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1stspotter
July 16, 2025, 13:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923730 |
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andihce
July 16, 2025, 13:21:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923732 |
I may be having a "brain fart" myself here, but do they definitely not?
The timestamps most certainly are not synced so the blue boxes on my image almost certainly need to move a little left or right, but actually when I looked at them before I think it's pretty close. What is it that makes you think they are out (genuine question!). As an aside, I have no knowledge of the software used by Flight Aware reporters, but I would be surprised if, at the very least, the computer involved was not set up with NTP (Internet Network Time Protocol) to synchronize its clock. This would set the computer's clock to within a small fraction of a second of correct time. For even greater accuracy, an inexpensive GPS device could be interfaced with the computer. Last edited by andihce; 16th July 2025 at 13:42 . Reason: typo |
Musician
July 16, 2025, 13:57:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923742 |
As I've previously posted, there is the fact that the ADS-B data (in your diagram) continues long after electrical power from the engines would have been lost. Someone recently posted that the engines don't even need to run down for this to happen, saying that operation of the FCS to cutoff would shut down the engine VFSG's.
![]() https://fliphtml5.com/quwam/qhdw/Boo...cs_Electrical/ (page 96) I don't know if the transponder is on the captain's instrument bus, but if so, it would have power from the main battery while the RAT is being deployed. We are definitely seeing the loss of thrust in the ADS-B data. |
Mrshed
July 16, 2025, 14:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923758 |
As I've previously posted, there is the fact that the ADS-B data (in your diagram) continues long after electrical power from the engines would have been lost. Someone recently posted that the engines don't even need to run down for this to happen, saying that operation of the FCS to cutoff would shut down the engine VFSG's.
As an aside, I have no knowledge of the software used by Flight Aware reporters, but I would be surprised if, at the very least, the computer involved was not set up with NTP (Internet Network Time Protocol) to synchronize its clock. This would set the computer's clock to within a small fraction of a second of correct time. For even greater accuracy, an inexpensive GPS device could be interfaced with the computer. So in the diagram (can't modify right now but I will), the blue bar starts at 5 and ends at 13, max altitude marker at 8. That would tie in with loss of power. It would put, interestingly, engine cutoffs right at the earliest opportunity within the window available with sampling etc. (Incidentally an apology to Musician who I incorrectly told earlier that such a movement would be inconsistent with max altitude record, I can see clearly now this isn't the case!). |
Dimitris
July 16, 2025, 14:26:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923766 |
Not trying to be part of the on-going hamster wheel. But the discussions regarding the odds of this being pilot suicide based on historical rates are missing a very critical statistical point.
Let's just assume that rate of commercial airliner crashes due to pilot suicide is 1 in 100 million departures. Simply put, that means that if you get on a commercial aircraft to fly from point A to point B, the historical odds are that there is a 1 in 100 million chance that your flight will crash due to an intentional suicidal pilot act. However, the historical odds say that the odds of your flight crashing for any reason are several million to one. Since the turn of the century, the fatal cash rate has been something around 1 in 5 million departures. Now, we know for a fact that the Air India 787 crashed - hence the probability of a crash for this particular flight is not 1 in 5 million - it's ONE! That means the historical odds of this crash being due to an intentional act by a pilot (i.e. suicide) is ~5%, not one in 100 million (obviously a rough number, but you get the idea). Oh, another to consider with regard to a pilot having a monumental 'brain fart'. We don't know where the pilot's mind was at during the takeoff. Was he focused on the task at hand, or was he preoccupied with the health of his father and what he was going to do about it. About 35 years ago, my one-time fianc\xe9 left me for another guy. I was devastated. Some of my friends were worried that I might attempt suicide, but that never entered my mind. However, I was horribly distracted and my work performance suffered greatly since my mind was not on the tasks at hand. I could have easily done something really stupid that could have endangered my life - such as missing a stop sign while driving or running a red light because I wasn't paying attention.
I have to say I'm really impressed with your work. It's no co-incidence that this image has been used noting that the rat is deployed which means the generators are already offline,
I'm equally impressed by how quickly No1 engine recovered. I think it's safe to say that this situation is not recoverable, but a truly impressive piece of engineering all the same. Regardless of what happened and why regarding the switches going to off, there is now a documented failure mode of the system that needs mitigation (?): Fuel switches off at less than XXX ft lead to unrecoverable AC. If fuel cut off during take off leads to unrecoverable at less than XXX ft or risk of error i.e. switching one vs the other, then inhibit them. I'm putting it too simplistically, but if after V1 the AC is GO and there is a range of altitude/speed that engines loss leads to unrecoverable some mitigation is needed. In the meantime maybe ban jump seating during such phases of flight regardless of it is relevant to this accident. If there is intention for something like that, less people with access reduces the possibility of happening. Too much discussion I think for the 10s to bring the switches back to on.... Pilots are not super humans. By that time the situation the AC was at must have been very clear, some hands shaking is expected... I wonder if based on the data from the flight, sim-runs have been made to see if the situation would be more survivable had the AC 'slammed' itself back to the runway. --> Any estimation of how many seconds in 'off' would not change the end result? If it is 2-3 seconds, its better to stop discussing if 10s response by pilots was ok or not. The 'why' and 'preventive' of going to 'off' is a lot more important. Edit: Have been reading tdracer posts for many many years now. Thank you! Last edited by Dimitris; 16th July 2025 at 14:31 . Reason: avoid post being regarded as 'dry' or confrontational to exceptional professionals on this forum |
GarageYears
July 16, 2025, 14:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923769 |
Potential issue with the locking feature of fuel control switches of the Boeing 787 is a * red herring*. There is no such issue. There was an issue on some Boeing 737 aircraft. The FAA requested operators of other Boeing made aircraft to check if their aircraft had switches with a similar issue. No reports of such issue are known.
See https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/ So your scenario is impossible. - GY |
GarageYears
July 16, 2025, 14:36:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923772 |
SLF here with engineering background.
Regardless of what happened and why regarding the switches going to off, there is now a documented failure mode of the system that needs mitigation (?): Fuel switches off at less than XXX ft lead to unrecoverable AC. If fuel cut off during take off leads to unrecoverable at less than XXX ft or risk of error i.e. switching one vs the other, then inhibit them. I'm putting it too simplistically, but if after V1 the AC is GO and there is a range of altitude/speed that engines loss leads to unrecoverable some mitigation is needed. In the meantime maybe ban jump seating during such phases of flight regardless of it is relevant to this accident. If there is intention for something like that, less people with access reduces the possibility of happening. Too much discussion I think for the 10s to bring the switches back to on.... Pilots are not super humans. By that time the situation the AC was at must have been very clear, some hands shaking is expected... I wonder if based on the data from the flight, sim-runs have been made to see if the situation would be more survivable had the AC 'slammed' itself back to the runway. --> Any estimation of how many seconds in 'off' would not change the end result? If it is 2-3 seconds, its better to stop discussing if 10s response by pilots was ok or not. The 'why' and 'preventive' of going to 'off' is a lot more important. Edit: Have been reading tdracer posts for many many years now. Thank you! - GY |
1stspotter
July 16, 2025, 14:49:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923781 |
What are the chances of both switches going bad on the same flight?
As stated many times previously the throttle quadrant was replaced well after the 2018 SB. Quadrants can be replaced for a myriad of reasons, according to the report none that had anything to do with the switches. If there was even a remote suspicion of the switches being at fault an emergency AD would already have been issued. If there was a 0,0001 percent chance the switches were faulty and could have moved because of gravity of an object hitting is, there would be a safety bulletin released to all B787 operators There has not been such a bulletin. The reason why the report does not mention which of the pilots ask " why did you cutoff ? " is unknown. We also do not know why it was written the switches ' transitioned' instead of ' moved' . My guess it was either for political reasons or because of a possible criminal investigation. For a pilot there is no reason to set both switches to cutoff without any reason. There was no engine fire. There was no discussion in the cockpit about using the switches. Nothing. A mistake is extremely unlikely. There is no reason why the hands of a pilot needs to be near the switches. I do not believe in a brain fart. |
EXDAC
July 16, 2025, 15:04:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923790 |
I have seen no documentation of such a failure mode. There are many flight crew actions that can cause loss of the aircraft but these are not failure modes. In any event the need for mitigation of a catastrophic failure mode depends on the probability of its occurrence.
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EXDAC
July 16, 2025, 15:09:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923795 |
The problem here with inhibiting the fuel cutoff is that what happens if you have an engine fire less than your XXX ft? You still need to turn off that engine, right? Now you could say turning off BOTH should be inhibited... what if they are both on fire and there's a nice flat space in front of you?
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za9ra22
July 16, 2025, 15:12:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923796 |
Everything in the preliminary report suggest one of the pilots moved both switches seconds after the liftoff to the CUTOFF position.
If there was a 0,0001 percent chance the switches were faulty and could have moved because of gravity of an object hitting is, there would be a safety bulletin released to all B787 operators There has not been such a bulletin. The reason why the report does not mention which of the pilots ask " why did you cutoff ? " is unknown. We also do not know why it was written the switches ' transitioned' instead of ' moved' . My guess it was either for political reasons or because of a possible criminal investigation. For a pilot there is no reason to set both switches to cutoff without any reason. There was no engine fire. There was no discussion in the cockpit about using the switches. Nothing. A mistake is extremely unlikely. There is no reason why the hands of a pilot needs to be near the switches. I do not believe in a brain fart. But the report doesn't suggest one of the pilots moved the switches - it avoids that question entirely. Instead, as you correctly state, it says the switches 'transitioned', which is the strangest way to describe a pilot physically switching them off. I could see that as merely cautious phrasing, but it then describes them as 'transitioning' on again. Admittedly, I'm a bit rusty with this kind of work these days, but I believe (and so does a former colleague) that the reason these actions are described in this way is that there is no evidence discernible (in time for the report) to identify how those switches were moved. Or even - just to be pedantic since they began in RUN and were discovered in RUN amongst the wreckage - that they moved at all. I'm not drawing any conclusions, just saying that in the absence of any evidence they could report, they didn't report on any evidence, and 'transition' is the choice how to do that. I seriously doubt the report fails to identify which pilot asks 'why' and which says 'I didn't' for political reasons. There is too wide a constituency of members of the team and no purpose to be gained, but there would be a possibility it isn't mentioned due to potential legal/criminal investigation if it weren't for the fact that it clearly doesn't actually have that effect at all, and isn't in the AAIB-India remit anyway. If they have no evidence of mental health conditions for either pilot, it's a moot question at this stage in any event. The only way you can read the report as an investigator is that they itemise all the material facts they know, and omit what isn't yet pertinent or known. |
Roo
July 16, 2025, 15:21:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923803 |
As for the video of the ex-787 pilot saying it is impossible to move the two switches to off position within approximately 1 second, I don’t buy it. While I don’t fly the 787, the switches on our aircraft are very similar to the ones on the 787 with the same movement required to either select them on or off and I can certainly switch them to any position within 1 or at the most 2 seconds.
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gulfstream7
July 16, 2025, 15:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923811 |
I see a lot of posts about how rare it is for a pilot to deliberately crash the plane. But a rare event did take place. A plane full of people crashing right after take off is rare. So given that event has already occurred, whatever caused it howsoever unlikely it may be, is very likely the cause of this crash. Now what information do we have. Let's start with preliminary report, all can agree that everything was just fine until the switches "transitioned" to cut-off after rotation and max speed of 180knots. The way report is written is clearly a compromise. They have timestamps of all the events and including pilot conversation. They chose to release time-stamps for some events but didn't for a lot (including the pilot question about the switch and subsequent response). They released enough information to convey that there is no systematic issues/risks to the planes (which is what NTBS, Boeing would push for) but at the same time they worded the report in a way to not directly call out pilot error (deliberate or not). Now coming to that we know about the pilots:
Captain was single and unmarried; his mom died recently; he moved from Delhi to Mumbai to take care of his dad. Captain also reported to have taken a medical leave in not so distant past. So as you can imagine; he went through a lot recently and it's not out of realm of possibility that his mental state would take him to do something like what happened. He had enough experience; he knew the recovery will be very unlikely once the fuel is cut off right after rotation. He was also PM so would have his hands free to move switches.Moreover, the PF was a trainee and probably wouldn't question his captain right away It would also still preserve captain's legacy; (at least what he might think, keep in mind his nephews are also pilots) if it's not clearly a case of deliberately crashing in the mountains or rapid descent (like previous deliberate pilot crashes) and there is enough ambiguity to ascertain beyond reasonable doubt what happened |
Chronic Snoozer
July 16, 2025, 15:39:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923819 |
For what its worth - you can actually shut both 787 fuel control switches off simultaneously, with one hand. Did so myself a few days ago. Closest FCS in your
purlicue
& other gripped between thumb tip & index finger. Lift both and move aft. BTW, not suggesting anything other than it can be done.
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Dimitris
July 16, 2025, 15:57:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923826 |
I repeat: SLF here
The problem here with inhibiting the fuel cutoff is that what happens if you have an engine fire less than
your XXX ft
? You still need to turn off that engine, right? Now you could say turning off BOTH should be inhibited... what if they are both on fire and there's a nice flat space in front of you?
- GY I read elsewhere in this thread that 'below 400ft (or whereabouts) no actions from the crew' as an SOP. What I read as SLF engineer --> between V1 and 400ft certification flies the AC unless there is failure outside certification bounds in which case we need the professional to attempt to save the day. So... what was the emergency IF hands were at switches area during that phase of the flight? I wrote that I'm SLF. For me the pilots or whoever is upfront is also a potential failure mode on the system. I also wrote 'ban jump seating', you missed that. If there is engine fire alarm at Vr what do SOP say? FBW control law of AC has several modes that doesn't let pilots do stuff. How do you switch from the one to the other as a pilot? Same can go with engines control. To avoid misunderstandings: I'm the type that wants human pilots at the front. |
1stspotter
July 16, 2025, 16:06:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923830 |
That almost started so well!
I seriously doubt the report fails to identify which pilot asks 'why' and which says 'I didn't' for political reasons. There is too wide a constituency of members of the team and no purpose to be gained, but there would be a possibility it isn't mentioned due to potential legal/criminal investigation if it weren't for the fact that it clearly doesn't actually have that effect at all, and isn't in the AAIB-India remit anyway. If they have no evidence of mental health conditions for either pilot, it's a moot question at this stage in any event. The only way you can read the report as an investigator is that they itemise all the material facts they know, and omit what isn't yet pertinent or known. Fact is there is a recording on the conversation recorded and available to the AAIB. There are multiple microphones in the cockpit. One for the cockpit, and one for each of the mic of the headset. Even when the mics of the headsets were not working as a result of power failure, pure on the difference in voices the AAIB knows who said what. So it was a choice not to write in the report what was known. |
JustusW
July 16, 2025, 17:14:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923864 |
A preliminary report can only contain what is certain. The attribution you want is unlikely to be available yet. |
Winemaker
July 16, 2025, 17:21:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923869 |
Lonewolf, I'm not talking about a switch that was broken all the time. It was wrongfully installed the same morning.
The switch was not broken. It was installed in a wrong way. I don't understand why you don't understand. Last edited by Winemaker; 16th July 2025 at 17:23 . Reason: spelling |
Dani
July 16, 2025, 17:31:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923873 |
I don't know why most of the forum contributors cannot see this.
So now you're claiming the two fuel cut off switches were replaced the morning of the flight?
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PC767
July 16, 2025, 17:37:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923880 |
783 posts ago, (or there abouts depending on when this post is published), I stated I was leaving this discussion because I had nothing significant to add and I felt the
PR
had brought discussion to a temporary end.
I held that the fuel control switches had been transisted to cut because that is where the evidence pointed and more importantly, that is what the investigators stated. But curiosity has got the better of me so I've scanned through the subsequent posts in case I'd missed something relevant or important. I have not. Before I dip out again I want to remove my horsehair wig, reach past the pilot peaked hat and put on my dusty old custodian helmet - police. I dealt with many suicides from finding bodies, informing and liasing with families/loved ones and writing statements and reports for the Coroners Court. My experience tells me that suicide is only rational to the suicidal sole. Any attempts to discredit the theory based on why they might do it, how they may do it and what might be a better way are irrelevant. Suicide cases I have dealt with have been difficult because of personal, cultural or financial reasons, be that of the suicidal person or those they left. Pride suprisingly is often important - not wanting to be thought badly of. You may question, theoretically, how one cannot but be thought badly of when taking the lives of several hundred people results from ones action. Thats a rational response, a suicidal person may, theoretically, prefer people to consider that they died heroically. It makes little sense to those of us not contemplating suicide. I know of a case a former colleague dealt with where a suicidal person drove head on into another vehicle which contained an innocent family. His family understood he had carried out a threat he had made, but there was insufficent evidence for the court. His death, and another was held as accidental. I dealt with people who, for instance, simply hanged themselves, thus voiding life insurance. The family asked if it could be reported as an accident. It could not. I dealt with the case of a man who threw himself of a bridge, landing on his head, at my feet. His final words to me being "I'm not going to be the devil's dog, you know what happens now." The family had try to supress his psycological issues and refused to accept a verdict of death by suicide from the Coroner's Court, when it clearly was. I dealt with a case of a young man who drove his vehicle at speed into a railway bridge. On the face of it a terrible accident, but with background and witness evidence it was accepted a suicide. I could go on. Now lets be clear, i am not saying this incident was the action of a suicidal pilot. The evidence does not exist in the public domain. However I want to respond to contributors who are opposed to the notion. I'll repeat myself from my last post. The switches were moved. We may never know why, but they were moved. |
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