Captain in his 40\x92s with 8200 hrs but reported to have been flying for 22 years and being a training/check pilot. So would be interesting to hear more about confirmation of his experience.
According to The Times today, he was in his 60s and shortly to retire.
Originally Posted by
stn
Is that with the B787? Because all buses can fly without APU. Those days at work are ####ty, tho
I think you might have misunderstood.
West Coast
was (I believe) suggesting that if APU operation needed to be maintained during take off, then an inoperative APU would ground the aircraft.
I flew on a BA A320 just a few days ago that departed with a non-functioning APU.
Subjects
(links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): APU
Being mere SLF, the knowledge that a mandatory system called TCMA even exists worries me a little. A system with authority to shut down (all) engines without any interference from one of the pilots should IMHO not exist in an airplane.
Having read this, and the earlier thread pretty much from beginning to end, my understanding is that several conditions need to be met for TCMA to intervene. WoW is just one of those conditions.
Recall that the various search 'arcs' for MH370 were calculated on the basis of attempts by the engine monitoring systems to transmit data via satellite. The system involved did not transmit the data continuously.
Not quite.
The periodic 'pings' from MH370 were automated health signals. For want of a better description a brief electronic greeting to the satellite. No attempt was made to transmit data.
My 10 cents is on the switches and there is not a aireworthiness directive out there for nothing.
Apologies for being pedantic, but there is no Airworthiness Directive related to the switches.
There is a
Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB for short). It's not the same thing, and it's not mandatory to act on it's contents. You can draw your own conclusions as to why that is.
Two separate fuel switches set to cut off, at one of the most critical phases of flight where doing so would lead to an unrecoverable situation, followed by one pilot asking the other why he set the switches to cut off.
No AD from Boeing or NTSB.
Given that there's no evidence that the Fuel Cut-off Switches, or indeed any other part of the aircraft functioned incorrectly, what exactly should such an Airworthiness Directive be saying?
Further, what would be your reaction (as a pilot flying) to your colleague turning off the switches (again, not a remotely normal course of action). I think that mine would be something along the lines of "What the h*ll do you think that you're doing?"
Don't underestimate the strength of the authority gradient.
If - hypothetically - it was the PF who noticed the switches had been pulled and who then asked the question, he may have been reluctant to challenge a senior and more experienced colleague in such an assertive manner.
Subjects
(links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Authority Gradient
