Posts by user "BrogulT" [Posts: 46 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 3]

I think that even if the DEL-AMD leg were flown totally empty for repositioning that it still would have been over MLW if it carried enough fuel for AMD-LGW. And we know from witnesses that the DEL-AMD leg was not empty. AMD is a regular stop for AI and has fuel, why would they tanker it in?

I don't want to refute your theory, but given your 30 years of experience---presuming it is relevant--I'd ask you to clarify a few things.

First, water in fuel is not a novel concept and I would presume that the designers of the 787 knew about it. You've simply stated that water might collect and settle out, but how much water might you expect under those conditions (57% humidity doesn't seem terribly high to me) and what features and procedures are already there to mitigage water contamination issues? Your theory would imply that there basically aren't any. IDK how the tank venting system works, but the idea that some huge amount of water could have condensed in the tank from the outside seems preposterous.

Second, how much water do you think it would take to cause a sustained flameout in one of those engines? Remember that they have automatic continous relight, so you're going to have to sustain your flame suppression long enough for them to wind down completely. I think those engines were probably using something like 2 gallons per second of fuel along with 250lbs of air heated to over 1100F. Any fuel in the mix would burn and the water would be converted to steam so you'd need mostly water for a long time. So if you think a hundred gallons of water could have gotten into each tank then perhaps I'd buy your theory--which, btw, does fit the known facts pretty well. But I think that short of some woeful neglect, Boeing and AI already know about and have methods of dealing with water contamination. At least I hope so.

What is "economy fuel"?

What boggles my mind (if my understanding is correct) is that you have redundant systems that use that redundancy not to make sure that they never accidentally shut down an engine improperly but rather to make sure they never fail to shut down an engine if even one channel thinks it should. AFAIK engines not returning to idle have not killed anyone yet (the engine can typically be just turned off or the fire handle pulled once the crew decides they want the engine to die) but engines shutting off at a bad time are an obvious hazard.

Would the throttles really roll back right away even at that low airspeed?

I think most line pilots, upon noticing that the fuel levers were in cutoff right after rotation, would immediately turn them back on. I don't think it would take 10 seconds--or even 5--to get that handled as I imagine most professional pilots would quickly grasp the seriousness of the problem. The only explanation I can think of for even that short delay--one that may have made a big difference--is the authority gradient between Captain and FO. But the preliminary report doesn't give us the level of detail we'd all like to have so it probably isn't possible to 100% support any specific conclusion just yet.

It won't be an issue, the cause is simply that they were below the airspeed needed for a successful airstart, the engine had spooled down too far to recover without being cranked and there was no power available from the APU yet. As far as knowing how long they were from #1 providing meaningful thrust, you'd need to have a lot more data to know. Another 30 seconds probably would have helped a lot.

He was a former Navy pilot employed as a FedEx flight engineer. Obviously he wasn't part of the assigned crew on that flight, but he was a qualified crewmember not just some random FedEx forklift driver.

Analyzing the rationality of someone in this situation isn't easy but there are some common threads from past incidents like FDX 705 that may help. If you start with the idea that the person in question doesn't want to continue their life but wants to conceal their suicide to make it look accidental for reasons of legacy, life insurance or whatever, then you'll see that their options become much more limited. Also, unlike a terrorist, they may not specifically want to kill a planeload of people but they are somehow willing to accept that as collateral damage. Unless they are outright delusional as in the AA/Horizon inciident, I think that last part takes a particularly specific type of mindset that should be the subject of psychological study. I'm not an expert of any kind in this area, but I don't think simple depression or suicidal ideation would suffice.

If it was an action by the captain, then claims that the plan was unlikely to succeed are disproven by the fact that it did succeed and probably with at least a few seconds to spare. He would have known that it would take a short bit of time for the FO to fully figure out that both engines had stopped and why. He would have known that shutting down for more than 10 seconds would spool down the engines far enough to make a relight either slow or unlikely and if need be, he could take further action. He also would have known that a crash into urban Ahmedabad would be catastrophic. I'm not saying his plan was perfect, but it is "reasonable" considering the stated goals and options available.

I would suggest everyone that wants to analyze the likelihood of particular actions on the part of the crew, whether referring to "muscle memory" or "brain farts" or whatever, simply add the phrase " during the initial climb " to their thoughts and see how that sounds. Without callouts for raising the gear and other than sleepwalking, what explanation is there for flipping the fuel cutoffs down in sequence? And further, doing so precisely in the time window where it was most likely to make the situation unrecoverable?

Well, it will be a single pilot plus the new HAL9000 system.

From the point that the fuel cutoffs were switched back to run, the primary (perhaps only) relevant issues were time and altitude. The left engine was relit and recovering on it's own but the right would probably have needed cranking as it appears to have had a hung start because it was spooled down too far and the airspeed was too low. However, I'm pretty sure that even if the APU had already been running at takeoff, they still would have needed at least another 30 seconds if not longer for full thrust. Also, there was nowhere near enough time for the APU to start and come online here.

If that were the case I'd certainly concede that we might have a much different story here. But also, if that were the case I think it would reflect extremely poorly on the Indian AAIB (who I currently hold in high regard) and their preliminary report. That would be a truly monumental omission that would cause me to seriously question their motives. I also think it would leak pretty quickly. I know the Indian ALPA wanted observer status in this investigation but I'm not sure if they got it or not.

I agree that deliberately crashing a passenger airliner is something more than ordinary suicide. IMO it goes way beyond a despondent person that just doesn't consider the effect on their family or those that might be affected or injured when they crash their car or jump out of building. A pilot who does this is murdering a bunch of innocent people who trusted them to keep them safe. We don't have to explain it to know that it happens and whatever psychological state that causes it is real. And I think there is probably a big difference between someone that commits such an act without trying to create a plausible cover-up (Germanwings) vs someone who tries to make it look like an accident (FDX 705) or someone who may just be making some sort of point (MH370).

Unless we face up to, study and discuss these issues they'll keep happening occasionally, perhaps even more frequently. If we keep going with preventing pilots from getting assistance by giving them a choice to 1) pretend everything is OK or 2) immediately hand in their medical, we'll stay right where we are.

The difference is that Indian police agencies are often extremely reluctant to take cases unless they have to. There are varous reasons that I won't try to explain but I wouldn't take the fact that the IPS or other agencies haven't publicly taken over the investigation yet as having any meaning. I would hope for more transparency but I would not be shocked if this ends up with the Indian equivalent of what happened with China Eastern 5735. Or perhaps pressure will be applied in a positive direction and they'll take and crack the case.

As I understood the question, the issue was what impact the lack of electrical power had on the restart. In this case, without the APU (or the other engine) for power the right engine was apparently never going to start despite heroic efforts on the part of the FADEC. With the APU running it could have been cranked. However, going from flight idle to full thrust is one thing, going from so far below idle that the engine needs to be cranked to flight idle will take a lot more time. How much more IDK since exactly how far the N2 speed had dropped, actual airspeed, temperature, etc are all factors. My guess is that it would feel like the engine was taking a million years to start. But the APU was not running and the point is moot.

One possilble reason (of many) is that the switches were turned off by someone who was otherwise unoccupied but they were turned on by someone who was busy trying to fly an airplane. Unless there was some deliberate effort to gum them up or damage them, I can't imagine mechanical faults suddenly appearing in the switch locking mechanisms right at that moment.

"Quite possibly"? A qualified, informed person has taken the time the share exactly how the 4 sets of contacts work on this switch and how they are connected to the plane's electrical system. Go back and find that and read it. It's not an open question. Broken or shorted wires would show up as specific faults, not as just a misreported switch position.

As for the locking mechanism, I don't have this switch but I do have various electronic devices with multiple examples of locking toggle switches with similar functions. They all share a common attribute in that while you can sort of balance the toggle in the middle, the internal toggle mechanism will not snap and change state until you go past that point. So if the switch is in the OFF position, it will not turn on until you go over the hump--and vice versa. So to get the switch in that condition you'd have to first switch it on and then back it off to the middle position. IDK for sure how the specific switches in question behave, but snap-action toggle mechanisms are pretty universal so I'd assume they are similar unless someone with access to one says otherwise.

That's a not a very meaningful common characteristic to use for comparing these events. Anyone who studies human behavior should include the ability to adapt to their analyses. Bacteria adapt to antibiotics by evolving, armies adapt to new weapons by adopting new defensive techniques and suicidal people who want to jump off a bridge can adapt to a chain-link fence by bringing a wire cutters. The obvious hole in your anti-theory here is that part of the theory of most known or suspected pilot suicides involve getting the other crewmembers out of the cockpit. Now that many airlines have adopted policies to prevent anyone from being alone in the cockpit, anyone contemplating suicide by crash will have to come up with a new plan. Now add in the addtional requirement that they hope to "die heroically" as a someone has previously said and now you have an even narrower set of possibilities.

From earlier and from the Honeywell datasheet these are 4PDT switches with all 4 section having the center as a common (ground AFAIK ) so that the FDR and other circuits can positively see that the switch is on one condition or the other--except for the brief time that both are open during switching. Snap toggles like this are most commonly break-before-make as tdracer confirms (but 50ms seems like a long time...). What this means practically is that a break or short in the wiring would cause a fault that would be recognized as such since a correctly operating circuit will have one or the other but not both of the circuits completed and there are 4 sets of circuits.