Page Links: First Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 Next Last Index Page
Iron Duck
2025-06-14T13:15:00 permalink Post: 11901474 |
Since it was spotted we're assuming that the MLG bogie position indicates that gear had been selected up, but the sequence was interrupted. It's been suggested that the bogies might droop nose-down if hydraulic pressure is lost, even if Gear Up has
not
been selected.
Is this the case? 2 users liked this post. |
aeo
2025-06-14T14:05:00 permalink Post: 11901513 |
I agree it is helpful to seek a consensus on some of these matters.
The most productive responses would be along the lines of:- (1) I too have read all previous posts and agree that your summary reflects the current consensus, (2) I too have read all previous posts and agree your summary reflects the consensus HOWEVER I challenge that consensus because... [ [i]EITHER (a) reference to previous post that merits greater credence, OR (b) new evidence supplied], (3) I too have read all previous posts but I do NOT agree your summary reflects the consensus [explanation required]. It is not necessary for everyone who thinks (1) to say it (although some initial feedback would be useful!). However, if any of the more experienced and informed PPRuNers are thinking either (2) or (3) then it would be instructive to hear that. FWIW, yours strikes me as a reasonable summary of the best consensus I have been able to discern (as of ~30 minutes ago). There are multiple caveats to each line item, but I presume you've deliberately left those out for the sake of readability, so I'll do the same! The only comments I would add are:- - It's a stretch to say the RAT is seen or heard "conclusively". Doubts have been expressed about the video quality and there are dissenting views regarding the audio. If a few more people were able to wade in on the audio point in particular, this could be very beneficial in moving the discussion forward because the presence or otherwise of the RAT is significant to several competing theories. - On the subject of audio, I am surprised there has not been more discussion regarding engine noise. In the primary eye witness video the (alleged) RAT can be heard distinctly, as can the sounds of distant impact. If the engines were working as expected when overflying the camera and then flying directly away from it, do we really not think the engine noise would be more conclusive, i.e. louder (notwithstanding quiet engines and derated takeoffs)? Whichever way readers are leaning in the flaps versus power loss debate, surely these two points are pivotal, and we have actual evidence available to discuss? - Gear bogies: I'm not sure a consensus has yet been reached regarding the angle of the bogies. (I am not personally qualified to comment on this - I am purely saying I don't see a clear consensus just yet among those who are) - Mayday call: I don't recall seeing a confirmed source for the widely reported mayday. Others have brought this up in the thread but nobody appears to be able to confirm one way or the other. If accurate, its contents are informative. Am I right to presume that you have left it out of your summary due to a lack of confirmation? - The bogie could be explained by the Flap/Slat priority valve giving priority to the flaps if the PM suddenly realised his mistake and quickly put the flap lever back to the TO position and then selected the gear lever to UP. Those systems are both heavy hitters and would\x92ve sucked the life out of the CTR hydraulic system pumps. - There is no way loss of AC (alleged RAT deployment) could've caused a spool down of both engines. Think QF A380 incident in SIN - The entire #1 engine wiring harness in the wing was completely severed and yet it continued (by design) to run at its previous thrust setting. They had to shut it down using a fire truck! - History and design would dictate that a big 180 minutes ETOP\x92s twin such as the 787 having a dual engine failure or significant power loss at such a critical phase of flight would be a billion to one chance at best. Only the Airbus A400 had a software issue causing all 4 engine fuel shutoff valves to close causing it to crash killing the flight test crew - But this was during its development and flt testing. - Wide body twin\x92s delivering in the region of 60,000 to 115,000 lbs of thrust at TO rarely , if at all, flame out from multiple bird strike(s) like the baby Bus\x92s and Boeing\x92s. If anyone has seen the frozen chickens at TO power video would know what I\x92m talking about. And the Fan Blade being \x91blown off\x92 as well. In both cases the engine was was able to maintain full TOGA thrust for significantly longer than the AI aircraft. But it\x92s early days and anything could happen. And nothing surprises me anymore. 3 users liked this post. |
BrogulT
2025-06-14T14:35:00 permalink Post: 11901533 |
Even though there is no point speculating about the cause of this accident, it is the nature of the beast to have questions. As pilots (most of us at least), we do have an inquiring mindset.
For me, a dual engine flameout seems the only possible explanation, now we only have to wait for its cause. I'm asking this as a question, not claming to have "cracked the case". I'm not an aviation fuel system expert. Can anyone who is or has direct knowledge comment? The reason I thought of it is that I've seen very similar issues with diesel engine systems where the mechanical injection pump can typically suck fuel but is normally fed with pressure. An internal (or external) leak can cause it to not be able to suction fuel properly but as long as the other pumps keep it pressurized it can work forever. 2 users liked this post. |
njc
2025-06-14T15:06:00 permalink Post: 11901555 |
- The bogie could be explained by the Flap/Slat priority valve giving priority to the flaps if the PM suddenly realised his mistake and quickly put the flap lever back to the TO position and then selected the gear lever to UP. Those systems are both heavy hitters and would’ve sucked the life out of the CTR hydraulic system pumps.
- There is no way loss of AC (alleged RAT deployment) could've caused a spool down of both engines. Think QF A380 incident in SIN - The entire #1 engine wiring harness in the wing was completely severed and yet it continued (by design) to run at its previous thrust setting. They had to shut it down using a fire truck! - History and design would dictate that a big 180 minutes ETOP’s twin such as the 787 having a dual engine failure or significant power loss at such a critical phase of flight would be a billion to one chance at best. Only the Airbus A400 had a software issue causing all 4 engine fuel shutoff valves to close causing it to crash killing the flight test crew - But this was during its development and flt testing. - Wide body twin’s delivering in the region of 60,000 to 115,000 lbs of thrust at TO rarely , if at all, flame out from multiple bird strike(s) like the baby Bus’s and Boeing’s. If anyone has seen the frozen chickens at TO power video would know what I’m talking about. And the Fan Blade being ‘blown off’ as well. In both cases the engine was was able to maintain full TOGA thrust for significantly longer than the AI aircraft. As for history and design making a dual-engine failure a billion to one chance: I'd be more inclined to agree that it's unlikely to be what happened if the actual manufacturing of planes (Boeings in particular) and the maintenance procedures were both carried out "by the book" at all times by the manufacturer and the airlines... This is clearly not the case though. Last edited by Saab Dastard; 14th Jun 2025 at 19:35 . Reason: reference to deleted posts removed |
galaxy flyer
2025-06-14T17:02:00 permalink Post: 11901661 |
Here’s another screen shot from an unknown source showing both the RAT and a bit of symmetric spoiler float due to lack of hydraulic pressure to close side.
![]() 6 users liked this post. |
TehDehZeh
2025-06-14T17:24:00 permalink Post: 11901678 |
There have been a couple comments regarding the tilt of the bogies not corresponding to the landing configuration which have taken this as an indicator for an attempted (but failed) retraction.
I don't think anybody has so far confirmed which of the two positions the bogie would have without hydraulic pressure, but I would strongly think it is the one used in the retraction/extension cycle and not the landing configuration, for the simple reason that otherwise the gravity drop would potentially not work (I assume it is tilted for the stowing because it would otherwise not fit). Maybe someone with concrete knowledge can confirm this? This would then only confirm that the bogies were unpressurized (likely because of loss of hydraulics, but of course could also still be a partial retraction that stopped for some reason) |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-14T17:35:00 permalink Post: 11901681 |
What concerns me a little bit is if indeed AC power is lost, would the suction feed inlets in the wing tanks provide enough fuel flow to maintain TO thrust?
I know the system is designed to achieve this in a situation where all of the AC powered boost pumps are lost. But what about in a real situation... Could this cause a degradation of thrust? Even the slightest decrease..
I did read and search this thread, but I found nothing about ADS-B loss just before the end of the runway and at 71 ft high, according to FR24. ADS-B coverage is poor on the ground on the north-east part of the airfield (hence the fake news about taking off from the intersection) but I don't think it would be lost once airborne, except if it has been shut off... electrical failure ?
more precisely, loss of the two Main AC buses (ADS-B not powered by Standby AC) There's a list of equipment operable on battery/RAT here, but I'm not sure which (if any) is the transponder (26:10): If you had gear pins and an engine loss, I could maybe see climb rate being zero or slightly negative. Not the brick impression we see here.
There have been a couple comments regarding the tilt of the bogies not corresponding to the landing configuration which have taken this as an indicator for an attempted (but failed) retraction.
I don't think anybody has so far confirmed which of the two positions the bogie would have without hydraulic pressure, but I would strongly think it is the one used in the retraction/extension cycle and not the landing configuration, for the simple reason that otherwise the gravity drop would potentially not work (I assume it is tilted for the stowing because it would otherwise not fit). Maybe someone with concrete knowledge can confirm this? This would then only confirm that the bogies were unpressurized (likely because of loss of hydraulics, but of course could also still be a partial retraction that stopped for some reason) 2 users liked this post. |
HumbleDeer
2025-06-14T17:37:00 permalink Post: 11901683 |
Considering everything that's possibly to be found in the vicinity of the plane in the picture, I don't think we can conclusively say that's the RAT deployed.
2 users liked this post. |
jimtx
2025-06-14T18:06:00 permalink Post: 11901700 |
I don't think you can infer no hyd pressure from the spoiler "float. I've read elsewhere that they are biased up slightly to be used in slow speed roll control.
|
Shep69
2025-06-14T19:44:00 permalink Post: 11901765 |
Even my very experienced planespotter friends agree with me that it'd be very hard to notice from the ground even with bino's, let alone grainy footage. The B787/788's flaps are so well integrated you can hardly spot the difference if you're not sitting right next to them already.
Now I'm curious of the mechanical switchover mechanism that prevents backtracking of the flaps in the event the hydraulics fail and pressure drops which would slowly retract the flaps as hydraulic fluid drains from the pressure reservoir. |
WITCHWAY550
2025-06-14T21:22:00 permalink Post: 11901851 |
That\x92s not a false conclusion if in fact hydraulics were lost. I dont think that was the case and if it was engine driven hydraulic pumps have normal output all the way down to idle and actually further. I dont think the RAT deployed for any reason and i am not sure that has been confirmed.
|
MaybeItIs
2025-06-14T21:40:00 permalink Post: 11901866 |
I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions. As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load. If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault. Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature. Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking. As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it. It's going to be difficult to prove though. 4 users liked this post. |
Compton3fox
2025-06-14T22:01:00 permalink Post: 11901878 |
That\x92s not a false conclusion if in fact hydraulics were lost. I dont think that was the case and if it was engine driven hydraulic pumps have normal output all the way down to idle and actually further. I dont think the RAT deployed for any reason and i am not sure that has been confirmed.
1 user liked this post. |
ILS27LEFT
2025-06-14T22:05:00 permalink Post: 11901881 |
Indeed
Thanks for answering the question I hadn't yet asked but wanted to confirm!
I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions. As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load. If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault. Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature. Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking. As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it. It's going to be difficult to prove though. 1 user liked this post. |
CriticalSoftware
2025-06-14T23:45:00 permalink Post: 11901966 |
Several hundred posts ago, a link to a PPrune thread re 787 RAT deployment was posted. I am sure everyone posting has at least seen if they have read the thread....
I apologise, if my thoughts have already been posted - please delete if this is the case, I cannot find them in the main thread though None of us know if there was no engine failure, single engine failure or double engine failure. If RAT was deployed, we do not yet know whether it was automatic or manually deployed by a very experienced captain because "We have no power. What harm can it do now?" (Electrical power, not thrust) Would the Captain also elect to start the APU in the few seconds he had? In the thread re 787 RAT deployment, some one states that a single engine failure, due to the small rudder size on 787-8, automatically throttles back the remaining engine as the rudder will not be able to correct the course. I am not clear about the guards around this - be they height restrictions, speed restrictions or % of power delivery. If there are any guards in the software. It may have been stated and I missed it or didn't understand. However, as someone involved with critical software design & development, if the generators were "playing up", which is highly possible given passenger observations on previous flights, could there be a window, if the aircraft experienced a problem with say no 1 engine ( suggested in video "analysis" despite the aircraft tracking right ) whereby the loss of electrical power triggered the software to "throttle back" No 2, and that again limiting any recovery of No 1, if the generators on 2 didn't perform/react as planned. Software always has holes. The primary flight deck screens have battery backup - but do they lose power when the main buses go offline - and/or again when the RAT delivers? Or is it seemless? Previous posts mention both scenarios but with no answer. Are there flickers, resets, reboots? All distracting at best and time limiting at worst. I think a pertinent point posted earlier, was that the problems seems to have begun with "gear up", a lot of load on the electrically driven, hydraulic pumps. Seemingly started, but obviously not completed. I believe the 2 guys sitting in row 0 dealing with this, were just passengers from the moment it left the gate - for whatever reason. The mayday call, by whichever pilot - although no transcript officially published - was probably a last ditch attempt to alert ATC asap to a situation with a clear outcome. Very sad. It is bad form to point the finger before any useful facts are confirmed. So, I suspect generator problems & a hole in the software and/or logic due to timing issues caused by generators appearing to be on/offline -maybe rapidly - restricting thrust by design.. 1 user liked this post. |
Lifer01
2025-06-15T02:29:00 permalink Post: 11902059 |
This applies equally to a normal gear retraction: the centre hydraulic pumps must have stopped very early for the trucks to be in that position on an "interrupted" gear retraction, with the main gear doors still closed (and presumably locked). Seems unlikely.
I did raise this earlier... FCOMs say that the bogies remain in the stowed tilt after a gravity drop, but I don't know if that's because the gear has springs to hold it that way without hydraulics, or just they close the valves on the hydraulics so it stays in the last commanded position without pressure.
Alternate extension appears to rely on the truck positioner remaining in its previously "positioned" state - stowed - where it has been sitting cold, unloved and unpowered since the gear was previously retracted. Like other Boeing types, the wheel well has some bars to stop the truck moving while it's up and stowed. It's remotely possible the main gear priority valves may have prevented more gear movement in the absence of good hydraulic pressure - however this wouldn't stop the nose gear from operating, so not likely. Last edited by Lifer01; 15th Jun 2025 at 02:39 . 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-15T02:36:00 permalink Post: 11902060 |
Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).
Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..first it bangs for awhile, then it burns itself up, then ...
Thanks for answering the question I hadn't yet asked but wanted to confirm!
I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions. As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load. If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault. Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature. Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking. As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it. It's going to be difficult to prove though. In addition, the 787 has four main generators and I believe the switching is segregated into at least two controllers, on top of the four separate generator control units. And again, electrical failure should not cause engine failure - consider QF32 where the wiring to the engine was mostly severed and they had to drown it with a fire truck.
Best post until now in my view. We will find out very soon I think. Gear up command triggered the instant lack of fuel to both engines. I'm not sure on how the fuel flow is dependant on the power supplies on the 787 but I genuinely believe you are very very close to what might have happened here.
Yes, thanks, I've seen a few comments to this effect, and I have to accept most of what you say. I understand that they have their own dedicated generators and local independent FADECs (or EECs), but I'm trying to use what I do know to attempt to figure this out. I know that there are Fuel Cutoff switches in the cockpit. Somehow, if switched to Off, these will cut off the fuel to the engines, "no matter what". Of course, even that's not true, as the Qantas A380 engine burst apparently (comment in this thread) showed.
Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can. You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve? Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so. ![]() The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...
What\x92s the usual time frame for the release of preliminary data and report from the FDR and CVR? Is it around 6 months?
I guess if no directives come from Boeing or the FAA in the next 2 weeks, it can be presumed that a systems failure from which recovery was impossible was unlikely. 1 user liked this post. |
MaybeItIs
2025-06-15T04:00:00 permalink Post: 11902086 |
![]()
I believe the valves are almost all bi-stable power-open power-close. When not powered, they remain in the last commanded position.
The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story... |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-15T04:53:00 permalink Post: 11902102 |
Ok, thanks for clarifying. Of course, an overload will simply cause the hydraulic pressure relief valves to activate. There will be a moderate increase in motor current when bypassing, but the electrical side should be fully able to cope with that. Should be! I'm suggesting here that there was a fault somewhere in the electrical supplies that effectively derated some part of it, and that maybe the GearUp load was too much for it on this occasion.
It uses a variable displacement pump to maintain 5000PSI constant pressure. The swashplate angle is varied to adjust pump output flow: more devices consuming fluid, more flow to keep the pressure up. If the pumps cannot deliver enough fluid, the swashplate reaches the full flow position and the output pressure decreases until flow consumed equals flow produced. Very much like a constant-current constant-voltage power supply. Running in that area of maximum flow is 100% expected under some conditions, especially if an engine or EDP fails and the electric demand pump is supplying a whole hydraulic system sized for the larger EDP (although I think this would be less of an issue on the 787 as the L/R systems don't do much, but the same variable-displacement pump design has been around for a LONG time including on the 737). And again, there's a VFD between the aircraft electrical bus and the pump motor, because the pump is 400Hz and the aircraft is wild-frequency. VFDs are very very good at isolating faults unless you are actually looking at a sustained overload on one of four generators .
Thanks for confirming the 4 gens. So there's probably quite a bit of switching required. Not sure how that's done, but I guess robust contactors are required. And even these can fail. Systems usually cannot tell that a contactor has failed on the open side until it's switched. So, a switchover may have been done, but a failed contact meant the backup generator wasn't connected. Who knows, so many possibilities.
No bus is essential on a modern aircraft. Boeing treats everything electric as a black box but the A380 has this beautifully overkill drawing - given both have 4x generators, 2x APU generators, and a RAT, it should not be entirely dissimilar levels of redundancy: ![]() Note that the reason for some links having two contactors in series (e.g. BTC5/6 or BTC7) is because this is spread across two separate units, so that a fire and total loss of one leaves ~half the aircraft powered and totally flyable.
Okay! Many thanks for that! Of course, it very much complicates the picture, and I'm very puzzled as to how the Fuel Cutoff Switches and Valves operate. Apparently, the TCAM system shuts off an errant engine on the ground at least, but my concern is not with the software but the hardware. It obviously has an Output going into the Fuel Shutoff system. If the TCAM unit loses power, can that output cause the Cutoff process (powered by the engine-dedicated generator) to be activated? I guess that's the $64 billion question, but if MCAS is any example, then: Probably!
Power-open power-close is very common in commercial/situations where you don't want to be wasting energy 24/7 and don't have a defined position for the valve/damper in case of power loss. Done a bunch of them in ductwork and electrically operated windows - your car likely has them, for example. Last edited by Someone Somewhere; 15th Jun 2025 at 05:08 . 4 users liked this post. |
Compton3fox
2025-06-15T06:14:00 permalink Post: 11902138 |
In summary, these billion to one events are only billion to one taking into account what we knew and predicted at the time. Throw in a wild or unpredicted event and all bets are off. Also, a Billion to 1 event only happens 1 in a billion times. So if you run the sequence 10 billion times, then in theory, it will happen 10 times but it may happen 20 in the 1st 10 billion or 5 and as skwdenyer stated, it can happen at event 1! Toss a coin 20 times and probability says you will get 10 heads and 10 tails but all the tosses are independent, so you could get 20 heads or 20 tails or any other combination. The same applies to billion to 1 events. Last edited by Compton3fox; 15th Jun 2025 at 07:44 . 9 users liked this post. |