July 17, 2025, 13:29:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924405
I have not posted on here in many years, but I feel compelled to do so now. I am a current 787 pilot and I have previously flown most Boeing types and an Airbus too. I also have an extensive background and qualifications in human factors, training and assessment. Before anybody reads any further, perhaps acquaint yourself with the notion of Occam's razor. That is, the simplest explanation is the most likely explanation. I was certain that after the preliminary report was released the preposterous conspiracy theories would finally cease, but no! It's 2025 and humans can no longer help themselves. In my opinion the captain committed suicide here. Simple.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
For those asking why not wait a bit longer before throwing the switches and hard nose down, why bother? Roll them back here, cause a startle that is JUST long enough and then let gravity and the FADEC start a race. No resistance needed.
July 17, 2025, 13:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924407
WSJ being leaked to again and they are not even trying to hide the fact that it is US officials doing the leaking as with the leaks in the days before the preliminary report
it\x92s hard to justify this and it does just make the AAIB\x92s job more difficult, would the NTSB appreciate Indian entities leaking to the Indian media before a preliminary and then final report?
im not saying it\x92s correct but it does only fuel the simmering Indian (domestic) audience\x92s views of a US/Boeing \x91coverup\x92
what new details were actually revealed here, it didn\x92t counter the facts laid out by the AAIB prelim at all so it\x92s not like we can claim the AAIB is covering up and the US has to issue counter factuals (as with the China Eastern 737)
it\x92s hard to justify this and it does just make the AAIB\x92s job more difficult, would the NTSB appreciate Indian entities leaking to the Indian media before a preliminary and then final report?
im not saying it\x92s correct but it does only fuel the simmering Indian (domestic) audience\x92s views of a US/Boeing \x91coverup\x92
what new details were actually revealed here, it didn\x92t counter the facts laid out by the AAIB prelim at all so it\x92s not like we can claim the AAIB is covering up and the US has to issue counter factuals (as with the China Eastern 737)
Quite right. The NTSB upbraided, warned and sanctioned Boeing over unauthorized release of information (with a somewhat self-defensive spin) in the Alaska 1282 investigation just last year.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...lines-blowout/
I'm sure that the WSJ believes that its sources are qualified and knowledgeable and that the sources probably believe what they are leaking, but it's a terrible and damaging practice in accident investigations, in this case serving no purpose other than clickbait taking advantage of public curiosity. And there really is nothing new in the "breaking news" story, at least nothing of substance.
July 17, 2025, 13:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924410
The issue of intent
Assumed: a pilot moved both fuel switches to CUTOFF, and that caused the accident.
Argument against intent:
1. The CVR, taken at face value, reveals that neither pilot was aware he had moved the switch himself
2. On a G650 simulator, CUTOFF after 10 seconds (then RUN after 10 more seconds) was barely recoverable. ( See upthread. ) This suggests the "unrecoverability" window on the 787 was quite short, making a suicide plan risky.
3. Similar accidents were survivable (someone said upthread).
4. Typically, pilot suicides start with the pilot alone in the cockpit at cruise altitude.
5. "Shut down both engines" is an action that often occurs after a flight, and could thus be learned as "muscle memory", and be subject to an action slip.
6. The airline stated that the captain's medical records were found "unremarkable".
Argument for intent:
1. It's the simplest explanation.
2. "I can't believe any pilot would do this unintentionally, and neither should you."
3. Pilot took 10 seconds to correct his "mistake"
4. Uncorroborated reporting has it that the captain did not sound panicked on the CVR.
Did I miss any points?
To be clear, given the facts in the preliminary report, I could not decide this question today.
Whatever happened in Ahmedabad is not affected by the outcome of our discussion.
I hope that the AAIB and the public prosecutor will gather as much evidence as possible, and then the question can hopefully be resolved from facts.
Argument against intent:
1. The CVR, taken at face value, reveals that neither pilot was aware he had moved the switch himself
2. On a G650 simulator, CUTOFF after 10 seconds (then RUN after 10 more seconds) was barely recoverable. ( See upthread. ) This suggests the "unrecoverability" window on the 787 was quite short, making a suicide plan risky.
3. Similar accidents were survivable (someone said upthread).
4. Typically, pilot suicides start with the pilot alone in the cockpit at cruise altitude.
5. "Shut down both engines" is an action that often occurs after a flight, and could thus be learned as "muscle memory", and be subject to an action slip.
6. The airline stated that the captain's medical records were found "unremarkable".
Argument for intent:
1. It's the simplest explanation.
2. "I can't believe any pilot would do this unintentionally, and neither should you."
3. Pilot took 10 seconds to correct his "mistake"
4. Uncorroborated reporting has it that the captain did not sound panicked on the CVR.
Did I miss any points?
To be clear, given the facts in the preliminary report, I could not decide this question today.
Whatever happened in Ahmedabad is not affected by the outcome of our discussion.
I hope that the AAIB and the public prosecutor will gather as much evidence as possible, and then the question can hopefully be resolved from facts.
Last edited by Musician; 17th July 2025 at 14:02 . Reason: link added
July 17, 2025, 14:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924430
Quite right. The NTSB upbraided, warned and sanctioned Boeing over unauthorized release of information (with a somewhat self-defensive spin) in the Alaska 1282 investigation just last year.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...lines-blowout/
I'm sure that the WSJ believes that its sources are qualified and knowledgeable and that the sources probably believe what they are leaking, but it's a terrible and damaging practice in accident investigations, in this case serving no purpose other than clickbait taking advantage of public curiosity. And there really is nothing new in the "breaking news" story, at least nothing of substance.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...lines-blowout/
I'm sure that the WSJ believes that its sources are qualified and knowledgeable and that the sources probably believe what they are leaking, but it's a terrible and damaging practice in accident investigations, in this case serving no purpose other than clickbait taking advantage of public curiosity. And there really is nothing new in the "breaking news" story, at least nothing of substance.
the AAIB(India) doesn\x92t appear to have tried to play any evasive games and has allowed all stakeholders (OEM, fleeing investigators from multiple countries etc) to be a party the investigation as they are entitled to. That one specific party whether by intent or a lack of ability to keep control of their own personnel has continuously leaked behind the lead investigators and that too not actually providing contrarian views just leaking to present a specific narrative, for reasons we can all surmise, is a genuine concern
I remember many questioning the AAIB(India)\x92s ability to run a competent and neutral investigation well it doesn\x92t seem like the US probe it being run in such a fashion
there were no immediate safety bulletins recommended in the prelim report, the AAIB/Indian government has done nothing to harm the interest of any OEM, why this rush to create this targeted narrative when human factors investigations by their very nature are more complex and convoluted than pure technical ones? Why can\x92t the facts be determined by the lead investigators?
Leaking CVR details is absolutely despicable and I would\x92ve thought a professional pilot\x92s forum would be more outraged by \x91persons familiar with the investigation\x92 mouthing off to the media
July 17, 2025, 14:29:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924442
I have not posted on here in many years, but I feel compelled to do so now. I am a current 787 pilot and I have previously flown most Boeing types and an Airbus too. I also have an extensive background and qualifications in human factors, training and assessment. Before anybody reads any further, perhaps acquaint yourself with the notion of Occam's razor. That is, the simplest explanation is the most likely explanation. I was certain that after the preliminary report was released the preposterous conspiracy theories would finally cease, but no! It's 2025 and humans can no longer help themselves. In my opinion the captain committed suicide here. Simple.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
To those suggesting an electrical phantom turned the fuel control switches off without them moving: no. Ask yourselves this: what made one pilot (PF and F/O in my opinion) ask the other "why did you cut off?" Firstly, some context. The 787 fuel control switches make a VERY distinct metallic *CLICK* sound as they are operated. EVERY 787 pilot knows it and won't forget it. It is audible even at high thrust settings owing to the 787's exceptionally quiet engines and cockpit. After rotation the pilot flying is fixated on the HUD; rotating towards the TOGA reference line (~12 degrees pitch attitude) and putting the flight path vector over the flight guidance cue. One hand would be on the control column and the other on the thrust levers. Alternatively he could have had both hands on the control column. In either scenario, the pilot flying's (again, my opinion the F/O's) inboard arm would block his peripheral view (he's focused on the HUD, remember) of the center pedestal and the fuel control switches. HE WOULD NOT SEE THE PM TURN THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES OFF. Ipso facto. We know the F/O was PF from the report. If the F/O stopped flying the aircraft and reached down to move the FCS from cutoff to run the captain would've plainly seen the whole thing. I can't imagine "why did you cutoff?" would be his words of choice! More like "WTF ARE YOU DOING?!?" More to the point, if the PF (F/O) did stop flying and reach down to cut one engine off, the captain would have had time to either stop him flicking the second FCS off or at least quickly flick them both back to run and potentially save the day. This plainly did not happen. So it was almost certainly the PM (Capt) that moved the fuel control switches.
So what would make the PF ask the PM "why did you cut off?" if he couldn't see it happen? You would never assume with a loss of thrust that the switches had been turned off. Never. It's not a procedure. It's not a thing. Bird strike? Sure. Fuel Contam? Maybe. But the point is, in the heat of battle at 150 odd feet, you'd never jump to the conclusion that the fuel control switches were off. Never. So what triggered the PF asking the PM why he cutoff? Because he HEARD the fuel control switches move from run to cutoff, that is why. He heard those distinctive *CLICK* sounds (and yes, you can easily flick them both in less than a second FWIW) followed by the engines immediately rolling back. He would then have looked down at the switches and noticed they were in cutoff. The point to be made here is that the switches were moved by the captain. They made their distinct sound. There were no phantoms. They cannot move on their own. They didn't simultaneously fail. This drew the PF's attention away from flying and triggered the question "why did you cutoff"?
Inadvertent selection of the wrong switches? No. The PM was a training captain with thousands of hours experience on the jet. I asked one of our most experienced examiners how many times he'd seen that done. The answer was "zero". Even the stab switches next to them. They're red, guarded and are of a completely different shape and operation. Gear or flap? Come on. I think we're starting to stretch things a bit now. EVEN IF it was inadvertent switching. The INSTANT you'd made that error, you'd go "oh whoops", and flick them back to run. I know startle... I teach it. This is different. You don't flick the fuel control switches off, hear the engines roll back and sit there wondering what happened for 10 seconds AFTER THE F/O JUST ASKED YOU IF YOU CUTOFF! You did something that had an instant effect on the flight. The report indicates that "why did you cutoff" was asked just after both engines rolled back. But it took another 10 seconds to flick the FCS' back to run. If it was inadvertent, the instant the other pilot called out your error you'd correct it. The report makes it clear that there was 10 seconds between that happening. 10 seconds is a LIFETIME in that situation. The training captain knew what he was doing. He only switched the FCS' back to run once he knew it was moot.
So, why did he respond that he didn't move the switches? As per other input from people on here, when people are suicidal they often want to throw authorities off their trail. Or maybe he wanted to confuse the F/O so he didn't flick them back to run himself, or to just buy himself more time while the F/O tried to wrap his head around things? Maybe he didn't want the F/O to die knowing it was a suicide mission. Maybe we'll find out more in the final report or police investigation if things proceed that way. Maybe we'll never know.
I acknowledge that this is my opinion and of course there could be things we don't yet know about, but I must say I'm surprised that some of the theories on this professional pilot forum are no more coherent or logical than those being sprouted on social media.
July 17, 2025, 14:35:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924443
Oldrightie
I am not aware of a part of the prelim report, second paragraph being discussed anywhere. Something I find, if I'm correct, not discussed yet for me surely very significant.
"The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1\x92s core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery . The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11"
Forgive my now 20 years into retirement as an F/O on the B737 400 and A320/21 but I still retain my lifelong avid interest in all things aviation. So am I correct in thinking this paragraph indicates significantly that eng2, right hand, core compressor had failed, albeit not explosively? It relit and fuel was being "re-introduced repeatedly "but could not arrest core speed deceleration". From day one I believed that no 2 failed after V1 and that the automatic correction for this on the 787 hid all but a possibly apparent small nose right on its climb out. Additionally I surmised that with all the warnings this produced, the low altitude and few seconds to address such a failure, the first recycle was offered up to the no 1 engine switch, in haste. The immediate result then RAT extension, a check on the engine parameters and an action on the no 2 switch, again in haste on realisation that was down on N2, then, sadly too late, No 1 recycled successfully. Unlike No 2. Heaven knows, a similar mistake was made on the Kegworth B737, when all he time in the world was available compared to AI171.
To me the long debate here about suicide is very unprofessional and surely this factual part of the report, has masses more credence, regardless of the consequences facing the AI crew.
If this bit about No 2 engine report is as I interpret, I would at least hope, if not already, someone else has picked it up, or at least it will get more attention ere long. God bless all the people so badly affected and I pray the cause will be one day revealed and not be buried to protect the money men. Has been known.
"The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1\x92s core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery . The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11"
Forgive my now 20 years into retirement as an F/O on the B737 400 and A320/21 but I still retain my lifelong avid interest in all things aviation. So am I correct in thinking this paragraph indicates significantly that eng2, right hand, core compressor had failed, albeit not explosively? It relit and fuel was being "re-introduced repeatedly "but could not arrest core speed deceleration". From day one I believed that no 2 failed after V1 and that the automatic correction for this on the 787 hid all but a possibly apparent small nose right on its climb out. Additionally I surmised that with all the warnings this produced, the low altitude and few seconds to address such a failure, the first recycle was offered up to the no 1 engine switch, in haste. The immediate result then RAT extension, a check on the engine parameters and an action on the no 2 switch, again in haste on realisation that was down on N2, then, sadly too late, No 1 recycled successfully. Unlike No 2. Heaven knows, a similar mistake was made on the Kegworth B737, when all he time in the world was available compared to AI171.
To me the long debate here about suicide is very unprofessional and surely this factual part of the report, has masses more credence, regardless of the consequences facing the AI crew.
If this bit about No 2 engine report is as I interpret, I would at least hope, if not already, someone else has picked it up, or at least it will get more attention ere long. God bless all the people so badly affected and I pray the cause will be one day revealed and not be buried to protect the money men. Has been known.
July 17, 2025, 15:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924460
Why would AAIB include that red herring in the prelim when they had the switches in their possession and included pics of them in the report? I have to admit that I took a bite of that herring and still have a nagging issue with myself not being able to see a dog on the lower part of the left switch. But I'm more inclined to think badly of the AAIB for including the herring.
To not detail the background would have been to omit a clearly pertinent fact which would have left others questioning the authority of the report for not covering it. The report itself then clearly states: "At this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and/or GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers." to ensure it is known that no defects were found at the time of the report being issued.
I suspect it is written as it is because at this point, there is no evidence the investigation can provide as to how the switches 'transitioned', let alone why.
July 17, 2025, 15:37:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924473
If it is suicide, which certainly seems to be most people's opinion, I still can't wrap my head around the fact that there are a lot more "certain" ways to do it, this crash was potentially survivable, he would have known the aircraft would come down at a relatively low speed and rate of descent. Plus other factors like the FO potentially intervening or relighting the engines in time. If you've made the decision to commit suicide, don't you choose a way that has less doubt? It just seems like a really odd way to bring down an aircraft.
* that the captain knew the terrain in front of the runway offered no "safe" spot to set the aircraft down
* that he knew there was a high fuel load
* that all he had to do was guard the FCS's (already set to CUTOFF) with his hand, which would make it very difficult for the FO to intervene while desperately trying to fly the aircraft as best he could under the circumstances
* that without autopilot in this phase of flight the FO had to continue to fly the aircraft
* that at this very low altitude, there would be no option like a turn back to the reciprocal runway
* that engine cutoff at this time would be almost certainly be unrecoverable with even a short delay before the FCS's were set back to RUN
(add your thought here)
and this choice, perverse (insane) as it is, makes more sense.
I want to add one separate thought: the authors of the Preliminary Report had to know that people reading it, reading what it actually said, and inevitably reading between the lines, would likely focus on deliberate action by the captain as a highly probable cause.
Don't you think, that if there was any mitigating factual information available to them, that they would have included it?
Secondly, regarding recently "leaked" information, if it indeed comes from the investigating team, is certainly a breach of protocol, but since the Preliminary Report would seem to clearly exonerate Boeing and GE, and point to pilot error at the very least, what would be the motivation for a leak at this point?
I would guess it might come from frustration that the Preliminary Report has failed to state facts that make almost inevitable a conclusion as to probable cause (for instance, who in the cockpit said what and when, and what else was said that we weren't told about). Possibly it also reflects concern that the investigation has not focused more on factors relevant to that conclusion.
Last edited by andihce; 17th July 2025 at 16:11 . Reason: Additional thoughts
July 17, 2025, 17:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924525
Not sure why you would think the paragraph in the preliminary report was a red herring - it's a statement of historical context directly relating to the fuel control switches which the investigation had found in the FDR record as having 'transitioned' to OFF before 'transitioning' ack to ON.
To not detail the background would have been to omit a clearly pertinent fact which would have left others questioning the authority of the report for not covering it. The report itself then clearly states: "At this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and/or GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers." to ensure it is known that no defects were found at the time of the report being issued.
I suspect it is written as it is because at this point, there is no evidence the investigation can provide as to how the switches 'transitioned', let alone why.
To not detail the background would have been to omit a clearly pertinent fact which would have left others questioning the authority of the report for not covering it. The report itself then clearly states: "At this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and/or GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers." to ensure it is known that no defects were found at the time of the report being issued.
I suspect it is written as it is because at this point, there is no evidence the investigation can provide as to how the switches 'transitioned', let alone why.
They have the switches.
July 17, 2025, 17:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924530
They are telling you that the crash aircraft had no reported issues with the fuel control switches (since 2023, which was I think when the unit was replaced), and subsequently also confirmed that there were no defects to report.
I would say it suggests they have concerns relating to the accident which are not yet fully investigated, so don't want to include a factual statement which may not be fact. It is a preliminary report after all. It's job is lay out the sequence of material facts.
July 17, 2025, 21:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924691
I had no problem getting access via that link from here (in the US).
Despite promising 'new details' the article tells us what we already knew: That the FO was flying, the captain monitoring; thus almost certainly the one who operated the switches. It says nothing else of any value, except that it misquotes the report, so can't exactly be trusted to accurately quote other sources too.
It tells us about the two pilots, but reveals no useful background, it also tells us that Air India's chief executive has said not to jump to conclusions and that the investigation is far from over.
It's a masterpiece of space-filling journalism mentioning sources and 'US officials' not disclosed as connected to the accident or investigation and therefore likely to actually know anything, just voicing opinions.
Despite promising 'new details' the article tells us what we already knew: That the FO was flying, the captain monitoring; thus almost certainly the one who operated the switches. It says nothing else of any value, except that it misquotes the report, so can't exactly be trusted to accurately quote other sources too.
It tells us about the two pilots, but reveals no useful background, it also tells us that Air India's chief executive has said not to jump to conclusions and that the investigation is far from over.
It's a masterpiece of space-filling journalism mentioning sources and 'US officials' not disclosed as connected to the accident or investigation and therefore likely to actually know anything, just voicing opinions.
That article tells us the following new (relative to the Preliminary Report) information:
"The first officer who was flying the Boeing 787 Dreamliner asked the more-experienced captain why he moved the switches to the \x93cutoff\x94 position after it climbed off the runway, these people said. The first officer expressed surprise and then panicked, these people said, while the captain seemed to remain calm."
I would say that information (if true) is significant, especially about the pilots' demeanor. It implies that further words were spoken in the cockpit, beyond what was mentioned in the Preliminary Report. What these unknown words were may be of great significance.
Now you may argue this is "fake news", but I find it hard to believe that the WSJ would publish such information without some reliable source.
July 17, 2025, 21:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924692
It really baffles me how the French prosecutor was able to come out
just
two days
after the Germanwings 9525 crash
and lay out the likely cause in remarkable detail \x97 even identifying it as an apparent suicide by the co‑pilot. Yet here we are with the Air India 171 crash: it took the AAIB an entire month to release a so‑called \x93preliminary\x94 report, and even then it\x92s vague, incomplete and raises more questions than it answers.
To me, this is unacceptable. If the French could piece things together and be honest about it in 48 hours, the AAIB should have been able to do better than this.
To me, this is unacceptable. If the French could piece things together and be honest about it in 48 hours, the AAIB should have been able to do better than this.
Ok, so they put in the preliminary report that the captain intentionally turned both fuel switches to CUTOFF, causing the crash. The Captain and his family is vilified, criminal investigations are launched. Vengeful relatives of those killed in the crash attack - perhaps even kill - members of the captain's family.
Then it turns out that it's NOT what happened... The captain's reputation and his family have already been destroyed - irreparable damage has been done, and no amount of retractions and apologies for the mistake are going to correct that.
Is it really too much to ask that we allow the investigation team to verify and validate their information before we throw someone to the wolves?
July 17, 2025, 21:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924695
Just to be clear, I'm referring to the article at
https://archive.ph/2QYNP
, I assume you are too.
That article tells us the following new (relative to the Preliminary Report) information:
"The first officer who was flying the Boeing 787 Dreamliner asked the more-experienced captain why he moved the switches to the “cutoff” position after it climbed off the runway, these people said. The first officer expressed surprise and then panicked, these people said, while the captain seemed to remain calm."
I would say that information (if true) is significant, especially about the pilots' demeanor. It implies that further words were spoken in the cockpit, beyond what was mentioned in the Preliminary Report. What these unknown words were may be of great significance.
Now you may argue this is "fake news", but I find it hard to believe that the WSJ would publish such information without some reliable source.
That article tells us the following new (relative to the Preliminary Report) information:
"The first officer who was flying the Boeing 787 Dreamliner asked the more-experienced captain why he moved the switches to the “cutoff” position after it climbed off the runway, these people said. The first officer expressed surprise and then panicked, these people said, while the captain seemed to remain calm."
I would say that information (if true) is significant, especially about the pilots' demeanor. It implies that further words were spoken in the cockpit, beyond what was mentioned in the Preliminary Report. What these unknown words were may be of great significance.
Now you may argue this is "fake news", but I find it hard to believe that the WSJ would publish such information without some reliable source.
Inferring meaning into this doesn't actually give it a genuine meaning. And it isn't as if we didn't already know which was actually flying the aircraft and therefore which was operating switches.
What will be new is when the investigation moves from fact gathering to reporting comprehensive findings. I'm not convinced they'll do that via the WSJ, and I must say their rehash of what is known in the guise of new news doesn't do them credit.
To add: You may think all I am doing is defending the indefensible in terms of culpability in this accident, but actually all I am doing is looking at evidence rather than commentary. If the WSJ have evidence via someone leaking the work of the investigation, they should at this stage be ashamed of themselves for undermining the process intended to best provide for airline and passenger safety.
July 17, 2025, 23:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924737
"There has been no defect reported pertaining to the fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB." - This will have been verified by the investigation team fairly rapidly. Verified reportable fact, included in the preliminary report.
Yes in the final report they would be in a position to make a statement like that. But in the preliminary - No.
July 17, 2025, 23:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924765
Because the preliminary report can only contain verified factual information.
"There has been no defect reported pertaining to the fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB." - This will have been verified by the investigation team fairly rapidly. Verified reportable fact, included in the preliminary report.
This could not have been done by the team in the time available. Bear in mind that the EAFR was not read until almost 2 weeks after the crash. Before that point there would have been little focus on the fuel switches, which were recovered in the run position (verifiable and reported). Once attention was directed to the switches, a small team will form just to forensically examine those switches. They will likely take WEEKS to even begin the detailed examination of the switches. Those switches have been through a crash and a fire. They dare not move them until every possible non-destructive examination technique has been used. What do you test first? just pulling the sleeve will move something. Moving the lever will move the contacts. Did fingerprints survive the fire?. You would want to x-ray them, measure wear on the locking, look at contact position. Electrically test the terminals. Does it need to be opened? They would get examples from the manufacturer and destructively test them.
Yes in the final report they would be in a position to make a statement like that. But in the preliminary - No.
"There has been no defect reported pertaining to the fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB." - This will have been verified by the investigation team fairly rapidly. Verified reportable fact, included in the preliminary report.
This could not have been done by the team in the time available. Bear in mind that the EAFR was not read until almost 2 weeks after the crash. Before that point there would have been little focus on the fuel switches, which were recovered in the run position (verifiable and reported). Once attention was directed to the switches, a small team will form just to forensically examine those switches. They will likely take WEEKS to even begin the detailed examination of the switches. Those switches have been through a crash and a fire. They dare not move them until every possible non-destructive examination technique has been used. What do you test first? just pulling the sleeve will move something. Moving the lever will move the contacts. Did fingerprints survive the fire?. You would want to x-ray them, measure wear on the locking, look at contact position. Electrically test the terminals. Does it need to be opened? They would get examples from the manufacturer and destructively test them.
Yes in the final report they would be in a position to make a statement like that. But in the preliminary - No.
July 18, 2025, 03:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924815
I am not sure why 50 feet in 4 seconds seems odd right after liftoff in a heavy aircraft. That corresponds to 750 FPM. Seems entirely normal to me. The rate would have been increasing as the timeline advanced. I would also point out that RAT deployment verses the rat coming online fully are two different times. When that RAT is singled to deploy it bangs out nearly instantly. It begins producing its rated electrical and hydraulic power sometime after deployment.
The widely watched video shows a very normal initial rotation and climb.
The widely watched video shows a very normal initial rotation and climb.
Since the preliminary report states E2 cutoff after 3-4 seconds after lift-off, if that cutoff corresponds to ADSB interruption and which itself was only transmitting for 4 seconds, then 50ft after liftoff is a bit anemic?
But if we include the first 25ft after rotation but before lift-off, then, because the ADSB duration is only 4 seconds, it means that ADSB was interrupted before the E2 FCO operation. I don't know if there is a sliding window - part after rotation, part after lift-off that might meet all of these constraints.
That still leaves unexplained the declining airspeed seen in the ADSB data... did prior discussions on the ADSB data cover this? is there a good explanation?
Last edited by appruser; 18th July 2025 at 04:03 . Reason: fixed heights
July 20, 2025, 18:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11925921
The full Flight Global article; those here who chose to put PPRuNe and themselves at risk of legal action by their accusations and emotive language may like to reflect and be more accurate in their contributions to this professional pilots forum in future.
US safety chief supports India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau in urging media to avoid ‘premature narratives’ about the 12 June disaster that killed 260 people
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash