Posts about: "RAT (Deployment)" [Posts: 361 Pages: 19]

No, it would have looked very different in the analysis.

About the engine spool down not present in the audio:
I did not know engines spooled down that quickly if shut down in the air, I am not an aerodynamicist, but it makes sense it would happen with all the drag. I had a mental sound in my head from normal shutdowns, and action movies I guess.
That means my point about it being no spool down detectable in the audio really doesn\x92t matter.

Is there known numbers for timing RAT deployment or spool up? Because there is no sign of that either in the audio.

I will have a go at a few after take-off videos and use some alternative comparison techniques to see if I can say anything with certainty about any engine power being present or not.

My hunch, after analyzing a few landing videos with and without the RAT with the standard audio analyzers tells me the engines were at similar or below rpm/noise making level/thrust compared to a normal landing, and that they had already completely spooled down(which you guys suggest is to be expected to happen much more quickly than I thought, so maybe doesn\x92t say much) when the video with audio starts.

I have seen your previous posts about this, and I happen to agree. Visually, as a lay man non visuals expert, I am in your \xabcamp.\xbb

However, the rat is small, and the artifacts are plentiful. Small sensor, compressed video, compressed upload, zoom, it is in short an awful source.

However, the RAT is a much better noisemaker, and the audio signature is much more obvious than it’s visual appearance in this case, and though the recording isn’t fantastic quality, there was more than enough information there to objectively conclude the RAT is out. And that is my professional, on the weekend, opinion.

I want to ask a pretty frank question for all of you, and I hope it is ok, from an audio specialist non-pilot:
Provided the engines spooled down. Provided the RAT is out. (There are no explosions, no bird strikes.)
Isn’t software and previous electrical failures a red herring too?Would anything but a complete fuel shut off lead to this result? That still leaves everything from the Fate is the Hunter plot, to Airbus A350 center consoles and Alaska 2059 open as root causes.

Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods ). A few more comments:

"Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight.

Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring).

As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level.

Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC).

The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight.

Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios.

In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive.

Just commenting on the earlier acoustic analyses of RAT deployment conducted by Kraftstoffvondesibel and myself.

Firstly it will be clear that we posted our respective audio analyses about the same time. There was no collaboration I assure you, and in fact I'd been waiting all day to see if someone else with more recent or pertinent experience than me would do something. When I hadn't seen anything I spent a little time and came up with what I did, however I think Kraftstoffvondesibel's work is probably more useful than mine given their specific plot methodology and that they included a non-RAT 'control' pass. I was in the process of acknowledging this when the thread was closed; late at night for me which is why this post is now some hours on.

At the time I posted I was fairly circumspect for the reasons given but, with the similarities between our results and along with some other detail that's come to light in PM, I am now more persuaded that the acoustic print we both observed is most likely to be from a RAT (although until this is confirmed a question must necessarily remain).

FWIW, and in part answer to a later post enquiring about the noise of a RAT dropping into position, this also aligns somewhat with the survivor's apparent observation of a noise ('bang'?) prior to impact, and an earlier post by DaveReidUK stating that RAT deployment results in a 'humungous' bang.

FP.

Further to the audio analysis of a deployed RAT; given an audio print, known noise source [RAT] frequency, location of a receiver and relative location + direction of moving object, and using the principles of doppler effect etc, it should be possible to calculate [ground]speed of a passing aircraft.

Thus, having been informed that the source frequency of a RAT is 145Hz (thank you that person - please ID yourself if you wish), and with regard to the [assumed] RAT acoustic print available for AI 171 we are close to being able to determine an approximate airspeed during descent (given the video from which we get this acoustic data appears to start during the descent).

There are several variables in play here that we don't know exactly (the positions of observer and aircraft, height agl of observer and aircraft etc), and some I will ignore for the moment (effect of air temperature/pressure for example) but if one makes an educated assessment from the visual cues in the video I calculate an initial relative airspeed of circa 120kn. Necessarily this is an extremely rough number, in fact the range (making various positional assumptions etc) appears to be between ~100kn to ~150kn, but if it turned out be either side of this I wouldn't be completely surprised.

As with the initial audio analysis to determine whether a RAT was deployed or not I offer this for those to whom this sort of data may be important. Not sure if it's of any real use or not, and I wouldn't hang your hat on it, but here it is in case it assists. Should it matter I expect some sort of corroboration could be obtained by making an assessment of vertical speed from the variously available videos and extrapolating from there.

My previous caveats over veracity of source data etc remain.

FP.

I realise the discussion has largely moved on, but for completeness I have analysed, filtered and compared the audio from several 787 videos\x97both take-off and landing (the latter with and without RAT deployment; take-off footage with the RAT out is rare).

Using the same style of frequency plots employed in the RAT analysis\x97and drawing on speed of different engine components data supplied by other contributors\x97it is straightforward to identify the engines\x92 high-power acoustic signatures objectively, despite variations among clips and the presence of Doppler shift.

What is clear is that the engine noise in the recording bears no resemblance to a typical 787 take-off profile. Whether the engines were merely at very low thrust/idle or fully windmilling I cannot say with certainty, but they were certainly nowhere near take-off power.

Make of that what you will.

The audio analysis in this case isn't anything obscure or vague. The same software is used in courts all over the world every day. You can be pretty sure the same software in some iteration is used investigating CVRs all the time. It shows something emitting the exact same sonic signature as a B787 RAT went over the camera at the same speed as the Boeing 787 seen going over the camera. It isn't a broken fanblade, or a motorcycle passing by, that would give a completely different result. It literally means hundreds of thousands of datapoints fall into the exact same pattern. If it were anything else, that would be easy to observe. It is a much more accurate tool than watching heavily compressed video. It is the same software used in hollywood to surgically remove airplane noises from historical dramas, btw. At least until AI came along and took on that job about 2 years ago. . Just because you aren't familiar with it doesn't mean it isn't accurate.
Just putting this out there, since many might be unfamiliar with this, you included.

As one of the two authors who have offered an acoustic analysis of the AI 171 'RAT' video here I feel obliged to make some observations.

First of all Kraftstoffvondesibel and I did our work completely without knowledge of each other. We reached the same conclusions more or less, most likely using different software (I used four different methodologies) and in subsequent discussions between us we've found our specific results (frequency etc) match very closely - including the doppler shift that we've also both commented on.

While this doesn't absolutely prove the RAT scenario (I was, at least initially, somewhat more circumspect on this matter as anyone reading my first post would find) it does go some distance towards reconciling our respective methodologies and outcomes. Given the confluence and discussion I am now more satisfied that the RAT was deployed than I was before - although for the reasons espoused earlier I totally recognise the [scientific] challenges to this view.

In this regard I too would not 'mind' if our view regarding RAT deployment were proven incorrect. What Kraftstoffvondesibel and I have done is simply use a little science and apply a quantitative analysis to the available data that many had qualitatively argued over. One might hope that, amongst other things, it could have dispelled the RAT/no RAT question to some degree and reduce thread noise, but unfortunately it seems some haven't read the thread through, or perhaps lack analytical reasoning.

This site isn't the place for a full academic paper+peer review and for me the real subject of this thread is the tragedy of AI 171 and what might determinable from what we know in the hope it will be useful to those closer to the coal face. If you are a physicist, scientist or engineer and have the capability then the same data we used is also available to you to do your own analysis. Should you do so we'd welcome hearing the outcome - whether it concurs with our results or not - as this is the scientific way. If you want to include the full nitty-gritty detail of how you've gone about then for a very small percentage of us that might be interesting, but it'd be peripheral to the main issue - and bear in mind that RAT deployment itself is merely an indicator of other potentially more serious issues. It is not likely to be the cause per se !

To conclude, I understand it's a long thread but as far as the RAT question is concerned, I'd encourage you to read the relevant posts at least and if you remain unconvinced, and you have the skills, then why not conduct your own analysis and let us know the results? Otherwise perhaps as a group we could move on from this, remembering that this is a terrible event which at the very least deserves informed useful discussion rather than wild and/or repetitive speculation.

FP.

I don't believe I owe you anything, I believe this is done adequately previously and has already taken up enough time on this thread. I am of the opinion that we have shown the RAT being deployed satisfactory enough to be of use for speculation in this thread. I find repeated comments about the bad video being the only evidence a bit disrespectful, though. Even from a mere physicist. It is based on a spectrogram over time. The source file shows audio up to about 16 kHz, it is unknown whether this limitation is in the file format (ie. 32kHz sampling rate) or microphone. Doesn't matter much. The frequencies above 16kHz is not important in this context as it is not where the sound energy is anyway. The audio will have been lossy data compressed, but it does not affect these prominent properties of the audio. It does make me hesitant to draw conclusions from the parts of the spectrum with more broadband noise and several intersecting sounds. Noise floor suggests 16 bit sampling depth. Spectral resolution? N/A All samples are included. The spectrogram covers the entire frequency range recorded, It shows comparatively the same overtones of the fundamental expected from the technical specifications of the 2 bladed RAT running at it's intended RPM, the doppler characteristics fits completely with a reasonable range of passing speeds and distance to the passing source plotted out. Compareatively, All the harmonics are identical both in pitch and seperation to a recording of a known B787 landing with RAT deployed, while the Doppler fall shows a longer time frame in the landing video taken from a further distance. As expected. The overtones easily discernable in this recording falls in the 220-2700Hz range. Below that, there is other noise centered around 150Hz, which gradually fades towards the end of the recording. This, as far as I can find in available information, fits with an idling or even windmilling B787 engine, but this is not conclusive. This falls in a range of the spectrum where there are other noise sources and the signal/noise is low and of a broader band characteristic, these masking frequencies is where the lossy data compression might play tricks, so I do not weigh that heavily. Recordings of landing B787 without the RAT, shows none off the same characteristics, and completely lack the tonal components and exact overtones shown with the RAT deployed. More importantly, compared to videos of B787s taking off with normal take off thrust, the latter shows distinct tonal elements, but with very different overtones,, both in separation and composition, again possible to relate to known quantities of the rotational speed and elements of the engine at high power. The AI recording shows none of this.

The latest techniques let us separate such things as reverbration from the source, when superimposing the reverberation/ambience and background noise of the AI crash urban environment on the clean, dead open field recording of the known B787 w/rat, they do indeed sound exactly the same to this very skilled and experienced listener. Although this is not courtesy of the computer analysis. It is just another angle of confirmation.

All in all, i think this source audio is excellent. The source is an iphone, their mems based microphones, although noisy shows great spectral balance and is comparable to basic measurement microphones of professional application. There is plenty of information to analyse from in this sample.

And again, I can't see it in the video either, and until I put on some really expensive headphones and fired up the software I was of a different opinion. I bowed to the science.

Edit: I took an extra look, I am prepared to say the fall off at slightly above 16kHz is from the original recording, this is probably a limitation in the microphone, as it is not a hard cut-off before a 16kHz Nyquist frequency as it would be with a 32kHz sampling rate, there is dither noise from 16-20kHz fitting with the source being 16 bit.

As is often the case "confirmation bias" is probably why he keeps trying to do the "reversion to authority" thing.
He has some other theory, and nothing to back it up, so continues to claim he can't see the obvious pattern in the data.
It's irrelevant, because there's really NO evidence to the contrary.
And by now, there's now FOUR solid pieces of evidence that the RAT deployed, so your analysis appears to be correct.
This includes the other "ballistic" analysis of the ascension, and subsequent descent, curve-- which indicates an approximately 100% loss of thrust from both engines.
In such a scenario, the RAT automatically deploys. Audio, visual, witness and classical physics all support the conclusion that, more likely than not, the RAT deployed.

The larger mystery, obviously, is the sight line through the swiss cheese that caused the chain of events resulting of Loss Of Thrust. We should hear the Preliminary within a month or so.

I've ground tested countless RAT's on 757/767's over many years....

Having just watched (or more importantly listened to) the latest video by Captain Steeeve on YT, I'm fully confident the deployed RAT can be heard

Not trying to be a smart ass, but how do you "ground test" a RAT?

I was not aware that we have granular ADS-B data from the a/c itself showing airspeed post rotation (rather than speed interpolated from GPS). Apologies if I have missed it. If it does show acceleration after takeoff I tend to agree with you.

In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread:

If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground.

As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems.

Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not).

Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact.

In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms.

In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known.

Thank you to the mods for an excellent job.

If you read the thread, you would know:

The RAT was almost certainly deployed. 4 different sources.
The Flaps were not retracted. Visible at the accident site plus many other sources agreeing they were indeed down.
APU will autostart when all engine power is lost. Potentially explaining why the inlet door was open or partially open at the accident site. Mentioned in several previous posts
On a 787-8, the main bogies tilt as the 1st action of the gear retract sequence. As stated in previous posts. I don't think this happens unless gear is selected up. So the conclusion was, gear was selected up. One caveat, IIRC, there was some discussion around a failure could have caused the bogies to tilt without Gear up being selected but I don't recall the outcome.
As for the Air France remark, un-necessary IMHO. Let's respect the crews please.

Something that occurred to me after I went to bed last night: My assumption that the FDR readouts would rapidly reveal the cause may be flawed.

Let me explain.

The consensus is that both engines quit shortly after liftoff (that assumes that the RAT did in fact deploy). At least one of the data recorders has battery backup, so it should have kept functioning when all aircraft power was lost.

However...

Over the years, I've looked at lots and lots of digital flight data recorder outputs when investigating some sort of incident or other engine anomaly, So I have become rather familiar with some of the interesting characteristics of DFDR data.

On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker. As a result, most of the avionics boxes 'reset' - this is quick, but it's not instantaneous. This shows up in the FDR data - sometimes as 'no valid data' for a few seconds, or as garbage readings of zero or 'full scale'. Now, looking at the FDR data, it's easy to simply disregard the data, so normally no big deal.

Starting with the 777 (and on the 787 and 747-8), this electrical power glitch was 'fixed' - there is slight delay (~quarter of a second IIRC) before the fuel cutoff signal is sent to the engine - during which the electrical system reconfiguration takes place so no more 'glitch' during a normal engine shutdown...Except whatever happened to these engines wasn't 'normal'.

If there is a fuel cut at high power, the engine spools down incredibly rapidly - a second or two from max power to sub-idle. Assuming the fuel cut wasn't commanded by the flight deck fuel switches, the electrical system won't know it's coming, so it can't reconfigure until after the engine generators drop offline - and you're going to get that power glitch. Nearly every avionics box on the aircraft will reset due to this electrical glitch, and the FDR isn't going to get useful data for a few seconds (and then, only from the stuff that's on the battery bus).

Whatever happened, happened quickly - it's quite possible that whatever initiated the high-power fuel cut didn't get recorded.

tdracer:

"What sort of 'confirmation' do you have in mind - the regulator mandate that resulted in TCMA basically says we can't take credit for the flight crew"

I had just that in mind, as any automated action that could shut down both engines really should have pilot confirmation, imho, but looks like the regulators may not have considered all possible scenarios.

Another question, maybe a complete red herring: Is the TCMA a completely self contained module with it's own processor and software, (possibly the best option) or is it part the FADEC software package, perhaps just a task in a real time multitasking system ?. If the latter, that would open a whole rabbit warren of possibilities.

From all the evidence thus far, it looks like the RAT did deploy, plus other data, which means there was likely a complete electrical power failure. The idea that all four generators and controls would fail at once doesn't make sense, so that doesn't leave much else as the next step.

True, I would bet that the voltage regulating architecture of the voice recorder at least will give useful information for a short time around the loss of power, as it did for the Lockerbie CVR using far less sophisticated recorder systems. That was sufficient to show the pressure pulse in the fuselage and to give a fairly good idea of where the explosion had emanated from. TWA was similar, a bigger bang though. Would be listening for any mechanical noises related to the fuel switches, and frankly I doubt that they existed, but they would be recorded.

If the cause is what I have suggested it will dificult to get direct evidence of that case, as it was for the QFA072 event as well. Like icing cases, a water ingress into the avionics is going to be a tough investigation, water would have been sprayed all over the wreckage in the aftermath. Dousing the E/E bay with 20 or 30 gallons of water will be an expensive investigative exercise to do in a real plane, with engines running. Would not want to be observing up close.

I'd like to mention something that, while unrelated, does shed a bit of light on how computerised systems can misinterpret input data and take the wrong action. I spent 40 odd years as an electronics engineer involving complex systems, it can be surprising just how careful one must be in systems that sample data and then process it for decision making in software.

On August 9th 2019, there was a significant grid failure in the UK leading to load shedding (removing supply to many consumers, including Newcastle Airport) which started when a series of several lightning strikes in Hertfordshire caused a trip out of generators at Little Barford combined-cycle gas turbine generation plant. This was followed by the shut down of the power concentrator and grid connector from the Hornsea1 off-shore wind farm, significant changes in the grid frequency away from the acceptable limits which is what triggered further load shedding.

The reason I mention it is that Hornsea1 going off line was due to the software that operated the concentrator/connector sensing large voltage transients due to the lightning strikes 120 miles away, however these transients were only of the order of 10us length spikes with nominal 20ms cycles at 50Hz on the grid. In old reliable grid equipment that had been in use for decades such spikes would have been ignored because the large rotating machine inertia would make them irrelevant. Other systems went into various states of shut down for protection reasons, some of the Siemens Class 700 trains had to be reset by the train crew, others required a Siemens engineer to drive to each train and reload its firmware. The train protection mode occurred because the grid frequency on the 25kV AC supply went below 49.8Hz, this was a programmed default and it turned out to have been a very conservative one, the trains could have continued to operate normally at even lower frequencies but someone decided to write the programs without actually testing what a sensible limit was. The whole very widespread problems this caused could have been avoided by not acting instantly on microsecond transients in a 50Hz system.

Is it possible that the monitoring systems on a Boeing 787 also sample the electrical system voltages and currents at a relatively high frequency, and thus in the event of a transient of some type perhaps over-react to this event by taking precipitate action instead of waiting a short time before re-sampling again. I have seen a suggestion that an alternative explanation for the "bang" heard by the survivor in seat 11A might have been the sound of a Bus Tie Contactor closing, which in itself suggests something quite important relating to the electrical system. The 787 is unusual in that it uses variable frequency AC generators whose outputs are rectified and then inverted to other AC voltages and also quite high DC voltages, some in the 250-300V region.

I hope that some hard information is going to come out from the investigators soon, but given that the flap mis-selection idea is effectively debunked and we know that the main undercarriage either started its retraction cycle with bogies tilting forwards or that falling hydraulic pressure caused the same thing to happen, then the only thing that fits the observed flight path is loss of thrust on both engines which could have either preceded or followed an electrical failure. We also know that the RAT deployed and in the relatively undamaged tail cone the APU inlet was open or opening indicating a likely auto-start of the APU due to the parameters to trigger that occurring.

I would like to know how many tests of the electrical/computer interactions in 787 development involved arcing/shorting voltage/current transient testing. Is this the sort of thing that is done at all? The EECs (FADECs) in the engines are self-powered via magnetos and self-controlling in many circumstances, but perhaps something caused them to think that the thrust levers had been retarded, and such a thing might have been down to the effect of electrical transients on the various signals received by the EECs.

I have read the original 65+ pages of the thread, but I have not seen any discussion of this particular idea. Maybe that is because the 787 is quite a significant departure from Boeing's previous design practices with totally different electrical systems, higher pressure hydraulics and no doubt other aspects as well.

What do you all think?

I previously speculated the forward truck tilt was proof the gear had been selected UP and the retraction sequence was interrupted.

I’m not so sure now and believe there is a different conclusion from this non-normal gear position.

In normal retraction sequence the gear doors open almost instantaneously after the forward truck tilt. It does seem coincidental the tilt was completed while no indication of the doors opening is visible on the rooftop video, which would suggest hydraulic failure at that exact moment; this precise timing of interruption in the retraction sequence feels unlikely. So is there a more likely answer for the forward truck tilt that does not involve movement of the gear lever?

I suspect it’s more likely that C hydraulics lost power prior to rotation, as a consequence the truck could not tilt rearward during rotation as it normally should. Therefore it’s probable it always stayed in a neutral or forward tilt position from the take off run until we see it in the rooftop video. If the gear was behaving normally, and the crew had omitted to retract, it should be hanging rearwards. Watch any 787-8 takeoff video and you can see at rotation all 4 main wheels stay on the runway as the aircraft rotates. Just after wheels up they tilt rearwards. It’s a very subtle position change.

If the gear was always in a neutral or forward truck tilt position then this undermines the theory that retraction sequence was interrupted. It insinuates the C hydraulic and electrical failure happened prior to main wheels lift off.

For this reason I believe we cannot assume that gear UP was selected nor that retraction was interrupted. I’m seeing lots of social media posts which suggest the forward tilt means gear was in retraction and I don’t believe it was now.

I think the truck tilt position is key to understanding the timeline of system failures and whether the automatic RAT deployment was triggered by power failures or engine(s) failure. The question remains, did loss of center hydraulics happen before or after loss of thrust?

Thanks as always TDR for your excellent professional input. It is therefore so much more perplexing that even you cant logic our way out of this impasse. That is, the assumption that the aircraft experienced a double engine failure (supported by a reasonably convincing argument that the RAT deployed), and yet no plausible reason (that we can see) for such an event. So some then collectively slip into the tired and lazy theories of intentional or unintentional crew actions that 1. beggar belief (intentional), 2. defy physics (flaps instead of gear despite clear evidence to the contrary) and call into question the professionalism of a very experienced Captain and crew as well as the aircraft manufacturer (because...well its Boeing so it must be software ).

Yet, the answer must be simpler and staring us in the face since logic and experience (everything you have offered TDR), tell us that modern airliner engines generally do not just suddenly quit flying at the same time. In this regard we can recall several instances of double engine failure associated with bird strikes generally involving large birds or large flocks or both. But it seems we have discounted this theory very early in discussion. Why? Because we cant see any birds, or flocks of birds or engine flames/surges or puffs of smokes from the engines which would support this. Really?

I have read all the 100's of posts (sadly) and while some very early posters tried to analyze the imagery, I suspect the very poor quality eventually discouraged most from seeing anything of interest. However, smattered throughout this discussion from the beginning to the end there have about four posts that describe seeing something where others have not. At least two of these were related to possible smoke but which were probably just the dust blown outwards by the wingtip vortices. Two others however have mentioned possible flames and puffs of smoke.

The video of course is very poor. There should be a special place in hell for people who subject us to looking at a video with continuous zooming in and out, inability to retain focus on the subject (it was just a CCTV monitor, not the actual aircraft they had to focus on) and constant camera shake. A video of a video, and then the resolution probably reduced for social media upload. This all results in a very unwatchable record of the aircrafts departure. The only immediate information gleaned seems to be some idea of how far down the runway the aircraft was at takeoff and the parabolic curve as it very clearly described the aircrafts flight path.




Air India Flight 171 on departure
But take a look at this frame. The right engine shows an artifact (pixelation if you like) that might represent a surge flame. I can almost see a puff of smoke just inboard of the aileron that may be associated with that too.

Am I just seeing distortion? Am I just seeing some smoke because that's where I would expect to see it?
We are all very used to seeing everything in 4K today but back in the day when everything was low res we used to join the dots. If pixels existed then something was there. If they didn't, it wasn't.
So if it's just pixels caused by distortion then they have coincidentally appeared in the tailpipe of an aircraft that crashed shortly after takeoff with a presumed double engine failure.

But surely we would see the birds? Well, not in this video. You cant even see the registration number on the side of the aircraft and that is much bigger than a bird. Haze, distortion, focus and low res, and each individual bird wouldn't even make up a pixel.

So make of this what you will, but this problem may have started on the ground. Birds strikes are very common according to Some AI pilots who interviewed for this following article but I have no idea of the authenticity of this report:

https://www.rediff.com/news/report/a...h/20250613.htm "The Air India pilots also added that Ahmedabad airport has long been known for bird activity near the runway, which could have contributed to the incident.

"This issue (of the excessive presence of birds) has been flagged multiple times," a third Air India pilot said, asking not to be named."
Of course, a single engine failure would not have brought this aircraft down, nor would it have deployed the RAT, but we can't see what happened on the left engine when the aircraft slipped behind the radio antenna building.

While these high bypass engines are designed and certified to keep running after experiencing certain types of bird strike, the effect on two engines concerns have been voiced about the contribution of certification to the mitigation of the risk hazardous bird strike in the two engine case.

This from Sky Library:
https://skybrary.aero/articles/aircr...nue%20to%20fly .

" A number of concerns have been quite widely voiced about the contribution of certification to the mitigation of the risk of hazardous bird strikes:

• The case of bird ingestion into more than one engine at the same time is not addressed directly and it is clearly extremely difficult to meaningfully estimate the probability of such an occurrence. However, it has been observed that, since some of the current standards only require that a damaged engine can be safely shut down, this circumstance should be more fully considered when determining the acceptable outcome of ingestion into single engines, especially for the twin engine case.
• It has been noted that the potential effects of bird strikes on modern electronic flight control systems and flight deck instrument displays have not yet been fully assessed.

Maybe someone can do some video enhancing of this image as others have done with the audio enhancement to give strong probability of RAT deployment.

If my suggestion can be corroborated at all, then the question of what happened next becomes somewhat easier to answer. Perhaps neither engine stopped running but they did so with limited thrust? If anything from the pilots mayday call can believed, it wasn't engines shut down..it was no thrust. So why did the RAT deploy? Cant answer that. And, I cant imagine it would be manually deployed if both engines were still running.
However, TDR did say.

"On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker."

Startle factor that electrically systems were about to fail? Manually deploy RAT?

Edit: I might add, they would have found remains on the runway if this did indeed happen. But we have heard anything from anybody?