Posts by user "D Bru" [Posts: 8 Total up-votes: 18 Pages: 1]

D Bru
2025-06-15T15:31:00
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Post: 11902557
Originally Posted by fox niner
777/787 driver here.

When you lift off the runway, the gear doors open REGARDLESS of gear lever position. If you do not raise the gear within 30 seconds, the gear doors close again and you keep the gear down as you apparently desire. In the video, the gear doors are closed again as the airplane flies into the suburb. This requires normal hydraulics in system C, which was apprently available as the doors are closed again.
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
Some previous posts have suggested that the 787-8 behaves differently from the later variants in respect of the automatic opening of the gear doors.

Are you saying that they are wrong?
I'm posting some YT-links to show that 787-9 gear doors indeed open on lift-off, while the -8 gear doors open only when gear up is actually selected. I also include links to a 787-8 and a -9 that keep their LG down after departure. The 8 doors are not opening. The 9 doors do open again regardless and indeed close again about 30 seconds after lift-off.

1. 787-8 LG retraction: boogies tilt forward, doors open, boogies tilt inward:
2. 787-9 LG retraction: doors open on lift-off, boogies tilt forward before inward:
3. 787-8 LG kept down: doors remain closed:
4. 787-9 LG kept down: doors open and close again about 30 secs after lift-off:

Last edited by D Bru; 16th Jun 2025 at 04:24 . Reason: Following pertinent comments EXDAC & Roo (thanks!)

Subjects: Gear Retraction  MLG Tilt

4 users liked this post.

D Bru
2025-06-17T22:37:00
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Post: 11904725
EEC MN4 - TMCA

Without a doubt one is looking at a very, very rare event, most likely the result of an unlikely/unlucky combination of issues, the grim gravity realised by the F/C (mayday) immediately after T/O. As a very, very FF/retired EU bureaucrat/economist/lawyer with an as ever staunch penchant for data/facts, I'm therefore wondering whether VT-ANB engines had already their EEC MN4 microprocessors replaced as mandated within 11000 cycles or 12 years per AD 2021-21-05 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/...2021-25491.pdf . This AD was prompted by in-service occurrences of loss of GEnX engines thrust control resulting in uncommanded high thrust. Uncommanded high trust on (at least one of) the engines during the TO-roll, in particular past V1, resulting in a discrepancy with the actual (likely derated)thrust settings, could have triggered TMCA on or just before lift-off.

Subjects: Air Worthiness Directives  GEnx (ALL)  Mayday  V1

3 users liked this post.

D Bru
2025-06-17T23:03:00
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Post: 11904743
Originally Posted by EXDAC
How would the thrust lever idle condition have been satisfied?
Originally Posted by EDML
That is not what the TCMA logic is supposed to do. Only high thrust with the thrust lever idle should trigger the TCMA.
Yes, there's another snag in the million dollar Q for the explanation. If the MN4 microprocessor can run amok, so could perhaps the TCMA not exactly act as intended. But I take in both your pertinent comments and will (as per the mods advice) from now on sit on my hands and only read until the prelim report hopefully soon!

BR, D Bru

Subjects: EDML  TCMA (All)  TCMA (Logic)

D Bru
2025-06-26T21:39:00
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Post: 11911519
Originally Posted by Senior Pilot
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDe...x?PRID=2139785

Status Report on recovery and examination of data from Black Boxes \x96 Air India Flight AI-171

Note the front EAFR is the one with RIPS battery backup.
Thx, this indicates at least two issues:

1. The investigation's reliance on the front RIPS battery backuped EAFR indicates a confirmation of a total electrical power loss;
2. Earlier reports (i.e. AVH, now removed) of successful readout of and observations from CVR have proven outright fake.

Regards,
D Bru

Subjects: AI171  CVR  EAFR  RIPS

4 users liked this post.

D Bru
2025-06-26T22:05:00
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Post: 11911534
Originally Posted by grumpyoldgeek
I have to disagree with point 1. They did not give a reason for using the front unit and I don't see why you would assume one.
Really, Grumpy? If aft EAFR (not RIPS supported) would have had any data/voice after elec failure following T/O, I think the AAIB would have been more than happy to extract everything from that one since it was found earlier and most likely more intact than the front one. Regards

Last edited by D Bru; 26th Jun 2025 at 22:17 . Reason: Sorry but I didn't want to sound too "grumpy" ;)

Subjects: AAIB (All)  EAFR  RIPS

2 users liked this post.

D Bru
2025-06-28T17:04:00
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Post: 11912578
Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere
I am not certain on that. Remember the 737 didn't have them on the standby bus (Jeju). The NTSB doc states they're powered from the L/R 28VDC buses on the 787.

This shows the centre TRUs can only power the instrument buses not the L/R DC buses, the RAT can't really power the right TRU without powering both R1/R2 buses, and powering the left TRU would require powering the left 235/115 ATU which would probably be a lot of magnetising current even if not much actual load. The contactor naming supports that.

My money is on the L/R DC buses being unpowered in RAT operation; only the CA/FO instrument buses and the 235VAC backup bus.
That's exactly why I would really recommend reading through the NTSB FDR report on the 2013 JA829J Boston incident helpfully posted by EDLB . There's potentially a wealth of data concerning a to me at least surprisingly number of 2000 of parameters written on a 787 EAFR, that is that at least if there's elec power. Even the 10 min RIPS is useless if there's no data sent from electrically shut off systems.

Last edited by D Bru; 28th Jun 2025 at 17:06 . Reason: deleting a repeat image of the elec system

Subjects: EAFR  Electrical Busses  FDR  NTSB  Parameters  RAT (All)  RIPS  TRU

5 users liked this post.

D Bru
2025-06-28T19:17:00
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Post: 11912637
Originally Posted by EXDAC
The requirements I have seen indicate that RIPS is applicable only to CVR or the CVR function of an EAFD. If you are aware of any requirement for RIPS to support flight data recording would you please provide a reference.

FAA requirements and the discussion/changes that resulted from the initial NPRM here -

https://www.federalregister.gov/docu...er-regulations

Yes, possible electric failure on the eafr is of course a totally different story concerning voice recording

Subjects: CVR  FAA  RIPS

D Bru
2025-07-01T10:21:00
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Post: 11914168
Originally Posted by Musician

1) I had seen the "50 feet below runway" referenced as well, and double-checked on Google Earth, and could not confirm this. The terrain looks reasonably level. I'd be happy to see evidence for this claim, but until I do, I'll think it's false.
According to official data ( https://aim-india.aai.aero/eaip-v2-0...AAH-en-GB.html & https://https://aim-india.aai.aero/eaip-v2-05-2023/eAIP/VAAH-ADC.pdf ):
05 THRE 180ft, TDZE 186ft
23 THRE 189ft, TDZE 189ft.
Google maps directions gives for walking from the nearest road next to the 05 THR (end of 23) to the accident site "mostly flat", i.e. going up 1m and going down 4m. That indeed can't add up to 50ft below RWY, more like 10/20ft, depending on the RWY elevation reference point. Moreover, the two floor building Air India 171 struck is about 20ft high.

Subjects: None