June 14, 2025, 08:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903718
I’m not a 787 driver so for fear of looking dumb in front of those that are this still confuses me. Even IF they’ve mis-selected the flap setting (I still don’t think it’s been cemented on here that there is in fact a FMS/flap setting disagreement warning but i believe there is), had the wrong de-rated take off settings, selected flaps instead of gear up the 787 with massive high bypass engines, FBW and full envelope protections surely cannot let itself be put in such a low energy/high alpha regime as we saw in the videos IF it has both fans functioning normally, surely?
the pilots may have messed up royally and numerous times so those holes lined up but the plane is the final block in the chain and a 21st century all digital entirely clean sheet design was sold as being immune to such catastrophic outcomes from a few minor (consequential yes) and fairly common errors- aren’t all the protections and our procedures designed after decades of mistakes?
im having a hard time squaring how a fully functioning modern bird like this could allow for this outcome and almost whatever the pilots did outside of unbelievable inputs and the pilots are are a bit of a red herring IMO
Dale Winsley
@Winsleydale
No. The LE slats are deployed therefore the flaps are as well. This is an automatic linkage. The flaps are set at Take-Off. Hard to see from the angle but they are...if slats are out (easy to see) then flaps are set. Looks like Flaps 5. Also, the 787 has the highest Thrust-to-Weight ratio of any airliner on Earth. The change in Alpha and lift is a trifling matter for it, at these settings (1-5). It will fly out of it easily, even at that density altitude. The attitude change is - in the circumstances I describe, consistent with a massive power loss (both sides). I believe based on probability that simultaneous mechanical failure is not the cause. Fuel contamination or starvation is likewise unlikely based on the 787 fuel system. The common element is the FADEC/Autothrottle/TOGO. However, each engine FADEC is dual redundant two channels. So any such common failure must happen further upstream. From a design perspective, that would be unthinkable. But this is Boeing. Given what I can see with my own eyes, I believe the flap issue is a non-starter. Also, re the landing gear: Clearly the Positive Rate challenge would be met based on normal rotation and fly-off at V2. But since we know the flaps were set correctly, that rules out an "oopsie" moment. Just as likely there was at the challenge moment an indication that something was amiss, and the Gear Up call was not made. They see both N1s unwinding and it takes a second to get past the WFT factor. They cross-check and see the airspeed also unwinding. Then they unload the Alpha and pitch to gear down Vy. And they had another 6 seconds. Whatever it was, it was not a flap, mechanical or fuel issue. We will know soon enough. But this is Boeing. My gut says "software". All 787s worldwide need to be grounded, now.
6:10 AM \xb7 Jun 14, 2025
\xb7
53.8K
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Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FADEC FBW Fuel (All) V2
June 14, 2025, 08:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11903719
https://x.com/winsleydale/status/193...230524974?s=46
I\x92m not a 787 driver so for fear of looking dumb in front of those that are this still confuses me. Even IF they\x92ve mis-selected the flap setting (I still don\x92t think it\x92s been cemented on here that there is in fact a FMS/flap setting disagreement warning but i believe there is), had the wrong de-rated take off settings, selected flaps instead of gear up the 787 with massive high bypass engines, FBW and full envelope protections surely cannot let itself be put in such a low energy/high alpha regime as we saw in the videos IF it has both fans functioning normally, surely?
the pilots may have messed up royally and numerous times so those holes lined up but the plane is the final block in the chain and a 21st century all digital entirely clean sheet design was sold as being immune to such catastrophic outcomes from a few minor (consequential yes) and fairly common errors- aren\x92t all the protections and our procedures designed after decades of mistakes?
im having a hard time squaring how a fully functioning modern bird like this could allow for this outcome and almost whatever the pilots did outside of unbelievable inputs and the pilots are are a bit of a red herring IMO
I\x92m not a 787 driver so for fear of looking dumb in front of those that are this still confuses me. Even IF they\x92ve mis-selected the flap setting (I still don\x92t think it\x92s been cemented on here that there is in fact a FMS/flap setting disagreement warning but i believe there is), had the wrong de-rated take off settings, selected flaps instead of gear up the 787 with massive high bypass engines, FBW and full envelope protections surely cannot let itself be put in such a low energy/high alpha regime as we saw in the videos IF it has both fans functioning normally, surely?
the pilots may have messed up royally and numerous times so those holes lined up but the plane is the final block in the chain and a 21st century all digital entirely clean sheet design was sold as being immune to such catastrophic outcomes from a few minor (consequential yes) and fairly common errors- aren\x92t all the protections and our procedures designed after decades of mistakes?
im having a hard time squaring how a fully functioning modern bird like this could allow for this outcome and almost whatever the pilots did outside of unbelievable inputs and the pilots are are a bit of a red herring IMO
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FBW
June 17, 2025, 21:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11904683
It is fair to say that the lack of groundings is significant but then what is the DGCA\x92s extra inspections of Indian 787-8s about? Just to reassure the flying public? Maybe.
it\x92s quite crazy how many different theories are going around and not just from SLF/uninformed people. At the end of my duty today the aircraft engineer we were handing the plane over to showed me a forward he had to \x91an official\x92 report stating the cause has been the captain\x92s chair sliding backwards thus retarding the thrust levers
it can be argued it\x92s better to be thorough and accurate so daily briefings by the DGCA/AAIB would just create a circus but at the same time silence created a vacuum that this day and age of fake news/click farming takes advantage of. Already most of the biggest aviation \x91influencers\x92 are onto their 3rd theory of what happened
that said the engineer did make an interesting point to me, he\x92s not Boeing rated but he says he has friends that are and he is told they apparently go 2 hours plus early out to the aircraft just to run through all the inevitable issues, apparently on the line the highly electrical fleet is plagued by electrical issues, is that related to this? Possibly not.
it\x92s quite crazy how many different theories are going around and not just from SLF/uninformed people. At the end of my duty today the aircraft engineer we were handing the plane over to showed me a forward he had to \x91an official\x92 report stating the cause has been the captain\x92s chair sliding backwards thus retarding the thrust levers
it can be argued it\x92s better to be thorough and accurate so daily briefings by the DGCA/AAIB would just create a circus but at the same time silence created a vacuum that this day and age of fake news/click farming takes advantage of. Already most of the biggest aviation \x91influencers\x92 are onto their 3rd theory of what happened
that said the engineer did make an interesting point to me, he\x92s not Boeing rated but he says he has friends that are and he is told they apparently go 2 hours plus early out to the aircraft just to run through all the inevitable issues, apparently on the line the highly electrical fleet is plagued by electrical issues, is that related to this? Possibly not.
Subjects: None
June 17, 2025, 22:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11904730
Most? The Airbus I'm familiar with is 100' AGL or 5s after liftoff and I think this is common to all Airbus FBW. The B787 & B777 appear to be 200' AGL but I'm taking this from online FCOM extracts. The
B737
does appear to be 400'. Company limitations may be higher.
As mentioned elsewhere both EK and Air NZ have had messy low level mis-set altitude capture incidents with the B777, but in isolation, obviously, this wouldn't cause RAT extension.
About airport cameras. Someone pointed out on the other thread that airports have more coverage than they would necessarily advertise. Presumably available to investigators but not to the public or press.
As mentioned elsewhere both EK and Air NZ have had messy low level mis-set altitude capture incidents with the B777, but in isolation, obviously, this wouldn't cause RAT extension.
About airport cameras. Someone pointed out on the other thread that airports have more coverage than they would necessarily advertise. Presumably available to investigators but not to the public or press.
yeah the low MCP alt setting/alt capture doesn\x92t make a whole lot of sense- the plane didn\x92t pitch forward it just failed to climb/lost lift
that\x92s not conducive with what happened nor does it explain why the gear is still down (although seemingly selected up given the boogie tilt) or the RAT deployed (if it really was)
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FBW FCOM RAT (All) RAT (Deployment)
June 19, 2025, 20:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11906367
Classy move along with rebuilding the medical school the plane crashed into
https://www.business-standard.com/am...1801390_1.html
definitely not the actions of a company or country trying to brush this under the carpet as was insinuated almost immediately by many here
Tata to create a new trust to help Air India crash victims: Chandrasekaran
https://www.business-standard.com/am...1801390_1.html
definitely not the actions of a company or country trying to brush this under the carpet as was insinuated almost immediately by many here
Subjects: None
June 29, 2025, 18:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11913162
his comments come from this interview but I don\x92t speak Hindi:
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/sabo...-mohol-8788920
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AI171
July 11, 2025, 20:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919771
- fuel cut offs were found in the RUN position
- on take off roll both engines lost power as the fuel cut offs went from RUN to cutoff
- CVR recorded one pilot asking why they had gone to CUTOFF
- within 10 seconds the fuel cutoff was moved back to RUN
-RAT was deployed, APU had begun auto start
- 32 seconds after Vr the MAYDAY was called
This should also dispel a lot of the comments about AAIB-India, Indian culture in general and general competence. For a preliminary report this is far more thorough and extensive than what would normally be expected and they\x92ve kept Boeing, GE, FAA and investigators from US, UK, Canada and Portugal in the loop from the start
They have also clarified why it took so long to do the EAFR download- because of the extensive damage they had to source specialist equipment from the NTSB that only arrived on the 23rd of June (they downloaded on the 24th) so all that talk of a \x91coverup\x92 is pretty embarrassing now
of course the big question is why/how those switches were commanded into cutoff in the first place the exact sequence at Vr is the most critical, there hasn\x92t been much scrutiny at all that I can see in the Indian/international media of the personal
background of the flight deck crew which has happened in other suspected pilot initiated disasters in the past, I guess this is an avenue investigators will have been doing themselves
- on take off roll both engines lost power as the fuel cut offs went from RUN to cutoff
- CVR recorded one pilot asking why they had gone to CUTOFF
- within 10 seconds the fuel cutoff was moved back to RUN
-RAT was deployed, APU had begun auto start
- 32 seconds after Vr the MAYDAY was called
This should also dispel a lot of the comments about AAIB-India, Indian culture in general and general competence. For a preliminary report this is far more thorough and extensive than what would normally be expected and they\x92ve kept Boeing, GE, FAA and investigators from US, UK, Canada and Portugal in the loop from the start
They have also clarified why it took so long to do the EAFR download- because of the extensive damage they had to source specialist equipment from the NTSB that only arrived on the 23rd of June (they downloaded on the 24th) so all that talk of a \x91coverup\x92 is pretty embarrassing now
of course the big question is why/how those switches were commanded into cutoff in the first place the exact sequence at Vr is the most critical, there hasn\x92t been much scrutiny at all that I can see in the Indian/international media of the personal
background of the flight deck crew which has happened in other suspected pilot initiated disasters in the past, I guess this is an avenue investigators will have been doing themselves
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): APU CVR EAFR FAA Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches MAYDAY NTSB Preliminary Report RAT (All) RAT (Deployment) RUN/CUTOFF
July 11, 2025, 20:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919779
FAA issued an SAIB in 2018 about these fuel control switches being installed without the locking feature engaged\x97Air India didn\x92t act on it (not mandatory).
No evidence of birdstrike, fire, or mechanical failure. Both engines had good health data. The only obvious explanation at this stage is an inadvertent dual shutdown by crew,
No evidence of birdstrike, fire, or mechanical failure. Both engines had good health data. The only obvious explanation at this stage is an inadvertent dual shutdown by crew,
then again this isn\x92t all pointing at the pilots which is interesting
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin
July 11, 2025, 20:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919788
What strikes me from the report is one of them/both of them (if it wasn\x92t intentional) did everything they could, and correctly. Another 30 seconds and he likely would have saved the aircraft. First engine was spooling up, as the survivor had reported. Damn. they just didn\x92t have the altitude/time to play with
I doubt you\x92d have got such immediate positive intervention from most line crews faced with the same circumstances and time
I doubt you\x92d have got such immediate positive intervention from most line crews faced with the same circumstances and time
Subjects: None
July 11, 2025, 21:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919801
Not really. It might also indicate that he saw them move, knew his hands were somewhere else, or a plethora of other reasons. Even if one accidentally moves a lever or pushes the wrong button, the first response would likely be denial as well, then followed by an 'oh oops, turns out I did'.
the cutoffs were found in the RUN position so there\x92s a lot more to this story
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): RUN/CUTOFF
July 11, 2025, 21:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919811
Deliberate action is the most obvious and simplest answer however\x85.
Subjects: None
July 11, 2025, 22:04:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919872
The landing gear lever is forward and up on the centre instrument panel, adjacent to the PFD. The two fuel control switches are aft and low, on the thrust pedestal. There's no reasonable way to confuse one for the other in terms of position, hand movement or 'muscle memory'.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches Gear Lever Muscle Memory
July 11, 2025, 22:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919903
I raised this on one of the other threads, they are supposed to be isolated systems, and I am sure they are according to electromechanical tradition, but for both human factors and electromechanical reasons, should\x92nt they be off to each side of the cockpit to be considered isolated?
In my airline (we don\x92t fly the 787 but our engine masters are in a near identical position on our jet) we have had *multiple* incidents of engine masters being manipulated accidentally in flight. This has involved both flight deck and cabin crew. This has meant a re-emphasis on SOPs regarding the centre pedestal but you still routinely see this broken on the line in minor and major ways from time to time
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Human Factors
July 11, 2025, 22:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11919932
Subjects: None
July 12, 2025, 04:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920195
The most scary thing here is that, on first glance this looks to be a massive balls up again by a flight crew.
I\x92ll hold judgement till the report is out as stranger things have happened. But what a seismic shift we have seen in the last 30 years.
30 years ago you worried about flying with certain airlines due to their maintenance records and ages of their fleets.
We are now in the time of choosing your airline of choice by having to research their flight routes over questionable airspace or their training schemes of their pilots.
It is rather worrying that the majority of major airline crashes in the last 20 years have been due to the two fleshy ones riding up front, if not questionable flight planning, Military or terrorist input.
I expect thats going to be about as popular as an lead balloon here.
In fact, I cannot remember the last major mechanical failure that led to a mass loss of life.
The Jeju one is still to be determined, but not sure if that can even be counted due to bird strikes.
I\x92ll hold judgement till the report is out as stranger things have happened. But what a seismic shift we have seen in the last 30 years.
30 years ago you worried about flying with certain airlines due to their maintenance records and ages of their fleets.
We are now in the time of choosing your airline of choice by having to research their flight routes over questionable airspace or their training schemes of their pilots.
It is rather worrying that the majority of major airline crashes in the last 20 years have been due to the two fleshy ones riding up front, if not questionable flight planning, Military or terrorist input.
I expect thats going to be about as popular as an lead balloon here.
In fact, I cannot remember the last major mechanical failure that led to a mass loss of life.
The Jeju one is still to be determined, but not sure if that can even be counted due to bird strikes.
Whenever this argument is used (humans are the problem, all modern crashes are because of pilot error) it doesn\x92t account for all of the problems and serious events that humans have avoided and where they\x92ve saved the day. Every airline in the world will have multiple such incidents a year but you\x92ll never hear of them outside of internal comns (maybe the occasional one will be serious enough to warrant external investigations)
still yet to see any evidence this has systematic implications for air india as a whole, if anything after that initial cutoff was \x91transitioned\x92 (we can speculate why or how) the actions of the flight deck (at least one of them) was commendable- with slightly more time they\x92d have flown away.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches
July 12, 2025, 04:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920199
My only question is, after close to 40 years flying, on takeoff, if I lost thrust/ Power, my immediate reaction would NOT BE TO CHECK THE FUEL CONTROL SWITCHES. Unless the Pilot flying saw the Pilot monitoring visually reach down and shut the fuel control switches off, which would be odd since as the PF, your attention is looking at the instruments and outside, not inside and downward in the direction of the FC switches. It seems odd how quickly they ascertained the fuel control switches were shut off. No startle factor, or confusion, just a very quick determination that the FC switches were cutoff. Very strange.
It\x92s a little annoying that we don\x92t know who spoke the and who denied about the cutoffs but it\x92s kind of the secondary issue.
The 787 has HUDs, PF is looking straight ahead and \x91up\x92 (as the U in HUD suggests), the cutoff toggles are not at all in his field of view , quite similar for the PM
the CVR transcript will have to reveal a lot more because the current sequence of events doesn\x92t really answer that much other than to rule out a few other theories
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches
July 12, 2025, 05:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920228
No experience of the 787 but lots on the 75/76.
The possibility of a perceived stab trim problem allied to an associated eicas message could have induced the PNF to go straight to the stab trim switches mindful of the problems associated with the 737 Max albeit a different type and a system not fitted in the 787 but an issue of which the Training Captain would have been well aware especially if he had been briefed on the stab messages from the previous sector. If, repeat if, he simply made the wrong selection and hit the fuel cut off switches then the holes have suddenly lined up. Unlikely, unfathomable perhaps but by no means impossible. Other than that....deliberate act ?
The possibility of a perceived stab trim problem allied to an associated eicas message could have induced the PNF to go straight to the stab trim switches mindful of the problems associated with the 737 Max albeit a different type and a system not fitted in the 787 but an issue of which the Training Captain would have been well aware especially if he had been briefed on the stab messages from the previous sector. If, repeat if, he simply made the wrong selection and hit the fuel cut off switches then the holes have suddenly lined up. Unlikely, unfathomable perhaps but by no means impossible. Other than that....deliberate act ?
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EICAS Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches
July 12, 2025, 11:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920546
Aside from anything technical, I find this attitude really strange. This is a discussion forum, of course there is (and should be!) significant discussion about a bizarre crash of a modern widebody aircraft. There will naturally be speculation and some nonsense but this is a discussion forum and that is to be expected. What's the point in locking threads until the final report comes out?
You can always not read it.
You can always not read it.
As long as things are mostly civil surely there\x92s zero reason to be shutting down organic conversations now
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Preliminary Report
July 12, 2025, 17:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920709
This is quite a useful if not also chilling illustration of the timeline to be expected in the real world and also explains why the gear never got selected up
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DL_w7rLB ... NzemRhbGY0
A true nightmare situation so anyone talking about 4 seconds here and there being slow needs to remind themselves this was an otherwise normal day and you are suddenly plunged into the worst imaginable situation with absolute sensory overload (every warning possible would\x92ve been going off in addition to the sensation of deceleration and loss of lift so early in a climb out)
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DL_w7rLB ... NzemRhbGY0
A true nightmare situation so anyone talking about 4 seconds here and there being slow needs to remind themselves this was an otherwise normal day and you are suddenly plunged into the worst imaginable situation with absolute sensory overload (every warning possible would\x92ve been going off in addition to the sensation of deceleration and loss of lift so early in a climb out)
Subjects: None
July 12, 2025, 17:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11920714
I echo the responsibility of posters to not judge the flight crew at this early stage of the investigation. My fear is that unproven potential crew actions presented without context provide oxygen to those who are pushing un piloted airliners. This is not a path we want to encourage...
if there\x92s one place that should respect the nature of the profession it\x92s surely here
Subjects: None