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DutchRoll
July 14, 2025, 11:53:00 GMT permalink Post: 11922128 |
I think there's a good chance that there might be mandated CCTV in cockpits in the future as a consequence of this accident. There's also near enough to a 100% chance it would not and could not prevent this type of accident, but "accident prevention" will be the reason given. It always makes me curious how knee-jerk regulatory actions get justified. I don't care that much if they do install it - the worst that could happen is I get sprung picking my nose. But I do care when authorities or Governments issue nonsense reasons for it in an effort to be "seen to be doing something" by the public.
I'm late to the party here (deliberately) but I'm slightly surprised there seem to be quite a few commenters not acknowledging the elephant in the room after this report. I spent years on the B767 and the B744 before moving to Airbus. These are big chunky switches requiring two different muscle actions to change their position. "Accidentally" moving them from run to cutoff with a neat 1 second split is extremely improbable even at the best of times, and makes no sense at all during the first moments of the takeoff phase. The hypothesis which does make more sense based on the facts now available is just a bit disturbing to mention, but that's unfortunately where we are at the moment. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CCTV Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches |
DutchRoll
July 14, 2025, 12:17:00 GMT permalink Post: 11922150 |
Subjects: None |
DutchRoll
July 14, 2025, 20:46:00 GMT permalink Post: 11922486 |
Which leads to a very unpleasant possibility that many people would rather not consider, and some even refuse to consider, despite there being at least one historical precedent that I can think of (a pilot for a particular airline many years ago who had an undiagnosed mental health condition and admitted to struggling with impulsive thoughts of shutting down all 4 engines on a B747). Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Mental Health Muscle Memory |
DutchRoll
July 14, 2025, 22:12:00 GMT permalink Post: 11922547 |
I'm still not clear on something, no surprise there.
If you are the PF and you are just after rotation, and for whatever reason, the fuel control switches transition to "CUTOFF", when and how do you notice this? Presumably your hands are on the yoke and you are looking very intently out the windshield. So, to me it seems unlikely that you saw whatever happened to the switches, however they moved. Do you get a warning indication that the switches have moved? If so, then that would be what I needed to know. You got a warning and therefore you looked right at the switches. If not, do you just notice that you have lost power? If that is the case, where do you look first? I presume it would be at the engine info gauges/displays. What I'm getting at is what priority is given to looking at the fuel cutoff switches in this situation? How long until you look at those switches as the possible cause of the engine problems? It is conceivable that you could notice hand movement around the throttle quadrant in your peripheral vision (noone's hands are on the thrust levers between V1 and shortly after takeoff), however even if you didn't, you'd immediately notice the loss of performance. The instinctive reaction is big loss of performance -> quick glance across at instruments -> why are they winding back? Also if the fuel control switches were moved to cutoff you'd suddenly get EICAS messages saying the engines were shutdown. So there are immediate clues and it's only a minor head movement to see where the fuel control switches are because they're right down there behind the thrust levers. Then the immediate action for a dual engine failure, which would by then likely be obvious with both sets of instruments showing everything winding back, is "fuel control switches cutoff, then run". There is no significant pause in that action because it's only to reset the electronic engine controls, so the 10 second gap between setting them back to "run" is not explained by the dual engine failure procedure but perhaps by a startle factor. One way or another, your eyes are going to end up checking where those switches are. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Dual Engine Failure EICAS Engine Failure (All) Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches RUN/CUTOFF V1 |
DutchRoll
July 14, 2025, 22:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11922558 |
Subjects: None |
DutchRoll
July 16, 2025, 05:22:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923430 |
Well..... having read through the discussion here and looked at the critical info in the prelim report, this former Boeing (now current Airbus) pilot is confident the elephant can safely hide in his dark little corner for a while yet.
Lots of stiff competition for "most implausible theory" going on but I think my favourite so far is "could've mistakenly moved fuel control switches to cutoff when going for gear up selection". Geezus. 🤦♂️ Plenty of others, including engineering related ones, around this level of plausibility too. The phrase recorded on the CVR by one of the pilots involving questioning why the fuel control switches were moved to cutoff needs to be taken very, very seriously. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Preliminary Report |
DutchRoll
July 16, 2025, 07:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923494 |
There are still possible factors that would have resulted in the information that has been provided to date that do not involve elephants. It is unreasonable to withhold judgement when there are enough curiosities in the event to keep the investigators busy? The issue of switch locking problems necessitates an in depth understanding of what that may have resulted in. That 2 switches would have the same fault type at the same time is.... unlikely, but stuff happens. Losing a Concorde due to a titanium fillet on a reverser cowl coming adrift on a preceding aircraft is also, stuff happens. Power levers walking back on some types is also a stuff happens event, one that should not occur, it comes up about every second year, and has done for decades. A single point failure remains the likely cause of this disaster, and there are only really 2 that make any sense; a failure of the electrical circuits for the fuel switches, which there is only one remote possible cause, and a cognitive/overt act by the crew.....
I have to totally disagree with that. Publicly released CVR transcripts are edited to remove things like swearing, shouts, screams, etc. Basically stuff which investigators consider not directly relevant to the chain of events in the cockpit and determining actions taken or not taken. Nor do I necessarily trust that brief transcript released is all that was said. If one pilot had said "why did you move the switches to cutoff you *******!!!!!" and if he had shouted it, none of that tone or colourful language would be in the public transcript. You would get exactly what was released in this case. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches |
DutchRoll
July 16, 2025, 11:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 11923671 |
I find this a particularly concerning statement coming from someone who claims to be a pilot. Things like "Action Slip" and "Mental Load" should have been covered extensively in any CRM related education. If you think you are exempt from that kind of failure you are rejecting some very costly lessons learned over the last 50 years of accident investigation.
There have been many accidents where unindicated or even counter indicated action was taken by one or more pilots involved. As discussed in the first and second thread extensively many pilots could report incidents where they observed someone retracting flaps instead of gear. There have been major fatal accidents with pilots shutting down healthy engines instead of surging or burning ones. There's good reason the 787 has extensive takeoff configuration warnings, because we have had accidents and incidents with unsafe configurations taken to takeoff, beyond and sometimes even into a crash. Humans make mistakes. It is the goal of Safety Culture to prevent those mistakes from causing harm. Nor do I claim to be exempt from that type of failure. Quite the contrary - I\x92ve experienced it. But I\x92ve never experienced reaching for a completely and utterly unrelated switch/lever in a totally different location such as fuel control switches versus landing gear levers (which are literally at opposite ends of pilot reach) on a Boeing (or Airbus) either in the sim or the real aircraft. Even with gear vs flaps, those errors occur where controls are proximate, or with controls that both involve \x93retraction\x94 (ie a similar action), or which have a similar method of operation, or which look vaguely similar in outward appearance. None of these principles apply here. So please, be my guest and find it as concerning as you like. And with that, you have convinced me to bow out of this discussion. Cheers. Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Action slip Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches |
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