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CV880
2025-06-17T00:03:00 permalink Post: 11903877 |
Aerospace101
post
makes a good point about the gear tilt. When jacking an aircraft with hydraulics off the trucks will often self-rotate with the heavier end obviously going down. Since the 787 truck position actuator is on the forward end of the truck it is probable that is the heavier end therefore the truck is likely to rotate nose down without hydraulics.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 17th Jun 2025 at 00:08 . Reason: Please use post permalink, not numbers, since their listing may change 2 users liked this post. |
Roo
2025-06-17T00:12:00 permalink Post: 11903880 |
Aerospace101
post
makes a good point about the gear tilt. When jacking an aircraft with hydraulics off the trucks will often self-rotate with the heavier end obviously going down. Since the 787 truck position actuator is on the forward end of the truck it is probable that is the heavier end therefore the truck is likely to rotate nose down without hydraulics.
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dragon6172
2025-06-17T01:30:00 permalink Post: 11903903 |
I previously speculated the forward truck tilt was proof the gear had been selected UP and the retraction sequence was interrupted.
I\x92m not so sure now and believe there is a different conclusion from this non-normal gear position. In normal retraction sequence the gear doors open almost instantaneously after the forward truck tilt. It does seem coincidental the tilt was completed while no indication of the doors opening is visible on the rooftop video, which would suggest hydraulic failure at that exact moment; this precise timing of interruption in the retraction sequence feels unlikely. So is there a more likely answer for the forward truck tilt that does not involve movement of the gear lever? I suspect it\x92s more likely that C hydraulics lost power prior to rotation, as a consequence the truck could not tilt rearward during rotation as it normally should. Therefore it\x92s probable it always stayed in a neutral or forward tilt position from the take off run until we see it in the rooftop video. If the gear was behaving normally, and the crew had omitted to retract, it should be hanging rearwards. Watch any 787-8 takeoff video and you can see at rotation all 4 main wheels stay on the runway as the aircraft rotates. Just after wheels up they tilt rearwards. It\x92s a very subtle position change. If the gear was always in a neutral or forward truck tilt position then this undermines the theory that retraction sequence was interrupted. It insinuates the C hydraulic and electrical failure happened prior to main wheels lift off. For this reason I believe we cannot assume that gear UP was selected nor that retraction was interrupted. I\x92m seeing lots of social media posts which suggest the forward tilt means gear was in retraction and I don\x92t believe it was now. I think the truck tilt position is key to understanding the timeline of system failures and whether the automatic RAT deployment was triggered by power failures or engine(s) failure. The question remains, did loss of center hydraulics happen before or after loss of thrust? In a normal retraction, the main gear doors begin to open before the truck tilt is complete (roughly when the gear trucks are "level", seen around 8-10 second marks of this video ). The nose gear doors open at the same time the main gear tilt starts (seen in Jetstar video linked below). It's too blurry in the video/stills of the accident aircraft to definitively say the nose doors are not open, but I'd say no. And it's pretty much a certainty that the main gear doors are not open. And finally I think it is also pretty clear that the main gear trucks are tilted down to the retract position. I have no confirmation of this, but I read (or heard someone say in a video) that the truck tilt actuator was a "single acting" actuator, meaning hydraulic pressure held it in the toe up position and it was spring loaded to the retract position. Which means if hydraulic pressure was lost due to loss of power to the electric driven center hydraulic system, then the main gear trucks would tilt forward on their own without moving the gear handle. The Jetstar burst tire video somewhat backs this up, in that the blown tire caused a leak to the center hydraulic system and an alternate extension was required (thus the reason the main doors are down during the landing). No hydraulic pressure means the main gear trucks remained pointing nose down during the landing. Video here Last edited by dragon6172; 18th Jun 2025 at 03:01 . Reason: Edit video links 3 users liked this post. |
1989Pistons
2025-06-17T02:40:00 permalink Post: 11903925 |
In a normal retraction, the main gear doors begin to open before the truck tilt is complete (roughly when the gear trucks are "level", seen around 8-10 second marks of this video ). The nose gear doors open at the same time the main gear tilt starts (seen in Jetstar video linked below). It's too blurry in the video/stills of the accident aircraft to definitively say the nose doors are not open, but I'd say no. And it's pretty much a certainty that the main gear doors are not open. And finally I think it is also pretty clear that the main gear trucks are tilted down to the retract position. 4 users liked this post. |
dragon6172
2025-06-17T03:04:00 permalink Post: 11903933 |
You'd be half right (or if you prefer, half wrong). Each channel of the FADEC has its own thrust lever position resolver. In other Boeing aircraft, there is a single resolver per engine, with dual electrical coils (i.e. electrically isolated but mechanically connected). But in order to go for full compliance with a (in my opinion) rather extreme FAA position regarding 'single failures' and 25.901(c), the 787 thrust lever actually has dual load paths, feeding to different thrust lever resolvers for each channel.
3 users liked this post. |
OldnGrounded
2025-06-17T03:34:00 permalink Post: 11903943 |
Thanks. Do we know that these are monitored by TCMA for air/ground state and if so, do we know the logic used to make a determination based on those inputs? Alternatively, do you know where we should be looking for those answers?
2 users liked this post. |
bbofh
2025-06-17T04:55:00 permalink Post: 11903967 |
If a gear retraction remains in "tilt", then what does that
interregnum
status say in response to various systems' interrogations of the WoW sensors? Is it stuck in the Netherworld of
betwixt and between
?
Perhaps the safer solution should be an additional circuitry micro-switch feed of all three "up and locked"? (that agrees with the gear-handle). Also waiting to hear what the 787-8 RADALT status is? Was it ever 5G emanations-proofed? Is there any software provision for the TCMA to know for sure that the gear is neither up nor down? I would doubt it. Does that uncertainty affect the thrust-lever's positional input? Last edited by bbofh; 17th Jun 2025 at 05:02 . Reason: typo |
DaveReidUK
2025-06-17T07:09:00 permalink Post: 11904017 |
One comment here, and maybe I am mis-understanding your comment, but the landing gear
only
operates via the center hydraulics. It does not matter whether the Left/Right engine driven hydraulic systems are operative or not. The RAT will only pressurize the primary flight control portion of the center hydraulics.
Or could it be that it's capable of delivering enough power (via either route) to move the tilt actuator but not a humungous retraction jack? 1 user liked this post. |
mechpowi
2025-06-17T07:42:00 permalink Post: 11904035 |
If a gear retraction remains in "tilt", then what does that
interregnum
status say in response to various systems' interrogations of the WoW sensors? Is it stuck in the Netherworld of
betwixt and between
?
Perhaps the safer solution should be an additional circuitry micro-switch feed of all three "up and locked"? (that agrees with the gear-handle). Also waiting to hear what the 787-8 RADALT status is? Was it ever 5G emanations-proofed? Is there any software provision for the TCMA to know for sure that the gear is neither up nor down? I would doubt it. Does that uncertainty affect the thrust-lever's positional input? Using up and locked as signal to prevent TCMA activation is obviously more dangerous as it allows TCMA to function while the aircraft is in the air. Even in the same aircraft there might be different logics to determin if the aicraft is on the ground or in the air, depending what is the priority. Is the priority to know that the aircraft is in the air or on the ground or even NOT in the air. Some of those logics could use up-and-locked sensors and the gear handle position. 2 users liked this post. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-17T09:28:00 permalink Post: 11904137 |
Are you saying that the RAT cannot power retraction of the gear, neither via its own hydraulic pump nor via its generator providing power to the centre system pumps?
Or could it be that it's capable of delivering enough power (via either route) to move the tilt actuator but not a humungous retraction jack? The RAT provides electrical power only to critical flight instrumentation (mostly Captains), navigation and communication. The same critical equipment that the Battery will provide. If all electrics was lost, the main Battery would provides standby power until RAT is fully deployed. The RAT electrical power would not be able to power C hydraulic electric pumps. 8 users liked this post. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-17T17:44:00 permalink Post: 11904511 |
I appreciate some don\x92t want to speculate on the RAT deployment or APU auto start until further evidence, but the gear truck tilt is a massive clue to a non-normal hydraulic issue, most likely caused by electrical power problems since C hydraulics is only electric pump powered. 7 users liked this post. |
Irishshamrock
2025-06-17T18:21:00 permalink Post: 11904534 |
If power was lost at the moment gear was selected ‘up’ it would have started the process only for it to stop, hence why the forward tilt was present - perhaps
2 users liked this post. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-17T19:01:00 permalink Post: 11904572 |
1. The hydraulic failure happened exactly when the truck had tilted forward but the split-second before the gear doors could open. That exact timing seems too coincidental. 2. The crew selected Gear Up. We have no proof of this. I speculate the crew never got as far as "Positive Rate...Gear Up" because they were already engrossed in flying the aircraft and processing their thrust problem. If an electrical problem had developed (as evidenced by the RAT deployment) the flight instrumentation would have been flickering and a flurry of silent master caution alerts would be very distracting. I suggest it's more likely that the truck remained in a forward tilt from the takeoff run because the hydraulic failure happened prior to rotation, therefore keeping it in this unusual position. This answer does not rely on the gear lever position either. It also insinuates that their hydraulic problems occurred probably between V1 and VR. See my earlier post . 3 users liked this post. |
KSINGH
2025-06-17T22:42:00 permalink Post: 11904730 |
Most? The Airbus I'm familiar with is 100' AGL or 5s after liftoff and I think this is common to all Airbus FBW. The B787 & B777 appear to be 200' AGL but I'm taking this from online FCOM extracts. The
B737
does appear to be 400'. Company limitations may be higher.
As mentioned elsewhere both EK and Air NZ have had messy low level mis-set altitude capture incidents with the B777, but in isolation, obviously, this wouldn't cause RAT extension. About airport cameras. Someone pointed out on the other thread that airports have more coverage than they would necessarily advertise. Presumably available to investigators but not to the public or press. yeah the low MCP alt setting/alt capture doesn\x92t make a whole lot of sense- the plane didn\x92t pitch forward it just failed to climb/lost lift that\x92s not conducive with what happened nor does it explain why the gear is still down (although seemingly selected up given the boogie tilt) or the RAT deployed (if it really was) |
Aerospace101
2025-06-18T16:46:00 permalink Post: 11905393 |
Loss of all Hydraulics
I still consider the forward truck tilt is a massive clue to a C system Hydraulic failure prior to wheels-up, which must have been caused by loss of electrics (since C is solely electrically powered), so I am still wondering if hydraulic failure happened before or after the loss of thrust.
While thinking about the consequences of a total hydraulics failure around time of rotation (caused by a suspected dual engine failure), here is a new observation. I searched the previous threads to see if anyone lese had noticed it.
Observation/Question - in the accident video, the view from behind the aircraft as it pitches up seems to show inboard spoilers aft of the engines on both wings partially open - is that what I'm seeing? Pic at 99 above roof top video screen shot see here] also shows what I'm looking at... Spoilers, or markings on the wings maybe?
@ treadigraph ![]() In the rooftop video, as it's just approaching the treeline, there are spoiler deflections visible just behind the engines on each wing. With a total hydraulics failure, the pilots control column using direct wiring, will only control this spoiler pair and the stabiliser. The RAT does not control this spoiler pair (hydraulically), only the most inboard spoilers pair. Its an interesting observation because it means this spoiler pair were being deflected electrically, either by the battery or RAT. But if the RAT provides emergency C hydraulic power why didn't the RAT powered spoilers deflect instead? Does this mean the RAT was unable to provide emergency hydraulic at such low airspeed? I think this also re-affirms the critical loss of power (dual engine failure), and rules out many other theories. It tragically lost all power, both engines, all hydraulics and electrics (apart from battery and RAT). I am wondering if anyone else has noticed other flight control deflections? (Tried posting link to youtube but unhelpfully frames entire video) Last edited by Aerospace101; 18th Jun 2025 at 16:48 . Reason: Removed youtube video 4 users liked this post. |
bbofh
2025-06-19T01:30:00 permalink Post: 11905658 |
The 787-8 landing gear retraction is primarily hydraulic, using the center hydraulic system for the main operation. However, the alternate gear
extension
system utilizes a dedicated electric pump to pressurize fluid from the center hydraulic system for gear extension. Obviously due its size and weight and staged retraction, the effort required to raise and stow the gear greatly exceeds that required for extension.
The main gear retraction/extension is controlled by the center hydraulic system. It is apparent that the hydraulics failed when the engines shut down after breaking the down-locks and leaving the Main Landing gear bogeys in the tilt position, ready for a next step internal stowage and door closure (that was now never to happen). It is therefore apparent that the dual engine failure and consequent automated RAT extension was precipitated by this gear selection or retraction cycle and thus likely to be either WoW micro-switch or 5G Radar altimeter-effect associated. Due to accumulator depletion, the electric pump load would have spiked to replenish it. This may have precipitated the dual engine shutdown due to an unfiltered electrical surge affecting the Ground/Air microswitches (or a local 5G transmission affecting the RADALT) and resetting the TCMA. The RADALT? Another plausibility? Because of the furore over a spasticated frequency allocation by the US FCC, the US FAA had finally “bought in” and declared that individual nations and their airline operators were responsible for their own 5G frequency spectrum allocations and for taking essential steps to ensure mitigation of the interference effects upon aircraft automated landings and other critical systems caused by their own national approved 5G spectrum decisions. It was admittedly a situation calling for extensive modifications to (and shielding for) the three radar altimeters fitted for redundancy considerations to all modern airliners... for Category 3 ILS approach and landing in zero/zero visibility conditions. The RADALT also features in many air-ground sensing applications. (eg the 747-8). This was an unusual FAA “passing of the buck” to manufacturers such as Honeywell etc. (to sort out with client operators). But then again, it was not the US FCC’s right to dictate the specific 5G frequencies internationally. These spectrum allocations now vary over the wide selection of 5G phones available (and also nationally). 5G Radar Altimeters constitute a part of the ground/Air sensing that changes the TCMA from ground mode (able to fuel-chop engines) to the air mode (inhibited from doing so)... Ground activation is acceptable ...where fuel chopping of uncommanded thrust can prevent runway sideways excursions or runway length overruns. The question now becomes: “Is it more (or less) safe having an automated fuel-chopping capability on BOTH your left and right, rather than leaving it to the pilot to react via his center console fuel cut-off switches... in the unlikely event of a runaway engine after landing (or during an abandoned take-off)? 5G Frequency Variations The frequencies of 5G phones vary nationally based on the frequency bands allocated and used by different carriers in each country. In the United States, for example, carriers such as AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and others use a combination of low-band, mid-band, and high-band 5G frequencies. Low-band 5G frequencies typically range from 600 MHz to 1 GHz, mid-band 5G frequencies range from 1.7 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and high-band 5G (mmWave) frequencies start at 24 GHz and go up to 40 GHz . These frequencies are allocated by regulatory bodies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and can vary between countries based on spectrum availability and regulatory decisions. In other countries, the specific frequency bands used for 5G may differ, leading to variations in the frequencies supported by 5G phones. Additionally, the deployment of 5G networks can also influence the frequencies used, with some countries focusing more on sub-6 GHz bands while others prioritize mmWave technology. 5G interference? It may be an avenue worth exploring? 6 users liked this post. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-19T07:25:00 permalink Post: 11905792 |
I recommend that everyone look at the video posted by Sawbones62 in
this post
. The video (Stig Shift #76) is by a qualified B787 engineer and he looks at the various aircraft systems that are being discussed in the Air India accident. With respect to the landing gear, he concludes that the landing gear handle must have been selected up for the bogies to have been tilted front down.
Point is the gear truck tilt is a clue of a C hydraulics failure, but we cant determine if hydraulics failed prior to wheels off runway or prior to gear doors opening in retraction sequence. 3 users liked this post. |
Pinkman
2025-06-19T07:55:00 permalink Post: 11905808 |
I too watched his explanation with interest. However I believe he is not considering the possibility of C hydraulics failure prior to wheels lift-off, because I speculated this is the more likely reason the gear trucks remained in a forward tilt position,
see my earlier post here
. I believe the crew never got as far as calling for the Gear Up... many possible reasons for this, flickering instrument screens during the electrical switchover to battery power, flurry of EICAS messages. For any of those things happening around time of rotation, I would be advocating delaying gear up decision until safely climbing away above AA and as a crew you have chance to discuss safest course of action. Not putting the gear up shouldn't kill you.
Point is the gear truck tilt is a clue of a C hydraulics failure, but we cant determine if hydraulics failed prior to wheels off runway or prior to gear doors opening in retraction sequence. |
CV880
2025-06-19T08:26:00 permalink Post: 11905827 |
In a video of a 787 gear swing on jacks the trucks start moving to the nose down tilt position at the same time as the door starts to open so if the door did not open it is unlikely the gear was selected up and the truck tilt was more likely a result of C system failure. The front end of the truck is the heavier end because of the truck position actuator location so along with air loads, a nose down position is the result.
3 users liked this post. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-19T08:27:00 permalink Post: 11905828 |
Last edited by Saab Dastard; 19th Jun 2025 at 10:58 . Reason: Reference to deleted post removed 1 user liked this post. |