Posts about: "Fuel Cutoff Switches" [Posts: 827 Pages: 42]

Feathers McGraw
July 10, 2025, 16:33:00 GMT
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Post: 11919132
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
With the recent (albeit unofficial) indications that both engine fuel control switches were found in the CUTOFF position
Given that it would have been obvious to the crew very late on that they were going down, might the switches being set to CUTOFF be a last ditch measure to try to prevent a post-crash fire?

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fdr
July 10, 2025, 16:34:00 GMT
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Post: 11919133
We are on a roll discussing the fuel control switch positions based on unsubstantiated reports which at least meet the stringent requirements of being "rumours". On the basis of those reports and in the vacuum of information, we seem to now be discussing how the fuel control switches function.
  1. There is no thrust lever interlock to the fuel control switch function. Don't know of any Boeing design that has that, nor Airbus, but the comment on the MD11 may or may not be valid. MDD had some odd functions in different systems, some good, some, less so.
  2. Switching off the fuel control switches gives an immediate shutdown, at any time.
  3. The rumour seems to be quite bizarre, as it presumes that as the aircraft is being rotated, (it still has symmetric thrust at that point) presumably someone with extra sets of hands turns off both fuel control switches, simultaneously. That is a 2 handed action. We are to assume that someone leans over and grabs both switches without the knowledge of the pilot who has at a minimum one hand but procedurally two hands on the control column?
Pretty easy to post & discuss unsubstantiated rumours in the absence of facts, and with those that are being possibly defamed being dead.

I am no longer interested in being a witness to the abuse of anonymity that arises on this thread.

cheers


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PPRuNeUser548247
July 10, 2025, 16:38:00 GMT
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Post: 11919135
That said, switches found in the RUN position don\x92t generate investigative focus, they're assumed to be where they should be. The mere fact that the fuel switches are attracting attention implies there's something abnormal.

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tdracer
July 11, 2025, 00:34:00 GMT
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Post: 11919310
This has all been answered in previous posts, but I'll repeat it for those you don't want to look back through something like 150 pages:

Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) is measured directly by the FADEC, using a resolver hardwired to and excited by the FADEC. Both FADEC channels have their own resolver input - on most Boeing aircraft it's a common resolver with two sets of electrically isolated windings, however on the 787 it actually uses two mechanically separate resolvers. The resolver is basically read as "sine" and "cosine" which is converted in the angle. This also makes error detection easy, using the sine squared + cosine squared relationship. Any other aircraft systems that use TLA use the TLA signal relayed back to the aircraft by the FADEC.

The fuel control switch is a two-position multiple pole 'latching' switch - you have to pull it out slightly over detent to move it between the RUN and CUTOFF positions (on other aircraft there is an interposing relay for some of the functions. not sure about the implementation on the 787). Moving the switch to cutoff sends a DC signal to both the High Pressure ShutOff Valve (HPSOV) in the fuel control and the spar valve commanding them to close. HPSOV is solenoid actuated and is near instantaneous, Spar Valve takes ~one second to change positions (yes, this is different than some other airframers that only send the signal to one valve or the other, but it's been standard Boeing design practice since the early 1970s). Both the HPSOV solenoid and the Spar Valve are designed to stay in their last commanded position if airframe power is lost. Moving the switch to CUTOFF also sends a 'reset' signal to the FADEC - meaning the FADEC will be offline for roughly one second. On the 787 (and 777 and 747-8), there is a brief pause (~0.25 seconds) before the shutdown signal is sent to the engine to allow the electrical system to reconfigure to prevent a brief interrupt of electrical power to the rest of the aircraft.

Pulling the Fire Handle does the same thing as the fuel condition switch - via separate wiring (physically isolated from the fuel switch wiring to help protect from things like rotor burst damage), with the exception of the FADEC reset (since there is no requirement to be able to restart the engine after a Fire Handle shutdown).

There is absolutely no TLA input into either the fuel conditions switch or the Fire Handle - you can shutdown the engine via either regardless of Thrust Lever Angle.

All this is standard Boeing design practice (and except for the no-break electrical power transfer) has been for at least 50 years. This is enforced by the Boeing "Design Requirements and Objectives" - DR&O - compliance with is demonstrated by an audit after the final design freeze.

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inbalance
July 11, 2025, 20:30:00 GMT
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Post: 11919765
From the Report:
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.

In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.

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KSINGH
July 11, 2025, 20:40:00 GMT
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Post: 11919771
- fuel cut offs were found in the RUN position

- on take off roll both engines lost power as the fuel cut offs went from RUN to cutoff

- CVR recorded one pilot asking why they had gone to CUTOFF

- within 10 seconds the fuel cutoff was moved back to RUN

-RAT was deployed, APU had begun auto start

- 32 seconds after Vr the MAYDAY was called



This should also dispel a lot of the comments about AAIB-India, Indian culture in general and general competence. For a preliminary report this is far more thorough and extensive than what would normally be expected and they\x92ve kept Boeing, GE, FAA and investigators from US, UK, Canada and Portugal in the loop from the start



They have also clarified why it took so long to do the EAFR download- because of the extensive damage they had to source specialist equipment from the NTSB that only arrived on the 23rd of June (they downloaded on the 24th) so all that talk of a \x91coverup\x92 is pretty embarrassing now

of course the big question is why/how those switches were commanded into cutoff in the first place the exact sequence at Vr is the most critical, there hasn\x92t been much scrutiny at all that I can see in the Indian/international media of the personal
background of the flight deck crew which has happened in other suspected pilot initiated disasters in the past, I guess this is an avenue investigators will have been doing themselves

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Engineless
July 11, 2025, 20:40:00 GMT
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Post: 11919772
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed
during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed
in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport
perimeter wall.

As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.
RAT in extended position
15
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.
What the hell happened in the cockpit?

08:08:42 Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position.
One of the pilots asks the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
08:08:52 Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN
08:08:56 Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN

Who (or what?) operated the cutoff switches?

Last edited by Engineless; 11th July 2025 at 20:53 .

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Kraftstoffvondesibel
July 11, 2025, 20:46:00 GMT
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Post: 11919773
So, yes, switches.
either
1/deliberately cut off by someone in the cockpit, or
2/placed in an intermediate gate position possible due to wear or wrong installation, happens during engine start, and then vibrates or bumps to cut-off during the take off roll or
3/some kind of liquid or other contamination in the LRU shorting both and cycling them after 8 seconds brought them electrically back to RUN.

Anyone got other ideas?

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PPRuNeUser548247
July 11, 2025, 20:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11919775
FAA issued an SAIB in 2018 about these fuel control switches being installed without the locking feature engaged\x97Air India didn\x92t act on it (not mandatory).
No evidence of birdstrike, fire, or mechanical failure. Both engines had good health data. The only obvious explanation at this stage is an inadvertent dual shutdown by crew,

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moosepileit
July 11, 2025, 20:52:00 GMT
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Post: 11919778
Ready to talk about the current Embraer method of respective throttle must be at idle to allow the fuel cutoff switch to send a cutoff signal?

That's where I was going in the last page of the last, closed thread.

Wear and tear, off by mistake, off by ill-will, off by cockpit FOD flying about at rotation, no effect with throttle forward.

Last edited by moosepileit; 11th July 2025 at 21:09 .

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KSINGH
July 11, 2025, 20:53:00 GMT
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Post: 11919779
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
FAA issued an SAIB in 2018 about these fuel control switches being installed without the locking feature engaged\x97Air India didn\x92t act on it (not mandatory).
No evidence of birdstrike, fire, or mechanical failure. Both engines had good health data. The only obvious explanation at this stage is an inadvertent dual shutdown by crew,
I don\x92t think we can rule out deliberate based on this report surely and the lack of emergency bulletin being issued is quite telling is it not?

then again this isn\x92t all pointing at the pilots which is interesting

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Rarife
July 11, 2025, 20:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11919787
Originally Posted by Kraftstoffvondesibel
So, yes, switches.
either
1/deliberately cut off by someone in the cockpit, or
2/placed in an intermediate gate position possible due to wear or wrong installation, happens during engine start, and then vibrates or bumps to cut-off during the take off roll or
3/some kind of liquid or other contamination in the LRU shorting both and cycling them after 8 seconds brought them electrically back to RUN.

Anyone got other ideas?
Is option 2 possible? It was my idea too but does the switch "connect" when it is not properly in its guarded possition?

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PPRuNeUser548247
July 11, 2025, 20:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11919789
That “I didn’t” on the CVR doesn’t sit right. If the cutoff switch movement was accidental, one would expect shock, confusion, or immediate troubleshooting, not a flat denial.

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Diff Tail Shim
July 11, 2025, 21:00:00 GMT
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Post: 11919790
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
FAA issued an SAIB in 2018 about these fuel control switches being installed without the locking feature engaged\x97Air India didn\x92t act on it (not mandatory).
No evidence of birdstrike, fire, or mechanical failure. Both engines had good health data. The only obvious explanation at this stage is an inadvertent dual shutdown by crew,
We are talking about the Engine 3 position stop/run/start switches here? SB stopping engine shut down if thrust lever are beyond flight idle? Blimey, seen a photo of the switches in question. Assume they are detented? Actually why are they not guarded?

Last edited by Diff Tail Shim; 11th July 2025 at 21:18 .

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digits_
July 11, 2025, 21:05:00 GMT
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Post: 11919798
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
That \x93I didn\x92t\x94 on the CVR doesn\x92t sit right. If the cutoff switch movement was accidental, one would expect shock, confusion, or immediate troubleshooting, not a flat denial.
Not really. It might also indicate that he saw them move, knew his hands were somewhere else, or a plethora of other reasons. Even if one accidentally moves a lever or pushes the wrong button, the first response would likely be denial as well, then followed by an 'oh oops, turns out I did'.

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wtsmg
July 11, 2025, 21:07:00 GMT
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Post: 11919802
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
That \x93I didn\x92t\x94 on the CVR doesn\x92t sit right. If the cutoff switch movement was accidental, one would expect shock, confusion, or immediate troubleshooting, not a flat denial.
I assure you, if both donkeys start rolling back and the other guy asks why I closed the masters when I hadn't, that fact is extremely likely to verbalised.

I would look at this from the other way and suggest it doesn't sit right as if someone had just done it deliberately, seconds after rotation, why would they bother denying it, if you see what I mean?

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NWSRG
July 11, 2025, 21:10:00 GMT
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Post: 11919807
10 seconds from challenge to switching the fuel switch back on? Would it not be an immediate act?

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digits_
July 11, 2025, 21:16:00 GMT
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Post: 11919815
Originally Posted by DTA
The switch state could be either on or off in that position. However, the CVR makes it pretty clear that the switches were moved deliberately to off. Just not why. Also, remember the report says one switch was moved then the other. Not together.
The exact quote was

"The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec."

Does anyone know what the sampling frequency of the data is? If we get one readout per second, then it's possible that a one second difference could only be a millisecond difference in real life, which doesn't necessarily rule out an accidental bump.
If there truly was a second of difference, there aren't many other options than an intentional act. Not necessarily with the purpose of crashing the plane though (confusion, hallucination, distraction, ..)

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Blacksheep
July 11, 2025, 21:17:00 GMT
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Post: 11919817
I remember the SAIB. I assessed it as “recommended” to all our customers and all agreed. I then raised work orders to check all fuel cut-off switches for the missing locking bar conditions. None were found defective. The preliminary report says the switches were found in the Run position. There is no mention of whether the locking mechanism is correctly in place. We need to wait for the full report for that, as this matter is still under investigation.

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mh370rip
July 11, 2025, 21:24:00 GMT
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Post: 11919826
Originally Posted by Engineless
What the hell happened in the cockpit?

08:08:42 Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position.
One of the pilots asks the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
08:08:52 Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN
08:08:56 Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN

Who (or what?) operated the cutoff switches?
The phrase in the report is "switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position".
Does the FDR actually have some input of the physical position of the switches or is it just measuring the output signal voltage
which might be changed by a momentary short from liquid or swarf.
Both signals go to cutoff within 1 second but then one recovers four seconds after the other.
Surely a pilot discovering a turned off switch would have both back on in less than four seconds.


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