Posts by user "51bravo" [Posts: 5 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 1]

I tried to figure out the pitch angle during the "coast". Very roughly, taking 63m length and 5,7m fuselage diameter and from the picture above it seems to be 1 diameter up between back and front - I arrive at a pitch of 5,2 degrees. So nothing with above the power curve at TOGA where I would expect 17 degrees or more in constant alt powered flight path.

I am clearly favouring dual engine problems. That was far less than what is available on a healthy 787. But not the slightest hint why. No fumes no strange sounds.
Flight controls seemed still good until ground, the pilot (R.I.P) clearly kept it away from stalling, but he quickly run out of energy. Really sad.

Any other thoughts, quick and dirty calculations on the pitch angle or angle of attack? And conclusion on available thrust.

Oh I forgot, fuselage not equal cord line of airfoil, there is the angle of incidence. What would it be on a B787? But no more than 3-4 degrees, right?
Would be glad if someone with more data could figure out the pitch and AoA and related thrust for a constant speed (I am sure air speed was kept at the minimum, but kept, had they a bit of power at least they would keep the low altitude. Assuming still full elevator control and no trim issues)

Question to Human Factors experts or pilots having experienced/witnessed that.

Disclaimer: I never flew something with retractable undercarriage, just flaps. I also acknowledge that under substantial stress, and especially panic, your lizard brain awakes and takes over your Einstein brain. But on the other hand less so in routine handlings before things go south.

So - my question: If you look at the 787 cockpit layout (google, YT, your picture), how can Flaps Up instead of Gears Up be executed? It is a totally different activation of arm muscles, hand muscles, fingers even when not looking what you do ("three greens no red" anyone?). I mean, I totally understand the mishandlig of the switches and buttons on the Vilnius B737 - taking out hydraulics instead of anti ice. Switches are close, switches are similar. But gears and flaps levers - I just dont understand why still many people here set this on the high probability list. I absolutely don't buy it. At least it would be on my possible causes on a list far, far down. Considering the deck layout on a 787.

Do I miss some physiological/psychological human brain factors?
Because some of the professionals seem to have written here - "quite possible" in real stressfull world. Maybe on some GA aircraft where flaps select is also sometimes on the front panel. But 787?

NB: I am still on the symmetrical and significant thrust loss hypothesis ~10s into the airborne time.

For the action slip theory, while worth of considering, I have one question. That is that both switches are reported to be moved to CUTOFF at practically the same time, quote "within 0.1 seconds". You can not move those switches one after the other in 0.1 seonds (grip one, pull it, move it, let loose , grip the other one ...).

Question: is it an often encountered practice when arriving at the stand, to shut-down both engines simultaneously? The switch design seems to try to prevent simultaneous action. But we are humans, right?

Why this is relevant. Because if normally you do two actions, maybe with 2..5 seconds gap between them. It would be unlikely that you would shut down both engines instead of gear up. One, yes, on a bad strange day, but not both of them. Except ... you got a habit and always Cut-Off both engines in one single go.

My bad, you are right. Sorry for the noise. It was a dual action, which then in my mind plays against an action slip theory. Just my 2Ct of course.

It would have been mentioned by now. Either in the prelim or by leaks/press.