July 17, 2025, 04:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924124
Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Last edited by BrogulT; 17th July 2025 at 12:10 . Reason: grammar
July 17, 2025, 06:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924148
I think it's simply inhumane to put the thousands of family members and friends of those who died in this tragedy through the stress caused by the protracted uncertainty as to who did what, and why, in the cockpit. And my view is that the scope for ongoing speculation does no favours for the interests of pilots or aviation safety.
The cockpit recorder almost certainly enables the investigators to distinguish between the voices recorded and identify which of those voices belongs to the PIC and which to the FO. And, based on my reading of previous posts, the cockpit recorder may have even picked up the 'clicks' of the fuel control switches. And the investigators almost certainly know which of the PIC and FO transmitted the MAYDAY. That all resolves to a small number of likely scenarios, which scenarios have been described (repeatedly) in this thread, all of which should already have been formulated by the investigators.
For the life of me, I cannot see the point of the investigators not coming out and saying: "At this point, we are confident of at least these facts: ... Unfortunately, it follows that we are confident that either the PIC or FO switched off both fuel control switches seconds after take off. That all leads us to be confident that one of X combinations of actions occurred in the cockpit, but we have yet to have any confidence as to what motivated any one or more of those actions: ..."
Look at how many NTSB update briefings occurred in the wake of the mid-air collision involving the CRJ and Blackhawk at DCA. The ATC recording is publicly available. What damage was done, to whom, by those update briefings or the publication of the ATC recording?
The cockpit recorder almost certainly enables the investigators to distinguish between the voices recorded and identify which of those voices belongs to the PIC and which to the FO. And, based on my reading of previous posts, the cockpit recorder may have even picked up the 'clicks' of the fuel control switches. And the investigators almost certainly know which of the PIC and FO transmitted the MAYDAY. That all resolves to a small number of likely scenarios, which scenarios have been described (repeatedly) in this thread, all of which should already have been formulated by the investigators.
For the life of me, I cannot see the point of the investigators not coming out and saying: "At this point, we are confident of at least these facts: ... Unfortunately, it follows that we are confident that either the PIC or FO switched off both fuel control switches seconds after take off. That all leads us to be confident that one of X combinations of actions occurred in the cockpit, but we have yet to have any confidence as to what motivated any one or more of those actions: ..."
Look at how many NTSB update briefings occurred in the wake of the mid-air collision involving the CRJ and Blackhawk at DCA. The ATC recording is publicly available. What damage was done, to whom, by those update briefings or the publication of the ATC recording?
You can bring your objections to the attention of ICAO and lobby them to change the rules, but given these rules have been in place for decades - and have generally worked quite will - I doubt there going to change them just to satisfy your curiosity.
July 17, 2025, 07:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924194
I'm confident I'm far from alone. I do take objection to the connotations of your suggestion that my motivation is to "just to satisfy [my] curiosity". If you read what I wrote, my motivation has nothing to do with anything as trivial as satisfying my curiosity. But I'm assuming you meant no offence.
However, the 'bottom line' is that you're almost certainly correct and this investigation will carry on for however long the investigators choose to take, while choosing to reveal or withhold whatever they chose to reveal or withhold, and ICAO will continue to do the things that bureaucracies tend to do. In the meantime, the thousands of family members and friends of the deceased will be at the mercy of speculation and leaks of unknown origin.
However, the 'bottom line' is that you're almost certainly correct and this investigation will carry on for however long the investigators choose to take, while choosing to reveal or withhold whatever they chose to reveal or withhold, and ICAO will continue to do the things that bureaucracies tend to do. In the meantime, the thousands of family members and friends of the deceased will be at the mercy of speculation and leaks of unknown origin.
Early releases of unvetted data can not only cause unproductive public reactions, it can result in external pressures being applied to the investigative team that can adversely affect their ability to come to the correct cause. Furthermore, I cannot recall a single preliminary report that contained anything like an actual CVR transcript. Those are routinely included in the final report, but not preliminary reports. About the only time you'll see unvalidated information is when there is a suggestion that there is an imminent air safety threat - in which case appropriate emergency inspections are ordered (sometimes even aircraft groundings).
I have a pretty vivid memory: In the aftermath of the Chicago DC-10 crash when the engine ripped off the wing, a couple of days later some department head (I don't remember if he was FAA or NTSB) stood on the podium holding a broken bolt and pronounced that it was the reason the engine came off. Unvetted information that turned out to be complete BS - but resulted in massive outrage that 'the engine was held on by one bolt' - more BS. Fortunately it didn't derail the investigation - and even had a silver lining in that the order bolt inspections lead to the discovery of the actual pylon structural damage that had caused the engine mount to fail. Similarly, after the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster - I watched the clueless head of NASA stand in from of the TV cameras and state as fact that a piece of foam could never have punched a hole in the Columbia wing (obviously never studied that mass*velocity squared thing) - which of course we again know was complete BS.
I've been involved in a few fatal accident investigations - the big one being the Lauda 767, where I was called in early. I was one of the first people to see the FADEC NVM readout that made it painfully obvious that the T/R had deployed at 23,000 ft. - something that we didn't think could happen. We (Boeing) had missed something, and a lot of people had died as a result. It really bothered me (more than once during that investigation, when I got home from work, I just sat down and drank a large glass of Scotch). And not being able to discuss any of it with anyone not involved in the investigation just made it worse. But I knew the rules, understood why there where there, and I followed them.
July 17, 2025, 10:13:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924281
For everyone interested in the fco switches, here’s a totally authoritative explanation. Fast forward to about 15 minute mark.
July 17, 2025, 11:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924319
For reference, here's the datasheet for the family of switches that includes the 787 fuel cutoff switch (4TL837-3D):
https://prod-edam.honeywell.com/cont...iid-148208.pdf
I apologize if this has already been posted.
https://prod-edam.honeywell.com/cont...iid-148208.pdf
I apologize if this has already been posted.
July 17, 2025, 11:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924321
"The unit is designed with a spring-loaded action when it's pulled up. Its natural state wants to stay down at all times - that is one locking mechanism. The secondary locking mechanism is the gate - when the switch is pulled up and transitioned into its next position, it gets locked by the gate, or the detent, or the bridge (whatever you want to call it)."
Obviously the narrator doesn't mean that there are two independent locking mechanisms - it's the combined action of the spring and the detent that supplies the desired locking characteristics.
Interestingly, he goes on to say that it was the failure of the spring on a 737 switch that led to the SB being issued.
July 17, 2025, 11:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924328
Press Report
Extract from a Telegraph article this morning, is this relevant ?.
Indian media, however, reported that investigators were examining potential electrical and digital faults that could have triggered “uncommanded” actions.
“The probe will ascertain the possibility of an ‘uncommanded transition’ of the fuel control switches to the cut-off mode seconds after the lift-off,” an official aware of the investigation was reported to have said.
Just hours before take-off, a pilot flying the same aircraft from Delhi to Ahmedabad noted in the technical log a “stabiliser position transducer defect”, the newspaper said.
The stabiliser position transducer is a sensor that controls the up and down movement of the aircraft’s nose, and transmits the data to flight control systems. The official said the malfunction was checked and the engineer did the troubleshooting.
“The malfunction is a critical issue as it can trigger incorrect responses in flight control, including unintended fuel cut-off signal,” the official was quoted as saying.
Indian media, however, reported that investigators were examining potential electrical and digital faults that could have triggered “uncommanded” actions.
“The probe will ascertain the possibility of an ‘uncommanded transition’ of the fuel control switches to the cut-off mode seconds after the lift-off,” an official aware of the investigation was reported to have said.
Just hours before take-off, a pilot flying the same aircraft from Delhi to Ahmedabad noted in the technical log a “stabiliser position transducer defect”, the newspaper said.
The stabiliser position transducer is a sensor that controls the up and down movement of the aircraft’s nose, and transmits the data to flight control systems. The official said the malfunction was checked and the engineer did the troubleshooting.
“The malfunction is a critical issue as it can trigger incorrect responses in flight control, including unintended fuel cut-off signal,” the official was quoted as saying.
July 17, 2025, 11:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924331
That's better than being at the mercy of speculation from the AAIB.
It's easy to go, "it must be suicide, there's nothing else in the preliminary report that explains it". Well, the things that might turn out to be a factor are not in the preliminary report because they're still being investigated. Fuel samples. The switches themselves, which suffered fire damage. A thorough understanding what can cause the transitions logged on the EAFR, and what did cause them.
YOU are one of the sources of "speculation of unknown origin".
It's easy to go, "it must be suicide, there's nothing else in the preliminary report that explains it". Well, the things that might turn out to be a factor are not in the preliminary report because they're still being investigated. Fuel samples. The switches themselves, which suffered fire damage. A thorough understanding what can cause the transitions logged on the EAFR, and what did cause them.
YOU are one of the sources of "speculation of unknown origin".
July 17, 2025, 11:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924333
Extract from a Telegraph article this morning, is this relevant ?.
Indian media, however, reported that investigators were examining potential electrical and digital faults that could have triggered \x93uncommanded\x94 actions.
\x93The probe will ascertain the possibility of an \x91uncommanded transition\x92 of the fuel control switches to the cut-off mode seconds after the lift-off,\x94 an official aware of the investigation was reported to have said.
Just hours before take-off, a pilot flying the same aircraft from Delhi to Ahmedabad noted in the technical log a \x93stabiliser position transducer defect\x94, the newspaper said.
The stabiliser position transducer is a sensor that controls the up and down movement of the aircraft\x92s nose, and transmits the data to flight control systems. The official said the malfunction was checked and the engineer did the troubleshooting.
\x93The malfunction is a critical issue as it can trigger incorrect responses in flight control, including unintended fuel cut-off signal,\x94 the official was quoted as saying.
Indian media, however, reported that investigators were examining potential electrical and digital faults that could have triggered \x93uncommanded\x94 actions.
\x93The probe will ascertain the possibility of an \x91uncommanded transition\x92 of the fuel control switches to the cut-off mode seconds after the lift-off,\x94 an official aware of the investigation was reported to have said.
Just hours before take-off, a pilot flying the same aircraft from Delhi to Ahmedabad noted in the technical log a \x93stabiliser position transducer defect\x94, the newspaper said.
The stabiliser position transducer is a sensor that controls the up and down movement of the aircraft\x92s nose, and transmits the data to flight control systems. The official said the malfunction was checked and the engineer did the troubleshooting.
\x93The malfunction is a critical issue as it can trigger incorrect responses in flight control, including unintended fuel cut-off signal,\x94 the official was quoted as saying.
The same applies to former pilots https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...room-in-india/
July 17, 2025, 12:00:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924343
For everyone interested in the fco switches, here\x92s a totally authoritative explanation. Fast forward to about 15 minute mark.
https://youtu.be/-ur234kwnhk?si=4GxUqlWmMOJs8VOC
July 17, 2025, 12:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924345
I have not posted on here in many years, but I feel compelled to do so now. I am a current 787 pilot and I have previously flown most Boeing types and an Airbus too. I also have an extensive background and qualifications in human factors, training and assessment. Before anybody reads any further, perhaps acquaint yourself with the notion of Occam's razor. That is, the simplest explanation is the most likely explanation. I was certain that after the preliminary report was released the preposterous conspiracy theories would finally cease, but no! It's 2025 and humans can no longer help themselves. In my opinion the captain committed suicide here. Simple.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
As to not putting out the CVR there is always tremendous outside pressure on an investigation of this scale. Air India is important to the nation. As someone else mentioned when the final report is published it will be old news. Time works for Air India in this case. They appear to finally be making solid progress on a return to financial solvency. The powers to be are not going to jeopardize that turnaround. The answers will come with the final report at a time when it will do far less damage to Air India.
July 17, 2025, 12:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924351
WSJ being leaked to again and they are not even trying to hide the fact that it is US officials doing the leaking as with the leaks in the days before the preliminary report
it\x92s hard to justify this and it does just make the AAIB\x92s job more difficult, would the NTSB appreciate Indian entities leaking to the Indian media before a preliminary and then final report?
im not saying it\x92s correct but it does only fuel the simmering Indian (domestic) audience\x92s views of a US/Boeing \x91coverup\x92
what new details were actually revealed here, it didn\x92t counter the facts laid out by the AAIB prelim at all so it\x92s not like we can claim the AAIB is covering up and the US has to issue counter factuals (as with the China Eastern 737)
it\x92s hard to justify this and it does just make the AAIB\x92s job more difficult, would the NTSB appreciate Indian entities leaking to the Indian media before a preliminary and then final report?
im not saying it\x92s correct but it does only fuel the simmering Indian (domestic) audience\x92s views of a US/Boeing \x91coverup\x92
what new details were actually revealed here, it didn\x92t counter the facts laid out by the AAIB prelim at all so it\x92s not like we can claim the AAIB is covering up and the US has to issue counter factuals (as with the China Eastern 737)
It is important to know who asked ' why did you cutoff'. Because it confirms that captain, who had both hands free, set both switches to CUTOFF for no reason.
July 17, 2025, 12:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924353
Continued Airworthiness Notification to International Community (FAA - July 11, 2025)
Previously, I posted the content of a Reuters article about FAA (as well as Boeing) having issued notices to operators prompted by the reference in the AAIB Prelim Rpt w/r/t the SAIB about fuel switches in certain 737 aircraft (Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin No. NM-18-33, December 17, 2018).
Through a LinkedIn timeline I happened to discover the actual document the Reuters report was based on. It is entitled "Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community", issued by the FAA Aircraft Certification Service, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, dated July 11, 2025. As reported by Reuters, the FAA Notification document specifically references the fact that the AAIB Prelim Rpt made reference to the 2018 SAIB w/r/t the fuel switches.
The social media platform makes it difficult to transfer content off of it. Interested people may access the document in a LinkedIn post by former NTSB Chair Robert L. Sumwalt, NTSB Chair 2017-2014. (A search of the thread did not turn up the document; apologies if it's already here and I slipped up and missed it.)
Through a LinkedIn timeline I happened to discover the actual document the Reuters report was based on. It is entitled "Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community", issued by the FAA Aircraft Certification Service, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, dated July 11, 2025. As reported by Reuters, the FAA Notification document specifically references the fact that the AAIB Prelim Rpt made reference to the 2018 SAIB w/r/t the fuel switches.
The social media platform makes it difficult to transfer content off of it. Interested people may access the document in a LinkedIn post by former NTSB Chair Robert L. Sumwalt, NTSB Chair 2017-2014. (A search of the thread did not turn up the document; apologies if it's already here and I slipped up and missed it.)
July 17, 2025, 12:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924357
For reference, here's the datasheet for the family of switches that includes the 787 fuel cutoff switch (4TL837-3D):
https://prod-edam.honeywell.com/cont...iid-148208.pdf
I apologize if this has already been posted.
https://prod-edam.honeywell.com/cont...iid-148208.pdf
I apologize if this has already been posted.
July 17, 2025, 12:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924361
I can fully understand and appreciate the leaking. I have been studying the bull!!!! reporting by India media about the cause of this crash. Former senior pilots, some who flew the B787, tell complete utter nonsense about possible technical issues. Like the engines failed and that was the reason to set both switches to cutoff.
It is important to know who asked ' why did you cutoff'. Because it confirms that captain, who had both hands free, set both switches to CUTOFF for no reason.
It is important to know who asked ' why did you cutoff'. Because it confirms that captain, who had both hands free, set both switches to CUTOFF for no reason.
im not sure how that justifies those with privileged information clearly on the US side leaking undermining the official investigation that is being run with international observers from multiple countries and in line with ICAO guidance
I\x92m not saying it is but it gives off more fuel to idea that Boeing has deep sway inside the US elites and institutions
your last paragraph is conjecture, we can speculate but the job of the investigators is to be 100% accurate, it\x92s easy for us to sit on the sidelines and throw out whatever theories we like but their responsibility is much higher
if US entities aren\x92t happy with the tone/substance of the preliminary report their is a mechanism for them to provide there own findings at a later date, this cloak and dagger selective leaking stuff really is uncalled for
July 17, 2025, 12:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924362
To those who find it difficult to accept certain suicide scenarios, the objection often stems from the perceived irrationality. As others have explained, the answer is that rationality is not present - or not in a form that the rest of us would recognise. I once came up with a thought exercise that helped explain it in a way that might satisfy a rational mind.
I have not posted on here in many years, but I feel compelled to do so now. I am a current 787 pilot and I have previously flown most Boeing types and an Airbus too. I also have an extensive background and qualifications in human factors, training and assessment. Before anybody reads any further, perhaps acquaint yourself with the notion of Occam's razor. That is, the simplest explanation is the most likely explanation. I was certain that after the preliminary report was released the preposterous conspiracy theories would finally cease, but no! It's 2025 and humans can no longer help themselves. In my opinion the captain committed suicide here. Simple.
All known cases of pilot suicide have indicators that are not present here. In some cases (like the often mentioned Germanwings incident) those indicators were such strong evidence that the criminal case was open and shut in days or weeks. Those weren't "simple" cases either, but they had the evidence one would expect from a pilot suffering such a complex condition. Nothing of the sort is known about either the Captain or the FO.
Suicide is almost always the last step in a long history of suffering from (mental) illness. Suicidal ideation is what the medical field calls thoughts (ideas about) suicide. It's a comparably common symptom shown in around 5-20% of adults worldwide with strong variation correlating with external factors, such as economic well being, occupation, stress, etc. Assessed globally Pilots, as far as relevant studies are available, seem to fall into the lower bracket of prevalence of suicidal ideation with a lower than expected prevalence when compared to the general population from their respective country of origin down to the rate observed in the general population of economically stable and strong countries.
Cases where pilot suicide is suspected (any case where at least some level of evidence is present but either no or only an officially disputed final assessment exists) also generally follow the same patterns. Attempts at concealment are known to happen, but make up only 10%-30% of completed suicides in the general population. This does include the gray area of potentially successful concealment which would lead to the assumption of an accidental death.
In almost all cases a recurring pattern is also the topic of certainty. In suicidal ideation it is a very common theme that any issues are projected into the future and the uncertainty of those issues generates anxiety. Many survivors of suicide attempts reveal that they considered the certainty of their own death to be preferable over the continuance of uncertainty and the associated anxiety. While we are far from being able to authoritatively call this a definitive mechanism in the psychological conditions related to suicide it is strongly implicated and subject of ongoing research. My personal way of explaining this to someone unfamiliar with depression is that your brain is quite literally poisoning you and generating so much trauma that the idea of ending it becomes preferable. Patients in this stage of major depression show a determination and rationality in their drive towards that goal that is often the primary source of perceived irrationality from the outside. They routinely ignore any and all information that is not relevant to their goal. The means are often chosen with preference of perceived certainty over any other motivation, including harm to others.
Summarizing:
1. Suicide is overwhelmingly the last step in a history of mental illness and almost exclusively presents without that in cases of immediate, significant and obvious trauma.
2. Attempts of concealment are of low probability in a suicide.
3. Methods of suicide are commonly chosen based on perceived certainty of success.
These indicators are all negative for the Air India accident. There is no indication of a prolonged history of mental illness, there is no immediate, significant or obvious trauma. Theorizing an attempt at suicide by either of the pilots requires the assumption of a major attempt at concealment. And most importantly: The method chosen is not following the pattern of maximizing certainty, the probable reason why all confirmed and even all suspected cases of pilot suicide happened in cruise flight.
The theory of suicide is thus, in this particular case, a bad fit.
If we are assuming an (intentionally) concealed medical condition there are much simpler and more likely candidates available. Any type of cardiac issue could lead to a clot and a stroke. A stroke fully explains what happened here. A clot triggered by the acceleration of the takeoff run could very reasonably present as a stroke in the timeframe given here. If the victim belatedly realizes what happened he may develop the wish to stop the situation, which in a stroking brain could absolutely lead to the shortcut of "turning off the engines is done at the end of flight". Or the stroke victim is trying to hold onto something and grabs the switches relatively close to the relaxed hand position after releasing the thrust levers at V1. Other conditions can rapidly present and impact judgement, motor function, or both. If we are willing to attribute the Captains recent decision to retire and be with his father as a potential change in character we might even fall into a number of neurological conditions that may be causal.
But there are even simpler explanations than a concealed medical condition. Maybe one of the pilots had previously finished recurring training for evacuations on the runway and had discussed this with his colleague ahead of the flight. The final memory item for those is turning off the fuel pumps. This kind of Action Slip is well documented. It's not very likely, thus I have no issue believing no one reported observing that type of a slip in a simulator, but it's not like accidents with this level of weirdness are common. There is however a good indicator here fitting the situation of at least one of the pilots: The Captain may have been preoccupied with his wish to retire soon and spending time with his father. While the latter makes absolutely no sense in a suicide it could be part of the causality for an action slip. Also note this post about inadvertent activation of switches despite majorly different modes of activation.
In the end here are three observations based on the preliminary report:
1. Any type of mechanical fault is unlikely and no immediately supporting evidence has been found.
2. A human factor is currently the most likely candidate for the cause of the accident.
3. The type of human factor is not being speculated upon in the preliminary report.
Note that the report specifically states:
Complete analysis of postmortem reports of the crew and the passengers is being undertaken to corroborate aeromedical findings with the engineering appreciation.
Attribution of an unclear accident to suicide is contributing to a problematic pattern of stigmatization and increases the likeliness of concealment of (mental) health issues associated with that stigma. In addition it precludes proper analysis of a potential inadvertent mishandling of controls. Both Airbus and Boeing commonly utilize this position and type of guarded switch. Both are sufficiently protected against accidental movement but nothing else. In many smaller aircraft setting the Master Switch to Off would not lead to engine shutdown. There are even reports of what we could consider negative training, by flight instructors demonstrating this fact by turning the Master Switch off in flight. Other commercial aircraft utilize different schemes, Embraer was mentioned right at the beginning of this thread by moosepileit as requiring Throttle Levers at idle for Fuel Cutoff as well as positioning those switches on the overhead panel .
Having just done a full review of this entire thread with regard to human factors I find it a bit sad to note that from the start there were multiple people with backgrounds in accident investigation present that pointed out human error and gave proper reasoning or even corroborating evidence in the form of accident reports. There are also multiple people repeatedly injecting their theory of pilot suicide either without providing any evidence or referring to baseless rumors from media reports. Notably those same people often rejected any other possibility of human error. They also repeatedly make statements of fact that are contradicted or not covered by the preliminary report. Any discussion of mental health seems pointless at this moment in time since there is no actual interest in the topic beyond occasionally going "It's suicide, duh". If anyone is interested in the topic I can once again only recommend taking a look at the Pilot Mental Health Campaign Research Page and other resources presented there.
I think the other worthwhile takeaway from this thread has been stated rather early, with the very applicable nod to a better layout regarding critical functionality that has no reason to be present in close proximity to regularly used flight controls.
July 17, 2025, 12:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924370
Obviously the narrator doesn't mean that there are two independent locking mechanisms - it's the combined action of the spring and the detent that supplies the desired locking characteristics.
Interestingly, he goes on to say that it was the failure of the spring on a 737 switch that led to the SB being issued.
July 17, 2025, 12:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924381
I have not posted on here in many years, but I feel compelled to do so now. I am a current 787 pilot and I have previously flown most Boeing types and an Airbus too. I also have an extensive background and qualifications in human factors, training and assessment. Before anybody reads any further, perhaps acquaint yourself with the notion of Occam's razor. That is, the simplest explanation is the most likely explanation. I was certain that after the preliminary report was released the preposterous conspiracy theories would finally cease, but no! It's 2025 and humans can no longer help themselves. In my opinion the captain committed suicide here. Simple.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
July 17, 2025, 12:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924382
If it was a suicide attempt, wouldn't the pilot responsible wait until the aircraft had got a bit higher before operating the fuel switches and follow it up with full forward stick ? At low level the outcome wouldn't have been in any doubt. Nose down would be instinctive to someone who wanted to crash and with the arms locked in the extended position it would be very difficult for the other pilot to override him.
July 17, 2025, 12:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924390
Please stop this nonsense. There was no problem with the engines until one of the pilots set both fuel control switches to the CUTOFF position. Why is it so hard to understand that the change of position of the switches is the reason there was no thrust anymore? There is not a single report of a switch failure on any of B787 aircraft.
1) There was a switch failure on a 737 that disabled the gate mechanism.
2) The switch on the 787 is of similar construction (edit: that's why it was included in the SAIB) .
3) Therefore, it is impossible that the accident 787 had a switch issue.
Do you understand that this is not logical?
And then you go on to cajole people who look forward to the AAIB thoroughly examining the switches they have in front of them, to generate actual evidence on whether these specific switches have an issue or not.
I agree that it is unlikely that the switches have an issue, but I still want the AAIB to look, so they can state it as a fact, instead of relying on guesswork.
Last edited by Musician; 17th July 2025 at 13:43 . Reason: see marked edit