Posts by user "Lonewolf_50" [Posts: 30 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 2]

Lonewolf_50
June 15, 2025, 19:20:00 GMT
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Post: 11902742
Originally Posted by fdr
I will wager that this is absolute nonsense. {snip sensible assessment}
Do any reporters bother to read what they write?
No, and editors no longer hold their feet to the fire.

Have never flown 787. Comment only about the investigation which is underway.

With GE and Boeing sending expert reps to India (engine and aircraft manufacturers respectively) digging into the details should inform them of what occurred, but as I understand the process, the public information flow will come from the Nation whom they are assisting.

Have any of you who have done investigations at this level seen it work out otherwise?

Aside: five of my work colleagues were either born in Gujarat, or their parents were. I asked
"I realize that India is a very big place, but are you concerned about any relatives being among the casualties?"
I got four head shakes (no) and one reply that got me to almost spill my coffee.
"Nobody in my {extended} family would live near to an airport. It's too noisy."
It took me a second to register that as a "no" presented in a way that I wasn't expecting.

Subjects: None

Lonewolf_50
June 17, 2025, 20:35:00 GMT
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Post: 11904634
Originally Posted by Tu.114
Or does TCMA have the authority to shut down any engine, whatever the operating state of the other engines may be, as long as the condition "not flying" is satisfied?
As I read back to explanations of TCMA further up, an additional criterion seems to be that the engine is at idle . I don't think that your curt summary fits, due to being incomplete.

Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 17th June 2025 at 21:17 .

Subjects: None

Lonewolf_50
June 21, 2025, 23:36:00 GMT
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Post: 11908151
Originally Posted by Musician
Looking at this diagram, I don't understand why certain media are concerned with fuel filters. Every filter here seems to have a bypass valve which opens if the filter clogs up. What am I missing?
Journos, when it comes to aviation, are morons. Kind of like my social skills, in my twenties, after a few more pints than I ought to have had.
That is what you are missing.
Originally Posted by Xeptu
Found It
Truth Table Line 101 = Service Terminated (licence agreement expired please contact your service provider)
We thank you for the source of innocent merriment.
Originally Posted by TryingToLearn

Also, so far there is no evidence I've seen regarding the 'chicken-egg' problem, did the engines fall below idle (fuel, stall...) and this caused an electrical blackout (-> battery, RAT...) or did an EE problem cause the engines to reduce thrust (FADEC, SW bug...). And where is the common cause in all this? There has to be a systematic error common to both engines, an external failure affecting both or a dependent fault with one affecting the other within seconds. This is the only thing I think everyone agrees here. And I refuse to beleave the external failure or dependent fault was sitting in the cockpit.
I think it is something not common to every aircraft type for the last 50 years.
While I enjoyed your post, a lot, 787 has been in service for over a decade and there are over 1,000 of them doing their duty day in and day out. Yes, battery issues arose, but resolved.

Based on the mishap investigations I did, more than one of which involved fatalities, there is a whole family of maintenance / company culture errors possible that seem to me to get short shrift in the discussion here: thread number 1 and thread number 2.

But here's the problem: Air India, for very understandable reasons, isn't about to open the kimono until they are forced to.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FADEC  RAT (All)

Lonewolf_50
June 22, 2025, 00:41:00 GMT
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Post: 11908191
Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner
Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury.
Except when there's more.
Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.
Yeah, some fuel samples make you go "Whaaat?" And then you keep draining fuel to see how much is in there, and you call up the Maintenance Control folks and tell them "We have a bad sample out here, call those idiots at the fuel farm..."
Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector.
But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time.

Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.

How much water would cause a sustained flameout?

I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling.

I think the engines were running, albeit badly.

Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow.

I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high percentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?

There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.

The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure.

That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.
I like the cut of your jib.
Not sure if you are right, and not familiar enough with 787 to check the fuel flow logic, but a friend of mine dead-sticked a single engine trainer into a field due to water in the fuel ... 20 minutes after takeoff.
It could have happened earlier.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Centre Tank  Electrical Failure  Fuel (All)  RAT (All)  RAT (Deployment)

Lonewolf_50
June 28, 2025, 22:49:00 GMT
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Post: 11912706
Originally Posted by spornrad
NYT illustrated the story, drawing the same conclusions as this thread so far:
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...ash-cause.html
Maybe Jeff Guzzetti reads PPRuNe.
Originally Posted by Innaflap
Not to mention the political pressure and Tata involvement
Yeah, that's a concern that one can do nothing about, but I recall Egypt Air 990 having that same sort of obstacle to the investigation (cultural/political). (No, I am not saying that the causes are the same). My point is that each nation's transparency varies, regardless of what ICAO calls for.
Originally Posted by tdracer

There is absolutely nothing unusual about the 787 arrangement in this regard.
Unless one is on PPRuNe, a haven for the garden variety Boeing-basher. (Though at times B seem to bring it on themselves...)

From two threads I see this: a sudden loss of thrust was the initiating event after a successful take off - all of this other electronic stuff was a result of that.
What I will be paying close attention to is what information comes out as regards maintenance and ground handling for that particular hull...and what isn't said. (I guess that may be a while in coming - and I do agree in the general sense that giving the benefit of the doubt is a good position to take at this point in time).

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ICAO  New York Times

Lonewolf_50
June 29, 2025, 12:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11913019
Originally Posted by Pilot DAR
As per my training, don't let communicate interfere with aviate. If you can do both simultaneously, go ahead. For me, "communicate" could be taking your mind away from task to formulate and interact in discussion. So yes, we don't allow a complex discussion to preempt flying the plane. For me, pressing a mic switch and calling Mayday is more instinctive and muscle memory, than distracting. If a pilot got a Mayday out, good for them! I can't see it helping much for the doomed flight, other than being a valuable "very soon after the event" indicator that the pilots knew that something very bad was happening. I've known pilots to wrestle control for seconds/minutes in an effort to regain control, before issuing a Mayday. Okay, tasks in priority. But in this case, it appears that a pilot issued a Mayday even before control was actually lost - a valuable timestamp on the order of events for investigation.
I got the idea that with no (or very little) thrust, and with the aircraft falling, the pilot (may have) realized that he was in out of control flight , and falling.
In a pedantic sense: if you make control inputs, and the aircraft won't or can't respond to them, you are in out of control flight .
The whole event happened pretty quickly. How far into "we are doomed" that his senses told him they were can have informed his decision to say something about it. (the human mind is an interesting thing).
There's also the matter of temporal distortion which can happen during stress or high adrenalin events. (I experienced that during the course of an aircraft accident: not on topic for this thread).
As to conformance with ICAO, not all investigations make good on that.
Spoiler
 


I sincerely hope that this one does.

(Note: some of what I refer to as out of control flight seems to be called upset in commercial transport jargon).

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ICAO  MAYDAY  Muscle Memory

Lonewolf_50
June 29, 2025, 19:00:00 GMT
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Post: 11913178
Originally Posted by 87guy
A jet upset is an undesirable aircraft state...ie stall, or severe turbulence causing the aircraft to flip upside down dive etc... Looking at the Air India incident, the aircraft was not in any of those situations... In fact, if you weren't aware, you would think it was landing. This is something else entirely.
They did not set out to fly a glider, and they had intended to takeoff and climb, not glide, nor land outside of an airfield boundary. That said, your pedantry from a different angle is accepted.
Originally Posted by island_airphoto
They just had little or no power. The plane flew just fine as a glider until it hit a building.
True, but what the crew were trying to do was climb after takeoff. Let's get back to basics here: power is a way to control flight.
Back from early flying, when you were first trying it out, your instructor taught you that Power plus attitude equals performance. (While true enough, power plus attitude plus configuration is a more accurate formulation).
That reply to you offered, yes, your response is well put.
(Maybe it's my rotary wing experience that puts "power" into what controls flight, but no matter, we are discussing a 787-8).
Originally Posted by Pilot DAR
I distinguish between "upset" and "out of control" for any airplane.
===
It's a fine point, but this event is well into fine point territory!
Yes. I did point out that I was engaging in pedantry. I appreciate all of the responses. Thanks to all.

Glad to hear that the Indian Government has a timeline for a prelim report. If it takes them a bit more time than ICAO wants, with alerts or bulletins issued as various things are confirmed, that probably serves the larger interest.

Mohol also stated that "sabotage" has not yet been ruled out at this stage of the investigation.
It is one thing to not rule it out, it is quite another to find evidence of it.
Spoiler
 


Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): ICAO  Preliminary Report

Lonewolf_50
June 30, 2025, 13:08:00 GMT
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Post: 11913613
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
We know that the right-hand GEnx-1B was removed for overhaul and re-installed in March 2025 so it was at “zero time” and zero cycles, meaning a performance asymmetry that the FADEC would have to manage every time maximum thrust is selected. If the old engine was still on the pre-2021 EEC build while the fresh engine carried the post-Service Bulletin software/hardware, a dual “commanded rollback” is plausible.
A latent fault on one channel with the mid-life core can prompt the other engine to match thrust to maintain symmetry, leading to dual rollback.
Then why didn't that happen on the previous flight from Deli to Ahmedabad, or any of the previous flights since that engine install in March?
Originally Posted by silverelise
He also confirmed that all the data from the recorders has been downloaded and is being processed by the Indian AAIB, no boxes have been sent abroad.
The 30 day deadline for the preliminary report is July 12th.
Thanks for the update, and in particular that bolded bit.
Originally Posted by the linked article
Investigators still haven’t ruled out the possibility of sabotage being behind the Air India crash in Ahmedabad earlier this month that killed 274 people , according to India’s aviation minister. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has confirmed that the aircraft’s flight recorders – known as black boxes – will not be sent outside the country for assessment and will be analysed by the agency, said Murlidhar Mohol, the minister of state for civil aviation.l

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AAIB (All)  AAIB (India)  DFDR  Dual Engine Failure  Engine Failure (All)  FADEC  Preliminary Report

Lonewolf_50
June 30, 2025, 13:20:00 GMT
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Post: 11913619
Originally Posted by island_airphoto
If rigorously applied, an "engine thrust balancer" would cause the good engine to fail if something happened to the other one. Surely there is some logic in there somewhere to give up and disconnect past a certain amount of adjustment??
* as for why not before, probably because it didn't happen that way or in Boeing's worst nightmare some weird corner case in the software that does this if certain parameters are in rare combination.
Thank you for that answer, edge cases do abound in complex systems, but would not moving the throttles forward by hand (as the thrust was beginning to reduce {for that strange reason}) overcome that and restore thrust?
(As I don't fly the 787, I may be missing something basic on how the systems work).

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Parameters

Lonewolf_50
June 30, 2025, 15:52:00 GMT
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Post: 11913718
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
That said, the continued absence of the FAA issuing an Emergency Airworthiness Directive for the Dreamliner suggests to me the fault was something like contaminated fuel which was specific to that flight.
Thanks for the whole answer, more stuff to learn.
Originally Posted by za9ra22
Yes, thanks. It reminds me of what a retired BAC test pilot once told me, that if you couldn't make it to where you were going, your instinct is to find where you can go that is the least hazardous.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): FAA

Lonewolf_50
June 30, 2025, 19:08:00 GMT
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Post: 11913852
@Sailvi767, thank you for that video. Nice illustration.

About the previous video regarding Air India Flight 171: when Geoffrey Thomas said that "the aircraft appears to hover" at about time 2:00, I wondered at what kind of aviation expert he is supposed to be.
The aircraft was in forward flight once it left the ground, and until the flight ended (unless it stalled near the bitter end...FDR should clear that up in due course...but my guess is that it didn't stall even then).
It stopped climbing, sure, but it didn't hover.

Concur with the assessment of "clickbait"

Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 30th June 2025 at 19:18 .

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Self Proclaimed Experts

Lonewolf_50
July 12, 2025, 02:09:00 GMT
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Post: 11920096
Y'all are killing me.
Originally Posted by mbd
If it was a deliberate act, why put them back to RUN?
If the intent is malicious, then if you know how the system works then you know how to try and confuse the investigation afterwards so that your family doesn't have to deal with you being the devil who did this. Read the entire of MH 370 if you doubt me.
Originally Posted by rab-k
I sense a hamsterwheel developing
Yeah.

I had the "opportunity" to investigate more than one fatal crash/mishap, and we dove down into the rat-hole of knobology and switch-ology. I read with some care the posts of one of our more sensible members, PJ2, as regards switches.

I'll leave the CVR extracts to those who want to run down that rat-hole, but WHO was flying and WHO was (doing all else) begins to matter.
Do any of you actually know who was PF and who was PM?
If you know that, how do you know that?

!!!! me, this thread is already going off the rails.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  RUN/CUTOFF

Lonewolf_50
July 12, 2025, 02:22:00 GMT
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Post: 11920103
Originally Posted by toiletsaft
The Preliminary Report clearly states that the co-pilot was the Pilot Flying (PF).
Right.
The flight was commanded by Captain Sumeet Sabharwal, 56, who had logged approximately 15,600 flight hours, including nearly 8,600 hours on the Boeing 787. The first officer, Clive Kunder, 32, had around 3,400 flight hours, with over 1,100 hours on the 787. Kunder was the pilot flying, while Sabharwal was the pilot monitoring for the flight.
I want you to think about what you just posted very carefully,

They would say that, wouldn't they?
But is it a fact?

Maybe it is, and maybe it isn't. (And I honestly don't know).

I offer you MH 370 and the various punting that the Malaysian government did as a point of reference, as well as China Eastern Airlines Flight 5735 as a point of reference.
Yes, I confess to you, I tend to be cynical.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Preliminary Report

Lonewolf_50
July 12, 2025, 02:52:00 GMT
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Post: 11920121
How many of you posting in this thread have bothered to read the report?
I did.
Some very interesting detail is available therein. (In particular, fuel).
If you haven't read the whole report, please stop posting until you have.
Damnit!
Double You Anchors abound.

Subjects: None

Lonewolf_50
July 12, 2025, 03:04:00 GMT
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Post: 11920127
*sigh*

Let's take the sketchy CVR extract as a given for the moment.

So there's this hard working FO doing the takeoff. He wants to do a good job and impress favorably the Training Captain.

For (reasons that I cannot fathom) the training captain On Takeoff On A Revenue Flight chops the fuel before they get to 400 feet AGL.

Yes, that makes no freaking sense. None. Zero. Zip. Nada.

The natural response from PF to the PM (who is the training captain) is some version of "WTF with the fuel switches?"

And the response is "Uh, no, I didn't do that."

Think about this for a moment.

How many "WTF?" things erupt in your brain if that was the sequence of events?

Full Disclosure: I was in charge of the CRM training for the Navy (all of it) for a couple of years (and yes, that was a couple of decades ago). We got our CRM stuff, mostly, From The Commercial Airline Industry.

But, honestly, that reported back and forth between PF and PM has me smacking my forehead in disbelief... given the advanced state of CRM training in today's airline industry.

I confess to you all: I am more confused by this report than I was by the first two days of "data" eruption after the crash.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches

Lonewolf_50
July 12, 2025, 03:55:00 GMT
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Post: 11920156
Originally Posted by katekebo
This is pure speculation but I can envision the following sequence of events that would match the timeline and the little we know from the CVR and sequence of events.
- While PF is concentrated on flying the airplane, PNF moves the switches from RUN to CUTOFF in quick succession (for whatever reason).
Sorry, stop right there.
What reason would any 787 Training Captain have for doing that at rotation, or slightly after rotation?
Really. Think about that. It makes Zero Sense.

@tdracers's point about the startle effect is at least plausible.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): CVR  RUN/CUTOFF  Startle Effect

Lonewolf_50
July 13, 2025, 23:16:00 GMT
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Post: 11921764
Originally Posted by DavidncRobson
Based on the news coming out of India, it appears that your suspicions regarding malicious intent may well be correct, but it is not the younger FO under suspicion as your post seems to suggest but the older more experienced captain.
Thank you for your kind reply. I confess to you that my post was not my best effort. I was in a deeply cynical mode when typing it.

I've reviewed the report a couple of more times since then, with some of the insights offered by PPRuNers to aid me. It had seemed to me, on first read, that they (whomever approved the final language of the report that we have all read) were hanging the FO out to dry...but...that may have been me reading too much between the lines . As others have noted, there's a lot not said.
Other comments in this thread had already made me think that the younger pilot was the PF and that it was he who had challenged the PM because he would have been focused on flying the aircraft and would have had neither the time nor the inclination to adjust the critical fuel cut off switches which you yourself categorically claim would never be mistaken for other switches.
Yes, that makes sense.

I've got some thoughts on compartmentalization still cooking in my head, to include "where was the captain's attention during take off, something he'd done hundreds of times?" I do not yet have those thoughts in coherent enough form to concisely present them to the very critical (as well it should be!) audience here.

The CRM piece has me grabbing at straws. I had mentioned in a previous post the bit about No Fast Hands and Confirmation of important switches/handles/levers before activating as general CRM principals, which it seems someone did not adhere to.

Nothing (yet) can tell me "what did the captain see with his eyes during the three seconds between leaving the ground and the switches being moved?"
I am not sure how much of the EICAS info ends up being recorded on the EAFR/FDR, or if there was a light that illuminated before the switches were moved, perhaps triggering a 'fast hands' moment / error...
Perhaps a subsequent report can shed some light on that.

And yes, it might have been an attempt at suicide for {X reasons} which are known only to someone who is now dead.

Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 13th July 2025 at 23:33 .

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EICAS  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff  Fuel Cutoff Switches

Lonewolf_50
July 13, 2025, 23:35:00 GMT
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Post: 11921778
Originally Posted by DIBO
Trying to read it all, don't think I saw this coming by

How would the (steep) authority gradient impact the sequence of critical events and associated timing?
Wouldn't the sequence of actions + timings be substantially different, depending on the critical mistake being discovered by the:

PIC/PM = instant recovery action (incl. expletives), assessing recovery, .... only then questioning FO's actions
FO = questioning PIC's actions.... assess response for a few seconds (physical/mental state).... only if clearly unsatisfactory, initiate critical recovery actions

For me the 2nd scenario it what matches best with the facts being presented.
Yeah, that's a part of the CM piece I am still puzzling over: authority gradient.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Authority Gradient

Lonewolf_50
July 14, 2025, 00:11:00 GMT
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Post: 11921797
tdracer, thank you.

I have watched the nonsense posted about 'that is a bad design' as regards the fuel switches and have bitten my tongue.

It's a sane and rational design choice unless one is a default Boeing basher.

There are two sets of two switches near to each other (see the photos and figures further up) that are important (one due to fuel, one due to a primary flight control, the horizontal stab). They are protected from inadvertent movement in two different ways based on their physical proximity.
1) Stab (influencing) switches use the covered guard. (The Horizontal Stab is a primary flight control).
2) The fuel switches are stopped from casual movement by the design of that switch (which has been discussed to death) unless you pull out then them move them to the other position.

See how this works, folks who don't fly?

Stab switches: uncover, then move. Two steps.
Fuel switches: pull out, then move. Two steps.
They look different and they feel different.

Given their proximity, the designers (who have to deal with ergonomics) provided both a visual and a tactile clue that they are different, and what switch your fingers are touching or trying to move.

Will that choice guarantee that some idiot won't activate a wrong switch?
No, it won't, because you can't idiot proof everything ... the universe will always provide a bigger idiot.

But it does offer two, not one, cues to "wait, what switch am I about to activate?" for the trained user and is thus a sound design choice. Yes, pilots do undergo training for how to use all of the switches in the cockpit/flight deck.
Really.
Not kidding about this.
(Have I ever moved a wrong lever or switch? Yes).

Oh, by the way, those who have posted here who fly the 737, 757, 767, 777, and 787, have affirmed the operation and usefulness of the fuel switches. IIRC one of our 777 flyers pointed out that his captain had written up one such switch since it wasn't working right.

Yes, friends on PPRuNe, you can know how they work and if they are worn, or feel as though they are not working correctly. You can do the write up and the maintenance team can replace the switch (or fix it, or replace the quadrant, yadda yadda).
As noted by others, those switches are used on every flight.
You'll know how it should feel/work, and if it doesn't feel or work correctly you make mention of that to the engineers/maintenance crew (depending on which side of the pond you are on).

The Bulletin from several years ago does not prevent normal maintenance, and write ups, from happening on a routine basis (as with various other things on aircraft that get written up).

I had three switch design and placement factors explained to me - visual, tactile, and positional - over 40 years ago when I was going through blind cockpit checks prior to getting initially qualified in the SH-2F.
Spoiler
 
As I flew other aircraft I would notice various choices made as regards all three factors. (A fascinating sub topic of its own, but I'll stop there).

I thus say to DiffTailShim, and whatever test pilot from the UK posted his noise: no, you are wrong.
The design decision is sound.
That Embraer did/does it differently (which is cool, there is more than one way to peel an onion ) has little or nothing to do with this accident.

One could argue that their proximity might have an impact, but that would require evidence that something to do with the Stab Switches was involved in this event.
So far, that vague mention of a write up from a previous flight about a stab light gives us a tenuous thread, but not a lot to work with.

Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 14th July 2025 at 00:37 .

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Electrical Failure  Fuel (All)  Fuel Cutoff Switches  Switch Guards

Lonewolf_50
July 14, 2025, 00:42:00 GMT
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Post: 11921806
galaxy, it was me who wasn't sure in my post from a few days ago, and I think David was trying to get me to accept that the FO was flying based on what was in the report.
Which I now do.

Subjects: None