Posts about: "Takeoff Roll" [Posts: 59 Pages: 3]

After reading tdracers informative post this morning, I too was musing: Why is all this attention being given to TCMA.

Of course, when the probable cause is profoundly unclear, our continuing distrust of latent technical systems comes to the fore .... as sadly, the shadow of MCAS still looms large in our imaginations

I would take any technical reporting in The Times with a pinch of salt. The author is the Paris correspondent, holds a PPL and read English at university.
The paper's science editor read Mathematics. As an engineer and Times subscriber, I have read many articles with technical errors.

What Alty posted is correct. There have always been single faults in the engine control systems that could cause uncommanded high thrust (UHT) - and such failures were considered in the safety analysis (e.g. FMEA) with the note that it wasn't unsafe as the pilot would shutdown the affected engine. Then there was a 737-200 event (JT8D engines) (1999 sounds about right - I'm thinking it was either an Egyptian operator or it happened in Egypt, but don't hold me to that) - the JT8D had an issue with excessive wear of the splined shaft that provided the N2 input into the hydromechanical fuel control. In this event, that splined shaft started slipping - causing the fuel control to think the N2 was below idle, and it keep adding fuel to try to get the N2 back above idle. This caused the engine to accelerate uncontrollably - the pilots pulled back the throttle and performed an RTO, but the engine didn't respond, and they went off the runway at low speed. Everyone evacuated safely, but the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The FAA pointed to this accident and said we couldn't depend on crew action to shutdown a runway engine, and therefore any single failure that could result in uncontrollable high thrust was not compliant with 25.901(c) (basically says no single fault can result in an unsafe condition). This basically made every commercial airliner flying non-compliant as every turbine engine control system at that time had single faults that could cause UHT . A consequence of this was everyone was effectively prevented from certifying any further engine control changes since we couldn't show compliance with 25.901(c) (even if the change actually improved safety). The FAA and EASA were forced to issue partial exemptions for all existing aircraft/engine combinations, with the stipulation that they wouldn't certify any new engines that didn't address UHT. A working group was put together at Boeing to come up with some way to comply - and they eventually came up with TCMA , only active on the ground since UHT was only considered unsafe when on the ground - first incorporated on the GE90-115B/777-300ER/200LR.

I've never been 100% comfortable with TCMA (for reasons that should be all to obvious right now), but the regulators gave us few options.
BTW, during the early development of the 747-8, we didn't have a robust way of providing air/ground to the FADECs - which the FAA immediately found objectionable since they never wanted the risk of TCMA being active in-flight. I eventually came up with a design change that would provide a robust air/ground indication (it solved several issues we were confronting at the time), so that concern went away - which made the FAA very happy.

In the very early posts it was concluded from the evidence available that the takeoff roll started at the begining of the runway and the rotation was with around 4000 ft of runway remaining. The rotation point was assessed to be similar to other take offs. Aircraft attitude and flight path during rotation and lift off was assessed to seem normal.

Yes.
1250m from the end of the runway, between high speed C and D, adjacent to the closed high speed.
There is nothing unusual with the rate of acceleration that is observable ninth video. You can work that out using google earth and the Indian AIP and/or state airport charts. The weight of the plane can be estimated by the flight time and pax load and an allowance for cargo. The simplified TO performance is in the inflight performance section of the FCOM, which you may find a copy on line.
The aircrafts rotation has no obvious issues, until a few seconds after achieving an attitude that is consistent with the V2+15-25 range, at which point the ROC visibly starts to decay.

Yes. Thank you tdracer. All those postulating TCMA / FADEC faults please read and understand this clear explanation.

Then, ask yourselves which extraordinarily low probability bundle of previously unrevealed faults could spontaneously manifest themselves on both engines simultaneously.

Also ask yourselves why these faults manifested at that critical phase of flight and not during taxiing or take-off roll when some of the TCMA sensors would have been primed.

Yes. Thank you tdracer. All those postulating TCMA / FADEC faults please read and understand this clear explanation.

Then, ask yourselves which extraordinarily low probability bundle of previously unrevealed faults could spontaneously manifest themselves on both engines simultaneously.

Also ask yourselves why these faults manifested at that critical phase of flight and not during taxiing or take-off roll when some of the TCMA sensors would have been primed.

After reading tdracers informative post this morning, I too was musing: Why is all this attention being given to TCMA.

Of course, when the probable cause is profoundly unclear, our continuing distrust of latent technical systems comes to the fore .... as sadly, the shadow of MCAS still looms large in our imaginations

I would take any technical reporting in The Times with a pinch of salt. The author is the Paris correspondent, holds a PPL and read English at university.
The paper's science editor read Mathematics. As an engineer and Times subscriber, I have read many articles with technical errors.

As a pilot with 40+ years of professional flying, currently on the B777, and with some background in modelling aircraft performance, I've got a few observations, having read all posts.


Flaps & Takeoff

The flaps were out for takeoff, which was normal: normal rotation rate, right place on the runway. Debris also shows the flaps were out at impact. The plane's flight path completely matched what you'd expect from a flight with flaps set correctly.


Flight Controls & Pilot Action

To my mind, the controls were clearly working right up to the very end of that tragic flight. This also strongly suggests the plane never had any asymmetric thrust, because there's no sign of yaw, rudder, or big aileron/spoiler movements. The pilots seemed to guide the plane accurately and consistently, just like an experienced crew would. It looks like they were highly skilled from the start: immediately after rotation, they lowered the nose a bit to keep the plane flying. They also bleed off speed to avoid ground contact. Eventually, with no speed left, the plane descends, but it still looked like they were in control. The instinctive pitch-up right before impact is what a lot of pilots would do.


ANC

Why transmit to ATC ? beautifully described by EGPI10BR


Aviate: The aeroplane has decided it doesn\x92t want to do that any more

Navigate: Not many options on where to go

Communicate: May as well let people know it\x92s going to be a bad day and to get there ASAP.


Booster Pumps

Engines don't actually need booster pumps at sea level to get takeoff thrust. (tdracer)


Restart

There's no noise of the engines spooling up at impact. The mobile phone footage just has the RAT noise, normal airframe sounds, and impact noises. I didn't hear any engine spooling up. That witness talking about a "revving, starting noise" sounds to me like he was trying to describe the RAT noise, which we're all pretty familiar with now.


Engine Spool Down

When I did this for real in an actual plane (we had an uncontrollable engine, but also three good ones), stuck at about 30% maximum thrust, at 220 knots, it was an instantaneous spool-down \x96 really dramatic. The yaw came on so suddenly it felt like a heavy catering truck had slammed into us at speed.


Engines

They appear to get the plane to the correct speed and position on the runway as commanded, then at a time very close to rotate they stop providing thrust. The rest of the flight is consistent with gliding flight.


Rotate vs. Air/Ground Switching Vs Pilot action

(This is my take, it might seem counterintuitive, if you know better help) On a normal takeoff at rotation, liquids don't slide backward any more than they do during the takeoff roll itself. They slide back during the takeoff roll, and at rotation, there's actually a slight reduction in those backward forces. The main force is still pushing them back, but because the wings are now generating lift, there's more drag than when the plane was just rolling on its wheels. So, if liquids have pooled at the back of something at rotation, during and just after that maneuver, they'll actually ease forward a bit. The main force is still pushing them back, but it's less so. My take is if something sudden happens around rotation, I think it's probably more connected to something like the air/ground sensing or pilot action, but it is still possible that pooled liquids sloshing forward a little could also cause it.
Pilots have to do a few things at rotate time, pull back in the controls, not the thrust levers in error and then move the landing gear lever. Over the years there's been a few action slips, so unintended control movements.

Pooled water around the moisture barrier is just looking for a suitable access point to drain into. The 3 events I am aware of in the B744 were all during manoeuvring, 2 at rotate and one during a descending turn.


SLF. As usual feel free to ignore.

Being mere SLF, the knowledge that a mandatory system called TCMA even exists worries me a little. A system with authority to shut down (all) engines without any interference from one of the pilots should IMHO not exist in an airplane.

As described multiple times in the previous thread, TCMA uses data from multiple WoW sensors, ground radar and throttle imput. It is also described that TCMA will determine WoW status if ONE OR MORE of the WoW sensors senses WoW. Therefore it will only need one malfunctioning WoW sensor to determine WoW.

Since, as I read in the previous thread, it also uses ground radar: what is its hysteresis in measuring ground proximity? In other words from what height after rotation does TCMA deem the airplane is not at ground level anymore? This feels like an important parameter to me.

If, during this accident, something happened during its takeoff roll (unexpected throttle movement for instance), could that have triggered TCMA to shut down (both) engines?

I hope not.

By the way, what is the time delay between TCMA detecting an abnormality and it switching off an engine?

(If TCMA is somehow involved in this accident, a future change might be to disable TCMA after the airplane reaches a certain speed.)

Could someone post an authoritative list of the inputs to the EAFR\x92s? By \x93authoritative\x94, I mean the actual wiring diagram excerpt of the aircraft model and engine configuration (and hopefully mod state...), that labels each input.

I\x92m confidently assuming that it will, for example, include an input monitoring the state of the input controlling the fuel shut off valves in the wing roots. But does it monitor, separately, each and every one of the switches and systems that can change the input controlling the fuel shut off valves? I'm hoping and assuming \x91yes\x92, but hope and assumptions can be unhelpful and misguided.

As we know, there are some things the pilots can do that will result in fuel shut off, but other things will result in fuel shut off without pilot intervention.

Of course, it may be that the recorded data will indicate that there was no change in the state of the inputs controlling the fuel shut off valves during the short flight. Hopefully \x96 yes hopefully \x96 that will be confirmed one way or other, soon. Along with another dozen questions....

I was struck by a comment in this or the earlier thread that I cannot now find. It was to the effect \x96 I\x92m paraphrasing \x96 that fuel shut off results in an almost immediate cessation of thrust. (Please correct my paraphrasing if I\x92m off track.) I was also struck by how quiet the aircraft was in the original video, except for the RAT. (Or was it a motorcycle? Sorry couldn\x92t resist. Just joking\x85)

Someone earlier asked how the aircraft could have kept climbing if both engines stopped very late in the take-off roll or shortly after take-off. My answer: Momentum. A bullet fired into the air loses thrust immediately after \x91take off\x92 but continues climbing for a while. And my understanding of the expert opinion on the available, reliable information is that the aircraft didn\x92t climb very far.

tdracer explained that earlier: T/O power to sub idle on fuel shutoff only takes 1s, at most 2s.

Slamming the throttles back is a lot slower as the FCU (on a traditional engine)/FADEC spins down the engine slowly - I suppose to make sure that the airflow through the engine remains stable.

Regarding the momentum: As the first few seconds of the climb were normal compared to previous T/Os of the same flight (speed & altitude, confirmed by comparison of the RAW ADS-B data) I don't believe the engine failure happened before or on lift-off.

Usually on takeoff LNAV and VNAV are armed. During the takeoff roll the autothrottle system goes in to HOLD mode at 80kts.

At that point the FMAs read:



At 50' LNAV engages and the FMAs change to:




At 400' VNAV engages and the FMAs change to:




The height is referenced to a barometric snapshot taken during the take off roll at 100kts.

If an altitude is captured before VNAV engagement (totally bizarre to capture an altitude of less than 400') then the FMAs would change to:

SPD | LNAV | ALT

So a 787, loaded for a flight to London, does a normal takeoff roll (liftoff around 4000ft to run) but then tops out at 200ft because the TWO ENGINED thrust isn't enough to keep it flying (assuming there was no single-engine failure)? I don't think so.

Yes, 8sec from flight idle to max. So if it had enough thrust to get airborne normally, "TOGA" (your words) would have been available in an instant because the engines would have been running at only a few % below max thrust anyway. There would be no waiting time. If those engines had been running, the crew could have recovered from that descent easily right up until the last second by firewalling the throttles.

If thre was a liquid invovlved, the rotation could be the trigger for a problem.

Can any 78 driver think of a scenario where an abnormal switch position (I'm thinking far up on the overhead panel like one of those Engineer test switches) or a pulled CB may have allowed the flight to continue the takeoff roll with perhaps one (or two) simple EICAS messages (which the crew might have ignored), to then later on result in something catastrophic?

Thanks much — pretty much same as 777. Was wondering if someone had set MCP to 200 in error what autothrottles would do. What I’m wondering is if the aircraft were being hand flown to a low capture like that if the autothrottles would initially pull power back from THR REF to anticipated level off setting for SPD which would be bug speed (V2 to V2+15). And might be a fairly dramatic reduction of power. Granted since its speed on autothrottles at some point power should come back up. But I wonder if the autothrottles would respond to what they thought for level flight initially.

Could explain the witnesses thought that power came back up before they hit but witness recollections post traumatic event as well as second hand reporting need some time to settle in before accurate facts come out.

@ferry pilot and others who mentioned the seat back collapsing: That was from an entirely unrelated incident on Air India Express flight 611 in 2018 which got poorly rehashed / fakenewsed into a bogus theory over the last week. It was a 737. It did *not* happen on AI171.

For what it's worth, the AIX 611 story in 2018 involved a 737 captain's seat back being overtightened and suddenly collapsing backwards during the takeoff roll. He had been guarding the thrust levers and reflexively grabbed them when falling back, causing a thrust reduction from 98% N1 to 75% N1 or thereabouts. Control was immediately transferred to the other pilot but the inadvertent thrust change was not corrected immediately, and the plane took off a few seconds later with a tail strike, scraping the runway, flying through the localizer and demolishing part of the airport perimeter wall with its landing gear. During the climb, the flight crew ran several system checks and landing gear tests to reassure themselves the plane was fine, then proceeded with the flight, pressurizing the aircraft and whatnot. They evidently did not consult the tail strike procedure. Many hours later they were ordered by company to divert and land quickly after the damage was seen at the airport. After landing, the plane was found to have a fair bit of damage, including part of the perimeter wall's barbed wire fencing material wrapped around the landing gear. But zero injuries, and the plane was fixed and flew again.

It's an entertaining story because of the cause and the happy ending, but had nothing to do with AI171, for which we all await the preliminary report.