Posts about: "RAT (All)" [Posts: 683 Pages: 35]

You need to read the previous posts. We are NOT relying on ear witness's alone, 2 independent PPRUNE folks did detailed audio comparisons and the evidence is compelling. Plus people close to the Boeing test airfields in the US who have heard RAT tests 500+ times. The RAT was out, that's a 99% certainty. What else would make a sound like prop blades getting close to or perhaps exceeding the speed of sound?

I told you this re translation 3 days ago but the post was deleted then again 2 days ago see post 993.
Notwithstanding the possibility that recollection of the traumatised survivor may be unreliable it seems clear that he thought the engines were spooling up before impact. I think he deserves the benefit of the doubt that he might be right.

Possible auto relight but too late?

May I make a friendly suggestion - might be best to avoid putting in our own interpretations/perspectives of what he said - for example, he doesn't mention "sound" anywhere - we would interpret 'sound' based on experience, but that isn't quite what he said - he only used the word 'race' (a.k.a 'revved' elsewhere). Another example would be interpreting that he said "we were still in one place & not moving" - what he really said was that it felt like they were "stuck" - his word, nothing about movement or standing still or one place. A third one would be 'green & white lights came on in the cabin as we hit something' makes those two events very close together or simultaneous, when his narrative doesn't actually do that, just that they hit something in the end, and before that they 'gave race', and before that a green & white light came on.

To break down the survivor's narrative into an interpretation, am including below a transliteration, direct translation, and the interpretation.


The survivor is a very fast speaker, so had to slow the video down to 0.5x through X's settings menu on the video to capture everything he said.

Video from 1:32 - 1:56

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Transliteration:
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Takeoff ke baad, ek minute ke andar hee, jab takeoff hua naa, to suddenly paanch das second kaise lagaa jaise stuck ho gaya woh. Baad mein (sirf mere ko???) lagaa kuchch hua, baad mein plane mein light on ho gayee, green aur white. Baad mein woh pata nahin woh plane takeoff jyadaa karne ke liye woh race, (do?) bolte hain kya, race diya waisa kuchch, woh seedha (re?) .. speed mein hee ghus gaya, jahan woh, woh (l??), kya tha woh

1:57
Reporter: woh hostel thaa ek, hospital ka

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As direct a translation as feasible without significant rewording or putting in my own perspective on his wording:
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After takeoff, within one minute, when takeoff happened, then suddenly 5-10 seconds what I felt like it got stuck. After, (only to me???) it felt something happened. After, in the plane, light came on, green & white. After, I don't know, to make the plane takeoff more they race, what do they say, gave race, something like that, it straight (1/2 spoken word 'race'?) in speed got into, where, what, what was it

Reporter: it was a hostel, of the hospital

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Less literal translation, more intepretation:
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After takeoff, within a minute, when takeoff occurred, then suddenly for 5-10 seconds it felt like it was stuck. After, it felt like something happened. After that, in the plane, a light came on, green & white. After, I don't know, to make the plane takeoff more they raced, what do they say - gave it race - something like that; it straight, with speed entered into, what was it -

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Later on he describes the mechanics of his escape, and how he was able to get out through a broken door because there was some space on the outside on the ground floor where he landed, and on the opposite side there was a hostel wall that might have prevented others getting out.

Hopefully this might be somewhat useful, even if to only lay to rest some of the theories based on mistranslations of what he said.

It certainly helped me understand that the timeline here doesn't have enough information to line up his description of in-flight events with what's on the external videos.

For example, using the cctv video for timing, his 5-10s lines up with the takeoff and climb from 00:18 to 00:27, and the "felt like it got stuck" part could correspond to 00:28-00:31 where the aircraft appears to 'stop climbing and float horizontally, very little descent' as compared to after 00:31 when it's visibly descending.

The 'something happened' could be the RAT coming online (bang?) but we don't know because there isn't enough detail. Is the RAT even audible inside the cabin? And then the green & white light could be the ceiling light or the exit sign, we don't know, but there is definitely no flickering mentioned.

The 'giving race' part is mystifying - see earlier discussion in the thread - was it changing pitch in the constant-speed RAT due to declining airspeed, something else, engines spooling up? we just don't have enough info here. When did they 'give race' within that 17s descent from 00:31 to 00:48 impact? If we knew that it might help, but that detail isn't there in his description; not surprising since it was a short descent. I think we have to wait for the data from the recorders, or another external video, or maybe even a video from the cabin if somebody was live-streaming to facebook/instagram/x etc.

The Times article also helpfully informs us that

"The [RAT] is not intended to provide enough power and controls for an aircraft to climb after take-off, merely to give minimum control for an emergency descent from altitude"

There was a comment very early in the thread (couldn't locate just now so assume hoovered up by the hard-working Mods) where someone postulated that the late "flare" we see in the video was possibly a pitch-up moment as the engines relit and the pilots went from a glide to a climb posture.

I don't want to review the video again -- personally, I suspect the "revving" the survivor heard was the sound of the RAT spooling up, and that the pilots were flaring as the ground approached in the vain hope of setting her down gently. Just sharing the OPs suggestion as it relates to your comment

Having followed this thread since the beginning, it is clear to me that this discussion is tainted by the fact that many contributors have MCAS and Boeing quality issues at the front of their minds.

I perfectly understand that, so no judgement from me, but it no doubt causes confirmation bias with conclusions being made about extremely improbable outcomes (dual engine failure at the same time during rotation/take off).

The RAT being deployed does not prove a TCMA-failure on both engines nor does it prove that both engines failed (its still not disproved or proven if it was manually deployed).

Extremely fast taxi!

Engineering function. You literally push the RAT guarded switch to on

I was not aware that we have granular ADS-B data from the a/c itself showing airspeed post rotation (rather than speed interpolated from GPS). Apologies if I have missed it. If it does show acceleration after takeoff I tend to agree with you.

In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread:

If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground.

As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems.

Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not).

Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact.

In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms.

In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known.

Thank you to the mods for an excellent job.

What you are saying is, as several have said before, is that everything started to fail at or shortly before rotation. Joining the dots from two other branches in this thread is it correct to say that there are only two things that happen at that point: the aircraft transitions from "ground" to "air" (multiple sensors) and there is a change in orientation such that any liquid (eg potable water) that has found its way into the EE bay will move. Question: the aircraft was routed DEL-AMD-LGW. Where was the potable water tankage topped up? Presumably prior to the longest sector? In addition to the inspection list that the Indian AAIB has mandated should they also inspect peer aircraft for EE bay corrosion...?

This doesn't make any sense. The plane was in the air for approximately 30 seconds, the plane stops climbing around 12 seconds after take off, and the noise of the RAT is heard 11 seconds before the plane crashes - even if we assume the RAT both deploys instantly and deployed the exact moment that video began recording, that only gives the pilots a 7 second window to perform an action that results in it being deployed.

There just isn't enough time for the RAT to be deployed as a result of any action by the crew, IMHO. And to demonstrate how long 7 seconds is - that's enough to say 20 words, assuming no interruptions .

If you read the thread, you would know:

The RAT was almost certainly deployed. 4 different sources.
The Flaps were not retracted. Visible at the accident site plus many other sources agreeing they were indeed down.
APU will autostart when all engine power is lost. Potentially explaining why the inlet door was open or partially open at the accident site. Mentioned in several previous posts
On a 787-8, the main bogies tilt as the 1st action of the gear retract sequence. As stated in previous posts. I don't think this happens unless gear is selected up. So the conclusion was, gear was selected up. One caveat, IIRC, there was some discussion around a failure could have caused the bogies to tilt without Gear up being selected but I don't recall the outcome.
As for the Air France remark, un-necessary IMHO. Let's respect the crews please.

OK, I promised some informed speculation when I got back, so here goes:
Disclaimer: never worked the 787, so my detailed knowledge is a bit lacking.

First off, this is perplexing - especially if the RAT was deployed. There is no 'simple' explanation that I can come up with.

GEnx-1B engines have been exceptionally reliable, and the GE carbon composite fan blades are very robust and resistant to bird strike damage (about 15 years after the GE90 entry into service, I remember a GE boast that no GE90 (carbon composite) fan blades had needed to be scrapped due to damage (birdstrike, FOD, etc. - now that was roughly another 15 years ago, so is probably no longer true, but it shows just how robust the carbon composite blades are - far better than the more conventional titanium fan blades).

Not saying it wasn't somehow birdstrike related, just that is very unlikely (then again, all the other explanations I can come up with are also very unlikely ).

Using improper temp when calculating TO performance - after some near misses, Boeing added logic that cross-compares multiple total temp probes - aircraft TAT (I think the 787 uses a single, dual element probe for aircraft TAT, but stand to be corrected) and the temp measured by the engine inlet probes - and puts up a message if they disagree by more than a few degree tolerance - so very, very unlikely.

N1 power setting is somewhat less prone to measurement and power setting errors than EPR (N1 is a much simpler measurement than Rolls EPR) - although even with EPR, problems on both engines at the same time is almost unheard of.

The Auto Thrust (autothrottle) function 'falls asleep' at 60 knots - and doesn't unlock until one of several things happens - 250 knots, a set altitude AGL is exceeded (I'm thinking 3,000 ft. but the memory is fuzzy), thrust levers are moved more than a couple of degrees, or the mode select is changed (memory says that last one is inhibited below 400 ft. AGL). So an Auto Thrust malfunction is also extremely unlikely. Further, a premature thrust lever retard would not explain a RAT deployment.

TO does seem to be very late in the takeoff role - even with a big derate, you still must accelerate fast enough to reach V1 with enough runway to stop - so there is still considerable margin if both engines are operating normally. That makes me wonder if they had the correct TO power setting - but I'm at a loss to explain how they could have fouled that up with all the protections that the 787 puts on that.

If one engine did fail after V1, it's conceivable that they shut down the wrong engine - but since this happened literally seconds after takeoff, it begs the question why they would be in a big hurry to shut down the engine. Short of an engine fire, there is nothing about an engine failure that requires quick action to shut it down - no evidence of an engine fire, and even with an engine fire, you normally have minutes to take action - not seconds.

The one thing I keep thinking about is someone placing both fuel switches to cutoff immediately after TO. Yes, it's happened before (twice - 767s in the early 1980s), but the root causes of that mistake are understood and have been corrected. Hard to explain how it could happen (unless, God forbid, it was intentional).

Not 757 - it was a 767. Second time it happened in about 12 months.

Determined to be an ergonomics problem with the switch layout in the flightdeck.

Early 767s (JT9D and CF6-80A) had a supervisory "EEC" (Electronic Engine Control - Boeing still uses "EEC" to identify what most people call the FADEC on modern engines). The procedure if an EEC 'failed' was to switch both EECs off (to prevent excessive throttle stagger - unlike FADEC, the engine could operate just fine with a supervisory EEC failed).

Problem was that the EEC ON/OFF switch was located on the aisle stand - right above the fuel cutoff switches. Turned out 'muscle memory' was when the pilot reached down there, it was usually to turn the fuel ON or OFF - which is what they did. Fortunately realizing what he'd done wrong, the pilot quickly restored the switches to RUN and both engines recovered. And yes, they continued on to their destination (RAT was still deployed since there is no way to retract it in-flight).

Previous event was with JT9D engines (United IIRC). In that case, only one engine recovered (second engine went into an unrecoverable stall), they simply came back around and did a single engine landing.

Realizing the ergonomic issue, the EECs were relocated to the pilot's overhead (retrofit by AD).

To the best of my knowledge, there hasn't been a repeat of an inadvertent dual engine shutdown since the EEC switches were relocated. It's also very difficult to 'accidentally' move the switches as there is a locking detent - the switch must be pulled out slightly before it can be moved to CUTOFF.

Sorry but you are wrong. The RAT was basic on the 767 - every single 767 built has one. The Gimli glider deployed the RAT (1982), and the Delta dual engine shutdown out of LAX deployed the RAT.

Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods ). A few more comments:

"Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight.

Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring).

As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level.

Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC).

The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight.

Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios.

In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive.

I hesitate to chip in in these accident threads. Keep them clean. However, as as a few comments above brushes my audio expertise, I will comment.

A very simple audio analysis give me this:
The 3 segments horisontally, are of different videos of B787s passing overhead/landing. The vertical drop you see is the doppler effect.
In other words, these are spectrograms over time which makes these distinctions easier than a simple static spectrogram.
1. B787 landing with RAT extended.
2.Air india crash
3. B787 landing without RAT


It's a 5 minute laptop job, and it would look much prettier and clearer if I spent some time with it, (Gain to color match, and spectrally match to compensate for microphone placement and type),
but it is 85% conclusive even when done as simple as this IMO.
(I do have legal forensic audio experience)
The RAT was out judging from the audio evidence. You can see the the equally spaced overtones of the propelller match when passing overhead resulting in the Doppler effect, the difference in length of the doppler is caused by distance and the slightly varying frequencies shown in the starting point is caused by a difference in speed. But the harmonic content match.
In the 3rd segment you see none of these overtones at all.

It was hard to let it go, so I spent a bit more time with the audio, using filtering and matching to see if I could be even more sure.

It's a pity uploading audio to this site isn't as easy as uploading photos, but I can say it took very little filtering and matching to make the Air India audio become nearly indistinguishable from audio taken of B787 with known RAT extended during landing.

I can't see it in the photos either, but in these circumstances the audio is a lot more trustworthy, and from my audio point of view RAT deployment is 100% confirmed.

In the off chance that the audio I borrowed from a confirmed RAT event was somehow faked, I plotted the technical data I could find of the B787 RAT (4000rpm, 2 blades) combined with a height estimate and asked the O3 model with deep research to estimate doppler shift and speed.
The result matches the above documented 270-200Hz (in one of the harmonics) Doppler shift observed in 1.7 seconds.

No, it would have looked very different in the analysis.

About the engine spool down not present in the audio:
I did not know engines spooled down that quickly if shut down in the air, I am not an aerodynamicist, but it makes sense it would happen with all the drag. I had a mental sound in my head from normal shutdowns, and action movies I guess.
That means my point about it being no spool down detectable in the audio really doesn\x92t matter.

Is there known numbers for timing RAT deployment or spool up? Because there is no sign of that either in the audio.

I will have a go at a few after take-off videos and use some alternative comparison techniques to see if I can say anything with certainty about any engine power being present or not.

My hunch, after analyzing a few landing videos with and without the RAT with the standard audio analyzers tells me the engines were at similar or below rpm/noise making level/thrust compared to a normal landing, and that they had already completely spooled down(which you guys suggest is to be expected to happen much more quickly than I thought, so maybe doesn\x92t say much) when the video with audio starts.

I have seen your previous posts about this, and I happen to agree. Visually, as a lay man non visuals expert, I am in your \xabcamp.\xbb

However, the rat is small, and the artifacts are plentiful. Small sensor, compressed video, compressed upload, zoom, it is in short an awful source.

However, the RAT is a much better noisemaker, and the audio signature is much more obvious than it’s visual appearance in this case, and though the recording isn’t fantastic quality, there was more than enough information there to objectively conclude the RAT is out. And that is my professional, on the weekend, opinion.

I want to ask a pretty frank question for all of you, and I hope it is ok, from an audio specialist non-pilot:
Provided the engines spooled down. Provided the RAT is out. (There are no explosions, no bird strikes.)
Isn’t software and previous electrical failures a red herring too?Would anything but a complete fuel shut off lead to this result? That still leaves everything from the Fate is the Hunter plot, to Airbus A350 center consoles and Alaska 2059 open as root causes.