July 13, 2025, 09:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921168
Air India didn't inspect the switches on board their 787s when the SB came out, so it's doubtful that they inspected those on the spare modules in stores.
Subjects: None
July 13, 2025, 19:29:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921564
Yes.
The ADS-B data collected by FR24 leave the aircraft at 172 knots
8 seconds
4 seconds into the outage. Vr was 155 knots per the report. The preliminary report also says it crashed at 8⁰ nose-up attitude, which was after the "flare".
Please tell me how recoverable that is, with hypothetical 95% thrust on both engines
2
6 seconds later.
edit: reviewed fr24 data and adjusted time covered; I think it did decelerate to approximately 155 knots in 10 seconds, based on -3knots/second.
The ADS-B data collected by FR24 leave the aircraft at 172 knots
Please tell me how recoverable that is, with hypothetical 95% thrust on both engines
edit: reviewed fr24 data and adjusted time covered; I think it did decelerate to approximately 155 knots in 10 seconds, based on -3knots/second.
Beware of comparing the speeds from ADS-B, which are groundspeeds, with those from the report, which are IAS.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ADSB APU FlightRadar24 Preliminary Report
July 14, 2025, 08:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921939
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Air Worthiness Directives FAA
July 16, 2025, 07:44:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923493
Not trying to be part of the on-going hamster wheel. But the discussions regarding the odds of this being pilot suicide based on historical rates are missing a very critical statistical point.
Let's just assume that rate of commercial airliner crashes due to pilot suicide is 1 in 100 million departures. Simply put, that means that if you get on a commercial aircraft to fly from point A to point B, the historical odds are that there is a 1 in 100 million chance that your flight will crash due to an intentional suicidal pilot act. However, the historical odds say that the odds of your flight crashing for any reason are several million to one. Since the turn of the century, the fatal cash rate has been something around 1 in 5 million departures.
Now, we know for a fact that the Air India 787 crashed - hence the probability of a crash for this particular flight is not 1 in 5 million - it's ONE! That means the historical odds of this crash being due to an intentional act by a pilot (i.e. suicide) is ~5%, not one in 100 million (obviously a rough number, but you get the idea).
Let's just assume that rate of commercial airliner crashes due to pilot suicide is 1 in 100 million departures. Simply put, that means that if you get on a commercial aircraft to fly from point A to point B, the historical odds are that there is a 1 in 100 million chance that your flight will crash due to an intentional suicidal pilot act. However, the historical odds say that the odds of your flight crashing for any reason are several million to one. Since the turn of the century, the fatal cash rate has been something around 1 in 5 million departures.
Now, we know for a fact that the Air India 787 crashed - hence the probability of a crash for this particular flight is not 1 in 5 million - it's ONE! That means the historical odds of this crash being due to an intentional act by a pilot (i.e. suicide) is ~5%, not one in 100 million (obviously a rough number, but you get the idea).
Subjects: None
July 16, 2025, 12:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923721
You might want to carefully read the complete SAIB. The FAA wanted to make sure the issue on some of the B737 switches does not exist on other Boeing made aircraft.
It is here. https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/
It is here. https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/202...787-explained/
It calls for the switches on any of the types mentioned to be replaced if found defective, and for the older type of switches on the 737 to be replaced whether defective or not.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
July 17, 2025, 08:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924226
Strictly speaking, they are SARPs (Standards and Recommended Practices) for accident investigation, not rules.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ICAO
July 17, 2025, 11:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924321
"The unit is designed with a spring-loaded action when it's pulled up. Its natural state wants to stay down at all times - that is one locking mechanism. The secondary locking mechanism is the gate - when the switch is pulled up and transitioned into its next position, it gets locked by the gate, or the detent, or the bridge (whatever you want to call it)."
Obviously the narrator doesn't mean that there are two independent locking mechanisms - it's the combined action of the spring and the detent that supplies the desired locking characteristics.
Interestingly, he goes on to say that it was the failure of the spring on a 737 switch that led to the SB being issued.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Fuel Cutoff Switches (detent)
July 17, 2025, 12:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924350
Subjects: None
July 17, 2025, 13:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924395
The mechanical interference between the fixed (lower) and moving (upper) parts of the switch depends on the spring force forcing the two parts to mesh:
Subjects: None
July 17, 2025, 15:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924486
Subjects: None
July 17, 2025, 17:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924532
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches