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D Bru
2025-06-15T15:31:00 permalink Post: 11902557 |
777/787 driver here.
When you lift off the runway, the gear doors open REGARDLESS of gear lever position. If you do not raise the gear within 30 seconds, the gear doors close again and you keep the gear down as you apparently desire. In the video, the gear doors are closed again as the airplane flies into the suburb. This requires normal hydraulics in system C, which was apprently available as the doors are closed again. 1. 787-8 LG retraction: boogies tilt forward, doors open, boogies tilt inward: Last edited by D Bru; 16th Jun 2025 at 04:24 . Reason: Following pertinent comments EXDAC & Roo (thanks!) Subjects: Gear Retraction MLG Tilt 4 users liked this post. |
D Bru
2025-06-17T22:37:00 permalink Post: 11904725 |
EEC MN4 - TMCA
Without a doubt one is looking at a very, very rare event, most likely the result of an unlikely/unlucky combination of issues, the grim gravity realised by the F/C (mayday) immediately after T/O. As a very, very FF/retired EU bureaucrat/economist/lawyer with an as ever staunch penchant for data/facts, I'm therefore wondering whether VT-ANB engines had already their EEC MN4 microprocessors replaced as mandated within 11000 cycles or 12 years per AD 2021-21-05
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/...2021-25491.pdf
. This AD was prompted by in-service occurrences of loss of GEnX engines thrust control resulting in uncommanded high thrust. Uncommanded high trust on (at least one of) the engines during the TO-roll, in particular past V1, resulting in a discrepancy with the actual (likely derated)thrust settings, could have triggered TMCA on or just before lift-off.
Subjects: Air Worthiness Directives GEnx (ALL) Mayday V1 3 users liked this post. |
D Bru
2025-06-17T23:03:00 permalink Post: 11904743 |
BR, D Bru Subjects: EDML TCMA (All) TCMA (Logic) |
D Bru
2025-06-26T21:39:00 permalink Post: 11911519 |
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDe...x?PRID=2139785
Status Report on recovery and examination of data from Black Boxes \x96 Air India Flight AI-171 Note the front EAFR is the one with RIPS battery backup. 1. The investigation's reliance on the front RIPS battery backuped EAFR indicates a confirmation of a total electrical power loss; 2. Earlier reports (i.e. AVH, now removed) of successful readout of and observations from CVR have proven outright fake. Regards, D Bru 4 users liked this post. |
D Bru
2025-06-26T22:05:00 permalink Post: 11911534 |
Really, Grumpy? If aft EAFR (not RIPS supported) would have had any data/voice after elec failure following T/O, I think the AAIB would have been more than happy to extract everything from that one since it was found earlier and most likely more intact than the front one. Regards
Last edited by D Bru; 26th Jun 2025 at 22:17 . Reason: Sorry but I didn't want to sound too "grumpy" ;) Subjects: AAIB (All) EAFR RIPS 2 users liked this post. |
D Bru
2025-06-28T17:04:00 permalink Post: 11912578 |
I am not certain on that. Remember the 737 didn't have them on the standby bus (Jeju). The NTSB doc states they're powered from the L/R 28VDC buses on the 787.
This shows the centre TRUs can only power the instrument buses not the L/R DC buses, the RAT can't really power the right TRU without powering both R1/R2 buses, and powering the left TRU would require powering the left 235/115 ATU which would probably be a lot of magnetising current even if not much actual load. The contactor naming supports that. My money is on the L/R DC buses being unpowered in RAT operation; only the CA/FO instrument buses and the 235VAC backup bus. Last edited by D Bru; 28th Jun 2025 at 17:06 . Reason: deleting a repeat image of the elec system Subjects: EAFR Electrical Busses FDR NTSB Parameters RAT (All) RIPS TRU 5 users liked this post. |
D Bru
2025-06-28T19:17:00 permalink Post: 11912637 |
The requirements I have seen indicate that RIPS is applicable only to CVR or the CVR function of an EAFD. If you are aware of any requirement for RIPS to support flight data recording would you please provide a reference.
FAA requirements and the discussion/changes that resulted from the initial NPRM here - https://www.federalregister.gov/docu...er-regulations Yes, possible electric failure on the eafr is of course a totally different story concerning voice recording |
D Bru
2025-07-01T10:21:00 permalink Post: 11914168 |
05 THRE 180ft, TDZE 186ft 23 THRE 189ft, TDZE 189ft. Google maps directions gives for walking from the nearest road next to the 05 THR (end of 23) to the accident site "mostly flat", i.e. going up 1m and going down 4m. That indeed can't add up to 50ft below RWY, more like 10/20ft, depending on the RWY elevation reference point. Moreover, the two floor building Air India 171 struck is about 20ft high. Subjects: None |
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