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Contact Approach
July 12, 2025, 01:19:00 GMT permalink Post: 11920062 |
There are no documented procedures to that effect during takeoff\x85\x85\x85
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Relight |
Contact Approach
July 12, 2025, 10:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11920472 |
NM-18-33 SAIB
left me wondering the same thing. It give a procedure for detecting the defect but omits to explain the cause. I was thinking that the wrong switches had been supplied/fitted. Assuming the image from the Chinese web site is correct, it is disappointing that the actuator can get into that state. I did not see anything that said whether that was how the switch arrived from Honeywell or if there was a defect that allowed the actuator to turn.
One other useful thing from that web site is a partial schematic which shows the connection of the 4 poles in the switch. I believe this is from a 737NG but it should be the same idea. ![]() If any of that were true why would it happen after Vr and why would one pilot ask: \x93why did you go to cutoff\x94. That is an observed deliberate action. Cmon folks enough with the nonsense! Why are people shying around the truth!? Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Honeywell SAIB NM-18-33 Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin |
Contact Approach
July 12, 2025, 10:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11920479 |
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Human Factors Switch Guards |
Contact Approach
July 12, 2025, 10:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11920488 |
This might have been discussed but as has been suggested upthread; a possible scenario is that at some point, PIC took their hands off the thrust levers and/or placed them in a guarding position behind the thrust levers at their base - but by doing so unfortunately nudged the Run switches to 'Off' - perhaps 'helped' by there either being incorrectly fitted locking mechanisms or worn locking mechanisms ? Subjects: None |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 18:03:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921494 |
It would have been useful if more of the CVR data had been released so as to see the crew interaction. Also the language used on what was released seems to refer to a third person.
However, from an operator perspective. Captain PM, FO PF. PF selects TOGA and follows the thrust levers, Captain confirms Thrust Set and replaces FO hands on the Thrust Levers. 80Kt call by PM, acknowledged by PF. Aircraft calls V1, Captain should withdraw hands from Thrust Levers and calls Rotate at Vr. PM is looking for confirmation the aircraft is climbing and calls Positive Rate. PF confirms and calls Gear Up. At this point the PF will be looking through the HUD looking to follow the flight director, the PM would be checking LNAV had engaged and at 400\x92 checking THR REF and VNAV SPD. However, at this point a loss of thrust occurred. So how was this apparent to the PF who would have been looking out with both hands on the control wheel. Reduction in pitch? GPWS call-out? Decreasing N1 on the engine instruments? EICAS ENG SHUTDOWN? What did the PM see? Who called out the situation? Were any actions called for? At some point as the generators went off line all the FO instruments would have blanked. Did the Captain assume control? I don\x92t think I would have been thinking about the Fuel Cut-Off switches at that point, yet they were specifically mentioned which does mean the switches were moved and it wasn\x92t some internal fault. Hopefully, as the CVR is further analysed some more information will come to light. Interestingly ENG 1 was cut off first\x85 Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR EICAS Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches Generators/Alternators Jump Seat TOGA V1 |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 18:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921509 |
You are desperately trying to make the scenario fit . Things aren\x92t left on the FCS . I\x92ve tried knocking em off in the sim doesn\x92t work .
Have you ever moved a set of them ? I\x92ve been moving them for 23 years on Boeings from 757 to 787. If they were really set to cutoff at the end of the runway it\x92s deliberate .. BUT we need more info \x85 FO was flying \x85 Capt moves them and then says \x93 why did you .. etc \x93 , Poor FO doing his best to stay in the air If you\x92ve ever moved those switches you know how they work and you know it\x92s impossible for anything to knock them or move them out of the detent. Over the years there have been many \x93slips\x94 that have led to accidents, I\x92m yet to come across one which involved both FCS inadvertently being cutoff. The design works, believe it or not. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent) |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 18:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921528 |
We are we not permitted to discuss the highly probable scenario that one of the crew were responsible for this incident? This is a discussion forum after all, not a cult. Those of us who actually operate these aircraft have to discuss away from this forum now purely because it\x92s no longer fit for purpose.
Subjects: None |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 19:14:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921549 |
Is this not a Professional Pilots forum? Or has it become something else? If it remains a Pilots forum allow us the decency to discuss what we think\x85 we are after all the most qualified to know the most likely set of events. Subjects: None |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 19:40:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921572 |
That totally clears up any doubt then, because a media interview where claims are made without any substantive evidence at all are clearly to be taken as gospel.
What I found interesting when viewing the Captain's background, was that he was a long-time carer for his aging father, and had called home before the flight to confirm that he would be in contact again once arrived in London. Also that he was highly respected with no history of difficult personal interactions, and had passed all medical clearances. I'm sure we're all open to actual evidence though. It certainly is very puzzling though. Could it be that the one who cut off the fuel control switches was the one who said \x93why did you cut off the fuel switches\x94, hence the reply \x93I didn\x92t\x94 as the other guy didn\x92t actually do it? Could that be an attempt to manipulate the CVR? Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 19:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921581 |
I\x92m at a loss as to why the discussion of an apu inlet door is relevant as it\x92s been clearly stated in the report to be working as per the conditions that were met. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR FDR |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 19:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921587 |
Not sure how much more evidence you need to start a discussion. We as operators are trying to put ourselves in that situation and describe likely outcomes based on present experiences. The most likely event is the PM orchestrating this, the Captain in this case. This however is up for debate\x85 the debate we should be having\x85 not APU doors. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): APU Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches RUN/CUTOFF |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 20:03:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921594 |
Because it wouldnt have been immediately available to support engine restart and/or other electrical functions, as it didn't open until around 13 seconds after cutoff event. It's relevant in so much of how it may (or may not) have affected recovery efforts.
It was working as per the conditions absolutely, but those conditions meant it wasn't available immediately. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FDR Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Relight |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 20:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921602 |
We don't know this. There is no identification of who did what during this incident. It's fair to say that the PM is
likely
to be the one who flips switches while the PF has his hands full on the yoke, but this incident was anything but normal, so we can't assume normal applies.
You are quite right, we don\x92t have any evidence of who did what, other than those actions and words that were said and done. That\x92s why we discuss based on our everyday experiences in the very job they were doing to at least come up with a plausible explanation, right? Subjects: None |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 20:23:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921612 |
MH370 evidence suggests deliberate attempts of deception and misdirection, with seemingly no motive. Could this be similar? Subjects: None |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 20:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921623 |
Could be - we have a group of some 200 or so oldies ex. airline who had a thrash at this subject this morning - if you know how the system works (FDR, CVR, accident investigation, etc.) you could suggest that you could manipulate the scenario and that it would be hard to prove who actually did it. The transcripts with the actual words, tones and emotions could well point to who did it but could it be proved?
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR FDR |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 20:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921640 |
Thanks for confirming - the point I'm trying to make (apparently badly) is twofold:
1. There's a discussion here about the delay of 4 seconds between switching engine 1 and engine 2 to RUN. The fact is that this is irrelevant in terms of outcome given the lack of APU at the start of this process. Moreover if the lack of APU was known to the pilots, then it would potentially explain this delay anyway (what was the point in flicking the other switch yet)? 2. The lack of APU until at least 12-13 seconds after loss of engines, lack of electrical power from the engines, and at best limited electrical power from the RAT (and for a time, none), would have affected other systems used by the pilots during this short flight, at least for part of it. This hasn't been discussed basically at all, despite a lot of discussion around the ten second delay to start the engines restart, even though that power loss would have been in that window. Ok so: 1) There may be a technical reason outside of my scope for what you describe. From an operational point of view, for every EFATO I\x92ve ever done in the sim we are taught ANC. Initially our primary focus is flying the aircraft, hence why it\x92s being suggested this was the work of the PM, the only one with sufficient capacity capable of such at that moment. The fact the APU hasn\x92t come online whilst under such workload whilst falling out of the sky at 300ft wouldn\x92t be much of a consideration from the PF 2) Without power, altitude or airspeed nothing else really matters at that stage, does it? The APU takes longer to come online than this flight lasted! Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): APU EFATO RAT (All) RUN/CUTOFF Relight |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 20:54:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921646 |
Alternatively, given that the PM was used to operating simulators, what conditions could have prompted him to do a sequence that was familiar to him of resetting the simulator (including operating the FCS switches), doing things that are inadvisable in a real aircraft? If these are stupid questions, I apologise for taking up a mod's time processing the comment deletion. 2) No instructor has ever action slipped both FCS at VR. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Thread Moderation |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 21:10:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921659 |
Startle will absolutely play a role, largely because no pilot is ever trained to deal with both FCS being cutoff a few seconds after rotate\x85 that would be suicide, for want of a better word.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches RUN/CUTOFF |
Contact Approach
July 13, 2025, 21:16:00 GMT permalink Post: 11921670 |
It would seem that the few professional pilots contributing to this topic do so all knowing the real direction of this investigation.
The majority however are clogging it up with utter nonsense, most of which I can guarantee are not professional pilots. Subjects: None |
Contact Approach
July 17, 2025, 12:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 11924371 |
Can we all just take a moment to acknowledge how absolutely pointless this entire thread was. Those of us Professional Pilots in this chat were banging the drum well before the WSJ article was released, yet the outrageous theories continued\x85 more so our accurate posts were removed.
I feel for the FO, crew and passengers, what a needless tragedy. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Wall Street Journal |
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