July 13, 2025, 19:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921587
Not sure how much more evidence you need to start a discussion.
We as operators are trying to put ourselves in that situation and describe likely outcomes based on present experiences. The most likely event is the PM orchestrating this, the Captain in this case. This however is up for debate\x85 the debate we should be having\x85 not APU doors.
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July 13, 2025, 19:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921588
It was working as per the conditions absolutely, but those conditions meant it wasn't available immediately.
I hardly think that the single sole relevant learning from an event such as this, and hence the sole discussion point, is around the trigger of the event. Yes, very relevant, but plenty of other areas to understand further as well (for example how a dual engine failure at such altitude could be adjusted in future process). If you aren't interested in that discussion that's ok of course, but it doesn't make it irrelevant.
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July 13, 2025, 20:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921594
Because it wouldnt have been immediately available to support engine restart and/or other electrical functions, as it didn't open until around 13 seconds after cutoff event. It's relevant in so much of how it may (or may not) have affected recovery efforts.
It was working as per the conditions absolutely, but those conditions meant it wasn't available immediately.
It was working as per the conditions absolutely, but those conditions meant it wasn't available immediately.
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July 13, 2025, 20:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921608
Some human in that flight deck moved both fuel switches to cutoff, physically moved them, one after the other. Another human, possibly either human in that flight deck then questioned verbally why they did that. This is factual and proven evidence as per the official report. Why are we not focusing on the who and why!?
Not sure how much more evidence you need to start a discussion.
We as operators are trying to put ourselves in that situation and describe likely outcomes based on present experiences. The most likely event is the PM orchestrating this, the Captain in this case. This however is up for debate\x85 the debate we should be having\x85 not APU doors.
Not sure how much more evidence you need to start a discussion.
We as operators are trying to put ourselves in that situation and describe likely outcomes based on present experiences. The most likely event is the PM orchestrating this, the Captain in this case. This however is up for debate\x85 the debate we should be having\x85 not APU doors.
I certainly don't need more evidence than we have for discussion. I just think a lot more evidence is necessary to conclude that either crew member on that flight deliberately killed the engines intending to crash the jet and, for some reason, accused the other of doing so. Indeed, I don't think we have any actual evidence for that. We simply have a set of circumstances that make that one of only a few possibilities we can reasonably imagine. Discussing it as a possibility is reasonable (although I don't think we can get anywhere on that path without evidence), but claiming that possibility as the one, the truth, what really happened, is not reasonable, not justified by the available evidence. And making unjustified claims that amount to accusing a pilot of mass murder, in a forum that citizens and journalists from around the world always turn to for information in the wake of a major airliner crash, seems like a very bad idea to me.
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July 13, 2025, 20:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921617
Quote: Originally Posted by
Contact Approach
But there is evidence, pretty clear evidence!
The "evidence" might be available, but I disagree it is available to us. I assert the prelim report has been deliberately sanitised to prevent us (i.e. everybody outside the AAIB circle) being given enough 'evidence' to make certain conclusions.
You/others might not like it, some might say it is obvious (I say not), but I think it is carefully worded enough to imply what might have happened, but nothing is clear - intentionally.
But there is evidence, pretty clear evidence!
You/others might not like it, some might say it is obvious (I say not), but I think it is carefully worded enough to imply what might have happened, but nothing is clear - intentionally.
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July 13, 2025, 20:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921631
Action slips - further information
Non-pilot here.
For those interested in reading more about 'action slips', including performing one routine function in place of another, the following free-access article goes into more detail:
Wiley Online Library: Oops! I Did it Again: The Psychology of Everyday Action Slips
As other people have perspicaciously pointed out, assuming that it was the Pilot Monitoring that transitioned the Fuel Cut-Off Switches from RUN to CUTOFF, what action would they likely have been attempting to perform
at that stage of the flight
for an action slip to be a likely possibility?
Alternatively, given that the PM was used to operating simulators, what conditions could have prompted him to do a sequence that was familiar to him of resetting the simulator (including operating the FCS switches), doing things that are inadvisable in a real aircraft?
If these are stupid questions, I apologise for taking up a mod's time processing the comment deletion.
For those interested in reading more about 'action slips', including performing one routine function in place of another, the following free-access article goes into more detail:
Wiley Online Library: Oops! I Did it Again: The Psychology of Everyday Action Slips
Type of slip: Habit intrusion/'double capture slip'
Analysis: Incorrect motor schema is activated during a task due to failure of sustained focal attention to the task in working memory
Example: Going to the kitchen sink to wash a dish but finding yourself washing one's hands instead
Analysis: Incorrect motor schema is activated during a task due to failure of sustained focal attention to the task in working memory
Example: Going to the kitchen sink to wash a dish but finding yourself washing one's hands instead
Alternatively, given that the PM was used to operating simulators, what conditions could have prompted him to do a sequence that was familiar to him of resetting the simulator (including operating the FCS switches), doing things that are inadvisable in a real aircraft?
If these are stupid questions, I apologise for taking up a mod's time processing the comment deletion.
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July 13, 2025, 20:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921645
Non-pilot here.
For those interested in reading more about 'action slips', including performing one routine function in place of another, the following free-access article goes into more detail:
Wiley Online Library: Oops! I Did it Again: The Psychology of Everyday Action Slips
As other people have perspicaciously pointed out, assuming that it was the Pilot Monitoring that transitioned the Fuel Cut-Off Switches from RUN to CUTOFF, what action would they likely have been attempting to perform at that stage of the flight for an action slip to be a likely possibility?
Alternatively, given that the PM was used to operating simulators, what conditions could have prompted him to do a sequence that was familiar to him of resetting the simulator (including operating the FCS switches), doing things that are inadvisable in a real aircraft?
If these are stupid questions, I apologise for taking up a mod's time processing the comment deletion.
For those interested in reading more about 'action slips', including performing one routine function in place of another, the following free-access article goes into more detail:
Wiley Online Library: Oops! I Did it Again: The Psychology of Everyday Action Slips
As other people have perspicaciously pointed out, assuming that it was the Pilot Monitoring that transitioned the Fuel Cut-Off Switches from RUN to CUTOFF, what action would they likely have been attempting to perform at that stage of the flight for an action slip to be a likely possibility?
Alternatively, given that the PM was used to operating simulators, what conditions could have prompted him to do a sequence that was familiar to him of resetting the simulator (including operating the FCS switches), doing things that are inadvisable in a real aircraft?
If these are stupid questions, I apologise for taking up a mod's time processing the comment deletion.
I\x92m inclined to give equal wait to intentional shutting down the engines (suicide, if you will) and \x93action-slip\x94. Three seconds after WOW and calling for \x93gear up\x94 is quick but not hugely so. We don\x92t have the transcript, we don\x92t know if the voices were associated with which pilots. It\x92s entirely possible, there was \x93positive rate\x94, \x93gear up\x94 exchange followed by the movement of the switches by the PM, followed by \x93why did you cut off\x94 by the PF who is soon without a PFD.
As to timing, in high stress situations, the mind can run like a computer slowing time or just the opposite, time speeds up and seconds go by trying to comprehend the situation. I was in an ejection, I could spends 15 minutes describing what happened in 500 milliseconds.
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July 13, 2025, 20:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921646
Alternatively, given that the PM was used to operating simulators, what conditions could have prompted him to do a sequence that was familiar to him of resetting the simulator (including operating the FCS switches), doing things that are inadvisable in a real aircraft?
If these are stupid questions, I apologise for taking up a mod's time processing the comment deletion.
2) No instructor has ever action slipped both FCS at VR.
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July 13, 2025, 21:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921659
Startle will absolutely play a role, largely because no pilot is ever trained to deal with both FCS being cutoff a few seconds after rotate\x85 that would be suicide, for want of a better word.
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July 13, 2025, 21:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921663
That totally clears up any doubt then, because a media interview where claims are made without any substantive evidence at all are clearly to be taken as gospel.
What I found interesting when viewing the Captain's background, was that he was a long-time carer for his aging father, and had called home before the flight to confirm that he would be in contact again once arrived in London. Also that he was highly respected with no history of difficult personal interactions, and had passed all medical clearances.
I'm sure we're all open to actual evidence though.
What I found interesting when viewing the Captain's background, was that he was a long-time carer for his aging father, and had called home before the flight to confirm that he would be in contact again once arrived in London. Also that he was highly respected with no history of difficult personal interactions, and had passed all medical clearances.
I'm sure we're all open to actual evidence though.
Without any substantive evidence at all...
The two fuel cutoff switches were put in the OFF position. If you have ever used those switches yourself, you will know that it can not be accidental. A deliberate action from one of the pilots is BY FAR the most plausible (or only) explanation. I feel very sorry for the innocent pilot in the cockpit and the hundreds of other victims. Having passed many medical examinations, I can assure you that psychological testing is not part of the periodic medicals.
I'm sure we're all open to actual evidence though.
Please enlighten me about how much time you have spent in an airline cockpit... Judging by what you contribute I suspect it will not be much.
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July 13, 2025, 21:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921669
Adverse training
You don\x92t \x93flick switches in the Sim\x94 for no apparent reason.
Even Indian sources are now reporting on the possibility of intent.
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/air-...-probe-8864239
Even Indian sources are now reporting on the possibility of intent.
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/air-...-probe-8864239
My own experience of simulator details was that there was always a very serious risk of adverse training occurring during the reconfiguration between the elements of a sim session.
During an actual training element pilots were of course expected to take the utmost care to brief, identify, confirm and verify every switch/lever movement and operate in the safest way possible using SOPs. But usually, just to save precious sim time, during the manual re-configuration for the next element instructors would typically rattle off a very long series of selections necessitating both pilots working flat out, hands flying around the cockpit trying to keep up.
Very easy to still be re-setting the fuel control switches while the instruction coming through the headset was \x91set the gear up\x92 (or any other combination of switches and selections). Massive risk of hardwiring in a mental slip for the future. Personally I found this to be one of the most discombobulating bits of sim details, completely destroying good \x91SOP hygiene\x92 and detaching the crew from the mental model of how the aircraft came to be in it\x92s suddenly new configuration and place in the sky.
Honestly I can think of only one occasion during my whole career where a sim instructor said, \x91Ok chaps that\x92s the first part done, hands off, flight freeze is on, now motor your seats back and listen in while we brief and the sim auto sets itself for the next bit.\x92 He then carefully spent two or three minutes building up our SA before we motored forward to get on with it. Complete revelation!
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July 13, 2025, 21:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921672
The two fuel cutoff switches were put in the OFF position. If you have ever used those switches yourself, you will know that it can not be accidental. A deliberate action from one of the pilots is BY FAR the most plausible (or only) explanation. I feel very sorry for the innocent pilot in the cockpit and the hundreds of other victims. Having passed many medical examinations, I can assure you that psychological testing is not part of the periodic medicals.
It does appear to me that you're NOT open to evidence if you continue to deny that a deliberate pilot action is not plausible.
Please enlighten me about how much time you have spent in an airline cockpit... Judging by what you contribute I suspect it will not be much.
Having added your newer arguments too, you appear to have ignored what I've said since. But to respond to your direct question, my time in an airline cockpit is that which related to participating (as a human factors SME) in an aircraft accident investigation. Not much, but not actually relevant to the point I made relating to your post, or this subsequently - unless you contend that investigators have no place in investigating an accident.
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July 13, 2025, 21:28:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921677
Well. Was there a “positive rate-gear up” exchange? This is SOP as we all know, but it does become relevant.
AFAIK you state the nature of any (perceived) failure when you select the gear to up.
They didn’t even get to that point. Action was already unilaterally done by someone, before that.
It is so incomprehensible that the fuel control switches were already in cutoff, before they even came to the pos-rate gear-up part.
AFAIK you state the nature of any (perceived) failure when you select the gear to up.
They didn’t even get to that point. Action was already unilaterally done by someone, before that.
It is so incomprehensible that the fuel control switches were already in cutoff, before they even came to the pos-rate gear-up part.
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July 13, 2025, 21:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921685
SAIB NM-18-33 Interpretation
Reading
SAIB NM-18-33
My Interpretation/reading:
Some 737 Operators reported incorrect/broken locking features on cutoff switches - PN 766AT613-3D
If you have PN 766AT61 3 -3D installed - Replace it with 766AT61 4 -3D, which includes an improved locking feature.
The other Aircraft listed - have switches with similar design. In the case of the B787, switch PN 4TL837-3D. Check those AC to ensure locking is OK, and if you do happen to find something odd, let us (the FAA) know.
No-one, has ever found anything wrong with any of those other switches, or there would be AD's.
Thus there is not a problem with 787 Fuel Switch locking features.
My Interpretation/reading:
Some 737 Operators reported incorrect/broken locking features on cutoff switches - PN 766AT613-3D
If you have PN 766AT61 3 -3D installed - Replace it with 766AT61 4 -3D, which includes an improved locking feature.
The other Aircraft listed - have switches with similar design. In the case of the B787, switch PN 4TL837-3D. Check those AC to ensure locking is OK, and if you do happen to find something odd, let us (the FAA) know.
No-one, has ever found anything wrong with any of those other switches, or there would be AD's.
Thus there is not a problem with 787 Fuel Switch locking features.
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July 13, 2025, 22:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921741
Right.
I want you to think about what you just posted very carefully,
They would say that, wouldn't they?
But is it a fact?
Maybe it is, and maybe it isn't. (And I honestly don't know).
I offer you MH 370 and the various punting that the Malaysian government did as a point of reference, as well as China Eastern Airlines Flight 5735 as a point of reference.
Yes, I confess to you, I tend to be cynical.
I want you to think about what you just posted very carefully,
They would say that, wouldn't they?
But is it a fact?
Maybe it is, and maybe it isn't. (And I honestly don't know).
I offer you MH 370 and the various punting that the Malaysian government did as a point of reference, as well as China Eastern Airlines Flight 5735 as a point of reference.
Yes, I confess to you, I tend to be cynical.
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July 13, 2025, 22:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921747
While this is thread is still deeply into hamster wheel status, there are some valuable inputs being made. I'll try to continue with that...
Thrust lever position post-accident - it takes very little force to move the thrust levers, a little more than one pound-force at the knob. I'd be very surprised if the post impact position was the same as pre-impact (and lever angle is recorded on the FDR, so the investigators know where they were). In short - the post-accident lever position is not meaningful.
Fuel condition switch position detents - if the Indian investigators had any reason to believe that a failed or inoperative detent was a contributing fact, the authorities would have ordered a fleet-wide inspection (especially since it literally takes only seconds to do the inspection - the paperwork would take many times longer than the actual inspection).
Engine restart (i.e. "Quick Windmill Relight"): Even if the igniters were firing, at high power they won't actually spark (the electrical resistance or the air at several hundred psi prevents a spark) - so they won't spark until you get down somewhere near idle if you're close to sea level. Once the engine has dropped below the min idle, it takes a long time for it accelerate back to even an idle condition. At takeoff power, the compressor components get very hot - do a power cut the air coming in the compressor gets heated by the residual heat in the compressor. This in turn limits how fast you can add fuel in the burner without excessively back pressuring the compressor and causing a compressor stall. So it actually takes longer for the engine to accel to idle that it would during a normal (cold engine) start. The 5 seconds to 95% accel requirement referenced earlier is from a stable 'high' idle (we typically call it 'approach idle' since it's automatically selected when landing flaps are selected). Approach idle is ~10% N2 higher than the in-flight minimum idle, so that takes several more seconds. Bottom line, after initiating the Quick Windmill Relight, you're not going to have usable thrust for at least 30 seconds - probably closer to 60 seconds.
For all the complaining about this preliminary report, it actually goes into more detail than is typical.
BTW, my money is still on the 'muscle memory/action slip' or whatever you want to call it. I can easily imagine a scenario along the line of 'why did you turn off the fuel' - 'I didn't - oh wait - oh
...
Thrust lever position post-accident - it takes very little force to move the thrust levers, a little more than one pound-force at the knob. I'd be very surprised if the post impact position was the same as pre-impact (and lever angle is recorded on the FDR, so the investigators know where they were). In short - the post-accident lever position is not meaningful.
Fuel condition switch position detents - if the Indian investigators had any reason to believe that a failed or inoperative detent was a contributing fact, the authorities would have ordered a fleet-wide inspection (especially since it literally takes only seconds to do the inspection - the paperwork would take many times longer than the actual inspection).
Engine restart (i.e. "Quick Windmill Relight"): Even if the igniters were firing, at high power they won't actually spark (the electrical resistance or the air at several hundred psi prevents a spark) - so they won't spark until you get down somewhere near idle if you're close to sea level. Once the engine has dropped below the min idle, it takes a long time for it accelerate back to even an idle condition. At takeoff power, the compressor components get very hot - do a power cut the air coming in the compressor gets heated by the residual heat in the compressor. This in turn limits how fast you can add fuel in the burner without excessively back pressuring the compressor and causing a compressor stall. So it actually takes longer for the engine to accel to idle that it would during a normal (cold engine) start. The 5 seconds to 95% accel requirement referenced earlier is from a stable 'high' idle (we typically call it 'approach idle' since it's automatically selected when landing flaps are selected). Approach idle is ~10% N2 higher than the in-flight minimum idle, so that takes several more seconds. Bottom line, after initiating the Quick Windmill Relight, you're not going to have usable thrust for at least 30 seconds - probably closer to 60 seconds.
For all the complaining about this preliminary report, it actually goes into more detail than is typical.
BTW, my money is still on the 'muscle memory/action slip' or whatever you want to call it. I can easily imagine a scenario along the line of 'why did you turn off the fuel' - 'I didn't - oh wait - oh
...
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July 13, 2025, 22:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921757
While this is thread is still deeply into hamster wheel status, there are some valuable inputs being made. I'll try to continue with that...
Thrust lever position post-accident - it takes very little force to move the thrust levers, a little more than one pound-force at the knob. I'd be very surprised if the post impact position was the same as pre-impact (and lever angle is recorded on the FDR, so the investigators know where they were). In short - the post-accident lever position is not meaningful.
Fuel condition switch position detents - if the Indian investigators had any reason to believe that a failed or inoperative detent was a contributing fact, the authorities would have ordered a fleet-wide inspection (especially since it literally takes only seconds to do the inspection - the paperwork would take many times longer than the actual inspection).
Engine restart (i.e. "Quick Windmill Relight"): Even if the igniters were firing, at high power they won't actually spark (the electrical resistance or the air at several hundred psi prevents a spark) - so they won't spark until you get down somewhere near idle if you're close to sea level. Once the engine has dropped below the min idle, it takes a long time for it accelerate back to even an idle condition. At takeoff power, the compressor components get very hot - do a power cut the air coming in the compressor gets heated by the residual heat in the compressor. This in turn limits how fast you can add fuel in the burner without excessively back pressuring the compressor and causing a compressor stall. So it actually takes longer for the engine to accel to idle that it would during a normal (cold engine) start. The 5 seconds to 95% accel requirement referenced earlier is from a stable 'high' idle (we typically call it 'approach idle' since it's automatically selected when landing flaps are selected). Approach idle is ~10% N2 higher than the in-flight minimum idle, so that takes several more seconds. Bottom line, after initiating the Quick Windmill Relight, you're not going to have usable thrust for at least 30 seconds - probably closer to 60 seconds.
For all the complaining about this preliminary report, it actually goes into more detail than is typical.
BTW, my money is still on the 'muscle memory/action slip' or whatever you want to call it. I can easily imagine a scenario along the line of 'why did you turn off the fuel' - 'I didn't - oh wait - oh
...
Thrust lever position post-accident - it takes very little force to move the thrust levers, a little more than one pound-force at the knob. I'd be very surprised if the post impact position was the same as pre-impact (and lever angle is recorded on the FDR, so the investigators know where they were). In short - the post-accident lever position is not meaningful.
Fuel condition switch position detents - if the Indian investigators had any reason to believe that a failed or inoperative detent was a contributing fact, the authorities would have ordered a fleet-wide inspection (especially since it literally takes only seconds to do the inspection - the paperwork would take many times longer than the actual inspection).
Engine restart (i.e. "Quick Windmill Relight"): Even if the igniters were firing, at high power they won't actually spark (the electrical resistance or the air at several hundred psi prevents a spark) - so they won't spark until you get down somewhere near idle if you're close to sea level. Once the engine has dropped below the min idle, it takes a long time for it accelerate back to even an idle condition. At takeoff power, the compressor components get very hot - do a power cut the air coming in the compressor gets heated by the residual heat in the compressor. This in turn limits how fast you can add fuel in the burner without excessively back pressuring the compressor and causing a compressor stall. So it actually takes longer for the engine to accel to idle that it would during a normal (cold engine) start. The 5 seconds to 95% accel requirement referenced earlier is from a stable 'high' idle (we typically call it 'approach idle' since it's automatically selected when landing flaps are selected). Approach idle is ~10% N2 higher than the in-flight minimum idle, so that takes several more seconds. Bottom line, after initiating the Quick Windmill Relight, you're not going to have usable thrust for at least 30 seconds - probably closer to 60 seconds.
For all the complaining about this preliminary report, it actually goes into more detail than is typical.
BTW, my money is still on the 'muscle memory/action slip' or whatever you want to call it. I can easily imagine a scenario along the line of 'why did you turn off the fuel' - 'I didn't - oh wait - oh
...
The EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained
forward (takeoff thrust) until the impact.
Would that position be consistent with a restart attempt?
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July 13, 2025, 23:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921763
Long time lurker, first time poster here.
I cannot post links, but I came across a short video on Reddit (search for r/aviation and a post called "Fuel cut off switch". It shows someone operating the switches up and down, and the movement / considerable effort required to do so. The video is quite illustrative.
Hoping this contributes to the thread.
BF
I cannot post links, but I came across a short video on Reddit (search for r/aviation and a post called "Fuel cut off switch". It shows someone operating the switches up and down, and the movement / considerable effort required to do so. The video is quite illustrative.
Hoping this contributes to the thread.
BF
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July 13, 2025, 23:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921764
I've reviewed the report a couple of more times since then, with some of the insights offered by PPRuNers to aid me. It had seemed to me, on first read, that they (whomever approved the final language of the report that we have all read) were hanging the FO out to dry...but...that may have been me reading too much between the lines . As others have noted, there's a lot not said.
Other comments in this thread had already made me think that the younger pilot was the PF and that it was he who had challenged the PM because he would have been focused on flying the aircraft and would have had neither the time nor the inclination to adjust the critical fuel cut off switches which you yourself categorically claim would never be mistaken for other switches.
I've got some thoughts on compartmentalization still cooking in my head, to include "where was the captain's attention during take off, something he'd done hundreds of times?" I do not yet have those thoughts in coherent enough form to concisely present them to the very critical (as well it should be!) audience here.
The CRM piece has me grabbing at straws. I had mentioned in a previous post the bit about No Fast Hands and Confirmation of important switches/handles/levers before activating as general CRM principals, which it seems someone did not adhere to.
Nothing (yet) can tell me "what did the captain see with his eyes during the three seconds between leaving the ground and the switches being moved?"
I am not sure how much of the EICAS info ends up being recorded on the EAFR/FDR, or if there was a light that illuminated before the switches were moved, perhaps triggering a 'fast hands' moment / error...
Perhaps a subsequent report can shed some light on that.
And yes, it might have been an attempt at suicide for {X reasons} which are known only to someone who is now dead.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 13th July 2025 at 23:33 .
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July 13, 2025, 23:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921787
This just popped up on my news feed - seems relevant...
Amid Air India probe, US FAA, Boeing notify fuel switch locks are safe, document, sources say
Amid Air India probe, US FAA, Boeing notify fuel switch locks are safe, document, sources say
The FAA's notification to Civil Aviation Authorities, seen by Reuters, said: "although the fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models, the FAA does not consider this issue to be an unsafe condition that would warrant an Airworthiness Directive on any Boeing airplane models, including the Model 787."
When asked for comment, the FAA said it did not have anything to add beyond the notification.
Boeing also referred to FAA's notification in a Multi-Operator-Message sent to the airlines in the past few days, which said the planemaker is not recommending any action, two of the sources with direct knowledge said.
When asked for comment, the FAA said it did not have anything to add beyond the notification.
Boeing also referred to FAA's notification in a Multi-Operator-Message sent to the airlines in the past few days, which said the planemaker is not recommending any action, two of the sources with direct knowledge said.
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