Posts by user "DavidncRobson" [Posts: 7 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 1]

My initial thoughts were the same as yours that the flaps were retracted instead of the MLG. I therefore surmised that the PF instructed the PNF to retract the MLG after take off and that because his experience was mainly on Airbus aircraft, he mistakenly moved the B787 flaps lever to fully retracted instead of the MLG lever. To this end I studied the layouts of the B787 and Airbus A320 consoles to see if that might explain this basic error. I discovered that the B787 Flaps lever is just to the right of the B787's single screen and that the A320's MLG lever is also just to the right of the lower screen. I therefore consider it possible that without thinking, the PNF pushed the Flaps lever up to fully retracted imagining that he was retracting the MLG. I apologize for not providing images but I am not allowed to do that until I have submitted at least 8 posts.

From my reading of the AAIB report, the delay in noticing the cut off switch position could not have been any later than 08:08:47 because the reference to the verbal exchange was written before the reference to the RAT deployment and I assume the written narrative follows the chronological sequence of events. The delay in resetting those fuel switches might therefore have been no more than 5 seconds. It is a pity that the pilot making the challenge didn't simply reset the switches to run instead of challenging the other pilot. I frequently tell people who blow their horns at pedestrians or other motorists that blowing the horn isn't going to help them avoid an accident and that what they really need to do in the limited time available to them is concentrate on applying the brakes and turning the steering wheel.

Honeywell Switch Gate Configurations (Ref: honeywell_hwscs06627_1-1735572)

This extract from the datasheet of the Honeywell switch installed in the B787 for switching between Cut Off and Run shows the various gates that can be incorporated in such a switch. I suspect that it is Configuration D which allows the switch to be in one or other of only 2 positions. But the centre gate has a relatively wide flat table on which the switch can rest if it is not moved correctly to either the Run or Cut Off position. I therefore think that it is not beyond the realm of possibility that both switches may have initially been resting on the gate and then slipped into the cut off position during take off. However, what militates against this theory are the words of the challenge, "Why did you do that?" suggesting that one pilot had seen the other pilot actually flip the switches.

Yes, Honeywell call them toggle switches, but Torquetalk was obviously using the term to describe switches that don't need to be pulled up to be moved. I don't know the correct term for the pull up and move switches and Honeywell's data sheets didn't enlighten me because they referred to their switches as toggle switches. Maybe they should be called Gated Toggle Switches.

I don't know why you're singling out India for alleged inadequate mental health monitoring of their pilots when the worst case of dereliction of duty occurred with a German airline. I was expecting to see a massive class action law suit after that followed by the subsequent bankruptcy of that airline.

Based on the news coming out of India, it appears that your suspicions regarding malicious intent may well be correct, but it is not the younger FO under suspicion as your post seems to suggest but the older more experienced captain. Other comments in this thread had already made me think that the younger pilot was the PF and that it was he who had challenged the PM because he would have been focused on flying the aircraft and would have had neither the time nor the inclination to adjust the critical fuel cut off switches which you yourself categorically claim would never be mistaken for other switches.

Originally Posted by Mrshed
The question is what impact was had on attempts to recover the aircraft by the (presumed) lack of most or all electrical power.

Response from BrogulT: From the point that the fuel cutoffs were switched back to run, the primary (perhaps only) relevant issues were time and altitude. The left engine was relit and recovering on it's own but the right would probably have needed cranking as it appears to have had a hung start because it was spooled down too far and the airspeed was too low. However, I'm pretty sure that even if the APU had already been running at takeoff, they still would have needed at least another 30 seconds if not longer for full thrust. Also, there was nowhere near enough time for the APU to start and come online here.

Your claim that at least 30 seconds were needed to achieve full thrust prompted me to look up reports on the Airbus A320 crash at Habsheim in France in 1988 where the aircraft had been flown at low altitude at the minimum allowable speed and was unable to achieve sufficient thrust to ascend above a copse of trees. The extract below shows that from Idle to 83% N1 took 5 seconds after the initiation of a TOGA, so I think your estimate of 30 seconds is probably too high. However, after reading that report, I am of the opinion that AI 171 had no chance of recovering. If the FCS switches had been set to Run within 5 seconds of being set to Cut Off, there might just have been a chance, but it is not at all certain.

(From Aviation Safety Network Sunday 26 June 1988)
The aircraft took off from nearby Basle-Mulhouse Airport at 14:41 and climbed to 1000 feet agl. The crew started the descent three minutes later and Habsheim was in sight at 450 feet agl. The Pilot Monitoring informed the Pilot Flying that the aircraft was reaching 100 feet at 14:45:14. The descent continued to 50 feet 8 seconds later and further to 30-35 feet. Go-around power was added at 14:45:35. The A320 continued and touched trees approximately 60 meters from the end of runway 34R at 14:45:40 with a 14 degree pitch attitude and engines at 83% N1. The plane sank slowly into the forest and a fire broke out.

PROBABLE CAUSES: "The Commission believes that the accident resulted from the combination of the following conditions: 1) very low flyover height, lower than surrounding obstacles; 2) speed very slow and reducing to reach maximum possible angle of attack; 3) engine speed at flight idle; 4) late application of go-around power. This combination led to impact of the aircraft with the trees. The Commission believes that if the descent below 100 feet was not deliberate, it may have resulted from failure to take proper account of the visual and aural information intended to give the height of the aircraft."