Posts about: "Memory Items" [Posts: 49 Pages: 3]

No, they did not climb that high. Latest FR24 ADS-B report was indeed 625 ft, but that is based on 1013 (STD). With the local QNH being 1000, that 625ft becomes roughly 300ft MSL. Corrected for airport elevation, this is just above 100ft. The last recorded altitude of the aircraft was roughly 100ft AGL, which does not mean it didn\x92t climb a bit higher, but the aircraft reaching 400ft is pure speculation.

A loss of lift AND thrust at this critical juncture could have had caused this awful disaster. I think the data recorders have already revealed the cause but If it's this, then I don't think we will hear much anytime soon.

If decrease in thrust not by transition to climb thrust due to early inadvertent flap retraction and pilot action on fuel control switches from accomplishing dual engine failure memory items, then fuel cavitation /fuel fumes lock may be a cause. Just saying.

Stop posting that rubbish. Once and for all!

While I deleted the offending post, I am leaving this objection to it and the text being objected to, up since this response was warranted.
T28B

The simplest answer: Lo Lvl Alt Cap; Thrust to Idle; Startle Factor; Inappropriate Memory Items : ( RAT deployed; insufficient time for Eng relight.

Non-aviation engineer here: I have a question about the low level altitude capture theory that I've been a bit hesitant to ask, since no-one else seemed to be bringing it up.

My understanding of altitude capture is that the autopilot will automatically adjust both thrust and pitch to intercept the requested altitude. However to my eyes there is very little pitch adjustment in the CCTV video of the plane taken from behind, until the very end of the video when it pitches up somewhat (obscured by buildings, more visible in the smartphone video). Please correct me if I'm wrong but I'd have thought that if the autopilot was trying to capture a very low altitude it would start pitching down (quite noticeably!) to do so, not remain at what looks like 10+ degrees nose-up. I honestly struggle to reconcile what I'm looking at in the video with an attempt to level off at 0ft, 200ft, or any of the other mentioned low-level altitudes.

Also maybe I'm missing something 787-specific but generally doesn't the autopilot have to be activated for the aircraft to automatically attempt to capture the pre-selected altitude? That was the case in this incident involving a Dash 8 and a target altitude of 0 feet that I am reading about ( https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...-dash-8-g-ecoe ). I'd have thought the PF would still be hand-flying the departure at the point that things went wrong, considering that the gear hadn't even been retracted yet...

DISCLAIMER: Poster (a) is one of the (apparently quite numerous) lawyers following this thread; (b) a long-time forum lurker and aviation enthusiast who loves studying FCOMs for fun (to each his own, I guess); (c) has followed and read this thread from the start.

What I cannot do is add new theories or uncover any new facts the actual experts have not already thought of. However, since summarizing and structuring information is one thing lawyers tend to regularly do (and sometimes even do well), here is my attempt at a useful contribution to this thread: an attempt to summarize the main theories discussed here since day one (which I think hasn't been done for quite some time) in the hope that a birds-eye view will be helpful to those who have not read everything since the beginning or might even trigger some new flash of inspiration for someone more knowledgable than me. I have focused on the cons since there does not seem to be enough evidence to come to any positive conclusion.

I shall try to be concise and to refrain from personal evaluations of my own. Of course, no disrespect whatsoever is intended towards all those who have contributed to this thread and to the individual theories, one or combinations of which may turn out to have led to this tragic outcome. That arguments can be made against every single theory that has been propagated seems to be the result of the highly improbable and unusual nature of this deplorable event and certainly not due to any lack of knowledge or reasoning skills in this forum.

DEAR MODS: If I have distorted anything or if, meaning well, should have achieved the opposite \x96 I guess you know where the delete button is\x85

Anyway, here goes:

A. Misconfiguration or wrong takeoff data
Widely refuted, since

• rotation, takeoff and initial climb seem normal;
• likely extreme errors would have been required to have such tragic effect (the fuel tanks should have been only about half full, so not close to MTOW);
• there is strong evidence that at least some flaps were extended for takeoff (post-crash photo, perhaps also visible in video from behind)

B. Flaps retracted post-takeoff instead of gear
Still brought up from time to time. However, widely disregarded due to

• the fact that with two working engines an inadvertent flap retraction should easily be recoverable, even with gear down;
• strong indications that hydraulic and electric power were lost (audible/visible indications of RAT extension, survivor statement, lack of engine noise, position of MLG bogies).

For a while, the forward tilt of the bogies as first part of the retraction cycle was seen as additional evidence that the gear had been selected up. However, it has been pointed out that the forward tilt and the opening of the gear doors occur almost simultaneously so that it seems unlikely that hydraulic power was lost in the split second between bogie tilt and gear door actuation. It is now assumed the forward tilt of the bogies was merely a consequence of the hydraulic power loss.
It should be pointed out that the question of "RAT in or out" was for a while the most contentious in this thread.

C. Low-altitude capture
Still argued, even if refuted by many since

• inconsistent with apparent loss of hydraulic/electric power;
• PF would have been flying manually (however, A/T reaction would have been unexpected for the PF);
• should have been recoverable (unless one assumes that the crew (a) remained unaware of the changed FMA annunciations although alerted by the unexpected FD commands; and (b) was so startled that an A/T thrust reduction was not noticed and corrected, even though the PF was apparently sufficiently alert not to follow the FD commands).

D. Loss of both engines at or shortly after rotation
Various possible reasons for this have been discussed:

I. Bird strike/FOD

• Would have to have occurred simultaneously due to lack of rudder/aileron input indicating symmetric thrust.
• No remains/traces on runway, no visual indications (flocks of birds, flames, structural engine damage).

II. Fuel-related III. Improper maintenance
Unclear which maintenance measures could possibly have been performed that would have resulted in simultaneous loss of both engines. No apparent relationships between malfunctions reported by previous passengers and essential systems.

IV. Large-scale electrical fault (e.g. due to water in E&E bay)
The engines will continue to run if electrical power is lost. FADECs are powered independently.

V. Shutdown of engines by TCMA
A parallel is drawn to the ANA incident. However, this would require not only a fault in the air/ground logic but also a sensed discrepancy between T/L position (not necessarily idle) and thrust output on both engines simultaneously.

VI. (Inadvertent) shutdown by flight crew VII. Malfunction/mishandling of the fuel cutoff switches (most recent)

Under most circumstances you would apply the benefit of the doubt but as the RAT deployed (something there is a lot of evidence for) it strongly suggests this. Yes, the RAT can deploy for other reasons but that would imply an even greater level of coincidence than two engines failing in a short period (3 hydraulic systems, 4 generators, etc.). The distance they went until ground contact also ties in with a loss of pretty much all thrust, as does the audio recording of idling/windmilling engines. There is also the fact, which may turn out to be an assumption, that any failure of other aircraft systems should not affect engine operation as a) the engines are effectively self-powered in flight and b) the engine controls on the flight deck are part of an isolated system powered by the FADECs.

I would be very surprised if the thrust levers were not firewalled early on, in fact with such determination that they went through the instrument panel!

On a wider observation, professional commercial pilots like the Air India ones in this accident go through regular simulator training according their own SOPs, which when dealing with things like thrust loss during or after the takeoff roll are likely pretty similar or even identical to the manufacturer\x92s guidelines; if they did differ it would be because they were more conservative in application. Boeing standard is to do nothing until 200\x92AGL other than control the aircraft in yaw, pitch and roll. Above 400\x92AGL you can start doing some drills, if applicable. This assumes, of course, that you can get to these heights in the first place.

I would put forward that in this accident, the crew immediately found themselves in what Boeing call \x93Special situations\x94 or \x93Situations beyond the scope of normal procedures\x94. We don\x92t know yet whether there was a thrust loss or total failure at the outset; we don\x92t know if the RAT deployed due to sensed failures or control operation. As a trainer, the captain would have known the implications of actioning the dual engine failure memory items, especially near the ground, but if you\x92ve tried everything else and are still going down then what is there to lose? This is not to suggest this is what happened, just to fill in the blanks in terms of possibilities. Whatever did occur likely put them outside the realm of SOPs in short order, which is a difficult situation at the best of times, especially as for your whole flying career you have been trained and assessed at your ability to conform to those SOPs as accurately as possible in the takeoff phase.

With EBT in play, every time I'm in the sim over the last few years and the airspeed does something "odd", the UAS drill is jumped on. On takeoff the training seems to be: when the airspeed is clearly "wrong", apply TOGA/15 (because it's guaranteed safe), do rest of memory items, diagnose, etc etc.


From the videos, it kind of looks like TOGA/15 was applied here but with rapidly reducing thrust. PM would be rapidly realising that thrust was the issue, but you have seconds to resolve it.

I don\x92t really know what you are talking about. I\x92m current 787 and have flown many types including airbus prior to this. EFATO is normally an SOP handling exercise, not a memory item in itself. Memory items on nearly all types cover the specific drill for the engine only in all regimes of flight\x85ie severe damage/separation, engine limit exceedance/surge, engine fire. ie you\x92d never say \x93I\x92ll take the memory items for an engine failure after takeoff\x94.

EFATO handling is similar on most types too\x85in essence, contain any yaw, rotate, get the gear up and either trim it out or (787) let the aircraft trim it out\x85.AP in and once safely climbing away at a defined altitude diagnose followed by memory items if applicable. 787 you don\x92t action any drills until above 400ft so it would be extremely unlikely this crew actually got the stage of touching a fuel control switch.

Eng Fail is not a memory item, it will bring up an ECL and is activated when engine speed is below idle. Problem is, if you get severe damage to an engine, it is likely to display engine fail too. 787 SOP is to carefully diagnose what you see and action the severe damage/separation memory items should you decide it\x92s severe damage (ie airframe vibrations, abnormal indications\x85no rotation etc, or engine separation). Initial diagnosis can happen anytime after getting the AP in at 200ft. Sev damage memory items are delayed until above 400ft once the appropriate lateral and vertical modes are confirmed. If it was just a case of engine failure (ie with no immediate memory actions), you\x92d complete the ECL at acceleration altitude once cleaned up.

The issues with the "they shut down the wrong engine" theory:
1. No asymmetry evidence with flight path deviation. No roll, no yaw effects
2. No rudder inputs visible.
3. No crew should be doing memory items below 400ft. Boeing requires each crew member confirm together memory item switch/control selections.
4. Non-normal gear truck tilt position, a one engine failure should not affect the C hydraulics. As per (3) gear would be selected Up before any memory actions.

The evidence so far is an almost simultaneous dual engine failure, which rules out alot of other theories.

The 787 will control yaw.

For what it's worth, if the fuel control switches were rapidly cycled as per the dual engine failure memory actions, the engines should both have restarted and recovered full thrust within a matter of seconds. This is part of the certification and Rolls Royce publish the procedure (unofficially) as a last-ditch attempt to recover an engine that's experiencing a locked-in surge condition.

Obvious questions, Is the procedure applicable to the GEnx engines installed on the accident aircraft and I assume this only applies if you realise the control switches are what the issue is, within seconds?

Not sure about this. I don\x92t think the loss of thrust on both engines memory items were envisaged to be done after liftoff. It\x92s way outside the ram air start envelope. The engines would spool down fairly quickly at that low airspeed. Procedures to the operator are written by Boeing, not the engine manufacturer. And there is no procedure official or otherwise to recover a single surging engine - you either run it surge and stall free at a lower thrust or shut it down.

As a 787 operator I can observe a couple of things......

Deliberately cycling the Engine Cutoff switches just after rotate, in response to a dual power loss is inconceivable. You are way too low and slow for it to have any effect and your attention is better devoted to aiming for the flattest area ahead to crash into. Commencing the Dual Eng Fail/Stall checklist memory items is conditional upon both engines being at sub-idle and the aircraft being within the in-flight relight envelope. Neither of those conditions existed.

The flight recorder will witness what came first - Power loss or Start Switches to Cutoff? It seems the 'Third Contingency' that I alluded to about a thousand posts ago, sadly now seems likely. Given the iron-grip that the government appears to have over the media, one wonders how the truth will ever surface?

Given your professional view above, how do you react to the posted Air India 787 manual suggesting that dual engine relight should be attempted at any altitude?

It is not inconceivable to me that a human being who THINKS they've had a dual engine failure at possibly the worst time imaginable (correctly or incorrectly) and has not taken the time to confirm, or take it all in and has immediately launched into memory items. I could certainly foresee one being rather startled by the energy state and the rapidly approaching buildings.
I'm not saying that this happened to this crew but it certainly could happen to someone. People do weird !!!! under high stress. There is an initial "oh !!!!, what's going on" then the training kicks in. Often at super fast rate and the challenge becomes slowing it all down.
The bloody master warning on the Airbus for smoke in the forward Lav used to get me everytime. Was always at night over the ocean too.

It\x92s also not inconceivable that a human being who KNOWS they\x92ve had a dual engine failure at the worst time has immediately launched into memory items. Those memory items include \x91cycling\x92 the fuel cut off switches\x85