June 13, 2025, 13:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11900509
There is a summary of all possible causes plus what indication supports the cause in
this article
Subjects: None
June 14, 2025, 08:13:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11901237
As so much of the analysis hinges on whether or not the RAT was deployed, I notice that back in 2015 on another forum somone posed the question
https://forum.dcs.world/topic/119812-787-deployed-ram-air-turbine/"I wonder why so many of these 787's land with their Ram Air Turbine deployed?"
Ttere are a number of videos around showing 787s landing with RAT deployed and it appears that this happens with 787s more than other types.
Can any knowledgeable Pruner answer this? Is there a problem with the 787's RAT and its deployment, or is the deployment a symptom of a problem within the 787s systems?
https://forum.dcs.world/topic/119812-787-deployed-ram-air-turbine/"I wonder why so many of these 787's land with their Ram Air Turbine deployed?"
Ttere are a number of videos around showing 787s landing with RAT deployed and it appears that this happens with 787s more than other types.
Can any knowledgeable Pruner answer this? Is there a problem with the 787's RAT and its deployment, or is the deployment a symptom of a problem within the 787s systems?
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): RAT (All) RAT (Deployment)
June 14, 2025, 18:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11901706
1. there are multiple frames of the video showing ' something' at the position where the RAT is located under the fuselage
2. the sound in the video which is very similar to a deployed RAT
3. the sound analysis posted here by multiple people
last but not least
4. the aircraft stopped transmitting ADSB data shortly after the rotating. This indicates an electrical failure. Other aircraft ADSB data was picked up by FR24 receivers indication there is a good reception of the signal in that area.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ADSB Electrical Failure FlightRadar24 RAT (All) RAT (Deployment)
June 14, 2025, 20:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11901788
There are more data messages than that, which FR24 shared on the day of the accident and which have been posted a few times in this thread. I'm pretty sure there's also been a comparison of this + previous flights posted in this thread that shows that while the coverage at the airport itself is spotty, it's reasonable to expect further messages to have been received before impact.
Not sure how permanent the content at this URL is, but here's a link to FR24's update which has a CSV with all frames received https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/
Not sure how permanent the content at this URL is, but here's a link to FR24's update which has a CSV with all frames received https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/
Somebody on this forum did some analysis with FR24 data of this flight and other AI171 B787 flights.
See this article for an overview of all scenarios. It all looks very like to an commanded dual engine shutdown. Why nobody knows.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AI171 Dual Engine Failure Engine Failure (All) Engine Shutdown FlightRadar24
June 14, 2025, 20:13:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11901794
https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ADSB FlightRadar24
June 14, 2025, 20:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11901798
People really need to stop using FR24 data if they don't understand it.
This FR24 recording of AI171
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/f.../ai171#3ac3097
only consists of 4 unique ADS-B data messages. The first two were on the apron/taxiway. Then one at the runway intersection. And the fourth and last one just after the aircraft became airborne. That's all.
The two last ADS-B data messages are more than 4 minutes apart. It was 8:04 UTC when they entered the runway at the intersection. The next and last data point was received at 8:08 UTC.
The map view connects these dots, so it looks like a proper track. But in reality the ADS-B receiver barely received anything. It's therefore silly to argue the aircraft stopped transmitting ADS-B data based on this poor recording. The only thing you can say with certainty is that FR24's ADS-B receiver at Ahmedabad has really, really poor coverage...
This FR24 recording of AI171
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/f.../ai171#3ac3097
only consists of 4 unique ADS-B data messages. The first two were on the apron/taxiway. Then one at the runway intersection. And the fourth and last one just after the aircraft became airborne. That's all.
The two last ADS-B data messages are more than 4 minutes apart. It was 8:04 UTC when they entered the runway at the intersection. The next and last data point was received at 8:08 UTC.
The map view connects these dots, so it looks like a proper track. But in reality the ADS-B receiver barely received anything. It's therefore silly to argue the aircraft stopped transmitting ADS-B data based on this poor recording. The only thing you can say with certainty is that FR24's ADS-B receiver at Ahmedabad has really, really poor coverage...
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ADSB AI171 FlightRadar24
June 15, 2025, 09:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11902276
Can we focus on theories explaining the facts? Specifically:
- Aircraft used almost the whole runway (3500m)
- Flaps found on the ground in setting 5
- RAT deployed
- Mayday that they lost power
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Dual Engine Failure Engine Failure (All) MAYDAY RAT (All) RAT (Deployment)
June 21, 2025, 15:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11907842
" A source at the airport did indicate that refuelling took longer than usual (at 42 minutes), but a few others indicated that this was not really an out-of-the-ordinary occurrence for a long-distance international flight with full load."
Subjects: None
July 14, 2025, 15:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922290
I disagree.
It was a very small "window of opportunity", maybe 30 seconds longer and the plane could have been saved. Also there's no guarantee the other pilot wouldn't work to prevent it. Indeed, it was deemed that checking the safety latches on the switches was not necessary.
If a pilot were feeling suicidal it would have been so much easier for them to drive off a bridge on the way to work.
The chance of any flight crashing due to pilot suicide is 1 in 122 million. Very, very unlikely.
It was a very small "window of opportunity", maybe 30 seconds longer and the plane could have been saved. Also there's no guarantee the other pilot wouldn't work to prevent it. Indeed, it was deemed that checking the safety latches on the switches was not necessary.
If a pilot were feeling suicidal it would have been so much easier for them to drive off a bridge on the way to work.
The chance of any flight crashing due to pilot suicide is 1 in 122 million. Very, very unlikely.
Logical thinking by a pilot murdering his passengers, crew and himself is non existent.
Suicide is the number one likely cause of this crash. Fuel control switches do not move by itself of an iPad hitting it. A pilot needs to move the switches by hand.
I cannot find any other cause for this crash. Especially the question ' why did you move the switches' is extremely suspicious. I bet the captain said that. He was the only one with his hands free to move the switches.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches
July 15, 2025, 10:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922821
Media in India are massively spreading disinformation. They mention a May 2025 CAA safety notice (based on 2015 FAA AD) on the fuel valve actuator but mention in the headline the fuel control switch. Two totally different parts of the aircraft. Seems to me coordinated damage control .
https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...trol-switches/
https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...trol-switches/
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Air Worthiness Directives FAA
July 16, 2025, 09:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923586
It is both fascinating and unsettling to observe how the media in India consistently refuse to acknowledge that suicide may be the most likely scenario. Key voices—such as former pilots and the airline pilots' union—continue to dismiss the possibility that a pilot could have deliberately moved the fuel control switches to the cutoff position. They rely on factually incorrect arguments and emotional reasoning. For instance, some suggest a potential defect in the Boeing 787’s fuel cutoff switches. However, the FAA's Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) they reference was specifically issued for the Boeing 737, not the 787.
An overview of public statements made by pilots in the media can be found here.
https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...room-in-india/
An overview of public statements made by pilots in the media can be found here.
https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...room-in-india/
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
July 16, 2025, 10:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923620
Fact is both fuel cutoff switches moved to the cutoff position three seconds after the wheels left the runway. While the speed was 180 knots. Nothing indicates a problem with the thrust of the engines.
So explain why one of the pilots , a ghost, an iPad set *both* switches to cutoff just after liftoff while the aircraft had a normal speed and no indications of a problem.
Mind there is no issue with those switches. The FAA SAIB was for the Boeing 737
https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/
There is just one explanation: one of the pilots deliberately set both switches to cutoff.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
July 16, 2025, 10:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923627
Subjects: None
July 16, 2025, 11:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923642
I wonder if the people who are so adamant that mistaken operation of the wrong control is simply impossible have ever had a windscreen wipe in a car while intending to use an indicator light. And if they have, have some of these occasions happened at higher than average stress moments, such as someone else behaving oddly at a junction.
(Of vehicles with two sets of stalk mounted switches adjacent to the steering wheel, some have lights on the left, and some have lights on the right. This may be, but isn't always, related to whether the home market of the car design drives on the left or the right. British drivers and owners of some Japanese cars may have more experience of both than Europeans only ever driving cars from their home country.)
(Of vehicles with two sets of stalk mounted switches adjacent to the steering wheel, some have lights on the left, and some have lights on the right. This may be, but isn't always, related to whether the home market of the car design drives on the left or the right. British drivers and owners of some Japanese cars may have more experience of both than Europeans only ever driving cars from their home country.)
When the fuel needs to be cut because of an engine failure there is a strict procedure before the switch is set to CUTOFF. Both pilots need to confirm the location (left or right) of the engine. No pilot will without consent switch off the fuel. However this is what happened.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Engine Failure (All) Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches RUN/CUTOFF
July 16, 2025, 11:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923649
I would love to explain, but my posts get deleted.
While I fully understand that a normal working fuel cut off switch on a Boeing can not move to cut off by itself, I'm completly certain that it can when the locking mechanism is not properly installed. In such a case, the moving part of the lever could even stand on a "needle point position", meaning it's neither in the on or off position. Smallest movement of the aircraft or a hand can move the lever to on or off.
I also observed many pilots in my career holding their hand at the backstop of the thrust levers on the pedestal as PM. Comes from a certain mistrust to the other pilot (mostly captains do that). If this hand falls down by a gust or a bump on the runway, his hand falls down on the pedestal. Exact location of the cut-off switches. If the locking mechanism isn't installed, you don't even feel that you moved it.
Dani
While I fully understand that a normal working fuel cut off switch on a Boeing can not move to cut off by itself, I'm completly certain that it can when the locking mechanism is not properly installed. In such a case, the moving part of the lever could even stand on a "needle point position", meaning it's neither in the on or off position. Smallest movement of the aircraft or a hand can move the lever to on or off.
I also observed many pilots in my career holding their hand at the backstop of the thrust levers on the pedestal as PM. Comes from a certain mistrust to the other pilot (mostly captains do that). If this hand falls down by a gust or a bump on the runway, his hand falls down on the pedestal. Exact location of the cut-off switches. If the locking mechanism isn't installed, you don't even feel that you moved it.
Dani
See https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/
So your scenario is impossible.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches
July 16, 2025, 12:35:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923704
You mean just because it never has happened, it's impossible? What a strange argument.
If you look closely at the picture in post no 262
Preliminary Air India crash report published
I see a perfect example of a wrongly installed locking mechanism.
How on earth do you think this argument is unthinkable, when there are even safety bulletins and mandatory maintenance orders about this very problem?
I understand that for you, as it is obviously for most Boeing pilot and anglosaxon pilots and forum members, a red herring. But that doesn't impair me from thinking logically. I'm on neighter side. That's why facts are more important for me than for many others.
Dani
If you look closely at the picture in post no 262
Preliminary Air India crash report published
I see a perfect example of a wrongly installed locking mechanism.
How on earth do you think this argument is unthinkable, when there are even safety bulletins and mandatory maintenance orders about this very problem?
I understand that for you, as it is obviously for most Boeing pilot and anglosaxon pilots and forum members, a red herring. But that doesn't impair me from thinking logically. I'm on neighter side. That's why facts are more important for me than for many others.
Dani
The Boeing 737 has the word IDLE on top of the switches, where the B787 has to word RUN on top.
Again read this https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/
The fact is the switches on a Boeing 787 has a different part number than those of the B737. There is no replacement part for the B787.
The FAA SAIB does not mention to operators that the switches on a B787 needs to be changed.
The problem was on the Boeing 737 * only*
So your point is not valid. It is *impossible* these two switches were moved because of a malfunction of the locking mechanism.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA RUN/CUTOFF Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
July 16, 2025, 12:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923708
You might want to carefully read the complete SAIB. The FAA wanted to make sure the issue on some of the B737 switches does not exist on other Boeing made aircraft.
It is here. https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/
It is here. https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
July 16, 2025, 13:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923730
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
July 16, 2025, 14:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923781
What are the chances of both switches going bad on the same flight?
As stated many times previously the throttle quadrant was replaced well after the 2018 SB.
Quadrants can be replaced for a myriad of reasons, according to the report none that had anything to do with the switches.
If there was even a remote suspicion of the switches being at fault an emergency AD would already have been issued.
As stated many times previously the throttle quadrant was replaced well after the 2018 SB.
Quadrants can be replaced for a myriad of reasons, according to the report none that had anything to do with the switches.
If there was even a remote suspicion of the switches being at fault an emergency AD would already have been issued.
If there was a 0,0001 percent chance the switches were faulty and could have moved because of gravity of an object hitting is, there would be a safety bulletin released to all B787 operators
There has not been such a bulletin.
The reason why the report does not mention which of the pilots ask " why did you cutoff ? " is unknown. We also do not know why it was written the switches ' transitioned' instead of ' moved' .
My guess it was either for political reasons or because of a possible criminal investigation.
For a pilot there is no reason to set both switches to cutoff without any reason. There was no engine fire. There was no discussion in the cockpit about using the switches.
Nothing. A mistake is extremely unlikely. There is no reason why the hands of a pilot needs to be near the switches. I do not believe in a brain fart.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Air Worthiness Directives Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Pilot "Why did you cut off" Preliminary Report RUN/CUTOFF
July 16, 2025, 16:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923830
That almost started so well!
I seriously doubt the report fails to identify which pilot asks 'why' and which says 'I didn't' for political reasons. There is too wide a constituency of members of the team and no purpose to be gained, but there would be a possibility it isn't mentioned due to potential legal/criminal investigation if it weren't for the fact that it clearly doesn't actually have that effect at all, and isn't in the AAIB-India remit anyway. If they have no evidence of mental health conditions for either pilot, it's a moot question at this stage in any event.
The only way you can read the report as an investigator is that they itemise all the material facts they know, and omit what isn't yet pertinent or known.
I seriously doubt the report fails to identify which pilot asks 'why' and which says 'I didn't' for political reasons. There is too wide a constituency of members of the team and no purpose to be gained, but there would be a possibility it isn't mentioned due to potential legal/criminal investigation if it weren't for the fact that it clearly doesn't actually have that effect at all, and isn't in the AAIB-India remit anyway. If they have no evidence of mental health conditions for either pilot, it's a moot question at this stage in any event.
The only way you can read the report as an investigator is that they itemise all the material facts they know, and omit what isn't yet pertinent or known.
Fact is there is a recording on the conversation recorded and available to the AAIB. There are multiple microphones in the cockpit. One for the cockpit, and one for each of the mic of the headset.
Even when the mics of the headsets were not working as a result of power failure, pure on the difference in voices the AAIB knows who said what.
So it was a choice not to write in the report what was known.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AAIB (All) Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Mental Health Pilot "Why did you cut off"