ability to shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection system - this is separate from the aircraft run/cutoff signal, although it uses the same HPSOV to effect the shutdown. That same system is used by TCMA to shutoff fuel if it determines the engine is 'running away'.

Hint, you might try going back a few pages and reading where all this has been posted previously.
Hi tdracer, and thanks for your comments.

I hope I never suggested you guys are idiots! I very much doubt that indeed. You cannot be idiots. Planes fly, very reliably. That's evidence enough.

Maybe my analysis is simplistic, but for someone who knows as little about the nuts and bolts that are your profession, I think I'm not doing too badly.

I believe I have made a number of worthy contributions to this thread. Maybe I'm deluded. Too bad. Fact is, over the history of modern aviation, there have been a number of serious design stuff ups that "shouldn't have happened". As far as I'm concerned, the crash of AF447 is bloody good evidence of not considering a very simple, fundamental failure, and should NEVER have happened. The thing is, that would have been sooo easy to avoid. So please, don't get on too high a horse over this.

Thanks for your information about all the fuel control valves. That's cool. Yes, my cars have numerous such systems, from the radiator grilles backward.

And you misunderstand what I meant about "complicates things". Was that deliberate? What I meant was it complicates understanding how a major electrical failure could cause the Fuel Cutoff valves to close, that's all. The valves don't close if unpowered, but if the control is via the FADEC, then what could have caused them to close?

Your explanation of how the Fuel Valves are controlled is rather simplistic too. "The pilot moves a switch, that provides electrical signals to the spar valve and the engine fuel valve to open or close." Seriously? Am I an idiot then? Is it a single pole, single throw switch? Is the valve driven by a stepper motor, or what? A DC Motor and worm drive? Does it have an integral controller? How does the valve drive know when to stop at end of travel? Would you mind elaborating, please?

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