June 15, 2025, 16:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11902614
Can anyone help with my theory - I'm an electronics and software engineer, but not a pilot.
My understanding of the infamous and previously fixed 787 issue was that the PCU software would trigger a shutdown of all AC generators (or rather their respective control units) after 248 days of continuous power due to an overflow of a software counter, and that this was fixed in software alone.
Hypothetically , if the PCU software triggered this state during takeoff, what would happen? I know the engines may continue running with engine-driven fuel pumps, but I also understand this doesn't work in all situations and perhaps during rotation with a high fuel demand and fuel tanks not horizontal this could be an issue? What does everyone here think it would look like if all AC generators were shut down, in terms of engine performance - would you expect there to be a reduction in thrust? With the gear stuck down would that be serious enough?
My understanding of the infamous and previously fixed 787 issue was that the PCU software would trigger a shutdown of all AC generators (or rather their respective control units) after 248 days of continuous power due to an overflow of a software counter, and that this was fixed in software alone.
Hypothetically , if the PCU software triggered this state during takeoff, what would happen? I know the engines may continue running with engine-driven fuel pumps, but I also understand this doesn't work in all situations and perhaps during rotation with a high fuel demand and fuel tanks not horizontal this could be an issue? What does everyone here think it would look like if all AC generators were shut down, in terms of engine performance - would you expect there to be a reduction in thrust? With the gear stuck down would that be serious enough?
June 15, 2025, 17:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11902645
When we see the video, the airplane is still climbing / flying straight and level (not losing altitude), yet we hear what we think might be the RAT, I can't imagine that they had the kinetic energy to do this with no engines. if they had dual engine failure, they would have been a brick, Hot and High, no thrust, flaps 5, zero chance.
The original mobile video (not the copy from someones phone screen) clearly sounds like a RAT but what does the engine itself sound like - is it idle or reduced in some way?
What is the minimum amount of thrust that would need to be lost to stop climbing and sink back down - it took 30 seconds from leaving the ground to impact from the CCTV and the first 15 was climbing.
I would look carefully at the fact that the PCU still has the technical ability to tell all AC generator control units to turn off via software, as proven in the documented and fixed 248-day software issue.
June 15, 2025, 21:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11902838
Would be interesting to understand more about the exact definition of TCMA’s “on the ground“ and some more detailed insight into its implementation (only one or more WoW’s or multiple sensing?… is there a switch on the gear added? …is there an ALT/AGL check?.. how is implementation split over HW/FW/SW? … ).
Also, how could external factors impact that sequence to run.
Appreciating your previous answers (as usual).
Also, how could external factors impact that sequence to run.
Appreciating your previous answers (as usual).
)
Apologies for a few terse posts last night, but a couple of inane posts (by a usual suspect) really set me off. I've never used the 'ignore' function, but I may need to revisit that.
I posted this previously, but it was about 70 pages ago, so I understand not going back that far, or forgetting that tidbit amongst all the noise.
In short, I'm not familiar with the specific air/ground logic on the 787/GEnx-1B - the logic I posted (3 radio altimeters, 2 Weight on Wheels, at least one of each must indicate 'on-ground) is for the 747-8 (which I'm intimately familiar with). I have a vague recollection of a discussion with my GEnx-1B counterpart 10 or more years ago that suggested that the 787 was not as complex as the 747-8, but I don't recall any details. Basic FADEC logic (BTW, as someone else noted - it's "Full Authority", not "Autonomous") is to default to 'air' if in doubt, as it's considered to be 'safer'.
The only real hardware in the TCMA system is the N2 overspeed shutdown system - which goes through a BITE style functional test on every engine start. Everything else is in software - with the only aircraft inputs being Air/Ground and thrust lever position.
As I've posted previously, the FADEC is powered by a dedicated Permanant Magnet Alternator (PMA) - aircraft power is used only as a backup for starting or if the PMA fails. If the FADEC determines it is running on aircraft power with engine running (i.e. the PMA has failed), it sets a 'No Dispatch" fault message.
June 15, 2025, 21:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11902850
The electrical failure is rather a chicken-egg question.
Not knowing the 787, I\xb4d find it extremely hard to believe that a massive electrical failure would kill the engines. I gather from this thread that the landing gear retraction is driven by the electrically-powered Center hydraulic system. Retracting the gear is hard work for the system and it will put a strain on the two pumps and their supplying electric circuits, and the time of the alleged total power loss would seem to be in the vicinity of the suitable time to retract the gear.
But if there was some freak epidemic failure this inflicted upon the aircraft electrics, it is hard to imagine that this would affect both engines. There are still the autonomous FADEC governing them that run on their own internal generators (with a small external power source from the main systems, should the permanent magnet alternators fail) and do everything they can to keep the engine alive. As long as there is fuel flowing into the feed pipes, the engine should be kept running by the FADECs, and that this does not require the large tank pumps at low altitudes has been established in this thread.
Consequently, I\xb4d deem it plausible that the alleged power failure must have been a consequence of whatever happened to the engines. After all, the engines drive the available generators at this stage of flight, the APU with its additional generators is apparently not run for takeoff on the 787. I find it logically much easier to wrap my head around a situation in which an engine failure takes along the generators than one in which a massive, epidemic electric breakdown kills the engines.
Not knowing the 787, I\xb4d find it extremely hard to believe that a massive electrical failure would kill the engines. I gather from this thread that the landing gear retraction is driven by the electrically-powered Center hydraulic system. Retracting the gear is hard work for the system and it will put a strain on the two pumps and their supplying electric circuits, and the time of the alleged total power loss would seem to be in the vicinity of the suitable time to retract the gear.
But if there was some freak epidemic failure this inflicted upon the aircraft electrics, it is hard to imagine that this would affect both engines. There are still the autonomous FADEC governing them that run on their own internal generators (with a small external power source from the main systems, should the permanent magnet alternators fail) and do everything they can to keep the engine alive. As long as there is fuel flowing into the feed pipes, the engine should be kept running by the FADECs, and that this does not require the large tank pumps at low altitudes has been established in this thread.
Consequently, I\xb4d deem it plausible that the alleged power failure must have been a consequence of whatever happened to the engines. After all, the engines drive the available generators at this stage of flight, the APU with its additional generators is apparently not run for takeoff on the 787. I find it logically much easier to wrap my head around a situation in which an engine failure takes along the generators than one in which a massive, epidemic electric breakdown kills the engines.
June 15, 2025, 21:51:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11902879
It is similar to the 248-day continuous power software bug on the 787. In both cases a counter in the software would overflow after an amount of time that would be proportional to something like the number of seconds, milliseconds or other unit.
The 248 day bug would cause the PCU to trigger ALL 4 AC generator control units to shut down. The fact that this is even possible in software alone is remarkable and should make any engineer concerned. The fact that this was only fixed in software with no redundant physical system (e.g. 1 or more AC units being independent of this system) is concerning. The fact that Boeing had a second software overflow error causing the 51 day directive should really have everyone discussing software as a possible cause for this crash.
People may say that the engine driven pumps / suction feed / gravity feed would continue to power the engines but my understanding is the aircraft attitude and high fuel flow at takeoff could potentially mean less thrust than was needed if all 4 AC generators disconnected and stopped all AC fuel pumps during rotation.
The 248 day bug would cause the PCU to trigger ALL 4 AC generator control units to shut down. The fact that this is even possible in software alone is remarkable and should make any engineer concerned. The fact that this was only fixed in software with no redundant physical system (e.g. 1 or more AC units being independent of this system) is concerning. The fact that Boeing had a second software overflow error causing the 51 day directive should really have everyone discussing software as a possible cause for this crash.
People may say that the engine driven pumps / suction feed / gravity feed would continue to power the engines but my understanding is the aircraft attitude and high fuel flow at takeoff could potentially mean less thrust than was needed if all 4 AC generators disconnected and stopped all AC fuel pumps during rotation.
June 15, 2025, 23:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11902970
Water ingress into the E/E bay is a serious issue. The B744 had this issue in the past causing serious problems, one of which was fortunate to not lead to a loss of the aircraft, on a B744F. The B744 pax aircraft had a number of water problems related to the toilets and the galley. The forward galley on the B742/3s had many issues.
Any large aircraft going through maintenance is interesting to observe the extent of corrosion that occurs near toilets and galleys, and from water lines.
Water accumulations on the B744 came to light at rotate, and took out a lot of electrical services.
My suspicion is some cause such as this will come to light shortly.
Both of the E/E bays contain stuff that is nice to keep dry and operating, and prior events have shown that multiple system failures can and have occurred when a flood is added to all the black boxes sitting innocently on their racks.
The ADs are not necessarily directly related to the specific cause, they highlight the potential for water damage and that bad stuff happens. In two cases I investigated, the event occurred at rotate. Both were B744's one pax, one F.
Compound, unrelated system failures at rotate? Single cause? Water in the E/E bay.
Any large aircraft going through maintenance is interesting to observe the extent of corrosion that occurs near toilets and galleys, and from water lines.
Water accumulations on the B744 came to light at rotate, and took out a lot of electrical services.
My suspicion is some cause such as this will come to light shortly.
Both of the E/E bays contain stuff that is nice to keep dry and operating, and prior events have shown that multiple system failures can and have occurred when a flood is added to all the black boxes sitting innocently on their racks.
The ADs are not necessarily directly related to the specific cause, they highlight the potential for water damage and that bad stuff happens. In two cases I investigated, the event occurred at rotate. Both were B744's one pax, one F.
Compound, unrelated system failures at rotate? Single cause? Water in the E/E bay.
"System malfunctions
Between 0846 and 0852, 4 after passing FL 100 and when the aircraft was turning
onto an extended left downwind leg for runway 01 Right (01R), the EICAS, flight
displays and automated systems showed faults of numerous electrical and other
aircraft systems, including:
\x95 AC buses 1, 2 and 3 not powered
\x95 autothrottle disconnected
\x95 autopilot disengaged
\x95 some fuel pumps not operating
\x95 weather radar not operating
\x95 automatic cabin air conditioning and pressurisation system not operating
\x95 right (FO\x92s) displays blanked
\x95 between three and five pages of messages on the EICAS display
\x95 lower EICAS display blanked.
The CSM contacted the flight crew and advised that the cabin lighting had failed."
"Origin of Generator Control Unit (GCU) faults
Post-incident examination of the GCUs revealed corrosion of the internal circuit
boards in all three of the GCUs that shut down. Analysis of the corrosion materials
observed in GCU 3 showed evidence of long-term exposure to water, including
evidence of acids and carbohydrates that are present in beverages such as coffee,
fruit juice and soft drinks. Those findings indicated a fluid source originating from
the aircraft\x92s galley drains or from spilt liquids in the cabin, and also suggested that
liquid ingress had been occurring over an unknown, but extended period of time."
https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/defaul.../ao2008003.pdf
This link to the report includes diagrams of where the 747 forward galley was located, directly above the Main Equipment Centre and the E1/E2 racks.
The phtographs show how ineffective the dripshield was in protecting the electrical equipment and the extent of corrosion and damage.
The aircraft was 17 years old at the time of the incident and had completed a C-check approximately three months before the incident.
As FDR notes, this issue seems to have carried over to the 787-8 with Airworthiness Directive AD 2016-14-04 ( https://drs.faa.gov/browse/excelExte...A0058AF6B.0001 )
"We are issuing this AD 2016-14-04 to prevent a water leak
from an improperly installed potable water system coupling, or main cabin water source, which could
cause the equipment in the EE bays to become wet, resulting in an electrical short and potential loss
of system functions essential for safe flight"
AD 2016-14-04 mirrors precisely what occurred to the Qantas 747 on 7 January 2008. It is possible something similar may have occurred on take-off of AI171, with water causing the equipment in the EE bays to become wet resulting in electrical short and potential loss of system functions
June 16, 2025, 00:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903017
From the detail in this video:
" Just a short video of the Boeing 787 RAT being driven by an attached hydraulic motor. This test is performed to check the RAT's hydraulic pump and electrical generator are functioning correctly. The motor that is bolted onto the back of the RAT is driven using an external hydraulic rig that is feeding the motor with hydraulic fluid at 4200psi at 40GPM ."
FP.
June 16, 2025, 00:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903019
June 16, 2025, 08:51:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903270
If TCMA cut fuel flow while still on the runway the aircraft would have been decelerating from the moment it lifted off, which is not what the ADS-B data indicates. The kinetic energy in the rotating parts of the engine wouldn't add much speed to the aircraft as the engines run down with no more energy being added via fuel.
In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread:
If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground.
As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems.
Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not).
Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact.
In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms.
In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known.
Thank you to the mods for an excellent job.
June 15, 2025, 04:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903424
Okay! Many thanks for that! Of course, it very much complicates the picture, and I'm very puzzled as to how the Fuel Cutoff Switches and Valves operate. Apparently, the TCAM system shuts off an errant engine on the ground at least, but my concern is not with the software but the hardware. It obviously has an Output going into the Fuel Shutoff system. If the TCAM unit loses power, can that output cause the Cutoff process (powered by the engine-dedicated generator) to be activated? I guess that's the $64 billion question, but if MCAS is any example, then: Probably!
TCMA (not TCAM) - Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation - is a FADEC based system. It's resident in the engine FADEC (aka EEC) - the ONLY inputs from the aircraft that go into the TCMA is air/ground (to enable) and thrust lever position (to determine if the engine is doing what it's being commanded to do. The FADEC has the ability to shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection system - this is separate from the aircraft run/cutoff signal, although it uses the same HPSOV to effect the shutdown. That same system is used by TCMA to shutoff fuel if it determines the engine is 'running away'.
Hint, you might try going back a few pages and reading where all this has been posted previously.
June 15, 2025, 21:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903426
Would be interesting to understand more about the exact definition of TCMA’s “on the ground“ and some more detailed insight into its implementation (only one or more WoW’s or multiple sensing?… is there a switch on the gear added? …is there an ALT/AGL check?.. how is implementation split over HW/FW/SW? … ).
Also, how could external factors impact that sequence to run.
Appreciating your previous answers (as usual).
Also, how could external factors impact that sequence to run.
Appreciating your previous answers (as usual).
)
Apologies for a few terse posts last night, but a couple of inane posts (by a usual suspect) really set me off. I've never used the 'ignore' function, but I may need to revisit that.
I posted this previously, but it was about 70 pages ago, so I understand not going back that far, or forgetting that tidbit amongst all the noise.
In short, I'm not familiar with the specific air/ground logic on the 787/GEnx-1B - the logic I posted (3 radio altimeters, 2 Weight on Wheels, at least one of each must indicate 'on-ground) is for the 747-8 (which I'm intimately familiar with). I have a vague recollection of a discussion with my GEnx-1B counterpart 10 or more years ago that suggested that the 787 was not as complex as the 747-8, but I don't recall any details. Basic FADEC logic (BTW, as someone else noted - it's "Full Authority", not "Autonomous") is to default to 'air' if in doubt, as it's considered to be 'safer'.
The only real hardware in the TCMA system is the N2 overspeed shutdown system - which goes through a BITE style functional test on every engine start. Everything else is in software - with the only aircraft inputs being Air/Ground and thrust lever position.
As I've posted previously, the FADEC is powered by a dedicated Permanant Magnet Alternator (PMA) - aircraft power is used only as a backup for starting or if the PMA fails. If the FADEC determines it is running on aircraft power with engine running (i.e. the PMA has failed), it sets a 'No Dispatch" fault message.
June 13, 2025, 23:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903714
Speaking as a B787 Captain..... There is so much rubbish and stupid suggestion being written here.
This aircraft was airborne for a grand total of 22 seconds, half of which was climbing to no more than 150' aal.
- No Flaps? Due to the setup of the ECL it is physically impossible to go down the runway without some sort of take-off flap set. The T/o config warning would have been singing it's head off. Despite assertions to the contrary I have seen no video clear enough to detect a lack of flaps.
- RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long.
- Flaps up instead of gear? The B787 flaps are slow both in and out. Given that the 'Positive rate' call is not made the second the wheels leave the ground, a mis-selection of flaps up would not cause any loss of lift for at least 20 seconds, by which time they had already crashed. I believe the gear remained down not because of mis-selection but because of a major distraction on rotate.
Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain:
1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or....
2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft.
It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope.
This aircraft was airborne for a grand total of 22 seconds, half of which was climbing to no more than 150' aal.
- No Flaps? Due to the setup of the ECL it is physically impossible to go down the runway without some sort of take-off flap set. The T/o config warning would have been singing it's head off. Despite assertions to the contrary I have seen no video clear enough to detect a lack of flaps.
- RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long.
- Flaps up instead of gear? The B787 flaps are slow both in and out. Given that the 'Positive rate' call is not made the second the wheels leave the ground, a mis-selection of flaps up would not cause any loss of lift for at least 20 seconds, by which time they had already crashed. I believe the gear remained down not because of mis-selection but because of a major distraction on rotate.
Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain:
1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or....
2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft.
It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope.
Even though these are big engines with plenty of inertia, when you select engine shut off they spool down very quickly if on load. IE, The generators, two per engine and hydraulic pumps, etc, being driven by the (relatively) small mass of the N2 rotor will drag the speed down very quickly, the gennies will trip offine in seconds, the pumps will quickly reduce flow and pressure.
As for what went wrong.
If the engines have stopped working there has to be a common failure mode, fuel is one but as has been said, no other aircraft has had a problem, as far as we know. FOD? It would have to be something major to shut down two GeNX engines and there would be debris all over the runway, we would know by now.
I have no idea if the RAT has deployed, I can't see it in the video and the noise could be something else.
We shall see.
There is compelling evidence that flaps are set correctly and not retracted inadvertently.
I await further evidence.
Edit to add. LAE 40 years, type rated on 737 to 787 with lots of others in between.
June 14, 2025, 01:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903716
Turin, your name appeared on a thread I was researching regarding generator control units, 787.
Do you recall a 787 made an emergency landing in Louisiana on a revenue flight Houston/Newark in 2012? Your Post referenced an abnormal that may lend credence to a major power loss in this wreck.
Never expected to see any surviving tail cone or Empennage structure. Quite a find
Forgive the intrusion sir
Do you recall a 787 made an emergency landing in Louisiana on a revenue flight Houston/Newark in 2012? Your Post referenced an abnormal that may lend credence to a major power loss in this wreck.
Never expected to see any surviving tail cone or Empennage structure. Quite a find
Forgive the intrusion sir
Boeing 787 Makes Emergency Landing
June 16, 2025, 00:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903734
From the detail in this video:
" Just a short video of the Boeing 787 RAT being driven by an attached hydraulic motor. This test is performed to check the RAT's hydraulic pump and electrical generator are functioning correctly. The motor that is bolted onto the back of the RAT is driven using an external hydraulic rig that is feeding the motor with hydraulic fluid at 4200psi at 40GPM ."
FP.
June 16, 2025, 08:51:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903752
If TCMA cut fuel flow while still on the runway the aircraft would have been decelerating from the moment it lifted off, which is not what the ADS-B data indicates. The kinetic energy in the rotating parts of the engine wouldn't add much speed to the aircraft as the engines run down with no more energy being added via fuel.
In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread:
If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground.
As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems.
Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not).
Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact.
In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms.
In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known.
Thank you to the mods for an excellent job.
June 16, 2025, 22:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903825
Something that occurred to me after I went to bed last night: My assumption that the FDR readouts would rapidly reveal the cause may be flawed.
Let me explain.
The consensus is that both engines quit shortly after liftoff (that assumes that the RAT did in fact deploy). At least one of the data recorders has battery backup, so it should have kept functioning when all aircraft power was lost.
However...
Over the years, I've looked at lots and lots of digital flight data recorder outputs when investigating some sort of incident or other engine anomaly, So I have become rather familiar with some of the interesting characteristics of DFDR data.
On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker. As a result, most of the avionics boxes 'reset' - this is quick, but it's not instantaneous. This shows up in the FDR data - sometimes as 'no valid data' for a few seconds, or as garbage readings of zero or 'full scale'. Now, looking at the FDR data, it's easy to simply disregard the data, so normally no big deal.
Starting with the 777 (and on the 787 and 747-8), this electrical power glitch was 'fixed' - there is slight delay (~quarter of a second IIRC) before the fuel cutoff signal is sent to the engine - during which the electrical system reconfiguration takes place so no more 'glitch' during a normal engine shutdown...Except whatever happened to these engines wasn't 'normal'.
If there is a fuel cut at high power, the engine spools down incredibly rapidly - a second or two from max power to sub-idle. Assuming the fuel cut wasn't commanded by the flight deck fuel switches, the electrical system won't know it's coming, so it can't reconfigure until after the engine generators drop offline - and you're going to get that power glitch. Nearly every avionics box on the aircraft will reset due to this electrical glitch, and the FDR isn't going to get useful data for a few seconds (and then, only from the stuff that's on the battery bus).
Whatever happened, happened quickly - it's quite possible that whatever initiated the high-power fuel cut didn't get recorded.
Let me explain.
The consensus is that both engines quit shortly after liftoff (that assumes that the RAT did in fact deploy). At least one of the data recorders has battery backup, so it should have kept functioning when all aircraft power was lost.
However...
Over the years, I've looked at lots and lots of digital flight data recorder outputs when investigating some sort of incident or other engine anomaly, So I have become rather familiar with some of the interesting characteristics of DFDR data.
On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker. As a result, most of the avionics boxes 'reset' - this is quick, but it's not instantaneous. This shows up in the FDR data - sometimes as 'no valid data' for a few seconds, or as garbage readings of zero or 'full scale'. Now, looking at the FDR data, it's easy to simply disregard the data, so normally no big deal.
Starting with the 777 (and on the 787 and 747-8), this electrical power glitch was 'fixed' - there is slight delay (~quarter of a second IIRC) before the fuel cutoff signal is sent to the engine - during which the electrical system reconfiguration takes place so no more 'glitch' during a normal engine shutdown...Except whatever happened to these engines wasn't 'normal'.
If there is a fuel cut at high power, the engine spools down incredibly rapidly - a second or two from max power to sub-idle. Assuming the fuel cut wasn't commanded by the flight deck fuel switches, the electrical system won't know it's coming, so it can't reconfigure until after the engine generators drop offline - and you're going to get that power glitch. Nearly every avionics box on the aircraft will reset due to this electrical glitch, and the FDR isn't going to get useful data for a few seconds (and then, only from the stuff that's on the battery bus).
Whatever happened, happened quickly - it's quite possible that whatever initiated the high-power fuel cut didn't get recorded.
Last edited by T28B; 16th June 2025 at 22:16 . Reason: White Space Is Your Friend
June 16, 2025, 22:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903839
tdracer:
"What sort of 'confirmation' do you have in mind - the regulator mandate that resulted in TCMA basically says we can't take credit for the flight crew"
I had just that in mind, as any automated action that could shut down both engines really should have pilot confirmation, imho, but looks like the regulators may not have considered all possible scenarios.
Another question, maybe a complete red herring: Is the TCMA a completely self contained module with it's own processor and software, (possibly the best option) or is it part the FADEC software package, perhaps just a task in a real time multitasking system ?. If the latter, that would open a whole rabbit warren of possibilities.
From all the evidence thus far, it looks like the RAT did deploy, plus other data, which means there was likely a complete electrical power failure. The idea that all four generators and controls would fail at once doesn't make sense, so that doesn't leave much else as the next step.
"What sort of 'confirmation' do you have in mind - the regulator mandate that resulted in TCMA basically says we can't take credit for the flight crew"
I had just that in mind, as any automated action that could shut down both engines really should have pilot confirmation, imho, but looks like the regulators may not have considered all possible scenarios.
Another question, maybe a complete red herring: Is the TCMA a completely self contained module with it's own processor and software, (possibly the best option) or is it part the FADEC software package, perhaps just a task in a real time multitasking system ?. If the latter, that would open a whole rabbit warren of possibilities.
From all the evidence thus far, it looks like the RAT did deploy, plus other data, which means there was likely a complete electrical power failure. The idea that all four generators and controls would fail at once doesn't make sense, so that doesn't leave much else as the next step.
June 16, 2025, 22:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903843
Something that occurred to me after I went to bed last night: My assumption that the FDR readouts would rapidly reveal the cause may be flawed.
Let me explain.
The consensus is that both engines quit shortly after liftoff (that assumes that the RAT did in fact deploy). At least one of the data recorders has battery backup, so it should have kept functioning when all aircraft power was lost.
However...
Over the years, I've looked at lots and lots of digital flight data recorder outputs when investigating some sort of incident or other engine anomaly, So I have become rather familiar with some of the interesting characteristics of DFDR data.
On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker. As a result, most of the avionics boxes 'reset' - this is quick, but it's not instantaneous. This shows up in the FDR data - sometimes as 'no valid data' for a few seconds, or as garbage readings of zero or 'full scale'. Now, looking at the FDR data, it's easy to simply disregard the data, so normally no big deal.
Starting with the 777 (and on the 787 and 747-8), this electrical power glitch was 'fixed' - there is slight delay (~quarter of a second IIRC) before the fuel cutoff signal is sent to the engine - during which the electrical system reconfiguration takes place so no more 'glitch' during a normal engine shutdown...Except whatever happened to these engines wasn't 'normal'.
If there is a fuel cut at high power, the engine spools down incredibly rapidly - a second or two from max power to sub-idle. Assuming the fuel cut wasn't commanded by the flight deck fuel switches, the electrical system won't know it's coming, so it can't reconfigure until after the engine generators drop offline - and you're going to get that power glitch. Nearly every avionics box on the aircraft will reset due to this electrical glitch, and the FDR isn't going to get useful data for a few seconds (and then, only from the stuff that's on the battery bus).
Whatever happened, happened quickly - it's quite possible that whatever initiated the high-power fuel cut didn't get recorded.
Let me explain.
The consensus is that both engines quit shortly after liftoff (that assumes that the RAT did in fact deploy). At least one of the data recorders has battery backup, so it should have kept functioning when all aircraft power was lost.
However...
Over the years, I've looked at lots and lots of digital flight data recorder outputs when investigating some sort of incident or other engine anomaly, So I have become rather familiar with some of the interesting characteristics of DFDR data.
On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker. As a result, most of the avionics boxes 'reset' - this is quick, but it's not instantaneous. This shows up in the FDR data - sometimes as 'no valid data' for a few seconds, or as garbage readings of zero or 'full scale'. Now, looking at the FDR data, it's easy to simply disregard the data, so normally no big deal.
Starting with the 777 (and on the 787 and 747-8), this electrical power glitch was 'fixed' - there is slight delay (~quarter of a second IIRC) before the fuel cutoff signal is sent to the engine - during which the electrical system reconfiguration takes place so no more 'glitch' during a normal engine shutdown...Except whatever happened to these engines wasn't 'normal'.
If there is a fuel cut at high power, the engine spools down incredibly rapidly - a second or two from max power to sub-idle. Assuming the fuel cut wasn't commanded by the flight deck fuel switches, the electrical system won't know it's coming, so it can't reconfigure until after the engine generators drop offline - and you're going to get that power glitch. Nearly every avionics box on the aircraft will reset due to this electrical glitch, and the FDR isn't going to get useful data for a few seconds (and then, only from the stuff that's on the battery bus).
Whatever happened, happened quickly - it's quite possible that whatever initiated the high-power fuel cut didn't get recorded.
If the cause is what I have suggested it will dificult to get direct evidence of that case, as it was for the QFA072 event as well. Like icing cases, a water ingress into the avionics is going to be a tough investigation, water would have been sprayed all over the wreckage in the aftermath. Dousing the E/E bay with 20 or 30 gallons of water will be an expensive investigative exercise to do in a real plane, with engines running. Would not want to be observing up close.
June 16, 2025, 22:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903844
I'd like to mention something that, while unrelated, does shed a bit of light on how computerised systems can misinterpret input data and take the wrong action. I spent 40 odd years as an electronics engineer involving complex systems, it can be surprising just how careful one must be in systems that sample data and then process it for decision making in software.
On August 9th 2019, there was a significant grid failure in the UK leading to load shedding (removing supply to many consumers, including Newcastle Airport) which started when a series of several lightning strikes in Hertfordshire caused a trip out of generators at Little Barford combined-cycle gas turbine generation plant. This was followed by the shut down of the power concentrator and grid connector from the Hornsea1 off-shore wind farm, significant changes in the grid frequency away from the acceptable limits which is what triggered further load shedding.
The reason I mention it is that Hornsea1 going off line was due to the software that operated the concentrator/connector sensing large voltage transients due to the lightning strikes 120 miles away, however these transients were only of the order of 10us length spikes with nominal 20ms cycles at 50Hz on the grid. In old reliable grid equipment that had been in use for decades such spikes would have been ignored because the large rotating machine inertia would make them irrelevant. Other systems went into various states of shut down for protection reasons, some of the Siemens Class 700 trains had to be reset by the train crew, others required a Siemens engineer to drive to each train and reload its firmware. The train protection mode occurred because the grid frequency on the 25kV AC supply went below 49.8Hz, this was a programmed default and it turned out to have been a very conservative one, the trains could have continued to operate normally at even lower frequencies but someone decided to write the programs without actually testing what a sensible limit was. The whole very widespread problems this caused could have been avoided by not acting instantly on microsecond transients in a 50Hz system.
Is it possible that the monitoring systems on a Boeing 787 also sample the electrical system voltages and currents at a relatively high frequency, and thus in the event of a transient of some type perhaps over-react to this event by taking precipitate action instead of waiting a short time before re-sampling again. I have seen a suggestion that an alternative explanation for the "bang" heard by the survivor in seat 11A might have been the sound of a Bus Tie Contactor closing, which in itself suggests something quite important relating to the electrical system. The 787 is unusual in that it uses variable frequency AC generators whose outputs are rectified and then inverted to other AC voltages and also quite high DC voltages, some in the 250-300V region.
I hope that some hard information is going to come out from the investigators soon, but given that the flap mis-selection idea is effectively debunked and we know that the main undercarriage either started its retraction cycle with bogies tilting forwards or that falling hydraulic pressure caused the same thing to happen, then the only thing that fits the observed flight path is loss of thrust on both engines which could have either preceded or followed an electrical failure. We also know that the RAT deployed and in the relatively undamaged tail cone the APU inlet was open or opening indicating a likely auto-start of the APU due to the parameters to trigger that occurring.
I would like to know how many tests of the electrical/computer interactions in 787 development involved arcing/shorting voltage/current transient testing. Is this the sort of thing that is done at all? The EECs (FADECs) in the engines are self-powered via magnetos and self-controlling in many circumstances, but perhaps something caused them to think that the thrust levers had been retarded, and such a thing might have been down to the effect of electrical transients on the various signals received by the EECs.
I have read the original 65+ pages of the thread, but I have not seen any discussion of this particular idea. Maybe that is because the 787 is quite a significant departure from Boeing's previous design practices with totally different electrical systems, higher pressure hydraulics and no doubt other aspects as well.
What do you all think?
On August 9th 2019, there was a significant grid failure in the UK leading to load shedding (removing supply to many consumers, including Newcastle Airport) which started when a series of several lightning strikes in Hertfordshire caused a trip out of generators at Little Barford combined-cycle gas turbine generation plant. This was followed by the shut down of the power concentrator and grid connector from the Hornsea1 off-shore wind farm, significant changes in the grid frequency away from the acceptable limits which is what triggered further load shedding.
The reason I mention it is that Hornsea1 going off line was due to the software that operated the concentrator/connector sensing large voltage transients due to the lightning strikes 120 miles away, however these transients were only of the order of 10us length spikes with nominal 20ms cycles at 50Hz on the grid. In old reliable grid equipment that had been in use for decades such spikes would have been ignored because the large rotating machine inertia would make them irrelevant. Other systems went into various states of shut down for protection reasons, some of the Siemens Class 700 trains had to be reset by the train crew, others required a Siemens engineer to drive to each train and reload its firmware. The train protection mode occurred because the grid frequency on the 25kV AC supply went below 49.8Hz, this was a programmed default and it turned out to have been a very conservative one, the trains could have continued to operate normally at even lower frequencies but someone decided to write the programs without actually testing what a sensible limit was. The whole very widespread problems this caused could have been avoided by not acting instantly on microsecond transients in a 50Hz system.
Is it possible that the monitoring systems on a Boeing 787 also sample the electrical system voltages and currents at a relatively high frequency, and thus in the event of a transient of some type perhaps over-react to this event by taking precipitate action instead of waiting a short time before re-sampling again. I have seen a suggestion that an alternative explanation for the "bang" heard by the survivor in seat 11A might have been the sound of a Bus Tie Contactor closing, which in itself suggests something quite important relating to the electrical system. The 787 is unusual in that it uses variable frequency AC generators whose outputs are rectified and then inverted to other AC voltages and also quite high DC voltages, some in the 250-300V region.
I hope that some hard information is going to come out from the investigators soon, but given that the flap mis-selection idea is effectively debunked and we know that the main undercarriage either started its retraction cycle with bogies tilting forwards or that falling hydraulic pressure caused the same thing to happen, then the only thing that fits the observed flight path is loss of thrust on both engines which could have either preceded or followed an electrical failure. We also know that the RAT deployed and in the relatively undamaged tail cone the APU inlet was open or opening indicating a likely auto-start of the APU due to the parameters to trigger that occurring.
I would like to know how many tests of the electrical/computer interactions in 787 development involved arcing/shorting voltage/current transient testing. Is this the sort of thing that is done at all? The EECs (FADECs) in the engines are self-powered via magnetos and self-controlling in many circumstances, but perhaps something caused them to think that the thrust levers had been retarded, and such a thing might have been down to the effect of electrical transients on the various signals received by the EECs.
I have read the original 65+ pages of the thread, but I have not seen any discussion of this particular idea. Maybe that is because the 787 is quite a significant departure from Boeing's previous design practices with totally different electrical systems, higher pressure hydraulics and no doubt other aspects as well.
What do you all think?
June 17, 2025, 00:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903890
Something that occurred to me after I went to bed last night: My assumption that the FDR readouts would rapidly reveal the cause may be flawed.
Let me explain.
The consensus is that both engines quit shortly after liftoff (that assumes that the RAT did in fact deploy). At least one of the data recorders has battery backup, so it should have kept functioning when all aircraft power was lost.
However...
Over the years, I've looked at lots and lots of digital flight data recorder outputs when investigating some sort of incident or other engine anomaly, So I have become rather familiar with some of the interesting characteristics of DFDR data.
On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker. As a result, most of the avionics boxes 'reset' - this is quick, but it's not instantaneous. This shows up in the FDR data - sometimes as 'no valid data' for a few seconds, or as garbage readings of zero or 'full scale'. Now, looking at the FDR data, it's easy to simply disregard the data, so normally no big deal.
Starting with the 777 (and on the 787 and 747-8), this electrical power glitch was 'fixed' - there is slight delay (~quarter of a second IIRC) before the fuel cutoff signal is sent to the engine - during which the electrical system reconfiguration takes place so no more 'glitch' during a normal engine shutdown...Except whatever happened to these engines wasn't 'normal'.
If there is a fuel cut at high power, the engine spools down incredibly rapidly - a second or two from max power to sub-idle. Assuming the fuel cut wasn't commanded by the flight deck fuel switches, the electrical system won't know it's coming, so it can't reconfigure until after the engine generators drop offline - and you're going to get that power glitch. Nearly every avionics box on the aircraft will reset due to this electrical glitch, and the FDR isn't going to get useful data for a few seconds (and then, only from the stuff that's on the battery bus).
Whatever happened, happened quickly - it's quite possible that whatever initiated the high-power fuel cut didn't get recorded.
Let me explain.
The consensus is that both engines quit shortly after liftoff (that assumes that the RAT did in fact deploy). At least one of the data recorders has battery backup, so it should have kept functioning when all aircraft power was lost.
However...
Over the years, I've looked at lots and lots of digital flight data recorder outputs when investigating some sort of incident or other engine anomaly, So I have become rather familiar with some of the interesting characteristics of DFDR data.
On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker. As a result, most of the avionics boxes 'reset' - this is quick, but it's not instantaneous. This shows up in the FDR data - sometimes as 'no valid data' for a few seconds, or as garbage readings of zero or 'full scale'. Now, looking at the FDR data, it's easy to simply disregard the data, so normally no big deal.
Starting with the 777 (and on the 787 and 747-8), this electrical power glitch was 'fixed' - there is slight delay (~quarter of a second IIRC) before the fuel cutoff signal is sent to the engine - during which the electrical system reconfiguration takes place so no more 'glitch' during a normal engine shutdown...Except whatever happened to these engines wasn't 'normal'.
If there is a fuel cut at high power, the engine spools down incredibly rapidly - a second or two from max power to sub-idle. Assuming the fuel cut wasn't commanded by the flight deck fuel switches, the electrical system won't know it's coming, so it can't reconfigure until after the engine generators drop offline - and you're going to get that power glitch. Nearly every avionics box on the aircraft will reset due to this electrical glitch, and the FDR isn't going to get useful data for a few seconds (and then, only from the stuff that's on the battery bus).
Whatever happened, happened quickly - it's quite possible that whatever initiated the high-power fuel cut didn't get recorded.
).
Yet, the answer must be simpler and staring us in the face since logic and experience (everything you have offered TDR), tell us that modern airliner engines generally do not just suddenly quit flying at the same time. In this regard we can recall several instances of double engine failure associated with bird strikes generally involving large birds or large flocks or both. But it seems we have discounted this theory very early in discussion. Why? Because we cant see any birds, or flocks of birds or engine flames/surges or puffs of smokes from the engines which would support this. Really?
I have read all the 100's of posts (sadly) and while some very early posters tried to analyze the imagery, I suspect the very poor quality eventually discouraged most from seeing anything of interest. However, smattered throughout this discussion from the beginning to the end there have about four posts that describe seeing something where others have not. At least two of these were related to possible smoke but which were probably just the dust blown outwards by the wingtip vortices. Two others however have mentioned possible flames and puffs of smoke.
The video of course is very poor. There should be a special place in hell for people who subject us to looking at a video with continuous zooming in and out, inability to retain focus on the subject (it was just a CCTV monitor, not the actual aircraft they had to focus on) and constant camera shake. A video of a video, and then the resolution probably reduced for social media upload. This all results in a very unwatchable record of the aircrafts departure. The only immediate information gleaned seems to be some idea of how far down the runway the aircraft was at takeoff and the parabolic curve as it very clearly described the aircrafts flight path.
Air India Flight 171 on departure
But take a look at this frame. The right engine shows an artifact (pixelation if you like) that might represent a surge flame. I can almost see a puff of smoke just inboard of the aileron that may be associated with that too.
Am I just seeing distortion? Am I just seeing some smoke because that's where I would expect to see it?
We are all very used to seeing everything in 4K today but back in the day when everything was low res we used to join the dots. If pixels existed then something was there. If they didn't, it wasn't.
So if it's just pixels caused by distortion then they have coincidentally appeared in the tailpipe of an aircraft that crashed shortly after takeoff with a presumed double engine failure.
But surely we would see the birds? Well, not in this video. You cant even see the registration number on the side of the aircraft and that is much bigger than a bird. Haze, distortion, focus and low res, and each individual bird wouldn't even make up a pixel.
So make of this what you will, but this problem may have started on the ground. Birds strikes are very common according to Some AI pilots who interviewed for this following article but I have no idea of the authenticity of this report:
https://www.rediff.com/news/report/a...h/20250613.htm "The Air India pilots also added that Ahmedabad airport has long been known for bird activity near the runway, which could have contributed to the incident.
"This issue (of the excessive presence of birds) has been flagged multiple times," a third Air India pilot said, asking not to be named."
Of course, a single engine failure would not have brought this aircraft down, nor would it have deployed the RAT, but we can't see what happened on the left engine when the aircraft slipped behind the radio antenna building.
While these high bypass engines are designed and certified to keep running after experiencing certain types of bird strike, the effect on two engines concerns have been voiced about the contribution of certification to the mitigation of the risk hazardous bird strike in the two engine case.
This from Sky Library:
https://skybrary.aero/articles/aircr...nue%20to%20fly .
" A number of concerns have been quite widely voiced about the contribution of certification to the mitigation of the risk of hazardous bird strikes:
- The case of bird ingestion into more than one engine at the same time is not addressed directly and it is clearly extremely difficult to meaningfully estimate the probability of such an occurrence. However, it has been observed that, since some of the current standards only require that a damaged engine can be safely shut down, this circumstance should be more fully considered when determining the acceptable outcome of ingestion into single engines, especially for the twin engine case.
- It has been noted that the potential effects of bird strikes on modern electronic flight control systems and flight deck instrument displays have not yet been fully assessed.
Maybe someone can do some video enhancing of this image as others have done with the audio enhancement to give strong probability of RAT deployment.
If my suggestion can be corroborated at all, then the question of what happened next becomes somewhat easier to answer. Perhaps neither engine stopped running but they did so with limited thrust? If anything from the pilots mayday call can believed, it wasn't engines shut down..it was no thrust. So why did the RAT deploy? Cant answer that. And, I cant imagine it would be manually deployed if both engines were still running.
However, TDR did say.
"On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker."
Startle factor that electrically systems were about to fail? Manually deploy RAT?
Edit: I might add, they would have found remains on the runway if this did indeed happen. But we have heard anything from anybody?