Posts about: "RAT (All)" [Posts: 683 Pages: 35]

Originally Posted by Sailvi767

I suspect both recorders will contain the same data. Given the radio transmission after the loss of thrust the aircraft still had at least the emergency electrical bus powered. This should have kept both recorders online. It is however possible given the 10 minute battery backup that Boeing chose to put the the recorders on another bus but that\x92s not the norm.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

I am not certain on that. Remember the 737 didn't have them on the standby bus (Jeju). The NTSB doc states they're powered from the L/R 28VDC buses on the 787.

This shows the centre TRUs can only power the instrument buses not the L/R DC buses, the RAT can't really power the right TRU without powering both R1/R2 buses, and powering the left TRU would require powering the left 235/115 ATU which would probably be a lot of magnetising current even if not much actual load. The contactor naming supports that.

My money is on the L/R DC buses being unpowered in RAT operation; only the CA/FO instrument buses and the 235VAC backup bus.

Originally Posted by spornrad

NYT illustrated the story, drawing the same conclusions as this thread so far:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...ash-cause.html

Originally Posted by EDLB

....... Both engines went from clean burning to immediate shut down at the same time within less than a second.....

Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner

Do we think the engines are fully 'off', shutdown - Or are they struggling to provide thrust?
Listen to the rooftop video in Capn Bloggs excellent Side-By-Side video . Ignore the RAT. Try and focus on all the sound that is not RAT.
I think I can hear a pulsing, a chunk-chunk-chunk' sound.
Do we think that is the engines struggling to work?

Originally Posted by Tailspin Turtle

suggests that the engines were providing some thrust in order for it to get as far as it did.

Originally Posted by AAKEE

I guess that that would not normally match the assumption that the generators disconnected (all four) and activated the RAT?
Some thrust from idle and up would normally keep generators online.

Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner

Thanks but I want to separate the RAT issue from the engines/thrust issue.
Its possible that the RAT was deployed for other reasons, prior to the engines losing thrust. So, leaving the RAT out of the equation for a bit, do we think there is a sound of engines TRYING to run?

Originally Posted by benjyyy

Just read a report by Richard Godfrey on the climb and descent
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/a9hhz...ioijg&e=1&dl=0
Not knowledgeable to know about a lot of this myself but interested in views. His calculation asserts that it was not a dual engine flameout to cover the distance it did but there must have been at least some thrust provided to do so.

Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner

Thanks but I want to separate the RAT issue from the engines/thrust issue.
Its possible that the RAT was deployed for other reasons, prior to the engines losing thrust. So, leaving the RAT out of the equation for a bit, do we think there is a sound of engines TRYING to run?

Originally Posted by Sailvi767

It would go against every aspect of training for a professional crew to deploy the rat below 400 feet. Further if you put 100 crewmembers in a simulator on takeoff and said deploy the rat manually I would bet not a single crew member could find the rat deploy switch and activate it in under 5 seconds and maybe 2 or 3 in 10 seconds.

Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner

....The theory I'm working is...

Originally Posted by za9ra22

What configuration, specifically?

Caused by what? /
Didn't I read somewhere in the wiki, that the engines will continue to suck fuel? / Which is?
Contaminated with what, and how? And why were no other aircraft affected?
Which specific circumstances?

Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner

OK - Fair Challenges - good post, I'll have a go at answering and simultaneously expanding my own thoughts. In fact I'm not having a go at you, I'm more working my theory....

Experience. Without wishing to dox myself, I've worked in engineering at a major airline from apprentice through (in no particular order) Line Maintenance, Heavy and Light Maintenance, to technical support and maintenance control on both Boeing and Airbus products, with various qualifications and authorisations along the way. [Hmm - Scrap this sentence?]On the day 9/11 occurred, I should have been making modifications inside a fuel tank instead of staring at the TV with mouth on the floor.
However, I would describe my experience as broad, yet shallow in respect to this incident. Some of my fleet I know every rivet. Some of my fleet I've only ever seen from a distance. I don't touch airplanes for a living any more. B787 though - is not my area of specialty. I'll dig in, but am not the expert. I am not a systems design engineer, so precise numbers and flow rates, are not what I do. But what the systems do, how they operate, what they look like, smell and taste like... yeah, I'm not a muggle. And I do have access to all the manuals and know how to use them. And - let me be clear, I am speculating. I was advancing a theory. It WILL be some flavour of wrong. The investigation will reveal all.

I Agree, Water in fuel is not a novel concept. Aircraft fuel tanks attract water - fact. How much? It varies. I've sumped tanks and got no water, I've seen drops of water beading about in the bottom of a gallon jug, I've seen gallons of water. I've been so covered in fuel I cant smell it or think straight and taken gallon after gallon not being able to tell if its fuel or water. I also agree that 57% humidity doesn't seem particularly high - its not south east Asian jungle levels - but I'm not an expert at humidity, 32Deg c at 57% humidity at 02:30 am is not going to be comfortable for me though. I looked at recent weather in DEL, and those values were at the higher end of the range.
Further, I believe the prevailing weather conditions on the ground are less important when it comes to the volume of water getting in. Fuel is cold, or gets damn cold during a 9 Hr flight. Fuel Temperature Management is an issue for our Drivers. So as the fuel is used at altitude, Air enters the tank through NACA Ducts in the outboard end of the wing. Its beneficial to maintain a slight positive pressure, amongst other things to reduce evaporation. (Added complication, there is also the Nitrogen Enrichment system due to TWA800 - but that's more about processing the air in the tank to change the properties and make it non-explosive). Then as the aircraft descends, more air enters as the air pressure increases. Its the humidity of that air in the descent that is going to determine the volume of water entering the tank and potentially the fuel. The water in the air condenses on the sides of the tank because of the cold post-flight fuel. It doesn't dissolve into the fuel, but sinks to the bottom. Ground temperature / humidity and time will likely affect how much water condenses out of that air while on the ground. There won't be a huge amount of air exchange on the ground. Likely if the AC landed at 2am, then from sunrise as the tank warmed up, there would actually be a flow out of the vents.

What Features and procedures are there to mitigate Water? I apologise if my post gave the impression that there are no mitigation processes. There are. Water is well understood in the industry.
Well for a start, Features / Design. The Aircraft has a water scavenge system. Water doesn't mix with fuel, it sinks to the bottom being about 20% denser than fuel, so at the very lowest point in the tank, the water scavenge system (Powered by the Aft Fuel Pump through a jet pump, a venturi like system) will suck up the 'fluid' at the very lowest point, where the water would collect and in Boeings words 'drip' that fluid into the path of the pump pickup inlet (but I'd describe it more as a 'squirt'). The idea being that a small amount of water injected into the fuel will be consumed by the engines harmlessly.
There is also agitation. The wing tank pumps are pretty much running constantly, from before engine startup to after engine shutdown. The pumps are quite violent to the fuel and supply more pressure then the engine could ever need. Any excess pressure is dumped right back into the tank, quite close to the pump, in a direction that would further stir up the fuel and help break up any water into suspended droplets.
This all works if there is a small amount of water in the fuel. The water scavenge pickup is right next to the pump inlet, but a bit lower. Little bits of water get managed. Looking at the pictures of the system, I'd say a couple of gallons of water would do no harm at all.
But if there was significantly more water in that tank. Guessing 10-30 + gallons, then the pump would be circulating water, or highly water rich fuel.

Then there's the suction pickup. Its in the same 'bay' as the aft fuel pump and located a little 'higher' than the pump inlet and water scavenge inlet. But also located between stringers that can separate out the settled water ( I wish I could share the pictures, but more than my job is worth ) I can imagine the suction pickup being in a pool of 'stagnant' water.

I also saw a post from Metcha about the scavenge system blocking with Algae - I don't know about that (B787 not my fleet). But possible that could aggravate things. There's also the reports of the Indian AAIB looking at the Titan Biocide incident. Its possible that might be related and could modify the theory.

Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury. Except when there's more. Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.

Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector. But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time. Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.

How much water would cause a sustained flameout? I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling. I think the engines were running, albeit badly. Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow. I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high perrcentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?

There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.

The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure. That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.

Ive written enough and am tired. Must stop now.

Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner

But this all hinges on whether the engines were trying to run, or commanded off. Hence the request for interpretation of the sound.

Originally Posted by The Brigadier

We know that the right-hand GEnx-1B was removed for overhaul and re-installed in March 2025 so it was at \x93zero time\x94 and zero cycles, meaning a performance asymmetry that the FADEC would have to manage every time maximum thrust is selected. If the old engine was still on the pre-2021 EEC build while the fresh engine carried the post-Service Bulletin software/hardware, a dual \x93commanded rollback\x94 is plausible. A latent fault on one channel with the mid-life core can prompt the other engine to match thrust to maintain symmetry, leading to dual rollback.

Originally Posted by Kraftstoffvondesibel

I did look into this while analyzing the audio for RAT confirmation, but I did not conclude with anything other than that the engines where clearly not at any kind of take off power.

I did not find good enough material to compare to, and time was lacking a bit.

There is engine noise, or engine-like noise from there, somewhat comparable to an engine at idle, that fades out into the background noise at the same rate as the RAT. I don\x92t know if it comes from an engine at idle, windmilling, an engine producing some power, or if it is even just aerodynamic noise from the rest of the airframe.

I\x92ll give it another go if time allows.

Originally Posted by Tailspin Turtle

This is my latest attempt to square the circle using all the data points and minimal assumptions. The main shortcoming of the analysis is not knowing the maximum L/D and the speed for maximum LD with the gear down, flaps 5, and the RAT extended. However, if I use a reasonable number in my opinion for the L/D in that configuration and assume that the airplane is being flown at the speed for it, it will not get to the crash site. The distance from the runway of the crash site is from a previous graphic (1.55 km); the rotation point from fdr, permalink 314; 200 feet max height above the runway being generally accepted; crash site 50 feet below the runway elevation cited previously. An average speed of 180 knots is consistent with the dimensions given and 30 seconds flight time. A flare at 50 feet will briefly increase the L/D to 20, maybe even 30 (500 feet more than shown) but still not enough to make up the shortfall, In fact, with a head wind the L/D will be lower than assumed as well as if the speed being flown is higher or lower than required for maximum L/D in that configuration. In other words, there must have been some thrust available.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

...Once both engines are running and the four VFSGs are online, I would not expect any load shedding and certainly not of flight loads like fuel pumps...

Originally Posted by MaybeItIs

...\xa7 25.903(b) includes the words: "in at least one configuration,"

It doesn't, that I can see, state that that configuration must be used during takeoff, though common sense would say it should.