June 21, 2025, 15:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11907854
Resubmitting following some Mod Feedback and a significant re-write. Yes, it is speculative
I have a theory that I'd like to share. It brings together various pieces of known information, along with 30+ years of my experience as an aircraft engineer that forms a plausible (IMO) explanation of what may have happened.
We Know - From the Video's and the ADSB Data:
That up to and for the first few seconds after take-off appears relatively normal.
The AC appears to lose thrust without e.g. birdstrike or other spectacular smoke /fire producing event.
That the RAT deployed.
That the pilot reported 'Thrust not achieved'
We can see that the AC had a relatively busy schedule in the few days prior to the accident flight, so there was no significant downtime for maintenance activities that could have caused incident.
The AC flew DEL-CDG on 11 Jun with quite a racy turnaround in CDG of 1h12m. The centre tank would have been empty at CDG on arrival, and would have been partially filled for the return CDG-DEL.
CDG-DEL Arrived 01:47 am IST. Again the Centre Tank would have been empty. But quite a bit of fuel in the wings.
8 Hrs later, at 09:48 am IST the AC departed DEL-AMD. For such a short-hop, Fuel upload would have been minimal, merely a 'topping up' if at all. Certainly nothing into the Centre Tank.
DEL That night was fairly hot and humid - 57% at 02:30, 54% at 05:30, 44% at 08:30. That wing tank fuel could have picked up a fair amount of water.
The flight DEL-AMD would have only used the wing pumps. Thus any water in that 'overnight' fuel would have been vigorously stirred and evenly suspended. At concentrations that would cause no ill-effect at all.
The AC was on the ground at AMD for 2 Hrs, from 11:17am to 1:17 pm IST. The AC would have re-fuelled, first filling up the wing tanks to the top, then filling the centre-tank to whatever quantity necessary. There was enough time for water in the wing tanks to settle out.
The B787 Fuel system has pumps in the wing tanks, and pumps in the centre tanks. The Centre Tank pumps are also known as 'override' pumps because they output a higher pressure than the wing tank pumps, thus ensuring that with all pumps running, the centre tank fuel is used first.
Should the centre tank pumps stop, due to either filure or running out of fuel to pump, the wing tank pumps then produce the pressure.
In the event that all pumps stop running (e.g. an electrical failure), the engines will suck the fuel from the wing tanks. The 'sucked' fuel comes from a dedicated pipe in each tank through the 'Suction Feed Check Valve' (so that pumped fuel doesn't just exit through the suction tube). The suction tube pickup is in a slightly different position to the wing pump pickups.
It is conceivable to me that the suction tube pickup could have been immersed in water, settled out from the fuel in the wing tanks.
Then - at start-up of the aircraft in AMD, The engines would have been supplied with fuel from the centre tank. Fresh Fuel. All OK. Wing pumps running and doing not much. But, I speculate, the suction pick-ups immersed in water. Waiting.
Start up and taxi out was all normal. Runway acceleration up to v1 appears normal. V1 - Rotate - (positive rate - Gear up? - Not my debate).
But somewhere around that time, I speculate that a significant electrical failure occurred. Enough for the RAT to deploy. Enough for the fuel pumps to stop. I'll not speculate on the cause. We know that it can occur, that's why the RAT was designed to operate.
The engines at that point were at TOGA thrust. In a significant electrical failure, the engines will keep on doing what they were last told. Keep that thrust stable. So the AC climbed for a few seconds more. The pilots did what they were trained to do for a power failure, manage that, thankfully the engines were still going well...
But there was only so much 'good' fuel in the lines. The engines sucking fuel themselves, the fuel would now be coming from the suction pickups, a different supply. A supply likely heavily water contaminated. It would take a few seconds for that contaminated fuel to actually reach the engines, but when that contaminated fuel hit, Thrust would have been significantly reduced. The EEC's would have been doing their best to maintain the thrust, firewalling the throttles would probably have little effect at that exact moment. The engines would have likely worked through that bad fuel in a shortish period of time, but a period of time that our crew did not have. A fully loaded aircraft producing less than take-off thrust, is not sustaining enough thrust for continued flight. The rest - is down to the skill of the crew in deciding exactly where to hit the ground within the very narrow range of choice they had.
I have a theory that I'd like to share. It brings together various pieces of known information, along with 30+ years of my experience as an aircraft engineer that forms a plausible (IMO) explanation of what may have happened.
We Know - From the Video's and the ADSB Data:
That up to and for the first few seconds after take-off appears relatively normal.
The AC appears to lose thrust without e.g. birdstrike or other spectacular smoke /fire producing event.
That the RAT deployed.
That the pilot reported 'Thrust not achieved'
We can see that the AC had a relatively busy schedule in the few days prior to the accident flight, so there was no significant downtime for maintenance activities that could have caused incident.
The AC flew DEL-CDG on 11 Jun with quite a racy turnaround in CDG of 1h12m. The centre tank would have been empty at CDG on arrival, and would have been partially filled for the return CDG-DEL.
CDG-DEL Arrived 01:47 am IST. Again the Centre Tank would have been empty. But quite a bit of fuel in the wings.
8 Hrs later, at 09:48 am IST the AC departed DEL-AMD. For such a short-hop, Fuel upload would have been minimal, merely a 'topping up' if at all. Certainly nothing into the Centre Tank.
DEL That night was fairly hot and humid - 57% at 02:30, 54% at 05:30, 44% at 08:30. That wing tank fuel could have picked up a fair amount of water.
The flight DEL-AMD would have only used the wing pumps. Thus any water in that 'overnight' fuel would have been vigorously stirred and evenly suspended. At concentrations that would cause no ill-effect at all.
The AC was on the ground at AMD for 2 Hrs, from 11:17am to 1:17 pm IST. The AC would have re-fuelled, first filling up the wing tanks to the top, then filling the centre-tank to whatever quantity necessary. There was enough time for water in the wing tanks to settle out.
The B787 Fuel system has pumps in the wing tanks, and pumps in the centre tanks. The Centre Tank pumps are also known as 'override' pumps because they output a higher pressure than the wing tank pumps, thus ensuring that with all pumps running, the centre tank fuel is used first.
Should the centre tank pumps stop, due to either filure or running out of fuel to pump, the wing tank pumps then produce the pressure.
In the event that all pumps stop running (e.g. an electrical failure), the engines will suck the fuel from the wing tanks. The 'sucked' fuel comes from a dedicated pipe in each tank through the 'Suction Feed Check Valve' (so that pumped fuel doesn't just exit through the suction tube). The suction tube pickup is in a slightly different position to the wing pump pickups.
It is conceivable to me that the suction tube pickup could have been immersed in water, settled out from the fuel in the wing tanks.
Then - at start-up of the aircraft in AMD, The engines would have been supplied with fuel from the centre tank. Fresh Fuel. All OK. Wing pumps running and doing not much. But, I speculate, the suction pick-ups immersed in water. Waiting.
Start up and taxi out was all normal. Runway acceleration up to v1 appears normal. V1 - Rotate - (positive rate - Gear up? - Not my debate).
But somewhere around that time, I speculate that a significant electrical failure occurred. Enough for the RAT to deploy. Enough for the fuel pumps to stop. I'll not speculate on the cause. We know that it can occur, that's why the RAT was designed to operate.
The engines at that point were at TOGA thrust. In a significant electrical failure, the engines will keep on doing what they were last told. Keep that thrust stable. So the AC climbed for a few seconds more. The pilots did what they were trained to do for a power failure, manage that, thankfully the engines were still going well...
But there was only so much 'good' fuel in the lines. The engines sucking fuel themselves, the fuel would now be coming from the suction pickups, a different supply. A supply likely heavily water contaminated. It would take a few seconds for that contaminated fuel to actually reach the engines, but when that contaminated fuel hit, Thrust would have been significantly reduced. The EEC's would have been doing their best to maintain the thrust, firewalling the throttles would probably have little effect at that exact moment. The engines would have likely worked through that bad fuel in a shortish period of time, but a period of time that our crew did not have. A fully loaded aircraft producing less than take-off thrust, is not sustaining enough thrust for continued flight. The rest - is down to the skill of the crew in deciding exactly where to hit the ground within the very narrow range of choice they had.
June 22, 2025, 00:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11908173
I don't want to refute your theory, but given your 30 years of experience---presuming it is relevant--I'd ask you to clarify a few things.
First, water in fuel is not a novel concept and I would presume that the designers of the 787 knew about it. You've simply stated that water might collect and settle out, but how much water might you expect under those conditions (57% humidity doesn't seem terribly high to me) and what features and procedures are already there to mitigage water contamination issues? Your theory would imply that there basically aren't any. IDK how the tank venting system works, but the idea that some huge amount of water could have condensed in the tank from the outside seems preposterous.
Second, how much water do you think it would take to cause a sustained flameout in one of those engines? Remember that they have automatic continous relight, so you're going to have to sustain your flame suppression long enough for them to wind down completely. I think those engines were probably using something like 2 gallons per second of fuel along with 250lbs of air heated to over 1100F. Any fuel in the mix would burn and the water would be converted to steam so you'd need mostly water for a long time. So if you think a hundred gallons of water could have gotten into each tank then perhaps I'd buy your theory--which, btw, does fit the known facts pretty well. But I think that short of some woeful neglect, Boeing and AI already know about and have methods of dealing with water contamination. At least I hope so.
First, water in fuel is not a novel concept and I would presume that the designers of the 787 knew about it. You've simply stated that water might collect and settle out, but how much water might you expect under those conditions (57% humidity doesn't seem terribly high to me) and what features and procedures are already there to mitigage water contamination issues? Your theory would imply that there basically aren't any. IDK how the tank venting system works, but the idea that some huge amount of water could have condensed in the tank from the outside seems preposterous.
Second, how much water do you think it would take to cause a sustained flameout in one of those engines? Remember that they have automatic continous relight, so you're going to have to sustain your flame suppression long enough for them to wind down completely. I think those engines were probably using something like 2 gallons per second of fuel along with 250lbs of air heated to over 1100F. Any fuel in the mix would burn and the water would be converted to steam so you'd need mostly water for a long time. So if you think a hundred gallons of water could have gotten into each tank then perhaps I'd buy your theory--which, btw, does fit the known facts pretty well. But I think that short of some woeful neglect, Boeing and AI already know about and have methods of dealing with water contamination. At least I hope so.
Experience. Without wishing to dox myself, I've worked in engineering at a major airline from apprentice through (in no particular order) Line Maintenance, Heavy and Light Maintenance, to technical support and maintenance control on both Boeing and Airbus products, with various qualifications and authorisations along the way. [Hmm - Scrap this sentence?]On the day 9/11 occurred, I should have been making modifications inside a fuel tank instead of staring at the TV with mouth on the floor.
However, I would describe my experience as broad, yet shallow in respect to this incident. Some of my fleet I know every rivet. Some of my fleet I've only ever seen from a distance. I don't touch airplanes for a living any more. B787 though - is not my area of specialty. I'll dig in, but am not the expert. I am not a systems design engineer, so precise numbers and flow rates, are not what I do. But what the systems do, how they operate, what they look like, smell and taste like... yeah, I'm not a muggle. And I do have access to all the manuals and know how to use them. And - let me be clear, I am speculating. I was advancing a theory. It WILL be some flavour of wrong. The investigation will reveal all.
I Agree, Water in fuel is not a novel concept. Aircraft fuel tanks attract water - fact. How much? It varies. I've sumped tanks and got no water, I've seen drops of water beading about in the bottom of a gallon jug, I've seen gallons of water. I've been so covered in fuel I cant smell it or think straight and taken gallon after gallon not being able to tell if its fuel or water. I also agree that 57% humidity doesn't seem particularly high - its not south east Asian jungle levels - but I'm not an expert at humidity, 32Deg c at 57% humidity at 02:30 am is not going to be comfortable for me though. I looked at recent weather in DEL, and those values were at the higher end of the range.
Further, I believe the prevailing weather conditions on the ground are less important when it comes to the volume of water getting in. Fuel is cold, or gets damn cold during a 9 Hr flight. Fuel Temperature Management is an issue for our Drivers. So as the fuel is used at altitude, Air enters the tank through NACA Ducts in the outboard end of the wing. Its beneficial to maintain a slight positive pressure, amongst other things to reduce evaporation. (Added complication, there is also the Nitrogen Enrichment system due to TWA800 - but that's more about processing the air in the tank to change the properties and make it non-explosive). Then as the aircraft descends, more air enters as the air pressure increases. Its the humidity of that air in the descent that is going to determine the volume of water entering the tank and potentially the fuel. The water in the air condenses on the sides of the tank because of the cold post-flight fuel. It doesn't dissolve into the fuel, but sinks to the bottom. Ground temperature / humidity and time will likely affect how much water condenses out of that air while on the ground. There won't be a huge amount of air exchange on the ground. Likely if the AC landed at 2am, then from sunrise as the tank warmed up, there would actually be a flow out of the vents.
What Features and procedures are there to mitigate Water? I apologise if my post gave the impression that there are no mitigation processes. There are. Water is well understood in the industry.
Well for a start, Features / Design. The Aircraft has a water scavenge system. Water doesn't mix with fuel, it sinks to the bottom being about 20% denser than fuel, so at the very lowest point in the tank, the water scavenge system (Powered by the Aft Fuel Pump through a jet pump, a venturi like system) will suck up the 'fluid' at the very lowest point, where the water would collect and in Boeings words 'drip' that fluid into the path of the pump pickup inlet (but I'd describe it more as a 'squirt'). The idea being that a small amount of water injected into the fuel will be consumed by the engines harmlessly.
There is also agitation. The wing tank pumps are pretty much running constantly, from before engine startup to after engine shutdown. The pumps are quite violent to the fuel and supply more pressure then the engine could ever need. Any excess pressure is dumped right back into the tank, quite close to the pump, in a direction that would further stir up the fuel and help break up any water into suspended droplets.
This all works if there is a small amount of water in the fuel. The water scavenge pickup is right next to the pump inlet, but a bit lower. Little bits of water get managed. Looking at the pictures of the system, I'd say a couple of gallons of water would do no harm at all.
But if there was significantly more water in that tank. Guessing 10-30 + gallons, then the pump would be circulating water, or highly water rich fuel.
Then there's the suction pickup. Its in the same 'bay' as the aft fuel pump and located a little 'higher' than the pump inlet and water scavenge inlet. But also located between stringers that can separate out the settled water ( I wish I could share the pictures, but more than my job is worth ) I can imagine the suction pickup being in a pool of 'stagnant' water.
I also saw a post from Metcha about the scavenge system blocking with Algae - I don't know about that (B787 not my fleet). But possible that could aggravate things. There's also the reports of the Indian AAIB looking at the Titan Biocide incident. Its possible that might be related and could modify the theory.
Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury. Except when there's more. Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.
Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector. But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time. Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.
How much water would cause a sustained flameout? I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling. I think the engines were running, albeit badly. Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow. I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high perrcentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?
There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.
The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure. That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.
Ive written enough and am tired. Must stop now.
June 22, 2025, 00:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11908191
Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury.
Except when there's more.
Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.
Except when there's more.
Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.
Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector.
But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time.
Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.
How much water would cause a sustained flameout?
I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling.
I think the engines were running, albeit badly.
Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow.
I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high percentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?
There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.
The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure.
That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector.
But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time.
Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.
How much water would cause a sustained flameout?
I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling.
I think the engines were running, albeit badly.
Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow.
I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high percentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?
There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.
The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure.
That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.
Not sure if you are right, and not familiar enough with 787 to check the fuel flow logic, but a friend of mine dead-sticked a single engine trainer into a field due to water in the fuel ... 20 minutes after takeoff.
It could have happened earlier.
June 29, 2025, 08:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11912883
NYT illustrated the story, drawing the same conclusions as this thread so far:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...ash-cause.html
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...ash-cause.html
June 29, 2025, 21:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913248
Its possible that the RAT was deployed for other reasons, prior to the engines losing thrust. So, leaving the RAT out of the equation for a bit, do we think there is a sound of engines TRYING to run?
June 29, 2025, 22:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913278
Thanks but I want to separate the RAT issue from the engines/thrust issue.
Its possible that the RAT was deployed for other reasons, prior to the engines losing thrust. So, leaving the RAT out of the equation for a bit, do we think there is a sound of engines TRYING to run?
Its possible that the RAT was deployed for other reasons, prior to the engines losing thrust. So, leaving the RAT out of the equation for a bit, do we think there is a sound of engines TRYING to run?
June 30, 2025, 15:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913688
Just read a report by Richard Godfrey on the climb and descent
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/a9hhz...ioijg&e=1&dl=0
Not knowledgeable to know about a lot of this myself but interested in views. His calculation asserts that it was not a dual engine flameout to cover the distance it did but there must have been at least some thrust provided to do so.
https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/a9hhz...ioijg&e=1&dl=0
Not knowledgeable to know about a lot of this myself but interested in views. His calculation asserts that it was not a dual engine flameout to cover the distance it did but there must have been at least some thrust provided to do so.
The determination of the height AGL seems quite incorrect - it completely ignores the local pressure and temperature, which very much need to be corrected for. Applying those corrections even using rough rules of thumb (~30 ft per mbar, ~4 feet per \xb0C per 1000 ft) gives a figure that's around ~100 feet AGL. The follow-up sanity check also fails even without knowing the correct math because if you match the ADS-B data (timestamp + location) to when & where the aircraft lifts off and starts to climb in the CCTV video (versus just assuming that the peak height seen in the video matches the last ADS-B data point), the aircraft is very much not 300 feet above the ground when its transponder reports an altitude of 625 feet.
Also the estimation of the glide ratio with flaps 5, gear and the RAT deployed being 3.5 to 1 seemed incredibly low to me, but I'm the first to admit that I have nowhere near as much knowledge of gliding performance as I do of weather math. So I looked up the closest incident I could think of: Air Transat 236, an A330-200 (so of a pretty similar shape, wingspan and wing area as a 787). According to the final report (link: https://www.fss.aero/accident-report...1-08-24-PT.pdf ), the aircraft arrived at a fix approximately 8 nautical miles (48609 ft) from the runway at an altitude of approximately 13000 ft, at which point the crew decided to execute a 360 turn to lose altitude as well as to extend the slats and landing gear during the turn (the RAT of course had already long been deployed at this point), both to prepare for landing and to help further lose altitude. Sure there's some rounding here, and my understanding is that "flaps 1" on Airbus aircraft deploys only leading edge and not trailing edge devices, but this already suggests that their expected glide ratio was significantly higher than the raw 48609:13000 ratio (~3.74:1).
They re-established themselves on final in their landing configuration at an altitude of ~8000 feet and a distance of 9 nautical miles (54685 ft), so let's say that the true distance was somewhere between 8 NM and 9 NM to account for rounding. That gives a glide ratio of between ~6:1 and ~6.83:1. But on top of that, the crew still had to execute a series of S-turns to lose enough altitude to actually make the runway, so their "dirty" glide ratio must have been even higher than that. Unfortunately I don't think it's possible to determine conclusively what the ratio was since we don't know how many track miles were added on by the turns (the flight data recorder stopped when the engines flamed out and human testimony only goes so far), and again they did not have flaps extended, but I think it's fair to say that a glide ratio of 3.5:1 is a wildly low estimate for an airliner of the 787's calibre even with the gear down.
Sorry if this is off-topic or too much rambling, but considering how much speculation there tends to be both in this thread and elsewhere about real-world glide performance (especially in non-ideal configurations), hopefully these details are helpful.
June 30, 2025, 18:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913841
Thanks but I want to separate the RAT issue from the engines/thrust issue.
Its possible that the RAT was deployed for other reasons, prior to the engines losing thrust. So, leaving the RAT out of the equation for a bit, do we think there is a sound of engines TRYING to run?
Its possible that the RAT was deployed for other reasons, prior to the engines losing thrust. So, leaving the RAT out of the equation for a bit, do we think there is a sound of engines TRYING to run?
June 30, 2025, 22:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913922
OK - Fair Challenges - good post, I'll have a go at answering and simultaneously expanding my own thoughts. In fact I'm not having a go at you, I'm more working my theory....
Experience. Without wishing to dox myself, I've worked in engineering at a major airline from apprentice through (in no particular order) Line Maintenance, Heavy and Light Maintenance, to technical support and maintenance control on both Boeing and Airbus products, with various qualifications and authorisations along the way. [Hmm - Scrap this sentence?]On the day 9/11 occurred, I should have been making modifications inside a fuel tank instead of staring at the TV with mouth on the floor.
However, I would describe my experience as broad, yet shallow in respect to this incident. Some of my fleet I know every rivet. Some of my fleet I've only ever seen from a distance. I don't touch airplanes for a living any more. B787 though - is not my area of specialty. I'll dig in, but am not the expert. I am not a systems design engineer, so precise numbers and flow rates, are not what I do. But what the systems do, how they operate, what they look like, smell and taste like... yeah, I'm not a muggle. And I do have access to all the manuals and know how to use them. And - let me be clear, I am speculating. I was advancing a theory. It WILL be some flavour of wrong. The investigation will reveal all.
I Agree, Water in fuel is not a novel concept. Aircraft fuel tanks attract water - fact. How much? It varies. I've sumped tanks and got no water, I've seen drops of water beading about in the bottom of a gallon jug, I've seen gallons of water. I've been so covered in fuel I cant smell it or think straight and taken gallon after gallon not being able to tell if its fuel or water. I also agree that 57% humidity doesn't seem particularly high - its not south east Asian jungle levels - but I'm not an expert at humidity, 32Deg c at 57% humidity at 02:30 am is not going to be comfortable for me though. I looked at recent weather in DEL, and those values were at the higher end of the range.
Further, I believe the prevailing weather conditions on the ground are less important when it comes to the volume of water getting in. Fuel is cold, or gets damn cold during a 9 Hr flight. Fuel Temperature Management is an issue for our Drivers. So as the fuel is used at altitude, Air enters the tank through NACA Ducts in the outboard end of the wing. Its beneficial to maintain a slight positive pressure, amongst other things to reduce evaporation. (Added complication, there is also the Nitrogen Enrichment system due to TWA800 - but that's more about processing the air in the tank to change the properties and make it non-explosive). Then as the aircraft descends, more air enters as the air pressure increases. Its the humidity of that air in the descent that is going to determine the volume of water entering the tank and potentially the fuel. The water in the air condenses on the sides of the tank because of the cold post-flight fuel. It doesn't dissolve into the fuel, but sinks to the bottom. Ground temperature / humidity and time will likely affect how much water condenses out of that air while on the ground. There won't be a huge amount of air exchange on the ground. Likely if the AC landed at 2am, then from sunrise as the tank warmed up, there would actually be a flow out of the vents.
What Features and procedures are there to mitigate Water? I apologise if my post gave the impression that there are no mitigation processes. There are. Water is well understood in the industry.
Well for a start, Features / Design. The Aircraft has a water scavenge system. Water doesn't mix with fuel, it sinks to the bottom being about 20% denser than fuel, so at the very lowest point in the tank, the water scavenge system (Powered by the Aft Fuel Pump through a jet pump, a venturi like system) will suck up the 'fluid' at the very lowest point, where the water would collect and in Boeings words 'drip' that fluid into the path of the pump pickup inlet (but I'd describe it more as a 'squirt'). The idea being that a small amount of water injected into the fuel will be consumed by the engines harmlessly.
There is also agitation. The wing tank pumps are pretty much running constantly, from before engine startup to after engine shutdown. The pumps are quite violent to the fuel and supply more pressure then the engine could ever need. Any excess pressure is dumped right back into the tank, quite close to the pump, in a direction that would further stir up the fuel and help break up any water into suspended droplets.
This all works if there is a small amount of water in the fuel. The water scavenge pickup is right next to the pump inlet, but a bit lower. Little bits of water get managed. Looking at the pictures of the system, I'd say a couple of gallons of water would do no harm at all.
But if there was significantly more water in that tank. Guessing 10-30 + gallons, then the pump would be circulating water, or highly water rich fuel.
Then there's the suction pickup. Its in the same 'bay' as the aft fuel pump and located a little 'higher' than the pump inlet and water scavenge inlet. But also located between stringers that can separate out the settled water ( I wish I could share the pictures, but more than my job is worth ) I can imagine the suction pickup being in a pool of 'stagnant' water.
I also saw a post from Metcha about the scavenge system blocking with Algae - I don't know about that (B787 not my fleet). But possible that could aggravate things. There's also the reports of the Indian AAIB looking at the Titan Biocide incident. Its possible that might be related and could modify the theory.
Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury. Except when there's more. Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.
Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector. But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time. Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.
How much water would cause a sustained flameout? I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling. I think the engines were running, albeit badly. Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow. I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high perrcentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?
There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.
The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure. That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.
Ive written enough and am tired. Must stop now.
Experience. Without wishing to dox myself, I've worked in engineering at a major airline from apprentice through (in no particular order) Line Maintenance, Heavy and Light Maintenance, to technical support and maintenance control on both Boeing and Airbus products, with various qualifications and authorisations along the way. [Hmm - Scrap this sentence?]On the day 9/11 occurred, I should have been making modifications inside a fuel tank instead of staring at the TV with mouth on the floor.
However, I would describe my experience as broad, yet shallow in respect to this incident. Some of my fleet I know every rivet. Some of my fleet I've only ever seen from a distance. I don't touch airplanes for a living any more. B787 though - is not my area of specialty. I'll dig in, but am not the expert. I am not a systems design engineer, so precise numbers and flow rates, are not what I do. But what the systems do, how they operate, what they look like, smell and taste like... yeah, I'm not a muggle. And I do have access to all the manuals and know how to use them. And - let me be clear, I am speculating. I was advancing a theory. It WILL be some flavour of wrong. The investigation will reveal all.
I Agree, Water in fuel is not a novel concept. Aircraft fuel tanks attract water - fact. How much? It varies. I've sumped tanks and got no water, I've seen drops of water beading about in the bottom of a gallon jug, I've seen gallons of water. I've been so covered in fuel I cant smell it or think straight and taken gallon after gallon not being able to tell if its fuel or water. I also agree that 57% humidity doesn't seem particularly high - its not south east Asian jungle levels - but I'm not an expert at humidity, 32Deg c at 57% humidity at 02:30 am is not going to be comfortable for me though. I looked at recent weather in DEL, and those values were at the higher end of the range.
Further, I believe the prevailing weather conditions on the ground are less important when it comes to the volume of water getting in. Fuel is cold, or gets damn cold during a 9 Hr flight. Fuel Temperature Management is an issue for our Drivers. So as the fuel is used at altitude, Air enters the tank through NACA Ducts in the outboard end of the wing. Its beneficial to maintain a slight positive pressure, amongst other things to reduce evaporation. (Added complication, there is also the Nitrogen Enrichment system due to TWA800 - but that's more about processing the air in the tank to change the properties and make it non-explosive). Then as the aircraft descends, more air enters as the air pressure increases. Its the humidity of that air in the descent that is going to determine the volume of water entering the tank and potentially the fuel. The water in the air condenses on the sides of the tank because of the cold post-flight fuel. It doesn't dissolve into the fuel, but sinks to the bottom. Ground temperature / humidity and time will likely affect how much water condenses out of that air while on the ground. There won't be a huge amount of air exchange on the ground. Likely if the AC landed at 2am, then from sunrise as the tank warmed up, there would actually be a flow out of the vents.
What Features and procedures are there to mitigate Water? I apologise if my post gave the impression that there are no mitigation processes. There are. Water is well understood in the industry.
Well for a start, Features / Design. The Aircraft has a water scavenge system. Water doesn't mix with fuel, it sinks to the bottom being about 20% denser than fuel, so at the very lowest point in the tank, the water scavenge system (Powered by the Aft Fuel Pump through a jet pump, a venturi like system) will suck up the 'fluid' at the very lowest point, where the water would collect and in Boeings words 'drip' that fluid into the path of the pump pickup inlet (but I'd describe it more as a 'squirt'). The idea being that a small amount of water injected into the fuel will be consumed by the engines harmlessly.
There is also agitation. The wing tank pumps are pretty much running constantly, from before engine startup to after engine shutdown. The pumps are quite violent to the fuel and supply more pressure then the engine could ever need. Any excess pressure is dumped right back into the tank, quite close to the pump, in a direction that would further stir up the fuel and help break up any water into suspended droplets.
This all works if there is a small amount of water in the fuel. The water scavenge pickup is right next to the pump inlet, but a bit lower. Little bits of water get managed. Looking at the pictures of the system, I'd say a couple of gallons of water would do no harm at all.
But if there was significantly more water in that tank. Guessing 10-30 + gallons, then the pump would be circulating water, or highly water rich fuel.
Then there's the suction pickup. Its in the same 'bay' as the aft fuel pump and located a little 'higher' than the pump inlet and water scavenge inlet. But also located between stringers that can separate out the settled water ( I wish I could share the pictures, but more than my job is worth ) I can imagine the suction pickup being in a pool of 'stagnant' water.
I also saw a post from Metcha about the scavenge system blocking with Algae - I don't know about that (B787 not my fleet). But possible that could aggravate things. There's also the reports of the Indian AAIB looking at the Titan Biocide incident. Its possible that might be related and could modify the theory.
Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury. Except when there's more. Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.
Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector. But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time. Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.
How much water would cause a sustained flameout? I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling. I think the engines were running, albeit badly. Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow. I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high perrcentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?
There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.
The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure. That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.
Ive written enough and am tired. Must stop now.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 30th June 2025 at 23:01 . Reason: Quote from a week ago; this is not a Hamsterwheel thread, thanks!
June 30, 2025, 23:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913950
We know that the right-hand GEnx-1B was removed for overhaul and re-installed in March 2025 so it was at \x93zero time\x94 and zero cycles, meaning a performance asymmetry that the FADEC would have to manage every time maximum thrust is selected. If the old engine was still on the pre-2021 EEC build while the fresh engine carried the post-Service Bulletin software/hardware, a dual \x93commanded rollback\x94 is plausible. A latent fault on one channel with the mid-life core can prompt the other engine to match thrust to maintain symmetry, leading to dual rollback.
July 01, 2025, 02:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913983
This is my latest attempt to square the circle using all the data points and minimal assumptions. The main shortcoming of the analysis is not knowing the maximum L/D and the speed for maximum LD with the gear down, flaps 5, and the RAT extended. However, if I use a reasonable number in my opinion for the L/D in that configuration and assume that the airplane is being flown at the speed for it, it will not get to the crash site. The distance from the runway of the crash site is from a previous graphic (1.55 km); the rotation point from fdr, permalink 314; 200 feet max height above the runway being generally accepted; crash site 50 feet below the runway elevation cited previously. An average speed of 180 knots is consistent with the dimensions given and 30 seconds flight time. A flare at 50 feet will briefly increase the L/D to 20, maybe even 30 (500 feet more than shown) but still not enough to make up the shortfall, In fact, with a head wind the L/D will be lower than assumed as well as if the speed being flown is higher or lower than required for maximum L/D in that configuration. In other words, there must have been some thrust available.
July 01, 2025, 05:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11914025
This is my latest attempt to square the circle using all the data points and minimal assumptions. The main shortcoming of the analysis is not knowing the maximum L/D and the speed for maximum LD with the gear down, flaps 5, and the RAT extended. However, if I use a reasonable number in my opinion for the L/D in that configuration and assume that the airplane is being flown at the speed for it, it will not get to the crash site. The distance from the runway of the crash site is from a previous graphic (1.55 km); the rotation point from fdr, permalink 314; 200 feet max height above the runway being generally accepted; crash site 50 feet below the runway elevation cited previously. An average speed of 180 knots is consistent with the dimensions given and 30 seconds flight time. A flare at 50 feet will briefly increase the L/D to 20, maybe even 30 (500 feet more than shown) but still not enough to make up the shortfall, In fact, with a head wind the L/D will be lower than assumed as well as if the speed being flown is higher or lower than required for maximum L/D in that configuration. In other words, there must have been some thrust available.
1) I had seen the "50 feet below runway" referenced as well, and double-checked on Google Earth, and could not confirm this. The terrain looks reasonably level. I'd be happy to see evidence for this claim, but until I do, I'll think it's false.
2) The maximum L/D is given for optimal speed, which remains constant throughout the glide. In the AI171 case, drag is balanced not just by loss of altitude (as it is in the optimal glide), but also by loss of speed. The speed decline provides energy, and I suspect that makes up the shortfall you assign to thrust.
Note that kinetic energy is proportional to v\xb2, i.e. a speed loss of 50 knots from 180 to 130 vs 50 to 0 provides 15500 vs 2500 units of energy, i.e. 6 times as much. If you hypothetically hurl a unpowered aircraft into the sky with a catapult (and if there was no drag), hurling it at 180 knots makes it go 6 times as high by the time its speed decays to 130 knots than it could ever go if you hurled it at 50 knots. Of course there's drag in reality, and that also varies with v\xb2, so this is a very theoretical consideration intended to calibrate your expectations.
I remember that someone used some kind of tool to confirm that the aircraft could've gone unpowered for as long as we assume it did, but of course I can't find it again now. :-(
July 01, 2025, 09:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11914147
I know that the engine driven pumps have documented limitations and that the regulations allow for some limitations. I know that at least one of these limitation is high altitude and I _suspect_ that the design intends for this unlikely scenario (engine driven fuel pumps alone with no AC pumps) to guarantee enough fuel flow to get to an airport and land. I also suspect that the APU is expected to solve loss of all AC generators - and as we know, there wasn't enough time for it to start in this scenario.
July 01, 2025, 10:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11914158
One of the things I've learned on this thread is that planes landing with the RAT deployed may be rare, but it does happen. The videos I've watched suggest that the engines were usually running as the plane landed, but of course the RAT can't be un-deployed in flight.
My question is: what caused the RAT to deploy on those flights? Presumably reports have to be submitted in those cases?
My question is: what caused the RAT to deploy on those flights? Presumably reports have to be submitted in those cases?
July 01, 2025, 10:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11914164
Not really relevant to what you quoted though, as the scenario in question requires:
-
Engines running on centre tank fuel during takeoff
while the aircraft is operating normally
- We don't know for certain if this is the case. It seems to be but it's not something that happens on other families.
- Then, total AC failure stopping fuel boost pumps.
- Engines suction feed from contaminated/full-of-water wing tanks.
I also don't see any evidence that engine driven fuel pumps alone must be able to handle this scenario: provide enough fuel flow for takeoff and climb, even while the pitch is rotating, even in a hot environment with significant weight, even while the gear is stuck down.
I know that the engine driven pumps have documented limitations and that the regulations allow for some limitations. I know that at least one of these limitation is high altitude and I _suspect_ that the design intends for this unlikely scenario (engine driven fuel pumps alone with no AC pumps) to guarantee enough fuel flow to get to an airport and land. I also suspect that the APU is expected to solve loss of all AC generators - and as we know, there wasn't enough time for it to start in this scenario.
I know that the engine driven pumps have documented limitations and that the regulations allow for some limitations. I know that at least one of these limitation is high altitude and I _suspect_ that the design intends for this unlikely scenario (engine driven fuel pumps alone with no AC pumps) to guarantee enough fuel flow to get to an airport and land. I also suspect that the APU is expected to solve loss of all AC generators - and as we know, there wasn't enough time for it to start in this scenario.
The limitations at high altitude are primarily air/volatiles degassing out of the fuel. That's not going to be much of an issue at sea level, even if the engines are a bit higher up during rotation.
APU is a nice-to-have; it's on the MEL. If you lose all four generators, it's because of some major carnage in the electrical software/hardware and chances of putting the APU on line even if it's operating are very slim.
July 01, 2025, 10:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11914172
One of the things I've learned on this thread is that planes landing with the RAT deployed may be rare, but it does happen. The videos I've watched suggest that the engines were usually running as the plane landed, but of course the RAT can't be un-deployed in flight.
My question is: what caused the RAT to deploy on those flights? Presumably reports have to be submitted in those cases?
My question is: what caused the RAT to deploy on those flights? Presumably reports have to be submitted in those cases?
ASN has a section on electrical power incidents: https://asn.flightsafety.org/asndb/cat/ACSE
In particular try these:
https://assets.publishing.service.go...009_G-EZAC.pdf
https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/233343
https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/219748
https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/34357
July 01, 2025, 11:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11914210
This is my latest attempt to square the circle using all the data points and minimal assumptions. The main shortcoming of the analysis is not knowing the maximum L/D and the speed for maximum LD with the gear down, flaps 5, and the RAT extended. However, if I use a reasonable number in my opinion for the L/D in that configuration and assume that the airplane is being flown at the speed for it, it will not get to the crash site. The distance from the runway of the crash site is from a previous graphic (1.55 km); the rotation point from fdr, permalink 314; 200 feet max height above the runway being generally accepted; crash site 50 feet below the runway elevation cited previously. An average speed of 180 knots is consistent with the dimensions given and 30 seconds flight time. A flare at 50 feet will briefly increase the L/D to 20, maybe even 30 (500 feet more than shown) but still not enough to make up the shortfall, In fact, with a head wind the L/D will be lower than assumed as well as if the speed being flown is higher or lower than required for maximum L/D in that configuration. In other words, there must have been some thrust available.
July 01, 2025, 12:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11914222
This is my latest attempt to square the circle using all the data points and minimal assumptions. The main shortcoming of the analysis is not knowing the maximum L/D and the speed for maximum LD with the gear down, flaps 5, and the RAT extended. However, if I use a reasonable number in my opinion for the L/D in that configuration and assume that the airplane is being flown at the speed for it, it will not get to the crash site. The distance from the runway of the crash site is from a previous graphic (1.55 km); the rotation point from fdr, permalink 314; 200 feet max height above the runway being generally accepted; crash site 50 feet below the runway elevation cited previously. An average speed of 180 knots is consistent with the dimensions given and 30 seconds flight time. A flare at 50 feet will briefly increase the L/D to 20, maybe even 30 (500 feet more than shown) but still not enough to make up the shortfall, In fact, with a head wind the L/D will be lower than assumed as well as if the speed being flown is higher or lower than required for maximum L/D in that configuration. In other words, there must have been some thrust available.
As the aircraft visibly continues to climb past that height (and for a longer period than ADS-B data covers, if the camera's perspective casts doubt on that), it seems rather clear to me that it reached its peak height past the end of the runway.
In light of this I find the fact that people keep calculating a glide from the runway to the crash site to be a bit strange. Wouldn't the first step of any math be to try to determine where it started descending?
July 11, 2025, 20:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919771
- fuel cut offs were found in the RUN position
- on take off roll both engines lost power as the fuel cut offs went from RUN to cutoff
- CVR recorded one pilot asking why they had gone to CUTOFF
- within 10 seconds the fuel cutoff was moved back to RUN
-RAT was deployed, APU had begun auto start
- 32 seconds after Vr the MAYDAY was called
This should also dispel a lot of the comments about AAIB-India, Indian culture in general and general competence. For a preliminary report this is far more thorough and extensive than what would normally be expected and they\x92ve kept Boeing, GE, FAA and investigators from US, UK, Canada and Portugal in the loop from the start
They have also clarified why it took so long to do the EAFR download- because of the extensive damage they had to source specialist equipment from the NTSB that only arrived on the 23rd of June (they downloaded on the 24th) so all that talk of a \x91coverup\x92 is pretty embarrassing now
of course the big question is why/how those switches were commanded into cutoff in the first place the exact sequence at Vr is the most critical, there hasn\x92t been much scrutiny at all that I can see in the Indian/international media of the personal
background of the flight deck crew which has happened in other suspected pilot initiated disasters in the past, I guess this is an avenue investigators will have been doing themselves
- on take off roll both engines lost power as the fuel cut offs went from RUN to cutoff
- CVR recorded one pilot asking why they had gone to CUTOFF
- within 10 seconds the fuel cutoff was moved back to RUN
-RAT was deployed, APU had begun auto start
- 32 seconds after Vr the MAYDAY was called
This should also dispel a lot of the comments about AAIB-India, Indian culture in general and general competence. For a preliminary report this is far more thorough and extensive than what would normally be expected and they\x92ve kept Boeing, GE, FAA and investigators from US, UK, Canada and Portugal in the loop from the start
They have also clarified why it took so long to do the EAFR download- because of the extensive damage they had to source specialist equipment from the NTSB that only arrived on the 23rd of June (they downloaded on the 24th) so all that talk of a \x91coverup\x92 is pretty embarrassing now
of course the big question is why/how those switches were commanded into cutoff in the first place the exact sequence at Vr is the most critical, there hasn\x92t been much scrutiny at all that I can see in the Indian/international media of the personal
background of the flight deck crew which has happened in other suspected pilot initiated disasters in the past, I guess this is an avenue investigators will have been doing themselves
July 11, 2025, 20:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919772
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed
during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed
in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport
perimeter wall.
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.
RAT in extended position
15
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed
during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed
in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport
perimeter wall.
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.
RAT in extended position
15
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.
08:08:42 Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position.
One of the pilots asks the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
08:08:52 Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN
08:08:56 Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN
Who (or what?) operated the cutoff switches?
Last edited by Engineless; 11th July 2025 at 20:53 .