Posts about: "Human Factors" [Posts: 58 Pages: 3]

It is nonetheless important to observe relative likeliness and circumstances when looking at unlikely events. Given the circumstances and total lack of any signs of mental health issues it is by far more likely that a simple human error occurred. It may be uncomfortable to consider that brain 1.0 has potentially lethal flaws, but it is a valid concern in the process of improvement through safety culture and learning from accidents. There is a reason CRM is now a staple in pilot training at almost any level from ultralight hobbyists to commercial professionals.
It's kind of amazing and terrifying that there is a set of switches that can cause this kind of accident with this kind of immediacy. Imagine having a button in your car directly next to your gear selector that will make the car suffer an immediate highspeed crash if touched under the wrong circumstances. I personally would not want that button there. Or if it had to be there I'd want there to be a few really good measures preventing anything that included "fiery death" and "me experiencing".

A major part of statistical analysis is a posteriori. It is not invalid or critically flawed methodology. And of course it can be applied here in the manner I have chosen. I have not used it to argue anything, but merely as foundation for an examination of the actual cases and to refute the false numbers thrown around here previously. Namely the claim that more people have supposedly died recently to pilot suicide than to any other cause. Which is simply false.

I have specifically examined the actual incidents of suspected and confirmed pilot suicide and contrasted their significant differences with the Air India accident. I have concluded based on those differences and the known data about behavior of people committing suicide that the Air India accident does not show even marginal overlap with any confirmed or suspected cases of pilot suicide and is inconsistent with our general understanding of the mental conditions leading to suicidal behavior. I have not, and will not make a statistical argument against this case being pilot suicide. I will however refute attempts at misrepresenting the statistical facts about pilot suicide.

The only reason we are talking about pilot suicide is that this is now likely to be a case of human error and some people are apparently unwilling to entertain the thought of human fallibility even in the total absence of any indication of a mental health issue, let alone crisis.
We know with absolutely certainty that people very rarely make lethal mistakes out of the blue that fly in the face of the entirety of their training and normal routine behavior. This should not be a hot take. Doubly so in the context of a Safety Culture that has majorly contributed to that very knowledge.

I refuse to use the phrase that involves small rodents and circular exercise machines. But this conversation has to move forward.

If we take it that the preliminary report is true (or true enough). switches were moved by human hands, and is thus a Human Factors incident with very little that we can learn technically about the aircraft design...
How is this community going to learn from this incident? What are we going to do as a community to improve safety?
Accident investigation - IMO - is about examining all the facts. Looking at those facts, in the most unfiltered light, and working out the TRUE causes, regardless of the prevailing opinions of the time. Any aviation death is one too many. Every aviation death should be used to improve safety for those that follow. Sometimes the results are technical / design philosophy changes, sometimes its about humans.

Regardless of whether this incident was action slip, absent mindedness, intrusive thoughts manifested, or murder-suicide. The common theme is mental health.
What - really - is the state of mental health awareness in the pilot/aviation community? How much does it vary across geographic locations / cultures and communities? I don't know. I'm an engineer in a single location. I have never been in a CRM training session (plenty of HF Training though), I have no business getting involved in your business . Yet I have observed from the outside over the years pilots going from outright ridicule of CRM concepts as a flash-in-the-pan management consultancy theory, to being 'a bit interesting', to being 'a useful tool', to it being baked in as a fundamental concept of what you do.

But CRM is about the interpersonal aspects of working with each other. About assessing the competency and capability of your team mates, and utilising each others skills and capabilities for the best outcome. CRM is about interacting with others? But what about interacting with your self? How open can you be? - Really?
I've seen this thread, this forum, and the moderation team deny the discussion of pilot suicide (and even action slip) as 'unprofessional' talk, slander against professional pilots. Is that not suggestive of a community that is not (as a group) ready to acknowledge the possibilities? If so - Why? Is there a fear that acknowledgement of mental health issues will lead to personal disadvantage?

Me - As an engineer. My company is starting to 'talk the talk' about mental health awareness. There's mental health awareness week. There's leaflets and presentations and hotlines to call. But do I believe really that if I seek help, my company has got my back? No of course not! There is fear. Fear that should I take advantage of the 'services' then a 30 minute conversation could balloon into the loss of my career, income, ability to pay the mortgage and feed the family.
And you guys and gals - have Licences to maintain. Lose that and you are off the job. How much pressure do you have to pass your medicals? at any cost?. I've been watching a PPL on YouTube recently - reddit link containing a video and discussion who lost their licence because they sought help for a relatively minor issue, in a modern western 'enlightened' society. They have a YouTube career to fall back on, and they are young. A lot of us have only done aviation all our lives, are paid well for it and have nothing to fall back on.

I don't know the answers. I don't have a magic solution. I don't know how the pilot (or aviation as a whole) community can solve the next big challenge. How do WE the aviation professional community address mental health in a way that works for safety as a whole, whilst protecting the needs of the individuals and the needs of our employers?
A lot of questions and no answers. Sorry.

After 9/11, many countries and airlines changed their jumpseat policies, restricting access to the flight deck to active crew members only. That was a knee-jerk reaction. Imagine there had been jumpseaters on the doomed 9/11 flights — wouldn’t they have tried to stop the cockpit intruders? With jumpseaters present, the pilots would at least have stood a better chance of defending themselves and avoiding being overpowered so quickly.

After 9/11, reinforced cockpit door locks were also introduced. But did that really make aviation safer? Consider Germanwings 9525, or MH370. On narrowbody aircraft, these locks don’t even prevent a group of terrorists seated in one of the front rows from storming the cockpit when the door is opened for a meal or a bathroom break. And yet, after GW9525, no one suggested removing the locks — despite the fact that they contributed to that tragedy.

Instead, many airlines — including mine — introduced a policy requiring that no pilot ever be left alone in the cockpit. But to what end? Would a flight attendant really be able to stop a determined pilot from committing suicide? It takes only seconds to shut off fuel control switches, pull engine master switches, and activate fire handles. A flight attendant could just as easily do those things, or take the cockpit fire axe and attack the remaining pilot, then lock the door. How rigorous are the background checks for flight attendants compared to pilots?

And now, in the US, some pilots are even allowed to carry guns in the cockpit. How long before that leads to catastrophe? I fear it’s only a matter of time.

I suspect there will again be knee-jerk reactions to AI171. Perhaps making it harder to operate critical switches? Would that really improve safety? Or installing CCTV in the cockpit? Would that prevent pilot suicide, or simply make it harder to hide? And would the cost and complexity really be worth it?

In my view, the biggest opportunity for improvement lies not in aircraft design, but in human resources. How can we better support pilots who are feeling down, stressed, or depressed? I don’t believe every crash necessarily calls for a technical or procedural fix. In this case, I see no compelling reason to change the aircraft itself.

Of course, the one sure way to eliminate pilot suicide would be to remove pilots altogether and fully automate flight. But I believe it will take a long time before such a system is truly safer than what we have today.

The best course of action for now is the same as in many situations in the cockpit: sit on your hands, resist the urge to act impulsively, and thoroughly investigate what would truly be the most effective response.

In my country, the ministry of transport has adopted the goal of “zero” road traffic fatalities. That’s unrealistic — even absurd — unless you ban all forms of transport altogether.

Perhaps we should acknowledge that not every incident or accident needs to be followed by a remedial action. In the case of AI171, any action we take should focus squarely on human factors.

Likewise it's fascinating that western pilots and technicians think that a technical problem is not possible. The hamster wheel shows very well how cultural behavior changes logical thinking: An Indian pilot cannot accept that a peer member can commit murder, while a Boeing pilot cannot accept that a simple technical problem can cause such a tragedy.
If you look at the list of possible causes of the accident, there are more technical ones than human factors.
I cannot explain the most likely cause further without risking that this post gets deleted, so I don't explain further.

Dani

Attention, Wall of Text incoming. Take appropriate precautions and fasten your seatbelts!

It is a bit difficult to not appear to use statistics in this fashion when trying to refute people using made up numbers and stories as argument.

If you had read the articles you quoted you might have realized that the basis for these "media reports" is a single individual who "heard from some Air India pilots". The supposed source wouldn't even have any way to actually know about the claimed information. Unless you want to elevate the Company Rumor Mill to hard evidence standard. This stands against:

Can we please stick to the actual facts, like za9ra22, and not spread baseless rumors that are self contradictory to begin with?

I find this a particularly concerning statement coming from someone who claims to be a pilot. Things like "Action Slip" and "Mental Load" should have been covered extensively in any CRM related education. If you think you are exempt from that kind of failure you are rejecting some very costly lessons learned over the last 50 years of accident investigation.

There have been many accidents where unindicated or even counter indicated action was taken by one or more pilots involved. As discussed in the first and second thread extensively many pilots could report incidents where they observed someone retracting flaps instead of gear. There have been major fatal accidents with pilots shutting down healthy engines instead of surging or burning ones. There's good reason the 787 has extensive takeoff configuration warnings, because we have had accidents and incidents with unsafe configurations taken to takeoff, beyond and sometimes even into a crash. Humans make mistakes. It is the goal of Safety Culture to prevent those mistakes from causing harm.

It was certainly mentioned. I'd not say it was discussed in any big way. Someone mentioned that for Embraer this is indeed the default, I haven't really found anything beyond that, despite considering it a worthwhile train of thought and possible recommendation as a result of this investigation.

This is a topic of actual research: https://www.pmhc.org/research
Currently 12.6% of pilots meet the medical threshold for depression, with a slight but below average difference between males (12.8%) and females (11.4%), with 4.1% of all pilots experiencing recent suicidal thoughts. https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/...940-016-0200-6

It should be noted that the utilized test (PHQ-9) is considered insufficient to assess suicide risk. Depending on scoring these values could be about average, or significantly below average. Based on their wording I would expect the latter, because their methodology does not specify severity.*1 Results of 0-4 points suggest no intervention necessary, 5-9 (classified as mild) simply suggest retaking the test after a few weeks. Research shows that for the general public Major Depressive Episodes have a prevalence of ~5-10%, with the prevalence of minor depression being less studied but significantly higher than major depression. There is also significant symptomatic overlap of mild depression with stress related conditions such as "Burnout" (if you know, please don't, this conversation is already complex enough without bringing that in). Considering the prevalence of stress in the industry I am actually surprised the numbers here are not higher. The lesser delta between males and females could be indicative of just such an issue, meaning that based on the data available the number of pilots actually suffering from depression could be less than even the comparably low number reported here. The actual suicide risk is usually orders of magnitude below even that but not easily covered in this data context due to the test used.

Cognitive impact is highly variable depending on the individual, actual symptoms and severity. It would be wrong to assess that 12.6% of pilots are a risk factor from this data. Quite the opposite, in fact. After the Germanwings crash the topic was discussed and has reached the awareness threshold for many. Mild cases usually require little to no intervention beyond raising awareness and helping the brain fix its chemistry through positive reinforcement. This can be as simple as taking PTO, reducing work hours, or focusing on social or physical activities. In the past 10 years these kinds of low impact measures have been made more readily available, most notably during the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting turmoil.

Further political activity has lead to some positive action as well. I already mentioned the recent success of the Pilot Mental Health Campaign getting legislation through Congress for improvements of the outdated FAA guidelines on mental health in an earlier post. Similar efforts are underway globally, be that internal review within regulatory bodies, or political movements.

Keeping what I wrote previously in mind I would still caution against extrapolating your personal experiences too far. Having family in the field and having volunteered myself I can certainly relate, albeit with far fewer and less impactful personal experiences. The research is obviously lagging and we haven't really understood the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic generally, let alone in all its intricacies. There is indeed an observable global trend. Some correlation has been shown to climate anxiety, but other factors like the deteriorating condition of international relations as well as a global rise in movements against individual rights are obvious sources for this trend as well.
This is certainly a challenge for healthcare everywhere, but I do not consider the data available to be majorly applicable in the context of aviation over the already very current research closer to the industry and GA. The positive impact of what has been done and is being done is highly likely to outperform whatever global mechanism is at work here. It's certainly a very important field of study, but based on the data I would still consider the industry and regulators as a global whole to be on a positive path.

We can certainly discuss this topic further, but I would not currently see it as likely to be causal in this particular case.

Overall I am still not convinced we are looking at an individuals mental health crisis in this case. I have already detailed the massive differences to all known or suspected cases of pilot suicide at least twice. There is no evidence of mental health issues for the Captain or the FO. There is certainly a strong indication for a human factors cause to this accident. And as mentioned above I find the idea of improving the safety of the Fuel Cutoff Switches a worthwhile topic to discuss. No single action, and I see these two switches as a single action just as much as operating both thrust levers, should be able to cause a major accident. I find it perfectly reasonable to require the Throttle Levers be at idle for the Cutoff Switches to work, and in case of an incorrect setting some sort of alert would be appropriate.

*EDIT*
*1: I missed this in my original readthrough, the cutoff is sensibly set to 10, starting with moderate depression. I'd have to look into the classification scheme but from memory both mild and moderate depression fall into the same category as relevant for the following statements.

Let me fix that statement for you:
"There is a reasonable explanation: One of the pilots set both switches to cutoff."

There is no known evidence for the claim of intent. There are documented instances of pilots making fatal mistakes out of the blue. Human Error is by far the more likely explanation.

Are we still going down this road? You (and many others) are saying we all can make mistake...an action slip...right? To use an analogy that is perhaps more familiar to most people, when driving my car I have set the wrong destination into my GPS, I have inexplicably locked my keys in the car, I have driven with the handbrake on and, my favorite, I have put petrol in a diesel car. But when operating a vehicle in a highly critical phase of driving such as entering a busy freeway and merging into high speed traffic, or overtaking with a single lane in each direction, I have never reached down and turned the engine off!! In fact, except for engine start and engine stop, there is never any reason or muscle memory to go anywhere near the ignition keys.

In a similar manner pilots can make errors, some small, some large that subsequently turn into disasters but at the time they thought their act or omission was the right thing to do. They didn't just do something absentmindedly that clearly wasn't the right thing to o.

But you suggest that during a critical phase of flight any highly experienced, professional pilot with thousands of hours under their belt can have an action slip or 'brain fart' and switch off fuel to all engines. Well in that case we should all be very worried and never fly again since every airliner has two crew who by your reckoning could potentially expose their inner 'brain fart' capacity and randomly (but unintentionally) deselect some very important switches during takeoff. I, m sorry but I just don't buy that.

I'd much rather accept that we have a very few CPT Fruit Loop and FO Looney Tunes types out there who are intent on bringing the aircraft down but that the chances of being on a flight operated by them is extremely slim.

I find that statement problematic. I have my own reasons to be skeptical of the field, mostly because of its continued lagging behind the evidence on neurodivergence. But the tools used for suicide risk assessment are surprisingly solid at this point. Of course application of those tools is where it usually falls flat. There are specific and proven tests for assessing general depression and its severity as well as specific and proven tests for assessing suicide risk. Nothing is ever certain in this field, especially since the veracity of any kind of self reporting is basically impossible to determine, but for cooperating individuals as well as for certain types of masking we have tools that are very accurate if applied correctly.
The issue in the context of Aviation is the stigmatization and risk of job loss...

We have to be a bit more careful with wording here. Prevalence of Major Depression is roughly twice as common in women than in men. [1] While it is correct that more men than women commit suicide, depending on what study you prefer somewhere between 2 and 4 times as many, the number of attempts however is skewed in the other direction with more women attempting suicide than men by a similar margin. [2] The difference is commonly attributed to the utilization of different means.
Notably, and as I wrote earlier, the prevalence of depression in pilots does _not_ show a significant difference between women and men, with female pilots even having a lower prevalence for moderate depression as measured in the aforementioned study. Same disclaimer applies obviously: The utilized PHQ-9 test is not useful for the assessment of suicide risk. It is however very reliable in detecting and gauging severity of depression or conditions presenting with similar symptoms. This is strongly indicative of an anomaly and needs to be examined. My personal suspicion would be the misattribution of a stress related condition like Burnout to depression. Note that Occupational Burnout also comes with the potential for suicidal thoughts but has a much lower actual suicide risk. [3]

The number of pilot suicides is thankfully far too small to be useful for any kind of statistical analysis. I have no idea why you would exclude the only actually confirmed pilot suicide where we have a psychotherapists treatment data as evidence. The evidence for MH370 is entirely circumstantial and treating it as a confirmed pilot suicide is very unhelpful for a discussion based on facts. The SilkAir incident classification by the NTSB is similarly based on circumstantial evidence exclusively. Without personally analyzing either report and reinspecting the evidence I again find it unhelpful to simply treat it as confirmed.

That being said, I fail to see the similarities of either case and the Air India accident. All known pilot suicides and all suspected ones happened in cruise, not during takeoff. All known or suspected cases have some kind of evidence of one or more causal psychological events (notably not with MH370). And that is evidence as opposed to company rumor mills. Evidence that is notably absent in any way shape or form in this instance. In case of the Germanwings accident the police was investigating the murder-suicide and informed the public within a week of the accident.

In the case of MH370 there is a single notable similarity: The theory of pilot suicide is being thrown around despite the complete absence of hard evidence towards a mental crisis. There is highly circumstantial evidence based on supposedly reconstructed "waypoints" that are very roughly similar to the theorized course the airplane may have taken. A theorized course on which we have continued to not actually find the wreckage. And even that circumstantial evidence is entirely absent here. The best explanation for the known facts in the Air India case would be human error.

I have not posted on here in many years, but I feel compelled to do so now. I am a current 787 pilot and I have previously flown most Boeing types and an Airbus too. I also have an extensive background and qualifications in human factors, training and assessment. Before anybody reads any further, perhaps acquaint yourself with the notion of Occam's razor. That is, the simplest explanation is the most likely explanation. I was certain that after the preliminary report was released the preposterous conspiracy theories would finally cease, but no! It's 2025 and humans can no longer help themselves. In my opinion the captain committed suicide here. Simple.

To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.

So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?

Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.

So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.

I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.

This thread could be two posts long instead of 64 pages and counting; the post with the preliminary report attached and this post above from a professional pilot.

This is likely to be very close to the final report. The switches moved themselves and all the other nonsensical scenarios being brought up make zero sense and in most cases simply could not happen.
As to not putting out the CVR there is always tremendous outside pressure on an investigation of this scale. Air India is important to the nation. As someone else mentioned when the final report is published it will be old news. Time works for Air India in this case. They appear to finally be making solid progress on a return to financial solvency. The powers to be are not going to jeopardize that turnaround. The answers will come with the final report at a time when it will do far less damage to Air India.

Saying so doesn't make it so. There is nothing "simple" about pilot suicide, major depression is a complex condition to begin with and the aviation context adds multiple complicating layers of conflicting motivation. I have stated before that depression and suicide are being displayed irrationally here by a number of people. It's simply not a magic explanation you can just wave at any behavior you don't understand. That's not how that works.

All known cases of pilot suicide have indicators that are not present here. In some cases (like the often mentioned Germanwings incident) those indicators were such strong evidence that the criminal case was open and shut in days or weeks. Those weren't "simple" cases either, but they had the evidence one would expect from a pilot suffering such a complex condition. Nothing of the sort is known about either the Captain or the FO.

Suicide is almost always the last step in a long history of suffering from (mental) illness. Suicidal ideation is what the medical field calls thoughts (ideas about) suicide. It's a comparably common symptom shown in around 5-20% of adults worldwide with strong variation correlating with external factors, such as economic well being, occupation, stress, etc. Assessed globally Pilots, as far as relevant studies are available, seem to fall into the lower bracket of prevalence of suicidal ideation with a lower than expected prevalence when compared to the general population from their respective country of origin down to the rate observed in the general population of economically stable and strong countries.

Cases where pilot suicide is suspected (any case where at least some level of evidence is present but either no or only an officially disputed final assessment exists) also generally follow the same patterns. Attempts at concealment are known to happen, but make up only 10%-30% of completed suicides in the general population. This does include the gray area of potentially successful concealment which would lead to the assumption of an accidental death.

In almost all cases a recurring pattern is also the topic of certainty. In suicidal ideation it is a very common theme that any issues are projected into the future and the uncertainty of those issues generates anxiety. Many survivors of suicide attempts reveal that they considered the certainty of their own death to be preferable over the continuance of uncertainty and the associated anxiety. While we are far from being able to authoritatively call this a definitive mechanism in the psychological conditions related to suicide it is strongly implicated and subject of ongoing research. My personal way of explaining this to someone unfamiliar with depression is that your brain is quite literally poisoning you and generating so much trauma that the idea of ending it becomes preferable. Patients in this stage of major depression show a determination and rationality in their drive towards that goal that is often the primary source of perceived irrationality from the outside. They routinely ignore any and all information that is not relevant to their goal. The means are often chosen with preference of perceived certainty over any other motivation, including harm to others.

Summarizing:
1. Suicide is overwhelmingly the last step in a history of mental illness and almost exclusively presents without that in cases of immediate, significant and obvious trauma.
2. Attempts of concealment are of low probability in a suicide.
3. Methods of suicide are commonly chosen based on perceived certainty of success.

These indicators are all negative for the Air India accident. There is no indication of a prolonged history of mental illness, there is no immediate, significant or obvious trauma. Theorizing an attempt at suicide by either of the pilots requires the assumption of a major attempt at concealment. And most importantly: The method chosen is not following the pattern of maximizing certainty, the probable reason why all confirmed and even all suspected cases of pilot suicide happened in cruise flight.

The theory of suicide is thus, in this particular case, a bad fit.

If we are assuming an (intentionally) concealed medical condition there are much simpler and more likely candidates available. Any type of cardiac issue could lead to a clot and a stroke. A stroke fully explains what happened here. A clot triggered by the acceleration of the takeoff run could very reasonably present as a stroke in the timeframe given here. If the victim belatedly realizes what happened he may develop the wish to stop the situation, which in a stroking brain could absolutely lead to the shortcut of "turning off the engines is done at the end of flight". Or the stroke victim is trying to hold onto something and grabs the switches relatively close to the relaxed hand position after releasing the thrust levers at V1. Other conditions can rapidly present and impact judgement, motor function, or both. If we are willing to attribute the Captains recent decision to retire and be with his father as a potential change in character we might even fall into a number of neurological conditions that may be causal.

But there are even simpler explanations than a concealed medical condition. Maybe one of the pilots had previously finished recurring training for evacuations on the runway and had discussed this with his colleague ahead of the flight. The final memory item for those is turning off the fuel pumps. This kind of Action Slip is well documented. It's not very likely, thus I have no issue believing no one reported observing that type of a slip in a simulator, but it's not like accidents with this level of weirdness are common. There is however a good indicator here fitting the situation of at least one of the pilots: The Captain may have been preoccupied with his wish to retire soon and spending time with his father. While the latter makes absolutely no sense in a suicide it could be part of the causality for an action slip. Also note this post about inadvertent activation of switches despite majorly different modes of activation.

In the end here are three observations based on the preliminary report:
1. Any type of mechanical fault is unlikely and no immediately supporting evidence has been found.
2. A human factor is currently the most likely candidate for the cause of the accident.
3. The type of human factor is not being speculated upon in the preliminary report.

Note that the report specifically states:
No further reference is made to any medical conditions, which is expected as these would fall outside the guidelines for inclusion in a preliminary report.

Attribution of an unclear accident to suicide is contributing to a problematic pattern of stigmatization and increases the likeliness of concealment of (mental) health issues associated with that stigma. In addition it precludes proper analysis of a potential inadvertent mishandling of controls. Both Airbus and Boeing commonly utilize this position and type of guarded switch. Both are sufficiently protected against accidental movement but nothing else. In many smaller aircraft setting the Master Switch to Off would not lead to engine shutdown. There are even reports of what we could consider negative training, by flight instructors demonstrating this fact by turning the Master Switch off in flight. Other commercial aircraft utilize different schemes, Embraer was mentioned right at the beginning of this thread by moosepileit as requiring Throttle Levers at idle for Fuel Cutoff as well as positioning those switches on the overhead panel .

Having just done a full review of this entire thread with regard to human factors I find it a bit sad to note that from the start there were multiple people with backgrounds in accident investigation present that pointed out human error and gave proper reasoning or even corroborating evidence in the form of accident reports. There are also multiple people repeatedly injecting their theory of pilot suicide either without providing any evidence or referring to baseless rumors from media reports. Notably those same people often rejected any other possibility of human error. They also repeatedly make statements of fact that are contradicted or not covered by the preliminary report. Any discussion of mental health seems pointless at this moment in time since there is no actual interest in the topic beyond occasionally going "It's suicide, duh". If anyone is interested in the topic I can once again only recommend taking a look at the Pilot Mental Health Campaign Research Page and other resources presented there.

I think the other worthwhile takeaway from this thread has been stated rather early, with the very applicable nod to a better layout regarding critical functionality that has no reason to be present in close proximity to regularly used flight controls.

Great post. Agree with your reasoning here. I also don't post often, and after this, I think I will return to the quiet life when surfing online forums.

52 pages and finally we get to the money shot.

For those asking why not wait a bit longer before throwing the switches and hard nose down, why bother? Roll them back here, cause a startle that is JUST long enough and then let gravity and the FADEC start a race. No resistance needed.

worse than that it absolutely will erode trust

the AAIB(India) doesn\x92t appear to have tried to play any evasive games and has allowed all stakeholders (OEM, fleeing investigators from multiple countries etc) to be a party the investigation as they are entitled to. That one specific party whether by intent or a lack of ability to keep control of their own personnel has continuously leaked behind the lead investigators and that too not actually providing contrarian views just leaking to present a specific narrative, for reasons we can all surmise, is a genuine concern

I remember many questioning the AAIB(India)\x92s ability to run a competent and neutral investigation well it doesn\x92t seem like the US probe it being run in such a fashion

there were no immediate safety bulletins recommended in the prelim report, the AAIB/Indian government has done nothing to harm the interest of any OEM, why this rush to create this targeted narrative when human factors investigations by their very nature are more complex and convoluted than pure technical ones? Why can\x92t the facts be determined by the lead investigators?

Leaking CVR details is absolutely despicable and I would\x92ve thought a professional pilot\x92s forum would be more outraged by \x91persons familiar with the investigation\x92 mouthing off to the media

I got a lot of stick a week or so back for saying that we were \x93dancing round the elephant in the room\x94 The above quote is rational and thoughtful and will, I am sure be acknowledged as the most likely scenario in the months to come. As an aside, on the 146/RJ that I flew, you had to retard the power levers to flight idle before pushing down on a lever to shut the engine down. Seems a better system.

Can you explain me Dave why the industry needs more like her?

She told utter nonsense.

This is the person who said the stuff quoted below. I hope you agree with me the ANA B787 uncommanded dual engine shutdown in 2019 *** after landing *** had nothing to do with a ' similar fuel cut-off malfunction during final approach".
There is also no Boeing software issue in the case of AI171. The ANA B787

ASN wrote: A Boeing 787-8 of All Nippon Airways operating ANA/NH985 from Tokyo/Haneda to Osaka/Itami stuck on runway 32L while landing at Itami due to sudden shut-down of both engines after Thrust Reverser actuation.

Ms Schiavo said:

"As fresh scrutiny surrounds Boeing after the Air India AI 171 crash, aviation expert Mary Schiavo reveals that a similar fuel cut-off malfunction plagued a Japanese Boeing 787 in 2019 \x97 with pilots never touching the controls. Investigators now face mounting questions on why warnings were missed and why Boeing\x92s software may still pose a global threat."

and
Mary Schiavo revealed that a near-identical incident occurred in 2019 on a Boeing 787 operated by ANA during its final approach to Osaka. \x93The investigation revealed the plane software made the 787 think it was on the ground, and the Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation (TCMA) system cut the fuel to the engines,\x94 she said.
On that occasion, both engines shut down simultaneously, but the crew landed safely. The Japanese aviation authority and Boeing traced the incident to a software fault, not human error. ANA\x92s Dreamliner, carrying 118 people, had to be towed off the runway.

I fear we could discuss comorbidities until we're blue in the face. But no, I wouldn't dismiss the possibility of it being suicide, no. I just consider it to require any kind of actual prove instead of prove by the inability to come up with better explanations. As for the topic of concealment: It's obviously a grey area but the previously quoted 10-30% prevalence is based on studies trying to figure out exactly that. I certainly wouldn't feel comfortable opining on that number.

Suicidal ideation does frequently present with both imagined as well as examined scenarios. Especially in more severe cases many victims have a history of attempts. The impulsive variants are typically in lesser severities of depression and are actually more common in people with lower levels of suicidal ideation. It would certainly be the most likely scenario for a suicide that I could come up with. It's especially prone to happen in cases with sudden traumatic events on top of an existing baseline condition but can occur in any other condition as far as I know. It would also fit somewhat with an unremarkable history as a person suffering from mild to moderate depression might consider being able to cope on his or her own. And then obviously be less prepared for a spontaneous urge. The troubling part here is that it would be indistinguishable from an action slip without additional evidence as to the pilots state of mind. The observable scenario would be something like this: Immediately upon reaching v2 the Captain moves both fuel cutoff switches to their off state in quick succession. When queried by the FO he denies having done so and remains passive until impact.

This is a plausible scenario, but also one that would be impossible to determine causally. Try for yourself, but you can use either rationalization for the behavior and even use the same rationalization for the opposite behavior. There is no way to predict how anyone would react in that situation and no way to determine either way what that behavior indicates. Not even moving those switches back into the on position by himself would give a reliable clue as to his state of mind. The report would probably default to Human Error in this case, as the intent could not be determined.
The resulting suggestions, ironically, would be basically the same as well. Ease access to mental healthcare, improve training for avoidance, and most importantly: Improve resilience of systems against this type of action.

Based on the numbers available to us right now I can almost guarantee that if you have taken more than 10 flights in your life one or both of your pilots or colleagues on the other seat suffered from symptoms of moderate to severe depression. And you will with almost absolute certainty never actually know. The true question people need to ask themselves is "Do I want my depressed pilot to have access to psychotherapy or not?"