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| B2N2
July 13, 2025, 19:06:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921541 |
These for me are very interesting questions.
There seems to be a period around second 12/13 post V1 where engines are (or should) be likely below idle, but prior to RAT power generation. Note that the report explicitly states the RAT started providing hydraulic power 5 seconds after engine shutdown commenced. It doesn't reference electrical power. So we don't know whether this was at the same time - others may clarify re: RAT operation. If memory serves me right on the 777 the electrical output capacity of the APU is about 8-10 times the output capacity of the RAT. It will likely be even more on the 787. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): APU Engine Failure (All) Engine Shutdown Hydraulic Failure (All) RAT (All) V1 |
| B2N2
July 13, 2025, 19:16:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921552 |
I don\x92t know if it started to open or was registered open at 8 seconds. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): APU Generators/Alternators Hydraulic Failure (All) RAT (All) |
| B2N2
July 15, 2025, 13:51:00 GMT permalink Post: 11922964 |
https://oodaloop.com/the-ooda-loop-e...-environments/ Keep in mind the critics of the \x91Miracle on the Hudson\x92. If they would have anticipated a dual engine failure and turned immediately they would have made a runway. Thats not how things work in reality. It takes times to analyze and come up with a response and look for a response. Just keep in mind this was not occurring in an air conditioned simulator under training conditions. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Dual Engine Failure Engine Failure (All) |
| B2N2
July 15, 2025, 19:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923193 |
Not really. They have released what data they see as pertinent to the investigation and the facts as they know them so far. They have not chosen to release only a portion of anything except that they were tasked with explaining how the event unfolded, as is common with preliminary reports. Data not included so far will be that which is not pertinent at this point, or not known... yet.
In other words, what they 'want known' is what happened. What they haven't said is why it happened, because that is so far not known. With the amount of data available and the time already spent analyzing it, they know who did what and when. They just don\x92t know the why and when they do how to formulate it so that it\x92s culturally palatable in the final report. There is likely also extensive testing to be conducted to exclude even the most remote possibilities that have been discussed here. It has been mentioned the Captain intended to retire to take care of his sick father well before mandatory retirement age. You would think that on Captains wages he would be able to pay for better care that he could provide himself on a partial pension. Maybe the real reason for his early retirement was less noble. It is fairly common in the US airline industry to offer a pilot the option to resign prior to being fired. Subjects: None |
| B2N2
July 15, 2025, 23:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923351 |
What we do know is that it\x92s less likely for the PF than it is for the PM to manipulate FCO switches. For the simple fact that the PF is rather busy and concentrated on other things like doing pilot stuff and the PM is well\x85.monitoring. Would you as CA and PM not even try to stop the PF from throwing the second switch? Versus the PF who may detect motion in his periferal vision but is concentrating on rotation and looking through the HUD? The CA had taken bereavement leave 3 years ago and according to Indian sources leave for mental health reasons? How would you suggest we connect the dots? https://liveandletsfly.com/air-india-flight-171-pilots/ https://www.ibtimes.sg/was-air-india...g-probed-80758 Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Mental Health Muscle Memory |
| B2N2
July 16, 2025, 14:13:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923752 |
I really don't get it why you oppose to the thought it could happen on any Boeing aircraft. Since they are all very similar switches. Maybe it's even possible to interchange some of them. There are so many errors a maintenance organization can make. Fake parts?
What really frightens me is that you and others resolutely block even to think about the possibility. Because, let's be honest, the probability is not zero (and I would say nearer to 1 than to 0). I have never moved such a switch, since I fly Airbus. Let me ask you your question differently: How many times have you moved a faulty switch? I know, that you and many others would immediatly identify such a bad switch and would render the aircraft as not airworthy. This is not the question. The question is: Has the Air India crew on that day identified the fault. And if yes, have they continued the flight preparation. You don't need a suicide theory to explain such a simple course of action. Dani As stated many times previously the throttle quadrant was replaced well after the 2018 SB. Quadrants can be replaced for a myriad of reasons, according to the report none that had anything to do with the switches. If there was even a remote suspicion of the switches being at fault an emergency AD would already have been issued. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Air Worthiness Directives |
| B2N2
July 16, 2025, 16:06:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923831 |
Video is around 45 minutes but it\x92s by three senior accident investigators with 100+ years of combined experience.
Subjects: None |
| B2N2
July 16, 2025, 19:05:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923939 |
Final report may take 1.5-2 years.
Subjects: None |