Posts about: "NTSB" [Posts: 62 Pages: 4]

I find that statement problematic. I have my own reasons to be skeptical of the field, mostly because of its continued lagging behind the evidence on neurodivergence. But the tools used for suicide risk assessment are surprisingly solid at this point. Of course application of those tools is where it usually falls flat. There are specific and proven tests for assessing general depression and its severity as well as specific and proven tests for assessing suicide risk. Nothing is ever certain in this field, especially since the veracity of any kind of self reporting is basically impossible to determine, but for cooperating individuals as well as for certain types of masking we have tools that are very accurate if applied correctly.
The issue in the context of Aviation is the stigmatization and risk of job loss...

We have to be a bit more careful with wording here. Prevalence of Major Depression is roughly twice as common in women than in men. [1] While it is correct that more men than women commit suicide, depending on what study you prefer somewhere between 2 and 4 times as many, the number of attempts however is skewed in the other direction with more women attempting suicide than men by a similar margin. [2] The difference is commonly attributed to the utilization of different means.
Notably, and as I wrote earlier, the prevalence of depression in pilots does _not_ show a significant difference between women and men, with female pilots even having a lower prevalence for moderate depression as measured in the aforementioned study. Same disclaimer applies obviously: The utilized PHQ-9 test is not useful for the assessment of suicide risk. It is however very reliable in detecting and gauging severity of depression or conditions presenting with similar symptoms. This is strongly indicative of an anomaly and needs to be examined. My personal suspicion would be the misattribution of a stress related condition like Burnout to depression. Note that Occupational Burnout also comes with the potential for suicidal thoughts but has a much lower actual suicide risk. [3]

The number of pilot suicides is thankfully far too small to be useful for any kind of statistical analysis. I have no idea why you would exclude the only actually confirmed pilot suicide where we have a psychotherapists treatment data as evidence. The evidence for MH370 is entirely circumstantial and treating it as a confirmed pilot suicide is very unhelpful for a discussion based on facts. The SilkAir incident classification by the NTSB is similarly based on circumstantial evidence exclusively. Without personally analyzing either report and reinspecting the evidence I again find it unhelpful to simply treat it as confirmed.

That being said, I fail to see the similarities of either case and the Air India accident. All known pilot suicides and all suspected ones happened in cruise, not during takeoff. All known or suspected cases have some kind of evidence of one or more causal psychological events (notably not with MH370). And that is evidence as opposed to company rumor mills. Evidence that is notably absent in any way shape or form in this instance. In case of the Germanwings accident the police was investigating the murder-suicide and informed the public within a week of the accident.

In the case of MH370 there is a single notable similarity: The theory of pilot suicide is being thrown around despite the complete absence of hard evidence towards a mental crisis. There is highly circumstantial evidence based on supposedly reconstructed "waypoints" that are very roughly similar to the theorized course the airplane may have taken. A theorized course on which we have continued to not actually find the wreckage. And even that circumstantial evidence is entirely absent here. The best explanation for the known facts in the Air India case would be human error.

I think it's simply inhumane to put the thousands of family members and friends of those who died in this tragedy through the stress caused by the protracted uncertainty as to who did what, and why, in the cockpit. And my view is that the scope for ongoing speculation does no favours for the interests of pilots or aviation safety.

The cockpit recorder almost certainly enables the investigators to distinguish between the voices recorded and identify which of those voices belongs to the PIC and which to the FO. And, based on my reading of previous posts, the cockpit recorder may have even picked up the 'clicks' of the fuel control switches. And the investigators almost certainly know which of the PIC and FO transmitted the MAYDAY. That all resolves to a small number of likely scenarios, which scenarios have been described (repeatedly) in this thread, all of which should already have been formulated by the investigators.

For the life of me, I cannot see the point of the investigators not coming out and saying: "At this point, we are confident of at least these facts: ... Unfortunately, it follows that we are confident that either the PIC or FO switched off both fuel control switches seconds after take off. That all leads us to be confident that one of X combinations of actions occurred in the cockpit, but we have yet to have any confidence as to what motivated any one or more of those actions: ..."

Look at how many NTSB update briefings occurred in the wake of the mid-air collision involving the CRJ and Blackhawk at DCA. The ATC recording is publicly available. What damage was done, to whom, by those update briefings or the publication of the ATC recording?

The ultimate assessment of the contents of the preliminary report is some time off in the future (contents, here meaning what is included and what is not). That being said, the comparison to the several briefings by NTSB in the wake of the 29 January 2025 midair collision at DCA is less valid than might at first seem to be the case.

First, the DCA collision occurred against the backdrop of significant weaknesses in the United States ATC system. The accident itself may have involved acts or omissions by the Army helicopter pilot or pilots, so there is that similarity in a general sense. But although a non-aviator, I did understand the many statements on the threads and in the general media about the difficulty of "visual separation" at night, particularly in the D.C. area and in the approach corridors to DCA. This is quite unlike the surpirse and/or disbelief that an experienced airline aviator would move fuel control switches to cutout at or nearly at the time of rotation. So the nature of the acts or omissions in question is quite different.

Second, it obviously occurred at Washington, D.C.'s close-in airport, which has been such a focal point of Congressional "air commuters".

There also is a difference in the likely litigation courses the two accidents will follow. On the premise that the WSJ report aligns with what appears to be the consensus on this thread - namely that the PM moved the switches although no one now knows why - and then reasoning further from that premise, the litigation to be faced by Air India will be considerable. I do not know the Law of India whatsoever, but under the Montreal Convention system for liability determinations and damages, I think it is a very easy straightforward assessment to say that the airline is going to face intense litigation challenges. In that light, the families will have their day in court (I mean, even without knowing Law of India, I think that's safe to say). Going beyond what - if I am reading and understanding the posters with actual significant investigation experience correctly - is the formal or nominal charge of the AAIB in this matter is not required in order to help the families. (And how bad would it be for them if the AAIB had to retract or materially change some information released ahead of determinations with certainty?)

Not least, in the DCA accident the legal landscape is quite diffrerent. Without rehashing the (perhaps tedious) posts I put on the DCA thread, the scope of available legal relief is quite limited under applicable federal law (just for reference, the "discretionary function exception" to the allowance to sue federal entities will almost certainly limit the scope of recoveries available from the Army or FAA/Dept of Transportation; the airline can be sued but it will be, in my not-so-hmo, ridiculous and mercenary to do so, as the CRJ and its tragically ill-fated crew had done nothing wrong).

Somewhat relatedly, on the WSJ article, while its sources are unnamed, I'm trying to recall a single article published in that newspaper (including online) about a major aviation incident which later was shown to have been inaccurate. Maybe there are one or more examples. Generally The Air Current's publisher got a very good start.

I'm sensing that the Journal, while not immune whatsoever to commercial pressures, is well-sourced.

From the article: "The preliminary details have fueled the belief among some U.S. officials that criminal authorities should review the matter, as would likely be the case if the crash had occurred on American soil, people familiar with the matter said." This assertion, stated without attribution, is fairly viewed as having unknown credibility.

But it also might be understood differently when read in a context of the entire reporting which includes these two quite specifically attributed statements:
From the article: "An NTSB spokesman said that [NTSB Chair Jennifer] Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight data recorder. Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was 'to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.'\x94 (internal quotation as in article)
........
From the article: "The Indian authorities\x92 preliminary report finding that the fuel control switches were flipped in succession, one second apart, suggested a deliberate act, according to Ben Berman, a former senior NTSB official who helped oversee the U.S.-led investigation into the crash of EgyptAir Flight 990 in 1999.

Berman said that, prior to the engines\x92 fuel being cut, the report didn\x92t suggest anything out of the ordinary for what should have been a routine takeoff and climb-out. 'There was nothing to prompt the crew to perform emergency procedures, become stressed, or do anything except rotate the nose up and retract the landing gear, like they had done so many times before,' Berman said." (internal quotation as in article)

The Air Current's reporting just prior to release of the preliminary report - based on unnamed sources possibly with close access to the AAIB - turned out to have been correct. Would NTSB have offered the comments it did, if it believed the Journal was about to publish stuff it was just making up?

Edit: the WSJ also, on Wednesday, published a column by one of its regular staff columnists who thinks pilotless airliners are inevitable and would be a much better system architecture. Perhaps in publishing this reporting about the Air India accident the Journal is hoping to preserve credibility among the industry and regulators, despite the nonsense (imho) of that part of the column (most of it concerns the apparent cause of the accident, which - as some post many many pages ago predicted would occur - becomes supposed justification for Captain HAL).

That says Homendy has been fully briefed.

It does not say the spokesperson who said this also has personal contact with all the same information.

Berman, as a former NTSB official, perfectly fits not only the article's prior description safety experts familiar with the matter, but also me pointing out that reading and interpreting the report isn't the same as taking part in it.

The article says some US officials think there should be criminal investigation. That doesn't necessarily mean there isn't, which may be happening without their knowledge, though there is this to note.

Aviation disasters that may involve potential deliberate actions to crash planes might never fully be resolved, due to incomplete evidence and disagreement over analyses. In some cases, countries taking part in lengthy international accident probes have disagreed with each other\x92s final conclusions.

Plane-crash investigations can often last a year or longer, and new information that comes to light can contradict initial assessments.

The investigation is following the ICAO rules, and those rules don't agree with what you'd like to see.
You can bring your objections to the attention of ICAO and lobby them to change the rules, but given these rules have been in place for decades - and have generally worked quite will - I doubt there going to change them just to satisfy your curiosity.

There are good, valid reasons for the ICAO accident investigation rules - and one of those rules says they'd don't release information until it is properly vetted and validated. As I posted previously, the preliminary report actually had more data that most - it would have been very easy for them to have simply said that the engines quit - one second apart - starting 3 seconds after liftoff. Instead they added detail, including a brief synopsis of a pilot conversation regarding the fuel switches. All this is factual. What they don't release is non vetted information and speculation - such as who moved the switches and why - because that's still being investigated.
Early releases of unvetted data can not only cause unproductive public reactions, it can result in external pressures being applied to the investigative team that can adversely affect their ability to come to the correct cause. Furthermore, I cannot recall a single preliminary report that contained anything like an actual CVR transcript. Those are routinely included in the final report, but not preliminary reports. About the only time you'll see unvalidated information is when there is a suggestion that there is an imminent air safety threat - in which case appropriate emergency inspections are ordered (sometimes even aircraft groundings).

I have a pretty vivid memory: In the aftermath of the Chicago DC-10 crash when the engine ripped off the wing, a couple of days later some department head (I don't remember if he was FAA or NTSB) stood on the podium holding a broken bolt and pronounced that it was the reason the engine came off. Unvetted information that turned out to be complete BS - but resulted in massive outrage that 'the engine was held on by one bolt' - more BS. Fortunately it didn't derail the investigation - and even had a silver lining in that the order bolt inspections lead to the discovery of the actual pylon structural damage that had caused the engine mount to fail. Similarly, after the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster - I watched the clueless head of NASA stand in from of the TV cameras and state as fact that a piece of foam could never have punched a hole in the Columbia wing (obviously never studied that mass*velocity squared thing) - which of course we again know was complete BS.

I've been involved in a few fatal accident investigations - the big one being the Lauda 767, where I was called in early. I was one of the first people to see the FADEC NVM readout that made it painfully obvious that the T/R had deployed at 23,000 ft. - something that we didn't think could happen. We (Boeing) had missed something, and a lot of people had died as a result. It really bothered me (more than once during that investigation, when I got home from work, I just sat down and drank a large glass of Scotch). And not being able to discuss any of it with anyone not involved in the investigation just made it worse. But I knew the rules, understood why there where there, and I followed them.

There is definitely information omitted. The report includes those facts the investigators judge to be relevant, based on the current state of the investigation.

When you look at a NTSB investigation with a public docket, there's always more information than what makes it even into the final report. That's a good thing.

WSJ being leaked to again and they are not even trying to hide the fact that it is US officials doing the leaking as with the leaks in the days before the preliminary report

it\x92s hard to justify this and it does just make the AAIB\x92s job more difficult, would the NTSB appreciate Indian entities leaking to the Indian media before a preliminary and then final report?

im not saying it\x92s correct but it does only fuel the simmering Indian (domestic) audience\x92s views of a US/Boeing \x91coverup\x92

what new details were actually revealed here, it didn\x92t counter the facts laid out by the AAIB prelim at all so it\x92s not like we can claim the AAIB is covering up and the US has to issue counter factuals (as with the China Eastern 737)

I can fully understand and appreciate the leaking. I have been studying the bull!!!! reporting by India media about the cause of this crash. Former senior pilots, some who flew the B787, tell complete utter nonsense about possible technical issues. Like the engines failed and that was the reason to set both switches to cutoff.

It is important to know who asked ' why did you cutoff'. Because it confirms that captain, who had both hands free, set both switches to CUTOFF for no reason.

Previously, I posted the content of a Reuters article about FAA (as well as Boeing) having issued notices to operators prompted by the reference in the AAIB Prelim Rpt w/r/t the SAIB about fuel switches in certain 737 aircraft (Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin No. NM-18-33, December 17, 2018).

Through a LinkedIn timeline I happened to discover the actual document the Reuters report was based on. It is entitled "Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community", issued by the FAA Aircraft Certification Service, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, dated July 11, 2025. As reported by Reuters, the FAA Notification document specifically references the fact that the AAIB Prelim Rpt made reference to the 2018 SAIB w/r/t the fuel switches.

The social media platform makes it difficult to transfer content off of it. Interested people may access the document in a LinkedIn post by former NTSB Chair Robert L. Sumwalt, NTSB Chair 2017-2014. (A search of the thread did not turn up the document; apologies if it's already here and I slipped up and missed it.)

No, however:

While I have not studied France's law applicable to aviation accidents generally or investigations in particular, it is my understanding that French law does allow earlier, or more direct, participation - or both - in aircraft accident investigations. Annex 13, on the other hand, does not contemplate determination of blame or liability which are substantially the same thing as sought to be determined by prosecutors (albeit in a different form of court proceeding).

Also, one of the most fundamental principles, if not the most fundamental principle, underwriting all of what ICAO does - at least within its traditional or historic remit and not drifitng off into DEI or strident environmental causes - from the Convention through the Annexes and SARPs, is standardization. Obviously criminal investigations will not be, and could not become, standardized across the States which are active in the international civil aviation sector.

At the time of the Alaska Airlines door plug incident and its aftermath, long-time aviation policy worthies decried the way in which the status of the NTSB investigation had been dragged into the criminal matter against Boeing pending in federal district court in Texas. Their reasoning was that accident investigators must have access as unfettered as possible to sources of information, and the presence of criminal processes necessarily makes people reluctant to speak or provide information otherwise. With this reasoning in mind, it could be agreed that although Annex 13 and pertinent SARPs are not the ultimate in investigatory enlightenment, criminal inquiries (and the French version of same) are not an inherently better approach.

Of course, when reasonably specific and articulable facts point to potential criminal conduct, that is a very different matter.

Quite right. The NTSB upbraided, warned and sanctioned Boeing over unauthorized release of information (with a somewhat self-defensive spin) in the Alaska 1282 investigation just last year.

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...lines-blowout/

I'm sure that the WSJ believes that its sources are qualified and knowledgeable and that the sources probably believe what they are leaking, but it's a terrible and damaging practice in accident investigations, in this case serving no purpose other than clickbait taking advantage of public curiosity. And there really is nothing new in the "breaking news" story, at least nothing of substance.

worse than that it absolutely will erode trust

the AAIB(India) doesn\x92t appear to have tried to play any evasive games and has allowed all stakeholders (OEM, fleeing investigators from multiple countries etc) to be a party the investigation as they are entitled to. That one specific party whether by intent or a lack of ability to keep control of their own personnel has continuously leaked behind the lead investigators and that too not actually providing contrarian views just leaking to present a specific narrative, for reasons we can all surmise, is a genuine concern

I remember many questioning the AAIB(India)\x92s ability to run a competent and neutral investigation well it doesn\x92t seem like the US probe it being run in such a fashion

there were no immediate safety bulletins recommended in the prelim report, the AAIB/Indian government has done nothing to harm the interest of any OEM, why this rush to create this targeted narrative when human factors investigations by their very nature are more complex and convoluted than pure technical ones? Why can\x92t the facts be determined by the lead investigators?

Leaking CVR details is absolutely despicable and I would\x92ve thought a professional pilot\x92s forum would be more outraged by \x91persons familiar with the investigation\x92 mouthing off to the media

It's the last sentence which prompts me to comment further. First, the relevant excerpt from the Journal item:
"An NTSB spokesman said Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight-data recorder.

Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was 'to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.'" (internal quotation as in original)

It's quite unlikely the NTSB spokesman would have said more than Chair Homendy had authorized. The content as to the scope of her review isn't the substantive part, but it does set the context for the quote from Ms. Homendy. Her statement refers to "quickly" making a determination about "immediate safety concerns." I read this as not referring only to the time after the Prelim Rpt was released, but all of NTSB's interactions with AAIB as of July 12.

We know no emergency (or other similar labels) ADs have been issued. Early on, when no such emergency ADs were issued, some people speculated that cover-up could be the reason why. And, recalling back to the first days as of July 12, there was wide recognition that a grounding order would have immense impact and consequences, given the widespread numbers in airline fleets.

But now, the Board Chair provides an attributable on-the-record statement about the need for immediacy, had there been an aircraft or engine problem. What I read as substantive is the confirmation from such an official source that no such problem has been shown to exist. Not a large segment of the "traveling public" let alone the public at large reads Accident Board reports, let alone preliminary editions. So in her giving an attributable statement, I read an intention to reach a wider and more general audience with the message, in effect, that the causal chain of this accident does not stem from an aircraft or engine problem implicating safety of flight.

Are you referring to a different or updated (after 19:00 US EDT 7-16-2025) WSJ article? Because that was the date and time of the piece headlined "New Details in Air India Crash Probe Shift Focus to Senior Pilot" and previously discussed here. This is the entirety of references to Homendy in that article:

Emphasis mine.

Could you share a citation to the article (s) that include the Homendy statements to which you refer, please?

I understand the sentiment and sometimes wonder if myself I'm too easily accepting a very damning verdict on what happened, while trying to remain open to alternative possibilities (like the "brain fart" explanation).

We are all of course (perhaps rather morbidly) fascinated and curious about this incident, and trying to reason out what happened with insufficient data - well, at least I am. And to be honest, I am not nearly as concerned about "throwing someone [dead] to the wolves" (to put it rather harshly) than if the pilots had survived and their reputations and livelihoods would be threatened - I have read about plenty of cases where surviving pilots were innocent, even heroic and masterful in their efforts to save life, yet at least in the beginning, were falsely pilloried for what happened.

The difficulty with waiting for the Final AAIB Report comes with the possibility of malicious action. I don't know anything about Indian law, but I would imagine that if this incident had happened in the US, it would already be part of a criminal inquiry (not to mention lawsuits), and not simply under the jurisdiction of the NTSB.

Well, the US investigators are actually part of the investigation team as a whole, so they'll have access to just about everything. This early in the process, while the whole investigation is still coming together and into focus, the team leader can't really know what doesn't need sharing around the team as a whole, so everyone is typically in the loop. All team members are required to maintain confidentiality of course.

Exceptions to confidentiality are not untypically 'home' country investigation boards, so AAIB members may feed back to AAIB seniors, NTSB to the NTSB chairperson for example, but it's really rare for it go further. Reporters on the other hand want to get paid, and that means selling stories.

So yes, I think we do know.

Sorry that I inadvertently created a sub-(h)-wheel of sorts. My post about the WSJ reporting could have been more explicit about the inferences I believe can properly be drawn from the statement actually quoted from Chair Homendy.

The NTSB spokesman said the Chair had reviewed everything. Her statement - on the not large assumption it was made after the Prelim Rpt was released (though the reporting doesn't say when) - refers to her, in her official role, wanting to determine quickly if any safety concerns had to be addressed immediately.

When no emergency ADs or other urgent safety messages were forthcoming in the first days after June 12 (other than the Air India inspection order) there was fairly extensive debate on-thread about whether the absence of such urgent safety bulletins could be taken to mean that neither the aircraft nor engines had been implicated as having caused the accident. Several posters pointed out that if there were an aircraft or engine problem there would already have been bulletins issued. Others argued, not necessarily, maybe it was too soon to tell.

Reading the WSJ reporting, and the words quoted from the Board Chair, now after the Prelim Rpt, and after the reporting by The Air Current prior to the Prelim Rpt release was proven accurate, I'm inferring her statement to communicate that, by now , if an aircraft or engine problem was present, it would have been discovered.... and Emergency ADs flying out of FAA etc.

Of course, it can be said that it's still too soon, but that's not how I see the pieces fitting together. And I apologize for allowing my earlier post to be read as if my inferential reasoning was instead part of Ms. Homendy's statement.

[ By the way, to za9ra22, as the head of the NTSB and the U.S. as the State of manufacture, she is hardly just some random federal official, as post 1411 implies. ]

Yes, even the switch thing can go nowhere without "interim reports".