Posts about: "Fuel Cutoff Switches" [Posts: 904 Page: 45 of 46]ΒΆ

Fursty Ferret
February 03, 2026, 13:38:00 GMT
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Post: 12031598
This is - in my opinion, I must stress - an incredibly clumsy move by an Air India pilot. I think the impartiality of the investigation was always dubious, and now even more so.

I can quite believe a fuel control switch not latching in position, because I've seen it happen myself when going from run to cut-off where someone let it sit on top of the raised lip between positions instead of deliberately moving it to cut-off.

I can just about conceive of a case where someone did this on engine start and the switch flicked to cut-off with the thumping of the nose wheel over a rough runway. Do I believe that it could happen simultaneously to both switches? No.

On top of that, when did they discover this? Were they flipping the switch during engine start? Did they abort the start and experiment with the switch? Why didn't they get engineering assistance? This is just spectacularly dodgy decision making.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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DTA
February 03, 2026, 13:55:00 GMT
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Post: 12031609
Originally Posted by Fursty Ferret
This is - in my opinion, I must stress - an incredibly clumsy move by an Air India pilot. I think the impartiality of the investigation was always dubious, and now even more so.

I can just about conceive of a case where someone did this on engine start and the switch flicked to cut-off with the thumping of the nose wheel over a rough runway. Do I believe that it could happen simultaneously to both switches? No.
Simultaneously would be more credible/possible than 1 second apart as it actually happened.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Musician
February 03, 2026, 14:02:00 GMT
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Post: 12031615
The document from the tweet, in full:

https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseP...6&reg=3&lang=1
Ministry of Civil Aviation
Rejoinder on News Item relating to purported malfunction of Fuel Cut Off Switch on M/s Air India Boeing B787-8 aircraft VT-ANX
Posted On: 03 FEB 2026 5:27PM by PIB Delhi
.
On 01.02.2026, Air India B787-8 aircraft VT-ANX operated flight AI 132 (London- Bangalore). During engine start in London, on two occasions crew observed that the fuel control switch did not remain positively latched in the “RUN” position when light vertical pressure was applied. On the third attempt, the switch latched correctly in “RUN” and subsequently remained stable. Before continuing with the rest of procedure, a physical verification was performed by the crew to confirm that the switch was fully and positively latched in the “RUN” position. No abnormal engine parameters, cautions, warnings, or related system messages were observed during engine start or at any time thereafter. The operating crew member was briefed on the observation, unnecessary contact with the switch was avoided, and engine indications and alerting systems were closely monitored by the crew for the remainder of the flight. The flight was completed without incident.
After landing at Bangalore, crew reported the defect in the PDR. Air India referred the matter to M/s Boeing for further guidance. Based on the M/s Boeing recommended checks to establish the serviceability of fuel control switch, M/s Air India engineering observed that:
“Both left and right switches were checked and found satisfactory, with the locking tooth/pawl fully seated and not slipping from RUN to CUTOFF. When full force was applied parallel to the base plate, the switch remained secure. However, applying external force in an incorrect direction caused the switch to move easily from RUN to CUTOFF, due to the angular base plate allowing slip when pressed improperly with finger or thumb.”
In addition, based on Boeing’s communication, the pull-to-unlock force was checked on the fuel control switch using the recommended procedure on the involved fuel cut off switch, the fuel control unit to be installed and fuel cut off switch of another aircraft. In all cases the pull-to-unlock force was found within limits. These inspections were carried out in the presence of DGCA officers.
The video currently circulating on social media was analysed in light of Boeing recommended procedures, and it was observed that the procedure demonstrated in the video being circulated is incorrect.
The airline is being advised to circulate the Boeing recommended procedure for the operation of Fuel CUT OFF switch to its crew members.

Subjects DGCA  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Parameters  RUN/CUTOFF

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Pilot DAR
February 03, 2026, 14:25:00 GMT
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Post: 12031636
However, applying external force in an incorrect direction caused the switch to move easily from RUN to CUTOFF............
I'm not clear on what an "incorrect direction" would be in this context. Does that imply that when the switch was in the RUN position pushing it toward run caused it to easily move toward CUTOFF?

..........due to the angular base plate allowing slip when pressed improperly with finger or thumb.”
This requires more explanation to make sense.

On the third attempt, the switch latched correctly in “RUN” and subsequently remained stable.
Hmmm... Were it to have been a circuit breaker, how many times would a reset attempt be acceptable practice? But ultimately, it latched correctly in RUN. But then someone evaluated the switch locking, and reported as quoted above? This is all very slushy.

Though this discussion being about the RUN/CUTOFF switch(s) of a 787 being accused of improper operation, does this really relate to the Air India 171 crash? The reported information has already stated that both switches were selected from RUN to CUTOFF within a second, and then back to RUN, with a pilot remark about that action. It is a statistical infinity that on 171 both switches would fail into the cutoff position by themselves within a second, and there not be a pilot remark about that in the CVR, when there was a remark "Why did you do that?" associated with the switches.

I have moved a lot of switches and other controls in my flying career. In each case, I made that action with the intent that doing so would cause the desired action of a system. Moving the control itself was a means to an end. So, in moving the control, I determined that the ultimate objective was achieved. If there was a "feel" or locking system associated with the motion of the switch/control, then I would assess that too - was it working as expected? Like a flap or landing gear selector, I don't just push it toward the other direction, and hope that it pops into the desired position, I actually move the control the whole way, and confirm by feel/sight/locking device, that it is where I intend it to be, and will stay. Let's not forget that very basic expectation of piloting! Yes, there is the phrase "throw the switch", but that is for Igor. We pilots will move the switch the whole way, and assure that it got where it was going and is going to stay!

Both of these topics relate to the switch(es) in the 787, but I think that the similarity ends there.

Subjects CVR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  RUN/CUTOFF

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Ver5pen
February 03, 2026, 14:52:00 GMT
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Post: 12031660
Originally Posted by Musician
We already have several threads on AI171 issues (at least one of them in Tech Log ), so moving this discussion to its own thread seems unproblematic.

The significance of this new finding is that it makes accidental movement more likely. We already know about the incident where a sun visor fell and moved the switch. We are learning now that the mechanism of "pull up, then move the switch" can be circumvented, and that the switch can be moved by a single application of force. It appears that the engineers were able to reproduce this behaviour, so it's no longer just that crew's word.

So while on VT-ANB both switches moved at the same time, and that is unlikely to happen by itself, it now appears possible that an external force such as a loose object or an inadvertant pilot motion could have moved both switches. At least, this requires further study to narrow down the conditions for it, and to check whether these conditions were present on the accident flight.
indeed. This is what I am taking from this

all of the noise about these switches being foolproof and above suspicion hence it could only have been deliberate action

yet many airlines have suffered inadvertent engine shutdowns because of accidental manipulation of fuel cut off switches/engine masters in

and these specific switches on the identical fleet in the same airline, it\x92s certainly a noteworthy revelation

dismissing this as professional crews trying to cover up for their colleagues or some other highly absurd slanderous accusation I would\x92ve hoped was beneath PPRUNE, but of course only Indians/foreigners are to be doubted, everyone else are professionals who only ever act with integrity. We\x92ve never seen western/American OEMs or regulators falling short on this absolutely not.

Subjects AI171  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Flightmech
February 03, 2026, 17:39:00 GMT
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Post: 12031737
This is nothing but a timed and very poor attempt at a diversion from reality. Oh look, we found a fuel cutoff switch problem on another one of our fleet (but flew on with it anyway).

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Pilot DAR
February 03, 2026, 17:57:00 GMT
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Post: 12031742
Oh look, we found a fuel cutoff switch problem on another one of our fleet
I read a report of a problem. I'm not sure that I actually see a report that there truly was a problem.

Preceding a "however" This was reported:

“Both left and right switches were checked and found satisfactory, with the locking tooth/pawl fully seated and not slipping from RUN to CUTOFF. When full force was applied parallel to the base plate, the switch remained secure.
If a "however" is written after that statement, it is either meaningless and to be ignored, or it has the effect of negating the statement. There is no "partly airworthy" for these switches. It can't be both statements. Thus, my doubt about the credibility/applicability of this whole situation in the context of the 171 crash, subject to these two statements being reconciled with each other.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  RUN/CUTOFF

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Musician
February 03, 2026, 18:53:00 GMT
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Post: 12031774
Originally Posted by Pilot DAR
I read a report of a problem. I'm not sure that I actually see a report that there truly was a problem.

Preceding a "however" This was reported:

If a "however" is written after that statement, it is either meaningless and to be ignored, or it has the effect of negating the statement. There is no "partly airworthy" for these switches. It can't be both statements. Thus, my doubt about the credibility/applicability of this whole situation in the context of the 171 crash, subject to these two statements being reconciled with each other.
I really, really want to see a better report on this.

I imagine one way for this to be true would be if the lever has some wiggle room, such that the teeth on it can move sideways past the teeth on the base, and then stick in that position where the lever is up and the flanks of the teeth are still touching. In that position, you could flip the switch back off without overcoming the detent. But if you operate the switch properly, with no sideways force, and seat the lever correctly in the ON position, then it'd be secure. That fits with the part of the press release about telling the pilots how to operate these switches properly.

Obviously I have no idea if this is true. I just want to give an example of how that switch might be operated one way to be unsafe, and another way to be safe. I'd really want to see Boeing's take on this, and not a third-hand press release that went from Boeing to Air India engineering to ??? to the ministry. It may say something impossible that differs from the possible thing the engineers actually found.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent)

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Abbas Ibn Firnas
February 03, 2026, 21:12:00 GMT
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Post: 12031844
This should never be allowed to happen again. As things stand it's entirely possible it could. I would hope the final report will recommend a re-think as to how this critical system could be improved to prevent miss use or failure.

Any mention of modifications have received pushback because operators cite how long Boeing have been doing it this way without any serious issues.

I feel that standpoint incredibly ill-advised given that the situation could be improved to negate single point failure or deliberate action, or at least determine which had occurred.

Previous discussions on here relating to either relocating or guarding the switches has been dismissed by most as unnecessary, which I can understand, as it would probably add little in the way of increased safety.

I'm no designer of aircraft systems, but reading this continued discussion about springs, detents latching wiggling and misplaced pressure, I'm astonished this whole incident exclusively involves only one mundane yet important component.

My point really is
1 engine cut-off should not be possible at 100ft elevation.
2 A single switch malfunction should not shut down engine(s)

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent)

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MechEngr
February 03, 2026, 21:24:00 GMT
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Post: 12031849
Originally Posted by Musician
I imagine one way for this to be true would be if the lever has some wiggle room, such that the teeth on it can move sideways past the teeth on the base, and then stick in that position where the lever is up and the flanks of the teeth are still touching. In that position, you could flip the switch back off without overcoming the detent. But if you operate the switch properly, with no sideways force, and seat the lever correctly in the ON position, then it'd be secure. That fits with the part of the press release about telling the pilots how to operate these switches properly.
There are two teeth on the switch body and two teeth on the plunger that is pulled up to unlatch the switch. There is not enough room for a tooth on the plunger to fit between the switch toggle and the mating tooth on the switch body. It would require the toggle axle pin to break to allow that, allowing the toggle to fall off and the plunger with it.

Clearly the design of the latch requires that it move from one position to another position with some applied forces. Absent some clarification of what the pilot(s) did or observed, their statement matches the way the switch is supposed to function.

" However, applying external force in an incorrect direction caused the switch to move easily from RUN to CUTOFF, due to the angular base plate allowing slip when pressed improperly with finger or thumb.\x94

The problematic part of the statement is that there is nothing that says what they think the incorrect direction is. But, if one wants it to move it must be pushed in a direction that is incorrect for it to remain locked in position. It is almost certain that if one pushes towards the opposite position from the current locked one and, at the same time uses the friction from that push, one can pull the plunger up and disengage the lock.

Is that what they meant by "incorrect direction"? Who, besides them, know what they meant?

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent)  RUN/CUTOFF

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ignorantAndroid
February 03, 2026, 22:12:00 GMT
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Post: 12031878
Originally Posted by Lifer01
For reference, Boeing does not provide a procedure to replace the cut-off switches. If there is an issue with a fuel cut-off switch, the whole thrust control module is to be replaced, ie. the throttle levers and cut-off switches are in one module.

I believe this has been the case since before the AI accident.
In this video from Stig Aviation, at 17:33, he states, "You can change the switches individually because it gives you the option in the maintenance manual."


Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Fursty Ferret
February 03, 2026, 23:14:00 GMT
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Post: 12031908
Originally Posted by Abbas Ibn Firnas
My point really is
1 engine cut-off should not be possible at 100ft elevation.
2 A single switch malfunction should not shut down engine(s)
1. Which is why no one looks at anything until the flight path is under control (essentially above 400' RA).
2. This is taken into consideration at the design stage and isn't an issue.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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TURIN
February 04, 2026, 00:52:00 GMT
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Post: 12031928
Originally Posted by Abbas Ibn Firnas
With respect, you've not addressed point 1.
That it is possible to cut of fuel at take off thrust and below 400'
2.are you saying a failed switch shutting down an engine isn't an issue, or that the inherent design eliminates that possibility?
Re point 2
Is there any evidence of the cut off switch failing AND shutting the engine down?

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Chernobyl
February 04, 2026, 07:06:00 GMT
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Post: 12032008
Originally Posted by Abbas Ibn Firnas
With respect, you've not addressed point 1.
That it is possible to cut of fuel at take off thrust and below 400'
The problem with your stated concern is how do you prevent it? Simple, you say: interlock it with the thrust levers and/or radio alt and/or baro alt in some combination to ensure you can ONLY switch to cutoff if not below 400' ft or at takeoff thrust. But what happens if this new logic fails in a novel way in the future preventing an engine shutdown when it really IS needed? Any new complexity adds potential unintended consequences and hence risks. Is the cure worse than the disease? Right now, the switch design is entirely consistent with Boeing standard practice: flight crew actions are the final say.

Subjects Engine Failure (All)  Engine Shutdown  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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FullWings
February 04, 2026, 07:41:00 GMT
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Post: 12032024
It could possibly be an interesting failure mode of the FCSs but a) it still appears to require significant (deliberate) force to make it happen and b) on the accident flight both switches go to cutoff and are left there for some considerable time before being put back to run despite the crew being aware of their unusual position for the phase of flight (CVR). Chances of this happening without pilot input infinitesimal?

Subjects CVR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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DaveReidUK
February 04, 2026, 09:26:00 GMT
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Post: 12032065
Originally Posted by Chernobyl
The problem with your stated concern is how do you prevent it? Simple, you say: interlock it with the thrust levers and/or radio alt and/or baro alt in some combination to ensure you can ONLY switch to cutoff if not below 400' ft or at takeoff thrust. But what happens if this new logic fails in a novel way in the future preventing an engine shutdown when it really IS needed? Any new complexity adds potential unintended consequences and hence risks. Is the cure worse than the disease? Right now, the switch design is entirely consistent with Boeing standard practice: flight crew actions are the final say.
Quite so.

We really don't need to read any more headlines that feature "Boeing" and "unintended consequences".

Subjects Engine Failure (All)  Engine Shutdown  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Musician
February 04, 2026, 11:16:00 GMT
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Post: 12032148
Originally Posted by Chernobyl
The problem with your stated concern is how do you prevent it? Simple, you say: interlock it with the thrust levers and/or radio alt and/or baro alt in some combination to ensure you can ONLY switch to cutoff if not below 400' ft or at takeoff thrust. But what happens if this new logic fails in a novel way in the future preventing an engine shutdown when it really IS needed? Any new complexity adds potential unintended consequences and hence risks. Is the cure worse than the disease? Right now, the switch design is entirely consistent with Boeing standard practice: flight crew actions are the final say.
AFAIK Embraer has the switches interlocked with the thrust levers so they won't cut off unless at idle, and Citations require moving the thrust lever past idle?
Obviously Boeing can't easily change "standard practice", especially if they want to keep training costs for pilots switching types low, but that doesn't mean it's not a good idea in general.
If this logic fails "when it is really needed", the pilot can still pull the fire handle. Or the engine won't start, but then they'd still be sitting at the airport. But I don't think the aircraft that already have this have had issues?


Subjects Engine Failure (All)  Engine Shutdown  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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Magplug
February 04, 2026, 17:49:00 GMT
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Post: 12032357
I am not aware of a spate of pilots purposely (or even accidentally) moving both fuel switches to cut-off at rotate that would require the investment of an interlock to prevent it. In fact, the very presence of such an interlock might introduce it's owns risks.

The chances of a centre fuel tank exploding in flight killing everybody on board may now be less that one in ten million. (It happened once so designs were modified). The chances of a pilot wishing to commit suicide may also be one in ten million. If he is denied the fuel cut-off switches then there are plenty of other options. If a pilot decides to execute a half-roll and pull-through on final approach, or some other non-recoverable manouvre then there is not a lot to prevent him.... not even the bloke sat next to him. (Please don't lecture me on Airbus AOB protections - You get my point)

For all you heating engineers with pet theories on how to design bad stuff out of aeroplanes, and all you wannabe airline pilots and CRM instructors let me tell you..... When I turn up for a trip, very often the other guy/gal is a complete stranger to me. I might have heard good things about them or they might have a bit of a reputation. As a Captain I have a limited amount of time to gauge this guy/gal before I get locked in the inner sanctum and I have to vest my TOTAL trust in them. TBH I have only ever flown with one guy who I would not trust alone in the flight deck, he was hyper-religious and just plain odd. I took my concerns to the adults and learnt I was not the first Captain making the same observation. I don't know what happened to him but our paths never crossed again.

The message here is simple.... Occasionally there are those amongst us who have their demons. It is the responsibility of us all to make sure they get the help they need before they hit rock-bottom and do something stupid.... oblivious to the 350 innocent souls sat behind the door.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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tdracer
February 04, 2026, 19:40:00 GMT
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Post: 12032406
Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
1: Intentional misuse by pilots is basically ignored in aviation design. If you want to start changing that, there's a *lot* of things to address. This is very different to the world of industrial safety, where the operator is the enemy.
THIS!!! While there is attention paid to factors to help prevent pilot mistakes, every safety analysis pretty much assumes that a pilot it not going to intentionally endanger an aircraft.
The Boeing fuel switch design is beautiful in its simplicity. A toggle switch - with detents to discourage unintentionally movement - hardwired directly from the switch to the engine with just an interposing relay. Further, the actual devices on the engine that turn the fuel ON or OFF are of a design that - if they lose power - they simply stay where they are. This latest theory that a problem with the aircraft electrical system caused it to lose electrical power and the lack of aircraft power caused the engines to shutdown was ridiculous from the start. That simply cannon happen.
Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
2: Switch failures leading to engine failure are counted as an in-flight shut down for ETOPS purposes, meaning <1 per 100K engine flight hours. So long as the failures are independent , this shouldn't be an issue.
When we started working on ETOPS, we looked at the historical rate for various shutdown causes and literally assigned design requirements that various systems had to stay below those rates.
For example, in the engine controls arena, we were allowed something like 2 shutdowns per million hours for engine control faults (I don't recall the exact number, but it was on that order or magnitude). Switch failures would fall under controls, but the historical rate of switch failure caused shutdowns is small enough that the overall rate would be vanishingly small.

Subjects Engine Failure (All)  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent)

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Someone Somewhere
February 04, 2026, 21:51:00 GMT
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Post: 12032457
Originally Posted by Magplug
I am not aware of a spate of pilots purposely (or even accidentally) moving both fuel switches to cut-off at rotate that would require the investment of an interlock to prevent it. In fact, the very presence of such an interlock might introduce it's owns risks.
One could, maybe, argue that Jeju's apparent shutdown of an engine while the other engine was in worse condition is also a case of bad use of the fuel switches, and could be prevented/dissuaded by the same protections depending on design.

It probably wouldn't prevent the Transair 810 option of ditching with the perfectly good engine at idle.

Subjects Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

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