July 13, 2025, 10:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921207
Not sure if this is helpful for anyone or not but I thought a visual view of the timeline of events might be useful, in seconds since V1.
I've assumed 1Hz for the switch sampling rate and >1Hz for everything else (could be wrong) to give windows for the switch state changes.
I've also added in the ADS-B relevant data, although made no attempt to work out whether these timestamps are synchronised or not, so take them as you will.
I have assumed the cutoff is in chronological order from the report, albeit I have ignored the RAT supply timestamp in terms of chronology from the CVR recording, as that statement in the report at that time may just be due to contextual nature of the statement, rather than it happening prior to the RAT power supply. This gives a window for potentially when that statement was made (assuming also that it was made prior to reversing cutoff).
Really highlights how knowing precisely when the why did you cutoff" question was asked might have provided more clarity and less speculation as to how those fateful seconds played out
And it would have helped to know if Positive rate / Gear Up was called ... and when
Last edited by unworry; 13th July 2025 at 12:19 .
July 13, 2025, 10:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921213
Don't think it neccessarily adds anything for me, other than:
- Would we expect ADS-B data to stop on engine transition to run? Note that ADS-B data was received between 08:08:43 and 08:08:51, so apparently only received in the time window that the switches were in "cutoff"
- The window between the switches being shut off and moved to run could be as short as 8 seconds, and the window between engine 1 and engine 2 being moved to run could be as short as 2 seconds
- The statement on the CVR could be a wide range of timepoints.
The ADS-B data is in my view odd, albeit this might be my lack of understanding. Yes, not synchronised, but unless the timestamps are way out (like 10 seconds out, and given the timestamp of max altitude, this feels incredibly unlikely), ADS-B data was transmitted without issue during phase 2 (both engines off, no RAT), and phase 3 (both engines off, RAT)...but NOT phase 4 (both engines firing back up, presumably still with RAT?). Bear in mind that phase 4 is almost half of the short flight. Also it would appear no data during phase 1 (both engines on), including during takeoff, despite receiving data during taxi?
- Would we expect ADS-B data to stop on engine transition to run? Note that ADS-B data was received between 08:08:43 and 08:08:51, so apparently only received in the time window that the switches were in "cutoff"
- The window between the switches being shut off and moved to run could be as short as 8 seconds, and the window between engine 1 and engine 2 being moved to run could be as short as 2 seconds
- The statement on the CVR could be a wide range of timepoints.
The ADS-B data is in my view odd, albeit this might be my lack of understanding. Yes, not synchronised, but unless the timestamps are way out (like 10 seconds out, and given the timestamp of max altitude, this feels incredibly unlikely), ADS-B data was transmitted without issue during phase 2 (both engines off, no RAT), and phase 3 (both engines off, RAT)...but NOT phase 4 (both engines firing back up, presumably still with RAT?). Bear in mind that phase 4 is almost half of the short flight. Also it would appear no data during phase 1 (both engines on), including during takeoff, despite receiving data during taxi?
Assuming the 787 is similar, perhaps the aircraft was broadcasting ADS-B for the full flight (with the transponder running off main battery/RAT power) but the reception was marginal, resulting in no reception until just after liftoff and no reception once they start to sink again.
July 13, 2025, 11:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921256
@Maybeitis,
how about we leave the total redesign of the fuel switch locations and operation (which have been moved billions of times in thousands of aircraft without a hitch) until the final report is out.
These were deliberately moved. It wasn't a brain-fart. Unless the interim report omits crew calls which turn the scenario on it's head.
These were deliberately moved. It wasn't a brain-fart. Unless the interim report omits crew calls which turn the scenario on it's head.
Firstly, you'll have seen plenty of things to disprove the "without a hitch" in this thread alone , and as a professional pilot you'll no doubt know of many others - including switches moved in-flight as a brain-fart , or switches moved by things like falling objects. Waiting for the final report may tell us if it would have made a difference in this case, but the lower tier of the safety pyramid (non-severe outcomes) is definitely already populated with plenty of examples of "hitches".
Secondly, I'm absolutely inclined to agree that the switches were moved deliberately (though perhaps absent-mindedly), but I'm genuinely shocked and baffled that you are already willing to assert that "It wasn't a brain-fart". Perhaps those words were typed in haste and you didn't re-read what you had written? (A brain-fart, in other words.)
You don\x92t \x93flick switches in the Sim\x94 for no apparent reason.
Even Indian sources are now reporting on the possibility of intent.
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/air-...-probe-8864239
Even Indian sources are now reporting on the possibility of intent.
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/air-...-probe-8864239
July 13, 2025, 21:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921654
Thank you for your reply! I'm aware you know more about ADS-B than I do, and I'm happy to learn.
As you know, I'm referring to the map view and data on https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ .
That's what I thought at first, based on the time stamps.
08:08:50.87 last full ADS-B message (172 kts)
08:08:54 APU inlet door starts to open, per the report.
My problem here is that the report also says that the maximum speed was 180 knots IAS at about 08:08:42. And we have
2025-06-12T08:08:46.550875Z,8005ec,23.069138,72.625871,575
associated with 184 kts as the first ADS-B message in the sequence.
Given that the clocks of ADS-B receivers are sometimes off, I think this might actually represent the moment of maximum speed; but then the AFS-B clock would be 4 seconds fast.
And that's why I adjusted my times.
A way to cross-check would be to track the aircraft position over time from the point of rotation, or to use the new photo in the report that shows the RAT over the runway to triangulate where that was.
Yes.
Would low pressure and high temperature make IAS lower than ground speed, even with the 7 knot headwind?
Either way, if they were decelerating at approximately 3 knots per second, then they would've ended up at about 150 knots IAS, which is less than Vr.
When I look at the CCTV video, 13 seconds into the flight, the aircraft is just "over the hump" and starts descending, so that tracks.
At this point, I don't know what having the engines spool up instead of being dead weight would've done to that flight path; and how successfully the aircraft could've been recovered from that.
Maybe they had only 4 seconds to flip those switches, instead of 5 seconds?
Still, the best bet is to not ask questions, but flip these switches back ASAP, no?
As you know, I'm referring to the map view and data on https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ .
08:08:50.87 last full ADS-B message (172 kts)
08:08:54 APU inlet door starts to open, per the report.
My problem here is that the report also says that the maximum speed was 180 knots IAS at about 08:08:42. And we have
2025-06-12T08:08:46.550875Z,8005ec,23.069138,72.625871,575
associated with 184 kts as the first ADS-B message in the sequence.
Given that the clocks of ADS-B receivers are sometimes off, I think this might actually represent the moment of maximum speed; but then the AFS-B clock would be 4 seconds fast.
And that's why I adjusted my times.
A way to cross-check would be to track the aircraft position over time from the point of rotation, or to use the new photo in the report that shows the RAT over the runway to triangulate where that was.
Beware of comparing the speeds from ADS-B, which are groundspeeds, with those from the report, which are IAS.
Would low pressure and high temperature make IAS lower than ground speed, even with the 7 knot headwind?
Either way, if they were decelerating at approximately 3 knots per second, then they would've ended up at about 150 knots IAS, which is less than Vr.
When I look at the CCTV video, 13 seconds into the flight, the aircraft is just "over the hump" and starts descending, so that tracks.
At this point, I don't know what having the engines spool up instead of being dead weight would've done to that flight path; and how successfully the aircraft could've been recovered from that.
Maybe they had only 4 seconds to flip those switches, instead of 5 seconds?
Still, the best bet is to not ask questions, but flip these switches back ASAP, no?
Last edited by Musician; 13th July 2025 at 21:36 .
July 13, 2025, 23:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921782
Thank you for your reply! I'm aware you know more about ADS-B than I do, and I'm happy to learn.
As you know, I'm referring to the map view and data on https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ .
That's what I thought at first, based on the time stamps.
08:08:50.87 last full ADS-B message (172 kts)
08:08:54 APU inlet door starts to open, per the report.
My problem here is that the report also says that the maximum speed was 180 knots IAS at about 08:08:42. And we have
2025-06-12T08:08:46.550875Z,8005ec,23.069138,72.625871,575
associated with 184 kts as the first ADS-B message in the sequence.
Given that the clocks of ADS-B receivers are sometimes off, I think this might actually represent the moment of maximum speed; but then the AFS-B clock would be 4 seconds fast.
And that's why I adjusted my times.
A way to cross-check would be to track the aircraft position over time from the point of rotation, or to use the new photo in the report that shows the RAT over the runway to triangulate where that was.
Yes.
Would low pressure and high temperature make IAS lower than ground speed, even with the 7 knot headwind?
Either way, if they were decelerating at approximately 3 knots per second, then they would've ended up at about 150 knots IAS, which is less than Vr.
When I look at the CCTV video, 13 seconds into the flight, the aircraft is just "over the hump" and starts descending, so that tracks.
At this point, I don't know what having the engines spool up instead of being dead weight would've done to that flight path; and how successfully the aircraft could've been recovered from that.
Maybe they had only 4 seconds to flip those switches, instead of 5 seconds?
Still, the best bet is to not ask questions, but flip these switches back ASAP, no?
As you know, I'm referring to the map view and data on https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ .
That's what I thought at first, based on the time stamps.
08:08:50.87 last full ADS-B message (172 kts)
08:08:54 APU inlet door starts to open, per the report.
My problem here is that the report also says that the maximum speed was 180 knots IAS at about 08:08:42. And we have
2025-06-12T08:08:46.550875Z,8005ec,23.069138,72.625871,575
associated with 184 kts as the first ADS-B message in the sequence.
Given that the clocks of ADS-B receivers are sometimes off, I think this might actually represent the moment of maximum speed; but then the AFS-B clock would be 4 seconds fast.
And that's why I adjusted my times.
A way to cross-check would be to track the aircraft position over time from the point of rotation, or to use the new photo in the report that shows the RAT over the runway to triangulate where that was.
Yes.
Would low pressure and high temperature make IAS lower than ground speed, even with the 7 knot headwind?
Either way, if they were decelerating at approximately 3 knots per second, then they would've ended up at about 150 knots IAS, which is less than Vr.
When I look at the CCTV video, 13 seconds into the flight, the aircraft is just "over the hump" and starts descending, so that tracks.
At this point, I don't know what having the engines spool up instead of being dead weight would've done to that flight path; and how successfully the aircraft could've been recovered from that.
Maybe they had only 4 seconds to flip those switches, instead of 5 seconds?
Still, the best bet is to not ask questions, but flip these switches back ASAP, no?
July 15, 2025, 04:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922651
1. Where is the Data showing the TIME STAMP of when each engine parameters FIRST indicated an Engine spooling down. ( N1- N2, RPM. FUEL FLOW. EGT)
2. if the time STAMP of any engine spool down data occurred prior to the first movement of the fuel start lever. Then any subsequent movement of the start levers must be seen as an attempt to restart.
3. so that timeline must be established. More data is required.
2. if the time STAMP of any engine spool down data occurred prior to the first movement of the fuel start lever. Then any subsequent movement of the start levers must be seen as an attempt to restart.
3. so that timeline must be established. More data is required.
The aircraft achieved the
maximum recorded airspeed
of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter , the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off .
UTC and immediately thereafter , the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off .
That's the Embraer option.
The other option I can imagine is a mechanical stop with an override button, like the landing gear lever. Can't switch the fuel levers off unless you're slow and on the ground, the engine is failed or on fire, or you push override.
July 15, 2025, 10:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922807
The fuel switch discrete doesn't really get used except for engine start - if it falsely indicates shutdown (on one or both channels), the FADEC won't do anything if the engine is already running. All this will set maintenance faults - and associated EICAS Status messages (L/R ENGINE CONTROL or ENGINE C1). I doubt that would be recorded on the DFDR - it would go to the QAR but that's unlikely to survive a crash. It would also be logged in the FADEC NVM - but again no guarantee that would survive either (although when the Lauda 767 crashed due to the thrust reverser deployment, the DFDR was destroyed but the FADEC NVMs both survived - much of what we know about that crash came from the FADEC NVM.)
Again, not familiar with the specifics of the 787, but on the 747-400/-8, one pole of the fuel switch feeds EICAS - which uses it in various message logic - and sends it out to any other aircraft systems that use it. There is "Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit) DFDAU (pronounced Daff Du) that takes all the various system digital signals, sorts them and provides them to the DFDR and QAR. The 787 has something similar to the DFDAU but I don't recall what it's called.
Again, not familiar with the specifics of the 787, but on the 747-400/-8, one pole of the fuel switch feeds EICAS - which uses it in various message logic - and sends it out to any other aircraft systems that use it. There is "Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit) DFDAU (pronounced Daff Du) that takes all the various system digital signals, sorts them and provides them to the DFDR and QAR. The 787 has something similar to the DFDAU but I don't recall what it's called.
I would assume from your statement, that if a mismatch in the NC/NO signal on the switch was detected the FADEC would not direct the Fuel Cutoff Valves to close (as far as the types you are familiar with are concerned), is that correct?
The report states:
[...] at about 08:08:42 UTC [...] the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.
The report then states:
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. [...] Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN.
July 15, 2025, 16:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923087
Having read through most of the posts in this and the other threads, and the preliminary report a few times in parts, am mystified by this:
The Preliminary Report states: "The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall."
Does this mean the RAT deployed "immediately after" in the sense of within 1 second after lift-off?
We, as a group, certainly seem to be interpreting the "immediately thereafter" in a prior paragraph to mean that the E1 and E2 fuel cutoff switches went RUN -> CUTOFF within 1 second or so after max airspeed of 180kts at 08:08:42.
The prior paragraph for quick ref:
"The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off."
Additionally, have to say, this PR has a few major weaknesses in it:
- no timestamp for RAT deployment, though RAT hydraulic power coming online has one; also is it for initial power or rated power?
- no timestamp for the pilot conversation about 'cutoff', though it is provided for the MAYDAY.
- no timestamps for E1/E2 Fuel Cutoff Switches going from RUN -> CUTOFF, though they're provided for CUTOFF -> RUN.
The Preliminary Report states: "The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall."
Does this mean the RAT deployed "immediately after" in the sense of within 1 second after lift-off?
We, as a group, certainly seem to be interpreting the "immediately thereafter" in a prior paragraph to mean that the E1 and E2 fuel cutoff switches went RUN -> CUTOFF within 1 second or so after max airspeed of 180kts at 08:08:42.
The prior paragraph for quick ref:
"The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off."
Additionally, have to say, this PR has a few major weaknesses in it:
- no timestamp for RAT deployment, though RAT hydraulic power coming online has one; also is it for initial power or rated power?
- no timestamp for the pilot conversation about 'cutoff', though it is provided for the MAYDAY.
- no timestamps for E1/E2 Fuel Cutoff Switches going from RUN -> CUTOFF, though they're provided for CUTOFF -> RUN.
Last edited by T28B; 15th July 2025 at 17:15 . Reason: formatting errors fixed.