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AerocatS2A
June 13, 2025, 00:34:00 GMT permalink Post: 11899868 |
Subjects: None |
AerocatS2A
June 13, 2025, 13:17:00 GMT permalink Post: 11900510 |
So - my question: If you look up the 787 cockpit layout (google, YT, your picture), how can Flaps Up instead of Gears Up be executed. It is a totally different activation of arm muscles, hand muscles, fingers even when not looking what you do ("three greens no red" anyone?). I mean, I totally understand the mishandlig of the switches and buttons on the Vilnius B737 - taking out hydraulics instead of Anti Ice. Switches are close, switches are same. But Gears and Flaps levers - I just dont understand why still many people here set this on the high probability list. I absolutely dont believe it. At least it would be on my possible causes on a list far, far down. Considering the deck layout on a 787. Do I miss some physiological/psychological human brain factors? Because some of the professionals seem to have written - "quite possible" in real stressfull world. Maybe on some GA aircraft where flaps select is also sometimes on the front panel. To answer your broader question though, how could such an error happen? It happens because us simple humans learn how to do actions to the point where we don\x92t have to think about them anymore. This allows us to effectively automate routine tasks and save our brains for more novel tasks. The problem arises when we trigger the wrong automatic action in response to a cue. You ask for gear up, I know I need to select the gear up, I know where the gear handle is and what it looks and feels like, yet something goes wrong in the wiring of my body and instead, the flap-up automatic action is run. It\x92s run before I have consciously thought about it. Sound far fetched? Well it has happened numerous times. I\x92ve seen someone do exactly that, select the flap instead of the gear, and there are incident reports publicly available. All modern passenger jets have a similar layout of the flap lever and the gear lever with the gear looking like a wheel and the flap looking like a wing, yet this error can still happen. Have you ever gone to put something in the fridge that should\x92ve been put in the cupboard? I\x92d bet that most people have made that weird error at some point in their lives, and yet the fridge doesn\x92t look like the cupboard and they\x92re nowhere near each other. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Gear Lever RAT (All) RAT (Deployment) |
AerocatS2A
July 01, 2025, 09:26:00 GMT permalink Post: 11914140 |
Hold your horses there
Bloggs
, I didn't say they did, I said centre tanks were typically turned on at that altitude (using a certain 737 operator as a guide). As the check list that you posted shows the centre pumps will automatically turn off because of load shedding once an engine is started.
![]() ![]() ![]() Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Centre Tank FCOM |
AerocatS2A
July 10, 2025, 01:30:00 GMT permalink Post: 11918727 |
I don't have any comment on it other than to note that the manual is not specific to Air India. My B787-9 FCTM is identical as far as I can tell. The actual memory item for dual failure is to reset the fuel switches and start the RAT. It is also conditional on the engines being sub idle as noted by the other poster.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches RAT (All) Relight |
AerocatS2A
July 12, 2025, 05:25:00 GMT permalink Post: 11920211 |
There are quite a few comments on here along the lines of "no one would do that", "that's highly unlikely", "that's impossible" etc. We need to remember that a highly unlikely event, a dual engine shutdown/fail, has undeniably happened. Given that a highly unlikely event has happened all of the possible unlikely events that could have caused it are actually reasonably likely
given
that we know the accident happened. Think of it this way, tossing 100 heads in a row is incredibly unlikely and tossing 99 heads in a row is also incredibly unlikely. However, if you happen to toss 100 heads in a row then the incredibly unlikely 99 heads that came before the 100th are a certainty. They had to have happened for the 100 heads to happen.
This accident was caused by an unlikely sequence of events. If it wasn't then similar accidents would happen more often. Therefore we can't rule out possibilities just because they're unlikely. It's worthwhile considering the relative likelihood of different scenarios. For example is it more likely that the fuel switches were turned off due to a selection error or a mechanical failure? This was not a normal flight. It resulted in an accident. There is little point in blathering on about how a normal crew operates on a normal flight. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches |
AerocatS2A
July 12, 2025, 09:19:00 GMT permalink Post: 11920402 |
That's well within a second. Click click, maybe half a second to three quarters.
Subjects: None |
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