Posts by user "EDML" [Posts: 48 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 3]

EDML
July 14, 2025, 17:48:00 GMT
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Post: 11922392
Two questions for tdracer :

1. What happens to the FADEC channels if both channels have different data / information (e.g. T/L encoders or fuel switches)?
- Will the currently active channel win?
- Or will the most sensible information be used (e.g. keep the engines running)?
- Will there be a disagree message?
- Logged to the DFDR?

2. As per the data sheet the fuel switches are 4 pole versions. 1 pole will be used for each FADEC channel. Will one (or both) of the other poles be used for the DFDR or is that information collected from the FADEC through some data bus?

I know, it's very specific stuff that might only be known by the designer of the FADEC system.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): DFDR  FADEC  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

EDML
July 14, 2025, 18:50:00 GMT
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Post: 11922425
Originally Posted by tdracer
... The fuel switch discrete doesn't really get used except for engine start - if it falsely indicates shutdown (on one or both channels), the FADEC won't do anything if the engine is already running. All this will set maintenance faults - and associated EICAS Status messages (L/R ENGINE CONTROL or ENGINE C1)...
Sorry if my wording was not precise here - I meant the fuel cut off switches that more or less caused this accident.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EICAS  FADEC  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches

EDML
July 14, 2025, 23:18:00 GMT
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Post: 11922574
Originally Posted by FullWings
...
We now know it is a HF accident, not an aeroplane technical one and although I would like to know exactly what happened, I’m much less concerned for the 787 and aviation in general, to the point that in this case I’ve lost a lot of interest in the eventual conclusion, if there ever is one.
Funny. My son just told me exactly the same. - He's an aircraft mechanic with LHT.

Subjects: None

EDML
July 15, 2025, 14:00:00 GMT
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Post: 11922968
Originally Posted by JustusW
...
Which actually brings me to this one because I would like to ask for a bit of clarification: By "fuel switch discrete" are you referring to the Fuel Control Switches discussed in the preliminary report?
I would assume from your statement, that if a mismatch in the NC/NO signal on the switch was detected the FADEC would not direct the Fuel Cutoff Valves to close (as far as the types you are familiar with are concerned), is that correct?
...
I first didn't understand his answer as well (it was my question). In the meantime I know more about the logic: The fuel shutoff valves are not operated by the FADEC. The switches are wired directly to latching relays that drive the (latching) fuel valves. Using an additional pole of that switch the FADEC just gets the information that the switch was operated (and of course the current position). The FADEC can then e.g. execute the engine restart sequence if required.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FADEC  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Preliminary Report  Relight

EDML
July 15, 2025, 22:08:00 GMT
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Post: 11923307
Originally Posted by Engineless
After all the analysis on PPRuNE, fuel switch failure (well, dual switch failure, at practically the same time) seems so unlikely it's no longer worthy of consideration. However, I'm still open to the idea of a failure elsewhere that may have signalled the fuel switches had transistioned from Run to Cutoff wthout physical movement of either switch. Why? Firstly, because of this (taken from the preliminary report)
There would have been multiple similar failures in different locations. The data for the EAFR is completely separated from the wiring and circuitry for the HP fuel valves. - And that on both engines.

Originally Posted by D Bru
Inspired by the mention in the PR about a MEL on the ‘core network’, I came across the polemics between Boeing and IOActive a few years ago about the alleged vulnerability of 787 core systems to outside interference (hacker attack from within a/c and/or ground), including the highly sensitive CDN module, from where also the fuel cut-off module can be accessed. It’s definitely not my specialty, but I thought to flag it in case someone has more informed ideas about this. To my mind it could potentially “outshine” intentional crew action. Boeing at the time denied such options, of course. Obviously also in good faith, moreover it seems to be Honeywell &GE code anyhow, but who knows where we are 6 years on.

https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-7...ecurity-flaws/
That is nonsense. There is no "fuel cut-off module". The fuel cut-off HP valves are operated directly by the cut-off switches through simple latching solenoids. No computer involved, not part of any communication network of the plane. The FADECs (which itself are totally separated from the rest of the aircraft) only get information on the status of the switches; e.g. to faciliate engine restart.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EAFR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Honeywell  MEL  Preliminary Report  Relight

EDML
July 16, 2025, 12:49:00 GMT
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Post: 11923715
Originally Posted by Feathers McGraw
Question for those that actually put together the 787 FC switches and the module into which they are attached.

How does the mounting nut fit over the illuminated part of the knob on the end? It looks too narrow to me. I'm assuming that the switch part with the knob and which might contain the spring is removable so that the lower part of the switch plus wiring is pushed through the panel from the underside and the securing nut and washer is then passed down over the threaded portion and tightened on to the panel. How does the top part of the switch with the illuminated knob then attach to the narrow cylindrical part of the switch poking through from below?
The larger, black (plastic?) part is clipped on to the metal lever of switch itself.

Subjects: None

EDML
July 16, 2025, 23:33:00 GMT
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Post: 11924059
Originally Posted by tdracer
Something else that has been repeatedly discussed in the three threads...
While there are interposing relays, the signals to the Fuel Metering Unit shutoff valve and the Spar Valve are hardwired from the switches to the valves in question. They don't go through some computer interface that could corrupt the signals.
Two more questions for tdracer ;-)

Are the FADECs able to drive the fuel shutoff valves as well? I would guess that this might be used for N2 overspeed protection (and therefore TCMA as well). If there is an overspeed there would be a good chance, that the fuel control/metering doesn't work as it should.

I am not asking to revive the switch discussion - I am just curious.

And one more question: Are the fuel shutoff valves powered by the PMG for the FADECs? I know the valves are latching so that a power failure of any kind wouldn't change their position.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Spar Valves

EDML
July 17, 2025, 17:46:00 GMT
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Post: 11924539
Originally Posted by Triskelle
An interesting quotation from this: "She highlighted a similar incident during which one of the engines suddenly shut down midflight on an All Nippon Airways Boeing 787 during its final approach to Osaka, Japan, in 2019.

Investigators later found that the aircraft’s software had mistakenly interpreted the plane as being on the ground, triggering the thrust control malfunction accommodation system, which automatically moved the fuel switch from “run” to “cutoff” without any action from the pilots."

Is it also interesting that this incident occurred at the time of ground-to-air transition?
Totally wrong.

The TCMA shuts down one or more engines - but it doesn't move the switches to cut-off in any magical way. TCMA directly operates the fuel valves - but the switches stay on.
Of course there is no entry for the switches being operated on the EAFR when TCMA shuts down an engine!

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EAFR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches