Posts about: "Gear Retraction" [Posts: 243 Pages: 13]

Looks more like a camera autofocus artifact? Speaking of video artifacts, or is something going on on top of the right wing at :28 in that first video?

In the take off video I think there is a subtle yaw to the right at lift off (the moment it begins being obscured by the building in the foreground). There is then a massive blast of dust on the airfield on the left side of the aircraft as it lifts off. Later video audio suggests the engines were not at full power ( or even operating - just wind noise) and that the RAT was whirring. It also shows the fuselage wheel bogies were tilted forward - so wheels up has commenced - but the gear doors are not open.

Possible sequence: right engine failure at rotation, firewalling of left engine, lift off and positive rate, gear up lever activated, wheels tilt forward, left engine failure, RAT deployed, insufficient hydraulics to Open gear doors to complete gear up sequence, ongoing dual engine failure?

Thank you, and to HI288 too! this combined with the FR24 blog post about adsb loss just over the runway threshold, and the latest DGCA ask for Air India 787 maintenance adds more weight to the theory, IMO, that there was a major technical issue in play here.

Neurotypically an error in an automatic action will occur when the routine that encompasses that action is changed. Hence babies being left in back seats of cars, and probably a factor for the sterile flight deck rule. Any reason to think that might have been in play here?

I agree it is helpful to seek a consensus on some of these matters.

The most productive responses would be along the lines of:-
(1) I too have read all previous posts and agree that your summary reflects the current consensus,
(2) I too have read all previous posts and agree your summary reflects the consensus HOWEVER I challenge that consensus because... [ [i]EITHER (a) reference to previous post that merits greater credence, OR (b) new evidence supplied],
(3) I too have read all previous posts but I do NOT agree your summary reflects the consensus [explanation required].

It is not necessary for everyone who thinks (1) to say it (although some initial feedback would be useful!). However, if any of the more experienced and informed PPRuNers are thinking either (2) or (3) then it would be instructive to hear that.

FWIW, yours strikes me as a reasonable summary of the best consensus I have been able to discern (as of ~30 minutes ago). There are multiple caveats to each line item, but I presume you've deliberately left those out for the sake of readability, so I'll do the same!

The only comments I would add are:-

- It's a stretch to say the RAT is seen or heard "conclusively". Doubts have been expressed about the video quality and there are dissenting views regarding the audio. If a few more people were able to wade in on the audio point in particular, this could be very beneficial in moving the discussion forward because the presence or otherwise of the RAT is significant to several competing theories.

- On the subject of audio, I am surprised there has not been more discussion regarding engine noise. In the primary eye witness video the (alleged) RAT can be heard distinctly, as can the sounds of distant impact. If the engines were working as expected when overflying the camera and then flying directly away from it, do we really not think the engine noise would be more conclusive, i.e. louder (notwithstanding quiet engines and derated takeoffs)?

Whichever way readers are leaning in the flaps versus power loss debate, surely these two points are pivotal, and we have actual evidence available to discuss?

- Gear bogies: I'm not sure a consensus has yet been reached regarding the angle of the bogies. (I am not personally qualified to comment on this - I am purely saying I don't see a clear consensus just yet among those who are)

- Mayday call: I don't recall seeing a confirmed source for the widely reported mayday. Others have brought this up in the thread but nobody appears to be able to confirm one way or the other. If accurate, its contents are informative. Am I right to presume that you have left it out of your summary due to a lack of confirmation?

SLF, so probably stupid question: Why don't companys like Airbus or Boeing integrate scales in their planes? Not to make calculation of lift of weight of calculations are wrong? Why don't they integrate systems that hinder you from retracting flaps in the first 20 to 30 seconds after the landing gear lost contact to the ground etc?

What I am trying to say: There are pretty simple logics that could be integrated that would presumably kill many discussions held here.

It's tempting to think that, however one may also have made the case 'why doesn't Boeing install a system that prevents the nose getting too high on the 737 MAX? Then they won't have to retrain crews on handling differences'. We know how that worked out.

When designing anything you need to account for unintended consequences and the possibilities for that system adversely affecting safety if it were to malfunction. If you introduced a system designed to prevent flap retraction 20 to 30s after liftoff, what if failure in a channel of that system then prevents flap retraction required to achieve a MACG with critical terrain on departure. We could 'why don't they do this / why don't they do that' until eventually we end up with not flying at all.

On your point of integrated scales, there is a far easier way to cross check actual aicraft weight with calculated weight: a computer that cross references acceleration data on the takeoff run with known values from lookup tables based on specific environmental conditions and engine thrust settings. If you're not accelerating at a normal rate expected for the calculated thrust and weight a warning can be triggered. This was a recommendation echoed by the AAIB following the incident with a Jet2 aircraft getting airborne at only 70% thrust. I believe Airbus and Boeing are looking into the potential implementation of such a safety system.

Why the need to make the two theories fit in such a convoluted manner? Inadvertent flap retraction was theorised because people assumed that was most likely to have caused the loss of lift - hardly anyone believed dual engine failure was possible. Now we know that the loss of lift was indeed almost certainly caused by a loss of engine power, why all these awkward attempts to reverse engineer it to still fit the flap retraction theory? People need to realise they are only trying to make the flap retraction theory fit because of cognitive biases. If we had all been told immediately, there was dual power loss and the RAT deployed, no-one would even be considering flaps. Its confirmation bias of past assumptions, that's all.

As has been said many times as well, the landing gear retraction process appears to start as the bogies tilt, and then suddenly stops. Which rather suggests they did pull the gear lever. Based on the videos and the amount of speed the plane lost in the very brief sequence ovents, I'd say that the plane lost power a lot earlier than it would have in your theory.

The difficulty is making the sensors and control systems reliable.

Your simple logics can make the situation worse in failure modes. E.g. someone mentioned MCAS, simple simple logic that fixed a minor problem but brought down two airplanes when the sensors failed.

Other examples: there was an A340 into Quito (?) a while back that landed hard, breaking the WOW sensors. Interlocks wouldn\x92t let ground spoilers, reversers, etc deploy. Aircraft unable to stop, went off the end with fatalities. Yet those interlocks do save lives in other situations, eg AC DC8 crash in Malton in the 1960s.

Simple sounding systems are not nearly as simple as imagined. Design engineers have to work out every conceivable combination of faults/failures and what would happen. Fixing one situation often opens up another one.

In the spirit of fairness there is another sensation that can be interpreted as "increased thrust" that a passenger is equally if not more likely to be talking about : a change in [perceived] engine noise level and/or quality.

Personally I don't hear much of the engines as the plane moves away from the cameraperson in the phone video, while the sound of impact is clearly discernible. If anyone can hear the engines well enough to tell if there is a significant change in their tone or volume, that would be valuable info, I think. Alternatively whatever increase in noise was heard started before the recording starts. In that case I suppose the "RAT theorists" would say it was the droning of the now-deployed RAT, with the assumption that it would be audible from inside the cabin (things like flap and landing gear actuation certainly are, so that isn't all that far-fetched). On the other hand, the "flap theorists" would probably say it was the crew firewalling the thrust levers in response to the inability to climb, which isn't far-fetched either.

Either way we will know soon enough what actions the pilots did or didn't take, since the various flight recorders should be found fairly easily in good condition.

Good summary, I'd just say the thrust levers definitely weren't firewalled. The plane lost a huge amount of speed by impact. This single fact should be enough to end the flap retraction theory. It lost a huge amount of speed while descending - now what might cause that? The gear also begin the retraction process (bogies tilting). The obsession with flaps when there isn't a single piece of evidence for it is very odd. (not suggesting you are guilty of it btw).

Yes indeed, the moment they pulled the gear lever, as we see the gear begin the retraction process, and then suddenly stop. Almost as if they suddenly lost power.

We can see the landing gear retraction process begin. We see the bogies tilted in the second video. We can hear the RAT. We can see the RAT. We can see the flaps extended in the video and at the crash site. There isn't actually a single piece of evidence the flaps were raised, it's just a conclusion people jumped too before evidence began to emerge.

The crazy thing is, when the report comes out and there is no mention of flaps none of the people who have been pushing the flap theory will self reflect or learn anything. They'll think those of us who didn't buy into it were just lucky, rather than it being down to use of fairly simple critical thinking.

I think you need to temper your tone This is a discussion about possibilities and quite honestly nothing would surprise me. There is no "winning" result here. Just hopefully answers which will help safety in the future.

On item 1, the TCMA issue should have been fixed, it does fit the sort of issue that occurred here. TDRACER can talk to that, and has done in 2019 and again in post 792. As to flap auto retraction, the B787 like all Boeings has a gated flap lever, and the flaps are only able to move independent of the lever by flap load relief. That would not have caused a loss of thrust, and in this case it is evident that the event is a thrust loss not a CL loss.

On item 2, the video shows no asymmetry at any time, so there is only a symmetric failure of the engines possible. Back on a B747 classic, you could chop all 4 engines at the same time with one hand, on a B737, also, not so much on a B777 or B787. I would doubt that anyone used two hands to cut the fuel at screen height. Note, there was a B744 that lost one engine in cruise when a clip board fell off the coaming. Didn't happen twice, and it only happened to one engine.


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Neila83 is correct, the gear tilt pre retraction is rear wheels low, and at the commencement of the selection of the retraction cycle (generally), the first thing that happens is the inboard MLG doors start to open below the wheel well and then the bogie is driven to front wheels low. (There is also an option that the inboard gear doors start to open early as a result of WOW sensing to improve the SSL climb limit). [my bad, for the B788 Capt Bloggs informs us the gear door sequence is after the tilt, not before, the B789 has the before tilt, the option for the door open at rotate is separate]

The inboard doors do not appear to have opened in this case, yet, the gear is forward wheels down. This appears to be out of sequence. TD may have better knowledge on the options that exist with the B788, but this is not looking good at this time.

There is enough in the way of anomalies here to end up with regulatory action, and airlines themselves should/will be starting to pore over their systems and decide if they are comfortable with the airworthiness of the aircraft at this moment. A latent single point of failure is not a comfortable place to be. Inhibiting TCMA might be a good interim option, that system could have been negated by having the ATR ARM switches....(Both)... ARM deferred to the before takeoff checks. The EAFR recovery should result in action within the next 24-48 hours. Boeing needs to be getting their tiger teams warmed up, they can ill afford to have a latent system fault discovered that is not immediately responded to, and the general corporate response of "blame the pilots" is not likely to win any future orders.

I think we are about to have some really busy days for the OEM.


Not sure that Neila83 is that far off the mark at all.

I have no knowledge about 787, but every landing gear system I\x92ve worked with did not sequence Left and Right MLG to retract and extend with each other. In fact it is typical for left and right side to move at slightly different speed due to different friction etc. Retraction assymmetry is probably not a clue to this mystery.

Perhaps the phrase \x93Losing power\x93 refers to electrical power so following your line of thought the mayday call might be an accurate description of what they are experiencing I.e. no thrust, failing electrics and can\x92t raise the landing gear.

The post you are replying to is completely wrong.
The 787 landing gear is operated by the centre hydraulic system's two electric pumps.
I have no idea why they have posted such nonsense.

Combining all the bits and pieces of info from this thread so far, IMO we can theoretically sequence it thus using the video from the left:

00:18 Rotation. Normal takeoff config.
00:24 Gear up starts. per Raffael with FF.
......... FR24 ADSB last transmission (71ft, 172kt) just before runway threshold. Matches with video aircraft altitude at 1/2 wingspan.
......... ? Full power flameout leaves N2 ~ 60%; Airspeed < 200k so N2 will decay to 15% in 8-10s?
......... ? Takeoff EGT of 900C needs 25-35s to fall below 250C ?
00:27 Gear up stops. per Raffael with FF. Bogies tilted.
......... ? APU starts. 20-55s to 95%N?
......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates Fuel Cutoff and Run.
00:28 Visible loss of thrust. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure.
......... Matches with eyewitness "within 5-10s ... it was stuck in the air".
......... Per 787 dual-engine fail/stall memory items, PM initiates RAT Switch for 1s. Whether auto or manual, the RAT initiates.
......... RAT "bang" heard by survivor
......... RAT coming online accounts for eyewitness "lights started flickering green and white".
......... Per 787 QRH below 1000ft, PF makes no change to Main Landing Gear and flaps, aircraft pointed straight for best glide.
00:31 Descending visibly, somewhere beyond the runway threshold. Alt ~ 200ft using aircraft wingspan as measure.
......... ? Because EGT > 250C FADEC blocks fuel (T-HOT hot restart inhibit?) so no relight though N2 > 15% ?
......... 787 glide ratio between 16:1 to 25:1 with MLG down, Flaps 5. About 15-20s and 3-5000ft of glide from 200ft?
......... Some flap accounts for the ground pictures.
00:34 ? N2 has presumably decayed to 15%, FADEC flips to X-START: airspeed outside envelope? No hope of relight now.
......... PM/PF transmits Mayday?
......... Video showing RAT deployed.
00:46 APU reaches some fraction of 95%N (APU sound accounting for survivor's perception of thrust?).
00:48 Impact. 4200ft from descent start, 3990ft from airport boundary road. 17s from visible descent start.

if this is a valid sequence, the only remaining question is why the dual-engine failure at ~200ft agl?

with condolences to the families and people affected.

Does the B787 have auto flap retract ? Possibly a fault in the system could cause the flaps to retract during the take off run which would not give a configuration warning at the start if they were set correctly. Aircraft uses more runway than normal which it seems to have done, crew become aware of the problem near rotation and miss retracting the landing gear while trying to work out what's going on.

There is no auto flap retract on the 787.