Posts about: "RAT (Deployment)" [Posts: 396 Pages: 20]

I\x92ll reply to my own post in light of the RAT deployment. If true then this opens up to a lot more. And simply guessing with grainy video a fools game. All I saw was gear down to high Into the climb. This should not happen under any circumstance . Dual engine failure would explain the loss of lift obviously. Early flap retraction also. One would hope it\x92s not a simple as that: cheers

Speaking as a B787 Captain..... There is so much rubbish and stupid suggestion being written here.

This aircraft was airborne for a grand total of 22 seconds, half of which was climbing to no more than 150' aal.

- No Flaps? Due to the setup of the ECL it is physically impossible to go down the runway without some sort of take-off flap set. The T/o config warning would have been singing it's head off. Despite assertions to the contrary I have seen no video clear enough to detect a lack of flaps.

- RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long.
- Flaps up instead of gear? The B787 flaps are slow both in and out. Given that the 'Positive rate' call is not made the second the wheels leave the ground, a mis-selection of flaps up would not cause any loss of lift for at least 20 seconds, by which time they had already crashed. I believe the gear remained down not because of mis-selection but because of a major distraction on rotate.

Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain:

1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or....
2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft.

It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope.

I have to agree with everything here except your assertion about engine shutdown.
Even though these are big engines with plenty of inertia, when you select engine shut off they spool down very quickly if on load. IE, The generators, two per engine and hydraulic pumps, etc, being driven by the (relatively) small mass of the N2 rotor will drag the speed down very quickly, the gennies will trip offine in seconds, the pumps will quickly reduce flow and pressure.
As for what went wrong.
If the engines have stopped working there has to be a common failure mode, fuel is one but as has been said, no other aircraft has had a problem, as far as we know. FOD? It would have to be something major to shut down two GeNX engines and there would be debris all over the runway, we would know by now.
I have no idea if the RAT has deployed, I can't see it in the video and the noise could be something else.
We shall see.
There is compelling evidence that flaps are set correctly and not retracted inadvertently.
I await further evidence.
Edit to add. LAE 40 years, type rated on 737 to 787 with lots of others in between.

Sometimes complex sequences can have very simple causalities. A lot of complex speculation in this thread so far focused on highly technical things. Yet the basic fundamentals of powered flight have not changed (despite our attempts to do so) over the past 100 years.

1. As a general rule it is a bad idea to run out of either altitude or airspeed or both.
2. If you try to maintain altitude without sufficient thrust you will eventually run out of airspeed.
3. If you have sufficient thrust you can maintain your altitude at a given airspeed, and if you have excess thrust you can maintain your airspeed and increase your altitude. If you have lots of excess thrust you can increase your altitude and increase your airspeed.
4. If you try to increase your altitude by pitching the nose up, and without sufficient excess thrust, your speed will decay quickly, up to the point of stall, at which point you will lose any small amount of altitude you have gained and begin descending.

So…

Fact 1: The airplane stopped going up because it lacked excess thrust necessary to sustain the climb, and;

Fact 2: The airplane’s airspeed decreased constantly because they were trying to maintain either altitude or the climb, but lacked the thrust to do so, and;

Fact 3: If they had prematurely raised the flaps, the climb rate would have decreased/possibly turned negative, but the airplane would have continued to accelerate.

So where did the thrust go?

Fact 4: There is no adverse yaw seen in any of the videos, so wherever it went the loss of thrust occurred (nearly) simultaneously in both engines.

Fact 5: The only way to stop a jet engine from thrusting (sorry) is by either blowing it up or removing the fuel supply. If it blows up- like from birds trying to become a fuel source, there will be evidence. (See Jeju Air for a good example.)

Fact 6: There is (so far) no evidence of either engine blowing up. (I’m deliberately using highly technical terms here…)

Fact 7: There is unmistakably clear audible evidence of the RAT being deployed on the raw video from the right rear quarter of the airplane. Near supersonic propellor blades are an unmistakable sound- the RAT was definitively deployed no matter how much people want to argue to the contrary.

Fact 8: In the same video there is silence from the engines when they should be thundering at full (or nearly full) power. (Yes, I know that isn’t a thing- I am a simple man alas.)

Thus the only possible conclusions are (cringes as he waits for fdr to rip him a new ah):

1. The engines stopped burning, at nearly the same moment in time.
2. As a result, the airplane stopped climbing and also began to lose airspeed in an attempt to maintain altitude.
3. The RAT being deployed so quickly means that the ‘puters believed both engines were dead donks. (They were.)
4. If both engines ceased burning it meant the fuel supply was interrupted. We aren’t talking flight idle here- it was lights out for both.
5. (I am quoting someone else here) There is enough suction for the fuel to feed even if the fuel pumps are inop.
6. The engines stopped being provided with fuel. Because something physical was placed between the tanks and the burners. And they flamed out.

The $64,000 question here (remember when that was a lot of money??!!) is simply: What stopped both engines from getting fuel?

There are a very finite number of possibilities to that answer- and I do have my suspicions, but I lack the qualification to opine on that one.

I’ll leave the rest to the more experienced folk here.

Warm regards-

dce

I hesitate to chip in in these accident threads. Keep them clean. However, as as a few comments above brushes my audio expertise, I will comment.

A very simple audio analysis give me this:
The 3 segments horisontally, are of different videos of B787s passing overhead/landing. The vertical drop you see is the doppler effect.
In other words, these are spectrograms over time which makes these distinctions easier than a simple static spectrogram.
1. B787 landing with RAT extended.
2.Air india crash
3. B787 landing without RAT


It's a 5 minute laptop job, and it would look much prettier and clearer if I spent some time with it, (Gain to color match, and spectrally match to compensate for microphone placement and type),
but it is 85% conclusive even when done as simple as this IMO.
(I do have legal forensic audio experience)
The RAT was out judging from the audio evidence. You can see the the equally spaced overtones of the propelller match when passing overhead resulting in the Doppler effect, the difference in length of the doppler is caused by distance and the slightly varying frequencies shown in the starting point is caused by a difference in speed. But the harmonic content match.
In the 3rd segment you see none of these overtones at all.

There has been much discussion here about RAT deployment. Various claims either way have been made, based on individual perspectives of available video and audio.

I am very mindful of just how awful a tragedy this is, and have significant misgivings about disproportionate interest in others misfortune where it carries no purpose, but also recognise that for some people knowing and learning what happened ASAP could be very important, particularly given the present circumstances.

Thus while I sincerely hope that early detail from investigators will give some clarity, in an effort to reduce needless speculation regarding RAT deployment I have taken:

(1) an audio sample from the video of AI171 passing by in which people claim to hear a RAT
(2) an audio sample from a 787 video with RAT deployed on test by Boeing
(3) an audio sample from a JAL 787 video with RAT deployed

And passed these through a FFT in order to gain a more quantitative view of the noise spectra from each event.

A spectrogram of the results is presented below. I hesitate to make any conclusions per se, but observe that there are similarities as well as divergences between them. In all three samples there is a relatively consistent signal roughly centered in the range 113-146Hz that could be what gives the characteristic 'buzz' sound of (apparently) a RAT in operation.

JAL ~141Hz
Test ~146Hz
AI171 ~113-134Hz (prob doppler variation here)


Spectral comparison AI171, B787 with RAT, JAL 787 with RAT



Spectral comparison #2 AI171, B787 with RAT, JAL 787 with RAT


These frequencies seem consistent(ish) with what I got from this video [[url]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1r3CuRwjPc] in which a 787 RAT is being tested - albeit in this case the blades are hydraulically powered and not driven as a turbine. This test showed a fundamental frequency of 135Hz with relevant harmonics above (the second harmonic at 270Hz is higher SPL, no weighting):




It's important to note that the initial recordings are necessarily different; these are not controlled conditions, the recording equipment is probably quite diverse and almost certainly not ideal, and the environmental conditions will also be different. Moreover all of these audio samples have come from video files referenced here, one has no way of determining the provenance or veracity of these sources and, crucially, I have no prior experience of analysing/extracting RAT acoustic fingerprints (nor have I sampled 'control' audio of a 787 passing by /without/ RAT!).

Additionally it's been quite a long time since I did any work with [turbine] noise so given these and other variables I'm not prepared to make any declarations per se, but perhaps more knowledgeable people could. That said, my feeling from what I see is that RAT deployment is not dis proven, and that the apparent fundamental frequency difference between the samples may be explainable by - amongst other things - difference in a/c airspeed, bearing in mind that AI171 was on TO, the others were landing.

Ultimately what I've done here is extremely rudimentary and while it would be possible to go into much more depth I'd hope that more definitive answer would be forthcoming by then, however if anyone wants to discuss specific methodology etc off-line please PM, no wish to add to noise on this thread.

FP.

Just commenting on the earlier acoustic analyses of RAT deployment conducted by Kraftstoffvondesibel and myself.

Firstly it will be clear that we posted our respective audio analyses about the same time. There was no collaboration I assure you, and in fact I'd been waiting all day to see if someone else with more recent or pertinent experience than me would do something. When I hadn't seen anything I spent a little time and came up with what I did, however I think Kraftstoffvondesibel's work is probably more useful than mine given their specific plot methodology and that they included a non-RAT 'control' pass. I was in the process of acknowledging this when the thread was closed; late at night for me which is why this post is now some hours on.

At the time I posted I was fairly circumspect for the reasons given but, with the similarities between our results and along with some other detail that's come to light in PM, I am now more persuaded that the acoustic print we both observed is most likely to be from a RAT (although until this is confirmed a question must necessarily remain).

FWIW, and in part answer to a later post enquiring about the noise of a RAT dropping into position, this also aligns somewhat with the survivor's apparent observation of a noise ('bang'?) prior to impact, and an earlier post by DaveReidUK stating that RAT deployment results in a 'humungous' bang.

FP.

Further to the audio analysis of a deployed RAT; given an audio print, known noise source [RAT] frequency, location of a receiver and relative location + direction of moving object, and using the principles of doppler effect etc, it should be possible to calculate [ground]speed of a passing aircraft.

Thus, having been informed that the source frequency of a RAT is 145Hz (thank you that person - please ID yourself if you wish), and with regard to the [assumed] RAT acoustic print available for AI 171 we are close to being able to determine an approximate airspeed during descent (given the video from which we get this acoustic data appears to start during the descent).

There are several variables in play here that we don't know exactly (the positions of observer and aircraft, height agl of observer and aircraft etc), and some I will ignore for the moment (effect of air temperature/pressure for example) but if one makes an educated assessment from the visual cues in the video I calculate an initial relative airspeed of circa 120kn. Necessarily this is an extremely rough number, in fact the range (making various positional assumptions etc) appears to be between ~100kn to ~150kn, but if it turned out be either side of this I wouldn't be completely surprised.

As with the initial audio analysis to determine whether a RAT was deployed or not I offer this for those to whom this sort of data may be important. Not sure if it's of any real use or not, and I wouldn't hang your hat on it, but here it is in case it assists. Should it matter I expect some sort of corroboration could be obtained by making an assessment of vertical speed from the variously available videos and extrapolating from there.

My previous caveats over veracity of source data etc remain.

FP.

As one of the two authors who have offered an acoustic analysis of the AI 171 'RAT' video here I feel obliged to make some observations.

First of all Kraftstoffvondesibel and I did our work completely without knowledge of each other. We reached the same conclusions more or less, most likely using different software (I used four different methodologies) and in subsequent discussions between us we've found our specific results (frequency etc) match very closely - including the doppler shift that we've also both commented on.

While this doesn't absolutely prove the RAT scenario (I was, at least initially, somewhat more circumspect on this matter as anyone reading my first post would find) it does go some distance towards reconciling our respective methodologies and outcomes. Given the confluence and discussion I am now more satisfied that the RAT was deployed than I was before - although for the reasons espoused earlier I totally recognise the [scientific] challenges to this view.

In this regard I too would not 'mind' if our view regarding RAT deployment were proven incorrect. What Kraftstoffvondesibel and I have done is simply use a little science and apply a quantitative analysis to the available data that many had qualitatively argued over. One might hope that, amongst other things, it could have dispelled the RAT/no RAT question to some degree and reduce thread noise, but unfortunately it seems some haven't read the thread through, or perhaps lack analytical reasoning.

This site isn't the place for a full academic paper+peer review and for me the real subject of this thread is the tragedy of AI 171 and what might determinable from what we know in the hope it will be useful to those closer to the coal face. If you are a physicist, scientist or engineer and have the capability then the same data we used is also available to you to do your own analysis. Should you do so we'd welcome hearing the outcome - whether it concurs with our results or not - as this is the scientific way. If you want to include the full nitty-gritty detail of how you've gone about then for a very small percentage of us that might be interesting, but it'd be peripheral to the main issue - and bear in mind that RAT deployment itself is merely an indicator of other potentially more serious issues. It is not likely to be the cause per se !

To conclude, I understand it's a long thread but as far as the RAT question is concerned, I'd encourage you to read the relevant posts at least and if you remain unconvinced, and you have the skills, then why not conduct your own analysis and let us know the results? Otherwise perhaps as a group we could move on from this, remembering that this is a terrible event which at the very least deserves informed useful discussion rather than wild and/or repetitive speculation.

FP.

As is often the case "confirmation bias" is probably why he keeps trying to do the "reversion to authority" thing.
He has some other theory, and nothing to back it up, so continues to claim he can't see the obvious pattern in the data.
It's irrelevant, because there's really NO evidence to the contrary.
And by now, there's now FOUR solid pieces of evidence that the RAT deployed, so your analysis appears to be correct.
This includes the other "ballistic" analysis of the ascension, and subsequent descent, curve-- which indicates an approximately 100% loss of thrust from both engines.
In such a scenario, the RAT automatically deploys. Audio, visual, witness and classical physics all support the conclusion that, more likely than not, the RAT deployed.

The larger mystery, obviously, is the sight line through the swiss cheese that caused the chain of events resulting of Loss Of Thrust. We should hear the Preliminary within a month or so.

I've ground tested countless RAT's on 757/767's over many years....

Having just watched (or more importantly listened to) the latest video by Captain Steeeve on YT, I'm fully confident the deployed RAT can be heard

Not trying to be a smart ass, but how do you "ground test" a RAT?

I was not aware that we have granular ADS-B data from the a/c itself showing airspeed post rotation (rather than speed interpolated from GPS). Apologies if I have missed it. If it does show acceleration after takeoff I tend to agree with you.

In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread:

If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground.

As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems.

Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not).

Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact.

In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms.

In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known.

Thank you to the mods for an excellent job.

If you read the thread, you would know:

The RAT was almost certainly deployed. 4 different sources.
The Flaps were not retracted. Visible at the accident site plus many other sources agreeing they were indeed down.
APU will autostart when all engine power is lost. Potentially explaining why the inlet door was open or partially open at the accident site. Mentioned in several previous posts
On a 787-8, the main bogies tilt as the 1st action of the gear retract sequence. As stated in previous posts. I don't think this happens unless gear is selected up. So the conclusion was, gear was selected up. One caveat, IIRC, there was some discussion around a failure could have caused the bogies to tilt without Gear up being selected but I don't recall the outcome.
As for the Air France remark, un-necessary IMHO. Let's respect the crews please.

I'd like to mention something that, while unrelated, does shed a bit of light on how computerised systems can misinterpret input data and take the wrong action. I spent 40 odd years as an electronics engineer involving complex systems, it can be surprising just how careful one must be in systems that sample data and then process it for decision making in software.

On August 9th 2019, there was a significant grid failure in the UK leading to load shedding (removing supply to many consumers, including Newcastle Airport) which started when a series of several lightning strikes in Hertfordshire caused a trip out of generators at Little Barford combined-cycle gas turbine generation plant. This was followed by the shut down of the power concentrator and grid connector from the Hornsea1 off-shore wind farm, significant changes in the grid frequency away from the acceptable limits which is what triggered further load shedding.

The reason I mention it is that Hornsea1 going off line was due to the software that operated the concentrator/connector sensing large voltage transients due to the lightning strikes 120 miles away, however these transients were only of the order of 10us length spikes with nominal 20ms cycles at 50Hz on the grid. In old reliable grid equipment that had been in use for decades such spikes would have been ignored because the large rotating machine inertia would make them irrelevant. Other systems went into various states of shut down for protection reasons, some of the Siemens Class 700 trains had to be reset by the train crew, others required a Siemens engineer to drive to each train and reload its firmware. The train protection mode occurred because the grid frequency on the 25kV AC supply went below 49.8Hz, this was a programmed default and it turned out to have been a very conservative one, the trains could have continued to operate normally at even lower frequencies but someone decided to write the programs without actually testing what a sensible limit was. The whole very widespread problems this caused could have been avoided by not acting instantly on microsecond transients in a 50Hz system.

Is it possible that the monitoring systems on a Boeing 787 also sample the electrical system voltages and currents at a relatively high frequency, and thus in the event of a transient of some type perhaps over-react to this event by taking precipitate action instead of waiting a short time before re-sampling again. I have seen a suggestion that an alternative explanation for the "bang" heard by the survivor in seat 11A might have been the sound of a Bus Tie Contactor closing, which in itself suggests something quite important relating to the electrical system. The 787 is unusual in that it uses variable frequency AC generators whose outputs are rectified and then inverted to other AC voltages and also quite high DC voltages, some in the 250-300V region.

I hope that some hard information is going to come out from the investigators soon, but given that the flap mis-selection idea is effectively debunked and we know that the main undercarriage either started its retraction cycle with bogies tilting forwards or that falling hydraulic pressure caused the same thing to happen, then the only thing that fits the observed flight path is loss of thrust on both engines which could have either preceded or followed an electrical failure. We also know that the RAT deployed and in the relatively undamaged tail cone the APU inlet was open or opening indicating a likely auto-start of the APU due to the parameters to trigger that occurring.

I would like to know how many tests of the electrical/computer interactions in 787 development involved arcing/shorting voltage/current transient testing. Is this the sort of thing that is done at all? The EECs (FADECs) in the engines are self-powered via magnetos and self-controlling in many circumstances, but perhaps something caused them to think that the thrust levers had been retarded, and such a thing might have been down to the effect of electrical transients on the various signals received by the EECs.

I have read the original 65+ pages of the thread, but I have not seen any discussion of this particular idea. Maybe that is because the 787 is quite a significant departure from Boeing's previous design practices with totally different electrical systems, higher pressure hydraulics and no doubt other aspects as well.

What do you all think?

I previously speculated the forward truck tilt was proof the gear had been selected UP and the retraction sequence was interrupted.

I’m not so sure now and believe there is a different conclusion from this non-normal gear position.

In normal retraction sequence the gear doors open almost instantaneously after the forward truck tilt. It does seem coincidental the tilt was completed while no indication of the doors opening is visible on the rooftop video, which would suggest hydraulic failure at that exact moment; this precise timing of interruption in the retraction sequence feels unlikely. So is there a more likely answer for the forward truck tilt that does not involve movement of the gear lever?

I suspect it’s more likely that C hydraulics lost power prior to rotation, as a consequence the truck could not tilt rearward during rotation as it normally should. Therefore it’s probable it always stayed in a neutral or forward tilt position from the take off run until we see it in the rooftop video. If the gear was behaving normally, and the crew had omitted to retract, it should be hanging rearwards. Watch any 787-8 takeoff video and you can see at rotation all 4 main wheels stay on the runway as the aircraft rotates. Just after wheels up they tilt rearwards. It’s a very subtle position change.

If the gear was always in a neutral or forward truck tilt position then this undermines the theory that retraction sequence was interrupted. It insinuates the C hydraulic and electrical failure happened prior to main wheels lift off.

For this reason I believe we cannot assume that gear UP was selected nor that retraction was interrupted. I’m seeing lots of social media posts which suggest the forward tilt means gear was in retraction and I don’t believe it was now.

I think the truck tilt position is key to understanding the timeline of system failures and whether the automatic RAT deployment was triggered by power failures or engine(s) failure. The question remains, did loss of center hydraulics happen before or after loss of thrust?

Thanks as always TDR for your excellent professional input. It is therefore so much more perplexing that even you cant logic our way out of this impasse. That is, the assumption that the aircraft experienced a double engine failure (supported by a reasonably convincing argument that the RAT deployed), and yet no plausible reason (that we can see) for such an event. So some then collectively slip into the tired and lazy theories of intentional or unintentional crew actions that 1. beggar belief (intentional), 2. defy physics (flaps instead of gear despite clear evidence to the contrary) and call into question the professionalism of a very experienced Captain and crew as well as the aircraft manufacturer (because...well its Boeing so it must be software ).

Yet, the answer must be simpler and staring us in the face since logic and experience (everything you have offered TDR), tell us that modern airliner engines generally do not just suddenly quit flying at the same time. In this regard we can recall several instances of double engine failure associated with bird strikes generally involving large birds or large flocks or both. But it seems we have discounted this theory very early in discussion. Why? Because we cant see any birds, or flocks of birds or engine flames/surges or puffs of smokes from the engines which would support this. Really?

I have read all the 100's of posts (sadly) and while some very early posters tried to analyze the imagery, I suspect the very poor quality eventually discouraged most from seeing anything of interest. However, smattered throughout this discussion from the beginning to the end there have about four posts that describe seeing something where others have not. At least two of these were related to possible smoke but which were probably just the dust blown outwards by the wingtip vortices. Two others however have mentioned possible flames and puffs of smoke.

The video of course is very poor. There should be a special place in hell for people who subject us to looking at a video with continuous zooming in and out, inability to retain focus on the subject (it was just a CCTV monitor, not the actual aircraft they had to focus on) and constant camera shake. A video of a video, and then the resolution probably reduced for social media upload. This all results in a very unwatchable record of the aircrafts departure. The only immediate information gleaned seems to be some idea of how far down the runway the aircraft was at takeoff and the parabolic curve as it very clearly described the aircrafts flight path.




Air India Flight 171 on departure
But take a look at this frame. The right engine shows an artifact (pixelation if you like) that might represent a surge flame. I can almost see a puff of smoke just inboard of the aileron that may be associated with that too.

Am I just seeing distortion? Am I just seeing some smoke because that's where I would expect to see it?
We are all very used to seeing everything in 4K today but back in the day when everything was low res we used to join the dots. If pixels existed then something was there. If they didn't, it wasn't.
So if it's just pixels caused by distortion then they have coincidentally appeared in the tailpipe of an aircraft that crashed shortly after takeoff with a presumed double engine failure.

But surely we would see the birds? Well, not in this video. You cant even see the registration number on the side of the aircraft and that is much bigger than a bird. Haze, distortion, focus and low res, and each individual bird wouldn't even make up a pixel.

So make of this what you will, but this problem may have started on the ground. Birds strikes are very common according to Some AI pilots who interviewed for this following article but I have no idea of the authenticity of this report:

https://www.rediff.com/news/report/a...h/20250613.htm "The Air India pilots also added that Ahmedabad airport has long been known for bird activity near the runway, which could have contributed to the incident.

"This issue (of the excessive presence of birds) has been flagged multiple times," a third Air India pilot said, asking not to be named."
Of course, a single engine failure would not have brought this aircraft down, nor would it have deployed the RAT, but we can't see what happened on the left engine when the aircraft slipped behind the radio antenna building.

While these high bypass engines are designed and certified to keep running after experiencing certain types of bird strike, the effect on two engines concerns have been voiced about the contribution of certification to the mitigation of the risk hazardous bird strike in the two engine case.

This from Sky Library:
https://skybrary.aero/articles/aircr...nue%20to%20fly .

" A number of concerns have been quite widely voiced about the contribution of certification to the mitigation of the risk of hazardous bird strikes:

• The case of bird ingestion into more than one engine at the same time is not addressed directly and it is clearly extremely difficult to meaningfully estimate the probability of such an occurrence. However, it has been observed that, since some of the current standards only require that a damaged engine can be safely shut down, this circumstance should be more fully considered when determining the acceptable outcome of ingestion into single engines, especially for the twin engine case.
• It has been noted that the potential effects of bird strikes on modern electronic flight control systems and flight deck instrument displays have not yet been fully assessed.

Maybe someone can do some video enhancing of this image as others have done with the audio enhancement to give strong probability of RAT deployment.

If my suggestion can be corroborated at all, then the question of what happened next becomes somewhat easier to answer. Perhaps neither engine stopped running but they did so with limited thrust? If anything from the pilots mayday call can believed, it wasn't engines shut down..it was no thrust. So why did the RAT deploy? Cant answer that. And, I cant imagine it would be manually deployed if both engines were still running.
However, TDR did say.

"On the 767 and 747-400, when you shutdown an engine and the IDG goes offline, there is a momentary 'glitch' in the electrical power system as it reconfigures for the available power source - this is why you see the flight deck displays flicker and return, and the cabin lights momentarily flicker."

Startle factor that electrically systems were about to fail? Manually deploy RAT?

Edit: I might add, they would have found remains on the runway if this did indeed happen. But we have heard anything from anybody?

I originally was onboard with the truck tilt seen in the one video being proof that the gear handle was selected rather than the flap handle. But after watching several videos and an "endless" web search for info, I also have started to think that there was a problem before the gear handle was moved.

In a normal retraction, the main gear doors begin to open before the truck tilt is complete (roughly when the gear trucks are "level", seen around 8-10 second marks of this video ). The nose gear doors open at the same time the main gear tilt starts (seen in Jetstar video linked below). It's too blurry in the video/stills of the accident aircraft to definitively say the nose doors are not open, but I'd say no. And it's pretty much a certainty that the main gear doors are not open. And finally I think it is also pretty clear that the main gear trucks are tilted down to the retract position.

I have no confirmation of this, but I read (or heard someone say in a video) that the truck tilt actuator was a "single acting" actuator, meaning hydraulic pressure held it in the toe up position and it was spring loaded to the retract position. Which means if hydraulic pressure was lost due to loss of power to the electric driven center hydraulic system, then the main gear trucks would tilt forward on their own without moving the gear handle. The Jetstar burst tire video somewhat backs this up, in that the blown tire caused a leak to the center hydraulic system and an alternate extension was required (thus the reason the main doors are down during the landing). No hydraulic pressure means the main gear trucks remained pointing nose down during the landing. Video here

WHEN something catastrophic happens, like dual engine failure, that then creates a query about any "duality" between two standalone systems that really should have nothing whatsoever in common... except the PF.
Nothing in common? Is that really the case for the 787-8 in the Air India 787 crash?
Look at these three TCMA-related links in the order presented and note the proforma prescriptive caveats in the first two:

https://downloads.regulations.gov/FA...tachment_1.pdf
https://downloads.regulations.gov/FA...tachment_1.pdf
https://patents.google.com/patent/US6704630B2/en

TCMA is designed to detect and accommodate single failures within the EEC/FADEC, preventing a failure from jeopardizing the safe operation of the aircraft.
Implementation:
It involves implementing specific software changes within the engine's control system (EEC).
Regulation:
After some incidents, the design change was mandated by regulators, with a deadline for production aircraft by December 31, 2018, and a retrofit plan for existing aircraft.
Boeing 787 Application:
The TCMA feature is specifically relevant to the 787-8 equipped with GEnx-1B engines, but it may also be applicable to other 787 variants using the same engine type.

The first two links are respectively the request for and FAA affirmation/approval for a GENx-1b software system called TCMA (Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation). TCMA is the system that precludes High Uncommanded Thrust (HUT) after touchdown by fuel-chopping the engines. It is designed to avoid runway departures. One input is power-lever position. It's then fair to say that (additionally) Air/Ground sensing is quintessentially vital (as to when the system is "armed" and can do this fuel-chop). The third link is the complex description (with diagrams) of the patent application's design functionality of TCMA.
FROM THE 3rd link above:
"​​​​​​The method of the present invention compares the engine's actual power level with a threshold contour defined by the TCMA software package. When the TCMA software package determines that a thrust control malfunction has occurred, based on the engine's power level exceeding the threshold contour, the engine is shut down by the TCMA circuit." It is also notable that it says within the 3rd link that "Typically the aircraft is allowed to operate for a limited period of time with just a single operative processing subsystem."
That Air India 787 was not long out of maintenance.
We are then motivated to ask "what dictates the Air/Ground sensing". Is it just a Weight-on-Wheels microswitch or a RADAlt? (or both? or triplicated micro-switches?). We may then ask: "Did Air India implement the post-5G changes to their RADAlts that concentrated on maintaining their auto-land capability (in the face of 5G interference with RADAlts?) I seem to recall that the FAA's dictums on this pointed out that it was an individual nation's responsibility to both control their 5G frequency spectrums and implement changes to Radar altimeters that would work interference-free in critical phases of flight. What has the Indian regulator done in this regard as the responsible entity? The whole shemozzle, starting with the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum allocations, was an ongoing fight between the telecom giants and their getting their new mobile tech to market.

So where are we going with this line of causal reasoning? The only commonality/duality between left and right engines is the software driving the TCMA as monitored by the TCMA software incorporated in each engine's EEC. Most pundits have identified the gear-tilt as evidence that only the centre electrically-driven pump can do the gear-tilt if the engines' other two hyd systems are suddenly both in QUIT mode (which accords also with the instant RAT deployment and loud noise heard by the sole survivor) - and an ensuing transition from climb-out to a deadly sinking and commensurate attitude change for speed maint.
My unavoidable conclusion is that the selection of gear UP and the breaking of the gear downlocks (and WOW sensing and energization of the RADALTs) called upon the TCMA to fuel-chop the engines (via the TCMA functionality in each engine's EEC).
We could start by looking at the No Break Power Transfer (NBPT) tech used in modern airliners. This has led to Gen Control Panel meltdowns in 777's due to GEN contact meltdown. I know of one instance when a 773 was reduced to a RAT only landing enroute and another where a disastrous MEC fire occurred after start on pushback at LHR. A description of the systems glitch often experienced is at the following link. It's quite apparently a "gear-up" hiccup with potential damning consequences for smooth TCMA operation. As to be seen in the quality videos, a fuel-chop provides no real clue (such as engine failure/smoke/fire classically does). An uncommanded "reset" of the two engine's TCMA's upon gear retraction (link below) is trackable to be the sought after "duality" leading to a "both simultaneously quit" engine failure. These momentary electrical glitches and instant "resets" are described in the two links below. Food for reasoned thought?

https://tinyurl.com/yn5ce4tz

https://tinyurl.com/3kkh6n3d

One comment here, and maybe I am mis-understanding your comment, but the landing gear only operates via the center hydraulics. It does not matter whether the Left/Right engine driven hydraulic systems are operative or not. The RAT will only pressurize the primary flight control portion of the center hydraulics.
No idea. I only got that info from the Master MEL on the FAA website. According to the MMEL the aircraft can be dispatched as long as there is one of each type sensor working on each main gear. (AIs MEL could be more restrictive)