Posts by user "DaveReidUK" [Posts: 55 Total up-votes: 202 Pages: 3]

DaveReidUK
2025-06-14T17:16:00
permalink
Post: 11901672
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
from the EASA statement yesterday :

No mention of UK
I'm not sure why one would rely on EASA for confirmation (or otherwise) of the AAIB's involvement.



Subjects: None

3 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-14T19:58:00
permalink
Post: 11901778
Originally Posted by dbenj
I agree. It is intriguing that we have none of the radio communication released.
Recording ATC communications is illegal in India.

Subjects: None

3 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-14T20:08:00
permalink
Post: 11901790
Originally Posted by QDM360
People really need to stop using FR24 data if they don't understand it.
This FR24 recording of AI171
https://www.flightradar24.com/data/f.../ai171#3ac3097
only consists of 4 unique ADS-B data messages. The first two were on the apron/taxiway. Then one at the runway intersection. And the fourth and last one just after the aircraft became airborne. That's all.

The two last ADS-B data messages are more than 4 minutes apart. It was 8:04 UTC when they entered the runway at the intersection. The next and last data point was received at 8:08 UTC.

The map view connects these dots, so it looks like a proper track. But in reality the ADS-B receiver barely received anything. It's therefore silly to argue the aircraft stopped transmitting ADS-B data based on this poor recording. The only thing you can say with certainty is that FR24's ADS-B receiver at Ahmedabad has really, really poor coverage...
The comments that you are criticising are based on a subsequent release of ADS-B data from FR24 containing 113 unique messages.

While those still have the 4\xbd minute gap while the aircraft was presumably backtracking, they resume during the latter part of the takeoff roll where reception is clearly better.

There is little doubt that when they abruptly cease after the aircraft is airborne it's because the plane has stopped transmitting.

Subjects: ADSB  AI171  FlightRadar24  Takeoff Roll

4 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-14T20:42:00
permalink
Post: 11901815
Originally Posted by AirScotia
I've been 'watching' flights take off from Ahmedabad on FR24. Assuming that the bold dots on the track are where FR24 gets some real transponder data, it looks as if flights become visible at take-off, then FR24 interpolates the track until roughly 800m/1km from the end of the runway when it gets the next 'real' data block. So all we can conclude is that the transponder stopped transmitting somewhere in the 8 - 10 seconds between take-off and 1km.
No, you can't generalise from that.

For everyday flights, FR24 displays enough plot points to produce a reasonably smooth track, with plots typically at 6-8 second intervals, while suppressing intermediate points to save bandwidth. That's why the initial download for the accident flight only had 4 plot points.

The supplementary "granular" data (FR24's description) contains plots towards the end of the takeoff roll at roughly 0.5 second intervals. So we can reasonably conclude that the aircraft's transponder stopped squittering within a second (probably less) of the final plot point.

Subjects: FlightRadar24  Takeoff Roll

1 user liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-14T21:21:00
permalink
Post: 11901849
Originally Posted by SQUAWKIDENT
Please stop posting information from this commercial aircraft spotter site. It is frequently inaccurate. ADS-B site free to use and more accurate IMHO.
Data from the various flight trackers may vary in coverage or granularity, but there is no reason in this instance to believe that airborne position/altitude data published by FR24 is less accurate than that from any other flight tracker, whether commercial or not.

What don't you believe in the published data?

Subjects: ADSB  FlightRadar24

5 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-14T21:27:00
permalink
Post: 11901855
Originally Posted by tdracer
Another hour spent sifting through the stuff since last night (my sympathies to the mods ). A few more comments:

"Real time engine monitoring" is typically not 'real time' - it's recorded and sent in periodic bursts. Very unlikely anything was sent from the event aircraft on this flight.

Commanded engine cutoff - the aisle stand fuel switch sends electrical signals to the spar valve and the "High Pressure Shutoff Valve" (HPSOV) in the Fuel Metering Unit, commanding them to open/close using aircraft power. The HPSOV is solenoid controlled, and near instantaneous. The solenoid is of a 'locking' type that needs to be powered both ways (for obvious reasons, you wouldn't want a loss of electrical power to shut down the engine). The fire handle does the same thing, via different electrical paths (i.e. separate wiring).

As I've noted previously, a complete loss of aircraft electrical power would not cause the engines to flameout (or even lose meaningful thrust) during takeoff. In the takeoff altitude envelope, 'suction feed' (I think Airbus calls it 'gravity feed') is more than sufficient to supply the engine driven fuel pumps. It's only when you get up to ~20k ft. that suction feed can become an issue - and this event happened near sea level.

Not matter what's happening on the aircraft side - pushing the thrust levers to the forward stop will give you (at least) rated takeoff power since the only thing required from the aircraft is fuel and thrust lever position (and the thrust lever position resolver is powered by the FADEC).

The TCMA logic is designed and scrubbed so as to be quite robust - flight test data of the engine response to throttle slams is reviewed to insure there is adequate margin between the TCMA limits and the actual engine responses to prevent improper TCMA activation. Again, never say never, but a whole lot would have had to go wrong in the TCMA logic for it to have activated on this flight.

Now, if I assume the speculation that the RAT deployed is correct, I keep coming up with two potential scenarios that could explain what's known regarding this accident:
1) TCMA activation shutdown the engines
or
2) The fuel cutoff switches were activated.
I literally can come up with no other plausible scenarios.

In all due respect to all the pilots on this forum, I really hope it wasn't TCMA. It wouldn't be the first time a mandated 'safety system' has caused an accident (it wouldn't just be Boeing and GE - TCMA was forced by the FAA and EASA to prevent a scenario that had never caused a fatal accident) - and there would be a lot embarrassing questions for all involved. But I personally know many of the people who created, validated, and certified the GEnx-1B TCMA logic - and can't imagine what they would be going through if they missed something (coincidentally, one of them was at my birthday party last weekend and inevitably we ended up talking about what we used to do at Boeing (he's also retired)). Worse, similar TCMA logic is on the GEnx-2B (747-8) - which I was personally responsible for certifying - as well as the GE90-115B and the 737 MAX Leap engine - the consequences of that logic causing this accident would be massive.
A TCMA bug just doesn't bear thinking about, I really hope that doesn't turn out to be the case.

Subjects: FAA  FADEC  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cut Off Switches  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Pump (Engine Driven)  Fuel Pumps  High Pressure Shutoff Valve  RAT (All)  RAT (Deployment)  TCMA (Activation)  TCMA (All)  TCMA (Improper Activation)  TCMA (Logic)  TCMA (Shutdown)

5 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T06:58:00
permalink
Post: 11902165
Originally Posted by FullWings
I think it needs to be said again that pretty much anything can happen to the aircraft systems and the engines will carry on running
I remember having that drummed into me when I was knee-high to a grasshopper ...

Subjects: None

2 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T09:14:00
permalink
Post: 11902272
Originally Posted by VR-HFX
Yes indeed. I strongly leant toward the incorrectly set AAI and VNAV capture and level off as the a/c reportedly reached max alt of 625ft or about 450ft AGL.
The only "max alt" that can be confirmed is the 95 ft AGL over the 05 piano keys.

Obviously the aircraft subsequently gained more height, but we don't yet have anything other than estimates of how high.

Subjects: VNAV

1 user liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T10:51:00
permalink
Post: 11902349
Originally Posted by CurlyB
The long runway roll in the tagline has not been proven, as seen many times in this thread
True, all we know from the data is that the aircraft was barely airborne (around 40 feet) with about 1650 feet to go before the runway end.

Subjects: None

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T12:02:00
permalink
Post: 11902410
Originally Posted by Aerospace101
This is an important distinction because the Center hydraulics which is solely electrically pump driven (not engine) only had enough power to tilt the bogey, not open the doors.
There was some debate earlier in the thread about whether the actuator was there to tilt the bogie or to untilt it. I don't recall that having been resolved, but I may be wrong.

Subjects: MLG Tilt

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T13:06:00
permalink
Post: 11902449
Originally Posted by fox niner
Then the gear.
When you lift off the runway, the gear doors open REGARDLESS of gear lever position. If you do not raise the gear within 30 seconds, the gear doors close again and you keep the gear down as you apparently desire. In the video, the gear doors are closed again as the airplane flies into the suburb. This requires normal hydraulics in system C, which was apprently available as the doors are closed again.
Some previous posts have suggested that the 787-8 behaves differently from the later variants in respect of the automatic opening of the gear doors.

Are you saying that they are wrong?

Subjects: Gear Retraction

6 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T16:20:00
permalink
Post: 11902604
Originally Posted by MaxRange120
There won't be updates from the UK AAIB.

" In accordance with international protocols, release of information on the investigation rests solely with the Indian authorities. "

Subjects: AAIB (All)  AAIB (UK)

7 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T16:52:00
permalink
Post: 11902627
Originally Posted by Gupeg
Looking at the raw data in your post, and given the speeds are likely IAS based i.e. can be affected by wind
They are groundspeeds.

Subjects: None

1 user liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T19:10:00
permalink
Post: 11902734
Originally Posted by modcat
Heard about CM1 seat runaway and thr levers moved back?
The 787 AD refers to uncommanded movement in a forward direction.

Subjects: Air Worthiness Directives

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T21:05:00
permalink
Post: 11902840
Originally Posted by EXDAC
But as previously posted a recorder is only as good as the systems that provide the data to it. If those systems, or some of those systems, are not powered the data is simply not available to be recorded. You need the DFDAU (or equivalent) to be powered and you need the systems that feed data to the DFDAU (or equivalent) to be powered and operational.

Edit to add - RIPS will likely maintain CVR function.
Correct, on the 787 it's the forward EARF that has the RIPS, and it will continue to record inputs from the CAM.

Subjects: CVR  Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit  RIPS

DaveReidUK
2025-06-15T21:24:00
permalink
Post: 11902857
Originally Posted by Barney Rock
Me thinks one cannot depend on ADS-B da6a at such low altitude. Lots of errors.
There is no reason to doubt the ADS-B data captured for this event. It was failure to understand it that led to erroneous assumptions (for example that the aircraft had taken off from an intersection).

Subjects: ADSB

2 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-16T06:35:00
permalink
Post: 11903140
Originally Posted by OldnGrounded
Thanks for the heads up. The story also says, "No cause has yet been identified for what would be an extremely rare power loss from both engines, but on Sunday the Indian civil air authority (DGCA) began urgent pre-flight inspections of fuel systems, electronic engine controls and other systems on Indian Boeing 787s."

And it quotes Juan Browne (Blancolirio): \x93There was something terribly wrong with this 787 jet and we need to find out really quickly what went wrong because we\x92ve got a thousand of these operating today and operators need to find out what happened.\x94
The Times article also helpfully informs us that

"The [RAT] is not intended to provide enough power and controls for an aircraft to climb after take-off, merely to give minimum control for an emergency descent from altitude"

Subjects: DGCA  RAT (All)

2 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-17T07:09:00
permalink
Post: 11904017
Originally Posted by dragon6172
One comment here, and maybe I am mis-understanding your comment, but the landing gear only operates via the center hydraulics. It does not matter whether the Left/Right engine driven hydraulic systems are operative or not. The RAT will only pressurize the primary flight control portion of the center hydraulics.
Are you saying that the RAT cannot power retraction of the gear, neither via its own hydraulic pump nor via its generator providing power to the centre system pumps?

Or could it be that it's capable of delivering enough power (via either route) to move the tilt actuator but not a humungous retraction jack?

Subjects: Gear Retraction  Generators/Alternators  Hydraulic Failure (All)  Hydraulic Pumps  MLG Tilt  RAT (All)

1 user liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-17T13:32:00
permalink
Post: 11904305
Originally Posted by Icarus2001
Should we talk about the RAT being an electrical generator? No? Okay then, carry on.
The post from which you quoted part did talk about both hydraulic and electrical power from the RAT. I'm not sure what point you're making.

Subjects: Generators/Alternators  RAT (All)  RAT (Electrical)

2 users liked this post.

DaveReidUK
2025-06-17T19:03:00
permalink
Post: 11904575
Originally Posted by Lord Bracken
Absolutely. This confidence that the EAFR has already been read is misplaced. It’s a specialist piece of equipment and probably can’t even be downloaded in India. It’s most likely on its way to the NTSB, the BEA or the AAIB (UK) for analysis which will be done under strict conditions (for obvious reasons).
It isn't. It's essentially just a CVR and FDR in the same box. The main USP is that you now have two of each, about as far apart from each other as possible on the aircraft.

Each is downloaded separately in pretty much the same way as always.

Subjects: AAIB (All)  CVR  EAFR  FDR  NTSB

5 users liked this post.