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Icarus2001
June 15, 2025, 06:31:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902144 |
I guess it all depends on what you mean!
If the fuel supplies were cut off, causing the engines to stop, is that engine failure ? I'd say not, nothing wrong with the engines until they impacted the buildings etc. No evidence of RAT deployment - but you're specifically restricting "the evidence" to a blurry amateur video. That alone is not great evidence, but why does that video exist at all? When they lift the relevant section of fuselage, RAT deployment or not is going to be fairly apparent. And Circumstantial evidence is still evidence, no? No evidence of electrical failure? Do you know that from the downloaded Flight Data? There is no evidence of an electrical failure. What evidence? A surviving passenger thought he saw flickering lights? Give me a break. The word evidence in English has a very specific meaning. Look for the simplest explanation here and then ask why the worldwide B787 fleet is still flying with no urgent inspection requirements from Boeing or GE. Think about that "evidence". |
MaybeItIs
June 15, 2025, 06:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902155 |
I hate to disappoint you, but the people (like me) who design, test, and certify aircraft are not idiots. We design for failures. Yes, on rare occasion, something gets missed (e.g. MCAS), but we know that aircraft power systems sometimes fail (or suffer short term interuptions) and we design for that. EVERY VALVE IN THE FUEL SYSTEM MUST BE POWERED TO CHANGE STATE!!!! If electrical power is lost, they just stay where they are. The engine fuel valve must be powered open, and it must be powered closed. Same with the spar valve. The pilot moves a switch, that provides electrical signals to the spar valve and the engine fuel valve to open or close. It's
not
complicated and has been in use for decades.
TCMA (not TCAM) - Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation - is a FADEC based system. It's resident in the engine FADEC (aka EEC) - the ONLY inputs from the aircraft that go into the TCMA is air/ground (to enable) and thrust lever position (to determine if the engine is doing what it's being commanded to do. The FADEC has the ability to shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection system - this is separate from the aircraft run/cutoff signal, although it uses the same HPSOV to effect the shutdown. That same system is used by TCMA to shutoff fuel if it determines the engine is 'running away'. Hint, you might try going back a few pages and reading where all this has been posted previously. I hope I never suggested you guys are idiots! I very much doubt that indeed. You cannot be idiots. Planes fly, very reliably. That's evidence enough. Maybe my analysis is simplistic, but for someone who knows as little about the nuts and bolts that are your profession, I think I'm not doing too badly. I believe I have made a number of worthy contributions to this thread. Maybe I'm deluded. Too bad. Fact is, over the history of modern aviation, there have been a number of serious design stuff ups that "shouldn't have happened". As far as I'm concerned, the crash of AF447 is bloody good evidence of not considering a very simple, fundamental failure, and should NEVER have happened. The thing is, that would have been sooo easy to avoid. So please, don't get on too high a horse over this. Thanks for your information about all the fuel control valves. That's cool. Yes, my cars have numerous such systems, from the radiator grilles backward. And you misunderstand what I meant about "complicates things". Was that deliberate? What I meant was it complicates understanding how a major electrical failure could cause the Fuel Cutoff valves to close, that's all. The valves don't close if unpowered, but if the control is via the FADEC, then what could have caused them to close? Your explanation of how the Fuel Valves are controlled is rather simplistic too. "The pilot moves a switch, that provides electrical signals to the spar valve and the engine fuel valve to open or close." Seriously? Am I an idiot then? Is it a single pole, single throw switch? Is the valve driven by a stepper motor, or what? A DC Motor and worm drive? Does it have an integral controller? How does the valve drive know when to stop at end of travel? Would you mind elaborating, please? |
Compton3fox
June 15, 2025, 06:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902156 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬 However, I think their reaction would likely be to apply more power. I know mine would be. But anything is possible! |
Chuck Canuck
June 15, 2025, 08:22:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902223 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬 This is a very plausible scenario. Above 400 ‘ AGL, memory items. |
amsm01
June 15, 2025, 08:54:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902253 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬 Am slightly puzzled as to why if flap reduction triggering climb thrust is part of the standard logic (and presumably clean-up technique) then partial dual thrust loss wouldn\x92t be immediately recognised as the classic symptom of gear / flap retraction handling error? I presume Boeing pilots / air India are just as aware of this it as everyone else, strikes me as odd that one would immediately go into full dual EF mode. My instinctive reaction without knowing the Boeing would be to firewall both TLs, would this have worked in the early flap retraction logic scenario? Many thanks all |
Kraftstoffvondesibel
June 15, 2025, 11:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902405 |
What this plot also does however is tell you the speed if you know the height or height if you know the speed. The iphone used to film this were pictured somewhere, knowing the iphone model, and thus the characteristics of the camera, and the dimensions of the airplane it wouldn't be impossible to calculate height from the video imo. Just throwing it out there if anyone sees the use and feels the call. My personal amateur speculation still centers around the cut off switches. I have spilled coffee and sweet tea over complex electro/mechanical switches/panels before(large format audio consoles with 8000 buttons) and seen unexpected things happen. I am sure the switches are spectacularly well built, but they are in close proximity and thus prone to the same external factors. Does anyone know if these two cut-off switches in such close proximity has the exact same installation, or they differentiated in some way that makes a freak failure mode in one not neccesarily affect the other the same way? Last edited by Saab Dastard; 15th June 2025 at 21:36 . Reason: Unwarranted speculation removed |
MarineEngineer
June 15, 2025, 14:25:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902503 |
Correct. That was the original purpose of the calculation. In addition to the sound itself having the measurable harmonic signature from other rat videos.
What this plot also does however is tell you the speed if you know the height or height if you know the speed. The iphone used to film this were pictured somewhere, knowing the iphone model, and thus the characteristics of the camera, and the dimensions of the airplane it wouldn't be impossible to calculate height from the video imo. Just throwing it out there if anyone sees the use and feels the call. My personal amateur speculation still centers around the cut off switches. Doesn't need to be a suicidal jump-seater, I have spilled coffee and sweet tea over complex electro/mechanical switches/panels before(large format audio consoles with 8000 buttons) and seen unexpected things happen. I am sure the switches are spectacularly well built, but they are in close proximity and thus prone to the same external factors. Does anyone know if these two cut-off switches in such close proximity has the exact same installation, or they differentiated in some way that makes a freak failure mode in one not neccesarily affect the other the same way? |
fdr
June 15, 2025, 18:58:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902721 |
The biggest news site in Greece claims to have the results of a kind of preliminary report from India AAIB which say that as the plane rotated, the pilot's seat malfunctioned (broken pin) and went suddenly far back forcing the captain to accidentally lower the thrust lever as he already had his hand on it and despite the co-pilots effort to help increase the thrust it was already to late to avoid the stall. I dont believe they would have posted something as serious as this without any credible source cause they are supposed to be a serious news outlet but you never know when stupidity takes over validity. Source is the protothema dot gr site
The proposition that is floated is that the pilot does not pull back on the control column, which he is holding onto with both hands as his seat slides backwards like a caricature of a bad Cessna 180 seat rail, that is plainly obvious from the pitch attitude of the aircraft, yet grabs lustily a double handful of thrust levers and holds onto those until meeting Ganesh in the next life? Greek papers appear to be as rigorous and incisive in their cognition as the Daily Telegraph. Golly. Seats: electric. RAT deployment... presumably the hapless pilot doesn't grab the control column, or the thrust levers, just grabs both fuel control switches instead???? Do any reporters bother to read what they write? |
Stivo
June 15, 2025, 19:23:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902745 |
I will wager that this is absolute nonsense. The effect of pulling the power levers back to idle at rotate would be readily countered by pushing them back up again. The engines are still delivering thrust, it is a function of N1, not the lever. The lever commands where the thrust level will end up, the N1 gives the thrust output. The acceleration/thrust characteristics of these engines is not like a J52 or JT3D etc.
The proposition that is floated is that the pilot does not pull back on the control column, which he is holding onto with both hands as his seat slides backwards like a caricature of a bad Cessna 180 seat rail, that is plainly obvious from the pitch attitude of the aircraft, yet grabs lustily a double handful of thrust levers and holds onto those until meeting Ganesh in the next life? Greek papers appear to be as rigorous and incisive in their cognition as the Daily Telegraph. Golly. Seats: electric. RAT deployment... presumably the hapless pilot doesn't grab the control column, or the thrust levers, just grabs both fuel control switches instead???? Do any reporters bother to read what they write? |
Alty7x7
June 15, 2025, 20:23:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902791 |
Engine failure with electrical power loss
We agree that there was a lack of thrust. Possibly caused by a dual engine failure. But the sharpest frames in the video do NOT show the RAT and this is counter evidence to the RAT theory. If there were substantial technical failures who knows what sounds could be generated. I find the evidence weak at best. And we immediately get into a chicken-egg problem: did some power issue of unknown nature cause an engine failure or did a dual engine failure occur, resulting in a power loss? Both are extremely unlikely and need to be backed by quality evidence. The video is not it, in my opinion. I don't know the APU intake mechanism and whether it could open after the impact.
Tdracer earlier confirmed that an airplane electrical power loss would allow engines to keep running , because 1) engines are fully-capable of suction feed operation in takeoff envelope (if boost pumps lost), and 2) the EECs are powered by their own PMAs when running and to substantially below idle (I recall roughly 10% N2). Airplane powers the EEC for ground starts, prior to PMA coming online, and as backup to the PMA after that. Related: Engine igniters are powered by the aircraft. So theoretical full loss of aircraft power would disable Autorelight upon a flameout. Ignitors typically don't make the cut for most-essential battery-only loads because it would also take an engine flameout, and the airplane past V1 in ground roll can fly fine on one engine that can achieve takeoff thrust. Autorelight is relevant - if there was a single-engine failure post V1, autorelight will attempt to relight the engine, so there is no need for a pilot to try to cycle the fuel switch to reset the EEC (potentially grabbing the wrong one), or to otherwise intervene. In such a circumstance, they need to trust their training. I've heard accounts that the most likely pilot instinct in such a situation would be to push the throttle(s) forward. Finally - there was talk earlier about accidentally cutting the fuel switches - and it was duly noted that they have to be pulled out over the detent, so very unlikely. The same cutoff effect could be achieved with the engine fire handle(s), right behind the fuel switches on the pedestal - though they are an upward pull, so also not subject to inadvertent or accidental engagement. |
Captain Fishy
June 15, 2025, 21:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902882 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬 A loss of lift AND thrust at this critical juncture could have had caused this awful disaster. I think the data recorders have already revealed the cause but If it's this, then I don't think we will hear much anytime soon. |
Kraftstoffvondesibel
June 15, 2025, 23:36:00 GMT permalink Post: 11902967 |
Maybe you should describe your analysis then and present the data? I'm a physicist so chances are I might actually not be so unfamiliar. Please include an analysis of raw data quality, spectral resolution and binning as well. And don't state it is the 'exact same' as this is statistically impossible.
The latest techniques let us separate such things as reverbration from the source, when superimposing the reverberation/ambience and background noise of the AI crash urban environment on the clean, dead open field recording of the known B787 w/rat, they do indeed sound exactly the same to this very skilled and experienced listener. Although this is not courtesy of the computer analysis. It is just another angle of confirmation. All in all, i think this source audio is excellent. The source is an iphone, their mems based microphones, although noisy shows great spectral balance and is comparable to basic measurement microphones of professional application. There is plenty of information to analyse from in this sample. And again, I can't see it in the video either, and until I put on some really expensive headphones and fired up the software I was of a different opinion. I bowed to the science. Edit: I took an extra look, I am prepared to say the fall off at slightly above 16kHz is from the original recording, this is probably a limitation in the microphone, as it is not a hard cut-off before a 16kHz Nyquist frequency as it would be with a 32kHz sampling rate, there is dither noise from 16-20kHz fitting with the source being 16 bit. Last edited by Kraftstoffvondesibel; 15th June 2025 at 23:54 . |
Muon71
June 16, 2025, 00:42:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903011 |
...
All in all, i think this source audio is excellent. The source is an iphone, their mems based microphones, although noisy shows great spectral balance and is comparable to basic measurement microphones of professional application. There is plenty of information to analyse from in this sample. And again, I can't see it in the video either, and until I put on some really expensive headphones and fired up the software I was of a different opinion. I bowed to the science. Edit: I took an extra look, I am prepared to say the fall off at slightly above 16kHz is from the original recording, this is probably a limitation in the microphone, as it is not a hard cut-off before a 16kHz Nyquist frequency as it would be with a 32kHz sampling rate, there is dither noise from 16-20kHz fitting with the source being 16 bit. The cut-off at 16 kHz is typically caused by lossy audio compressions (AAC), not the microphone. In this case, the audio was compressed two times (first the iPhone, then the Twitter). A microphone does not simply cut all frequencies above the certain point. Also, this audio content is Mono (the same signal on both channels) - an additional loss of information, if the original recording was Stereo. |
mechpowi
June 16, 2025, 06:11:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903125 |
Without any 787 knowledge, I would assume two discreet signals from respective Engine Fuel Switch to each FADEC channel, possibly with other redundancies. Or other solution that is at least as robust. |
bakutteh
June 16, 2025, 06:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903143 |
Fuel Cavitation/Vapour block?
If decrease in thrust not by transition to climb thrust due to early inadvertent flap retraction and pilot action on fuel control switches from accomplishing dual engine failure memory items, then fuel cavitation /fuel fumes lock may be a cause. Just saying.
|
lighttwin2
June 16, 2025, 08:51:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903270 |
If TCMA cut fuel flow while still on the runway the aircraft would have been decelerating from the moment it lifted off, which is not what the ADS-B data indicates. The kinetic energy in the rotating parts of the engine wouldn't add much speed to the aircraft as the engines run down with no more energy being added via fuel.
In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread: If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground. As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems. Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not). Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact. In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms. In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known. Thank you to the mods for an excellent job. |
pampel
June 16, 2025, 09:39:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903323 |
I'm not convinced the RAT is deployed. If it has deployed it could've been a last ditch effort for the crew to bring the fuel control switches from RUN to CUTOFF & back to RUN believing they've had a dual engine failure. This would account for the RAT if it did deploy.
There just isn't enough time for the RAT to be deployed as a result of any action by the crew, IMHO. And to demonstrate how long 7 seconds is - that's enough to say 20 words, assuming no interruptions . |
Compton3fox
June 16, 2025, 09:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903328 |
The PF could've been task focused flying manually, following the FD's and not expecting the sinking feeling of losing the lift. The PM has made the mistake without knowing. ie. he/she has selected the flaps all the way to UP believing that the gear was now retracting. Both pilots now think the gear is retracting, they have full thrust but are sinking into the ground. "Professional crews" like Air France for eg. have made way worse decisions. Slats are extended because they are the last to retract. I'm not convinced the RAT is deployed. If it has deployed it could've been a last ditch effort for the crew to bring the fuel control switches from RUN to CUTOFF & back to RUN believing they've had a dual engine failure. This would account for the RAT if it did deploy. The APU inlet door could've been open as well because they were carrying out an APU to Pack takeoff.
Once the aircraft is airborne and the
weight-on-wheels (WOW) switches indicate air mode
, the main gear
bogies automatically tilt to the neutral position
before retraction. Also when the flaps passed the last takeoff position on the quadrant, the Landing gear configuration warning horn would've sounded further confusing the pilots.
The RAT was almost certainly deployed. 4 different sources. The Flaps were not retracted. Visible at the accident site plus many other sources agreeing they were indeed down. APU will autostart when all engine power is lost. Potentially explaining why the inlet door was open or partially open at the accident site. Mentioned in several previous posts On a 787-8, the main bogies tilt as the 1st action of the gear retract sequence. As stated in previous posts. I don't think this happens unless gear is selected up. So the conclusion was, gear was selected up. One caveat, IIRC, there was some discussion around a failure could have caused the bogies to tilt without Gear up being selected but I don't recall the outcome. As for the Air France remark, un-necessary IMHO. Let's respect the crews please. |
tdracer
June 12, 2025, 22:02:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903414 |
Air India Ahmedabad accident 12th June 2025 Part 2
OK, I promised some informed speculation when I got back, so here goes:
Disclaimer: never worked the 787, so my detailed knowledge is a bit lacking. First off, this is perplexing - especially if the RAT was deployed. There is no 'simple' explanation that I can come up with. GEnx-1B engines have been exceptionally reliable, and the GE carbon composite fan blades are very robust and resistant to bird strike damage (about 15 years after the GE90 entry into service, I remember a GE boast that no GE90 (carbon composite) fan blades had needed to be scrapped due to damage (birdstrike, FOD, etc. - now that was roughly another 15 years ago, so is probably no longer true, but it shows just how robust the carbon composite blades are - far better than the more conventional titanium fan blades). Not saying it wasn't somehow birdstrike related, just that is very unlikely (then again, all the other explanations I can come up with are also very unlikely ![]() Using improper temp when calculating TO performance - after some near misses, Boeing added logic that cross-compares multiple total temp probes - aircraft TAT (I think the 787 uses a single, dual element probe for aircraft TAT, but stand to be corrected) and the temp measured by the engine inlet probes - and puts up a message if they disagree by more than a few degree tolerance - so very, very unlikely. N1 power setting is somewhat less prone to measurement and power setting errors than EPR (N1 is a much simpler measurement than Rolls EPR) - although even with EPR, problems on both engines at the same time is almost unheard of. The Auto Thrust (autothrottle) function 'falls asleep' at 60 knots - and doesn't unlock until one of several things happens - 250 knots, a set altitude AGL is exceeded (I'm thinking 3,000 ft. but the memory is fuzzy), thrust levers are moved more than a couple of degrees, or the mode select is changed (memory says that last one is inhibited below 400 ft. AGL). So an Auto Thrust malfunction is also extremely unlikely. Further, a premature thrust lever retard would not explain a RAT deployment. TO does seem to be very late in the takeoff role - even with a big derate, you still must accelerate fast enough to reach V1 with enough runway to stop - so there is still considerable margin if both engines are operating normally. That makes me wonder if they had the correct TO power setting - but I'm at a loss to explain how they could have fouled that up with all the protections that the 787 puts on that. If one engine did fail after V1, it's conceivable that they shut down the wrong engine - but since this happened literally seconds after takeoff, it begs the question why they would be in a big hurry to shut down the engine. Short of an engine fire, there is nothing about an engine failure that requires quick action to shut it down - no evidence of an engine fire, and even with an engine fire, you normally have minutes to take action - not seconds. The one thing I keep thinking about is someone placing both fuel switches to cutoff immediately after TO. Yes, it's happened before (twice - 767s in the early 1980s), but the root causes of that mistake are understood and have been corrected. Hard to explain how it could happen (unless, God forbid, it was intentional). |
tdracer
June 13, 2025, 02:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11903415 |
Determined to be an ergonomics problem with the switch layout in the flightdeck. Early 767s (JT9D and CF6-80A) had a supervisory "EEC" (Electronic Engine Control - Boeing still uses "EEC" to identify what most people call the FADEC on modern engines). The procedure if an EEC 'failed' was to switch both EECs off (to prevent excessive throttle stagger - unlike FADEC, the engine could operate just fine with a supervisory EEC failed). Problem was that the EEC ON/OFF switch was located on the aisle stand - right above the fuel cutoff switches. Turned out 'muscle memory' was when the pilot reached down there, it was usually to turn the fuel ON or OFF - which is what they did. Fortunately realizing what he'd done wrong, the pilot quickly restored the switches to RUN and both engines recovered. And yes, they continued on to their destination (RAT was still deployed since there is no way to retract it in-flight). Previous event was with JT9D engines (United IIRC). In that case, only one engine recovered (second engine went into an unrecoverable stall), they simply came back around and did a single engine landing. Realizing the ergonomic issue, the EECs were relocated to the pilot's overhead (retrofit by AD). To the best of my knowledge, there hasn't been a repeat of an inadvertent dual engine shutdown since the EEC switches were relocated. It's also very difficult to 'accidentally' move the switches as there is a locking detent - the switch must be pulled out slightly before it can be moved to CUTOFF. |
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