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EXDAC
July 15, 2025, 18:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923145 |
Inspired by the mention in the
PR
about a MEL on the \x91core network\x92, I came across the polemics between Boeing and IOActive a few years ago about the alleged vulnerability of 787 core systems to outside interference (hacker attack from within a/c and/or ground), including the highly sensitive CDN module, from where also the fuel cut-off module can be accessed. It\x92s definitely not my specialty, but I thought to flag it in case someone has more informed ideas about this. To my mind it could potentially \x93outshine\x94 intentional crew action. Boeing at the time denied such options, of course. Obviously also in good faith, but who knows where we are 6 years on.
https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-7...ecurity-flaws/ |
LiveSpark
July 16, 2025, 21:26:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924011 |
787 has RDC's - Remote Data Concentrators. Doing the same function. Two of the switch pole-sets go each to one of 2 different RDC's, that feed the EAFR's / QAR, and the common core network so that any system that wants to know, can. The wiring is positive voltage from the RDC's to the switch and to GND through the common pin. So the RDC's would be able to detect anomalies such as both contacts open, or both contacts closed. The EAFR will see two independent channels per switch.
The other 2 contact sets feed latching relays (again driven each coil independently by dropping to GND at the switch) that then drive spar valves and reset signals to the FADEC Channels. (and more). So - for the benefit of those that hang on to the 'possibility' of electrical gremlins and 'ghost' switch signals. Each switch has 4 mechanically separated 'channels' - 2 of which do electromechanical things to the engines through separate paths, the other 2 feed through independent paths the FDR and the rest of the computer systems. The results of the electromechanical actions also feed back to the FDR. Thus the readout from the EAFR will PROVE that the switches MUST have been PHYSICALLY MOVED. |
tdracer
July 16, 2025, 22:00:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924027 |
While there are interposing relays, the signals to the Fuel Metering Unit shutoff valve and the Spar Valve are hardwired from the switches to the valves in question. They don't go through some computer interface that could corrupt the signals. |
EDML
July 16, 2025, 23:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924059 |
Something else that has been repeatedly discussed in the three threads...
While there are interposing relays, the signals to the Fuel Metering Unit shutoff valve and the Spar Valve are hardwired from the switches to the valves in question. They don't go through some computer interface that could corrupt the signals. Are the FADECs able to drive the fuel shutoff valves as well? I would guess that this might be used for N2 overspeed protection (and therefore TCMA as well). If there is an overspeed there would be a good chance, that the fuel control/metering doesn't work as it should. I am not asking to revive the switch discussion - I am just curious. And one more question: Are the fuel shutoff valves powered by the PMG for the FADECs? I know the valves are latching so that a power failure of any kind wouldn't change their position. |
GroundedSpanner
July 16, 2025, 23:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924060 |
The switch is directly connected to the coils of a latching relay. That latching relay is directly connected to the coils of the spar valve. There is no digital logic device in the way, The position of the switch is monitored (through a different set of contacts) by the EAFR (twice). The position of the spar valve is monitored by the EAFR. Thus the recorder sees (twice) that the switch is moved, and that the valve moved in response. |
EXDAC
July 17, 2025, 00:16:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924069 |
tdracer excellently summarised. But I'll confirm.
The switch is directly connected to the coils of a latching relay. That latching relay is directly connected to the coils of the spar valve. There is no digital logic device in the way, The position of the switch is monitored (through a different set of contacts) by the EAFR (twice). The position of the spar valve is monitored by the EAFR. Thus the recorder sees (twice) that the switch is moved, and that the valve moved in response. |