July 12, 2025, 03:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920147
...The report mentions that the flight crew on the immediately prior flight had written up a "STAB POS XDCR" status message, and that troubleshooting was carried out. I wonder if the scenario could be that the accident crew received a Stabiliser EICAS message on or around take-off and the Capt (who was PM) decided to action the first checklist item immediately from memory, by intending to move the Stab switches to Cutoff but moving the fuel switches instead...
July 12, 2025, 03:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920152
Such a fault in a multi pole switch would be odd. And in two switches at roughly the same time?
Typically you'd have a fault in one set of poles, giving you conflicting data.
Such as the EAFR registers a fuel switch in cutoff, but the fuel did not actually cut off.
Don't forget that the RAT deployed instantly, shortly after liftoff, agreeing that both switches were in CUTOFF.
Typically you'd have a fault in one set of poles, giving you conflicting data.
Such as the EAFR registers a fuel switch in cutoff, but the fuel did not actually cut off.
Don't forget that the RAT deployed instantly, shortly after liftoff, agreeing that both switches were in CUTOFF.
Literally covering all the bases with a video would not only show what the switch status was but also how it got there, if it has an immediate effect, which a second line would not do.
July 12, 2025, 03:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920154
I don\x92t know if the FDR measures the switch position or the electrical signal. The latter is probably more likely, although there has been much discussion around potential scenarios involving accidental switch movement as well as possible causes of electrical glitches. Let\x92s assume that the switches were actually moved, and ignoring the \x93bad faith\x94 scenario, we need a situation that encompasses the switches being moved to Cutoff by one pilot, this action being queried by the other pilot and denied by the pilot who moved the switches. For consideration, here is a possible scenario that hasn\x92t been mentioned yet and encompasses the frailty of human performance. The report mentions that the flight crew on the immediately prior flight had written up a "STAB POS XDCR" status message, and that troubleshooting was carried out.
I wonder if the scenario could be that the accident crew received a Stabiliser EICAS message on or around take-off
and the Capt (who was PM) decided to action the first checklist item immediately from memory, by intending to move the Stab switches to Cutoff but moving the fuel switches instead. As in all modern Boeings, the Stabiliser Cutoff switches are immediately next to the Fuel Cutoff switches and operate in the same sense (i.e. down for Cutoff). They are guarded and never normally moved but, with an intent to move the stab switches, \x93muscle memory\x94 (cerebellum activation if you prefer) may have taken the Captain\x92s hand to the Fuel switches, which are operated on every flight. The FO (who is PF) is manually flying at this stage sees and queries it. The Capt denies it, as he doesn\x92t realise what he has done (confirmation bias perhaps). After a few seconds, the terrible mistake is realised, and the fuel switches are moved back to run, but sadly too late and the Capt makes a Mayday...
July 12, 2025, 03:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920159
To those who still try to put the blame on the switches...
- If the switches were defective (wrong type without the detent was installed), this airplane has been in operation for 10+ years - somebody would have noticed.
- If the switches were defective due to wear, it's impossible that both would fail simultaneously at exactly the same time. Have you ever seen all FOUR wheel bearings in a car fail within one second of each other?
- If this was an electric issue (spilled coffee theory), there is no way that ALL electrical contact simultaneously shorted into the exact condition to cut off the fuel. We would see one or two contacts fail first and some kind of "command disagreement", but not a nearly instantaneous total failure. Maybe only if somebody spilled a glass of mercury over the switches ...
The only plausible explanation is that somebody moved them (for a reason unknown).
- If the switches were defective (wrong type without the detent was installed), this airplane has been in operation for 10+ years - somebody would have noticed.
- If the switches were defective due to wear, it's impossible that both would fail simultaneously at exactly the same time. Have you ever seen all FOUR wheel bearings in a car fail within one second of each other?
- If this was an electric issue (spilled coffee theory), there is no way that ALL electrical contact simultaneously shorted into the exact condition to cut off the fuel. We would see one or two contacts fail first and some kind of "command disagreement", but not a nearly instantaneous total failure. Maybe only if somebody spilled a glass of mercury over the switches ...
The only plausible explanation is that somebody moved them (for a reason unknown).
July 12, 2025, 04:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920166
The switches got moved to cutoff, I dont see how anyone can take the audio from the report any other way. There are way to many ECAM warnings in this case for the pilot to know that that's what happened if there was a short or similar software failure. Add to the fact they got put back to run. Why we will find out.
July 12, 2025, 04:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920167
I wonder if the scenario could be that the accident crew received a Stabiliser EICAS message on or around take-off and the Capt (who was PM) decided to action the first checklist item immediately from memory, by intending to move the Stab switches to Cutoff but moving the fuel switches instead.
PJ88
PJ88
July 12, 2025, 04:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920176
It\x92s fascinating to read all the what-ifs, some even more delusional then others.
- There are no cup holders close to the fuel cutoff switches
- We don\x92t hand each other tea at rotation.
- There is no g-force during rotation, we don\x92t jank the airplane of the ground. It\x92s a 3 second rotation to approximately 15 degrees.
- No worn switch would \x93fall over into cutoff\x94 when pitching up.
- The trim cutout switches are totally different design and are checked during the cockpit setup
- The PF places both hands on the yoke at V1 and looks outside and inside at the speed and attitude information throughout V1\x85Rotate\x85Positive rate\x85gear up.
- In the simulator, the instructor programs a V1 cut at their control station.
- The CA hands are on the thrust levers and guarding the yoke until the automated V1 call then the thrust levers hand gets pulled off to avoid the temptation of a reject above V1.
- Headsets are on separate channels on the cockpit voice recorder.
- The Indian authorities already know who said what and when.
- Cockpit cameras would have never prevented this, it would have only shown who pulled the switches.
July 12, 2025, 04:37:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920190
I just looked at a picture of the 787 throttle area and I don't see how one would ever confuse the stabilizer cutout switches with the engine fuel cutoff switches. They are completely different in look and feel and operation.
July 12, 2025, 04:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920192
The report mentions that the flight crew on the immediately prior flight had written up a "STAB POS XDCR" status message, and that troubleshooting was carried out. I wonder if the scenario could be that the accident crew received a Stabiliser EICAS message on or around take-off and the Capt (who was PM) decided to action the first checklist item immediately from memory, by intending to move the Stab switches to Cutoff but moving the fuel switches instead.
Question: I imagine the accident crew /Captain at least would have been aware of this status message, or at least that it had been looked into. Is that fair comment, or known anywhere? Or maybe he even knew what they did, which may well have been FNF.*
I mean, possibly the Captain decided, since he had a young pilot flying, that he would try to avoid any potential Stabiliser problems from startling his junior pilot by pre-emptively cutting off the Stab control while they were still good. And didn't announce the intention because he didn't want to distract the PF, or make him even more nervous. Stuff like this does happen.
If he happened, as you say, to flip the Fuel Cutoffs instead, that's all that would show on the FDR.
Knowing who said what would be a big help.
*Fault Not Found, in case that's not an Aviation acronym.
Last edited by MaybeItIs; 12th July 2025 at 04:56 .
July 12, 2025, 04:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920195
The most scary thing here is that, on first glance this looks to be a massive balls up again by a flight crew.
I\x92ll hold judgement till the report is out as stranger things have happened. But what a seismic shift we have seen in the last 30 years.
30 years ago you worried about flying with certain airlines due to their maintenance records and ages of their fleets.
We are now in the time of choosing your airline of choice by having to research their flight routes over questionable airspace or their training schemes of their pilots.
It is rather worrying that the majority of major airline crashes in the last 20 years have been due to the two fleshy ones riding up front, if not questionable flight planning, Military or terrorist input.
I expect thats going to be about as popular as an lead balloon here.
In fact, I cannot remember the last major mechanical failure that led to a mass loss of life.
The Jeju one is still to be determined, but not sure if that can even be counted due to bird strikes.
I\x92ll hold judgement till the report is out as stranger things have happened. But what a seismic shift we have seen in the last 30 years.
30 years ago you worried about flying with certain airlines due to their maintenance records and ages of their fleets.
We are now in the time of choosing your airline of choice by having to research their flight routes over questionable airspace or their training schemes of their pilots.
It is rather worrying that the majority of major airline crashes in the last 20 years have been due to the two fleshy ones riding up front, if not questionable flight planning, Military or terrorist input.
I expect thats going to be about as popular as an lead balloon here.
In fact, I cannot remember the last major mechanical failure that led to a mass loss of life.
The Jeju one is still to be determined, but not sure if that can even be counted due to bird strikes.
Whenever this argument is used (humans are the problem, all modern crashes are because of pilot error) it doesn\x92t account for all of the problems and serious events that humans have avoided and where they\x92ve saved the day. Every airline in the world will have multiple such incidents a year but you\x92ll never hear of them outside of internal comns (maybe the occasional one will be serious enough to warrant external investigations)
still yet to see any evidence this has systematic implications for air india as a whole, if anything after that initial cutoff was \x91transitioned\x92 (we can speculate why or how) the actions of the flight deck (at least one of them) was commendable- with slightly more time they\x92d have flown away.
July 12, 2025, 04:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920199
My only question is, after close to 40 years flying, on takeoff, if I lost thrust/ Power, my immediate reaction would NOT BE TO CHECK THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES. Unless the Pilot flying saw the Pilot monitoring visually reach down and shut the fuel control switches off, which would be odd since as the PF, your attention is looking at the instruments and outside, not inside and downward in the direction of the FC switches. It seems odd how quickly they ascertained the fuel control switches were shut off. No startle factor, or confusion, just a very quick determination that the FC switches were cutoff. Very strange.
It\x92s a little annoying that we don\x92t know who spoke the and who denied about the cutoffs but it\x92s kind of the secondary issue.
The 787 has HUDs, PF is looking straight ahead and \x91up\x92 (as the U in HUD suggests), the cutoff toggles are not at all in his field of view , quite similar for the PM
the CVR transcript will have to reveal a lot more because the current sequence of events doesn\x92t really answer that much other than to rule out a few other theories
July 12, 2025, 04:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920202
I just looked at a picture of the 787 throttle area and I don't see how one would ever confuse the stabilizer cutout switches with the engine fuel cutoff switches. They are completely different in look and feel and operation........Also, what is the supposed startling event here?
The fact that EICAS messages were recorded does not mean that they were provided in the preliminary report.
The notion is that around liftoff EICAS reported an error related to an error logged on the previous flight, that the PM felt it prudent to remedy the problem by cutting the stab cutoff switches, inadvertently cutting fuel. Action-slip, as mentioned countless times in these threads.
July 12, 2025, 05:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920206
July 12, 2025, 05:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920208
A couple of thoughts
1. if I wanted to crash an ac I would physically fly it into the ground after t/o and NOT toggle a couple of fuel cutoff switches ?
2. these 2 vital fuel cutoff switches seem to be much too HANDILY positioned and easy to operate !
1. if I wanted to crash an ac I would physically fly it into the ground after t/o and NOT toggle a couple of fuel cutoff switches ?
2. these 2 vital fuel cutoff switches seem to be much too HANDILY positioned and easy to operate !
July 12, 2025, 05:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920211
There are quite a few comments on here along the lines of "no one would do that", "that's highly unlikely", "that's impossible" etc. We need to remember that a highly unlikely event, a dual engine shutdown/fail, has undeniably happened. Given that a highly unlikely event has happened all of the possible unlikely events that could have caused it are actually reasonably likely
given
that we know the accident happened. Think of it this way, tossing 100 heads in a row is incredibly unlikely and tossing 99 heads in a row is also incredibly unlikely. However, if you happen to toss 100 heads in a row then the incredibly unlikely 99 heads that came before the 100th are a certainty. They had to have happened for the 100 heads to happen.
This accident was caused by an unlikely sequence of events. If it wasn't then similar accidents would happen more often. Therefore we can't rule out possibilities just because they're unlikely. It's worthwhile considering the relative likelihood of different scenarios. For example is it more likely that the fuel switches were turned off due to a selection error or a mechanical failure?
This was not a normal flight. It resulted in an accident. There is little point in blathering on about how a normal crew operates on a normal flight.
This accident was caused by an unlikely sequence of events. If it wasn't then similar accidents would happen more often. Therefore we can't rule out possibilities just because they're unlikely. It's worthwhile considering the relative likelihood of different scenarios. For example is it more likely that the fuel switches were turned off due to a selection error or a mechanical failure?
This was not a normal flight. It resulted in an accident. There is little point in blathering on about how a normal crew operates on a normal flight.
July 12, 2025, 05:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920213
The cutoff switch movement doesn\x92t look like a procedural error in isolation , more like a symptom of
heat, stress, and cognitive load
catching up at the worst possible moment. Muscle memory kicks in, hands move before thought does.
At Vr, you\x92re saturated \x97 hot cockpit, high workload, maybe a tech snag pre-departure. You\x92re doing everything right, until your hand isn\x92t.
It doesn\x92t take malice or incompetence. Just a second of invisible overload , and the wrong switch moves.
At Vr, you\x92re saturated \x97 hot cockpit, high workload, maybe a tech snag pre-departure. You\x92re doing everything right, until your hand isn\x92t.
It doesn\x92t take malice or incompetence. Just a second of invisible overload , and the wrong switch moves.
July 12, 2025, 05:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920221
No experience of the 787 but lots on the 75/76.
The possibility of a perceived stab trim problem allied to an associated eicas message could have induced the PNF to go straight to the stab trim switches mindful of the problems associated with the 737 Max albeit a different type and a system not fitted in the 787 but an issue of which the Training Captain would have been well aware especially if he had been briefed on the stab messages from the previous sector. If, repeat if, he simply made the wrong selection and hit the fuel cut off switches then the holes have suddenly lined up. Unlikely, unfathomable perhaps but by no means impossible. Other than that....deliberate act ?
The possibility of a perceived stab trim problem allied to an associated eicas message could have induced the PNF to go straight to the stab trim switches mindful of the problems associated with the 737 Max albeit a different type and a system not fitted in the 787 but an issue of which the Training Captain would have been well aware especially if he had been briefed on the stab messages from the previous sector. If, repeat if, he simply made the wrong selection and hit the fuel cut off switches then the holes have suddenly lined up. Unlikely, unfathomable perhaps but by no means impossible. Other than that....deliberate act ?
July 12, 2025, 05:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920223
There are quite a few comments on here along the lines of "no one would do that", "that's highly unlikely", "that's impossible" etc. We need to remember that a highly unlikely event, a dual engine shutdown/fail, has undeniably happened. Given that a highly unlikely event has happened all of the possible unlikely events that could have caused it are actually reasonably likely
given
that we know the accident happened. Think of it this way, tossing 100 heads in a row is incredibly unlikely and tossing 99 heads in a row is also incredibly unlikely. However, if you happen to toss 100 heads in a row then the incredibly unlikely 99 heads that came before the 100th are a certainty. They had to have happened for the 100 heads to happen.
This accident was caused by an unlikely sequence of events. If it wasn't then similar accidents would happen more often. Therefore we can't rule out possibilities just because they're unlikely. It's worthwhile considering the relative likelihood of different scenarios. For example is it more likely that the fuel switches were turned off due to a selection error or a mechanical failure?
This was not a normal flight. It resulted in an accident. There is little point in blathering on about how a normal crew operates on a normal flight.
This accident was caused by an unlikely sequence of events. If it wasn't then similar accidents would happen more often. Therefore we can't rule out possibilities just because they're unlikely. It's worthwhile considering the relative likelihood of different scenarios. For example is it more likely that the fuel switches were turned off due to a selection error or a mechanical failure?
This was not a normal flight. It resulted in an accident. There is little point in blathering on about how a normal crew operates on a normal flight.
And I won't comment now. But this article, about another classic "no one would do that" scenario is pertinent and worth reading in its own right:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes...a52_story.html
It's precisely the ones who loudly proclaim "I would NEVER do that", "that could NEVER happen to me" who are most at risk. And that is relevant to aviation too. IMHO.
R1
July 12, 2025, 05:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920228
No experience of the 787 but lots on the 75/76.
The possibility of a perceived stab trim problem allied to an associated eicas message could have induced the PNF to go straight to the stab trim switches mindful of the problems associated with the 737 Max albeit a different type and a system not fitted in the 787 but an issue of which the Training Captain would have been well aware especially if he had been briefed on the stab messages from the previous sector. If, repeat if, he simply made the wrong selection and hit the fuel cut off switches then the holes have suddenly lined up. Unlikely, unfathomable perhaps but by no means impossible. Other than that....deliberate act ?
The possibility of a perceived stab trim problem allied to an associated eicas message could have induced the PNF to go straight to the stab trim switches mindful of the problems associated with the 737 Max albeit a different type and a system not fitted in the 787 but an issue of which the Training Captain would have been well aware especially if he had been briefed on the stab messages from the previous sector. If, repeat if, he simply made the wrong selection and hit the fuel cut off switches then the holes have suddenly lined up. Unlikely, unfathomable perhaps but by no means impossible. Other than that....deliberate act ?
July 12, 2025, 06:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920235
Placing the fuel control switches to cutoff is not \x93hard\x94 but you certainly need some force to do it.
They certainly can not jump across the safeguard by themselves. (in turbulence for example)
this whole scenario is simply far beyond my comprehension.
what happened to crew coordination when selecting fuel switches? Even in a perceived emergency situation, the switcher needs to confirm the perception.
They certainly can not jump across the safeguard by themselves. (in turbulence for example)
this whole scenario is simply far beyond my comprehension.
what happened to crew coordination when selecting fuel switches? Even in a perceived emergency situation, the switcher needs to confirm the perception.