Posts by user "Lookleft" [Posts: 6 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 1]

Lookleft
June 18, 2025, 00:29:00 GMT
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Post: 11904797
There have been a few accidents where the thrust levers were at idle right up to the point of impact. Turkish airlines in Amsterdam and Asiana in SFO. I think a lot of pilots are of the view that the thrust levers are set and forget. Whether the fuel stopped through a shut-off by equipment failure or a mismanaged event by the crew I think pilots should regain the practice of keeping a hand on the T/L whenever they are airborne and in the take-off or landing phase. I'm not blaming the crew in this accident but I can well imagine the confusion in processing a series of indications from EICAS that the aircraft was no longer capable of climbing. They simply would not have had the time to do even the most rudimentary G.R.A.D.E. or whatever acronym for decision making AI use to have recovered the situation. Airline pilots are not test pilots and are taught to be methodical in dealing with an emergency. If it transpires that it was a fault with the engines, either software or hardware, then the regulatory authorities need to consider the validity of 370 minutes ETOPS.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EICAS

Lookleft
June 18, 2025, 01:08:00 GMT
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Post: 11904815
In both cases the crew had realized the problem and manually advanced the throttle levers before impact--just not soon enough.
Both crews responded to the stick shaker, they were not aware of the problem up to that point. My point being the T/L should always have the PFs hand on them so that they know what the T/Ls are doing.

Subjects: None

Lookleft
June 20, 2025, 05:20:00 GMT
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Post: 11906598
Assuming there is some credence to the article, dual engine failure due to water contamination is the leading theory.
No it can't be. All discussion about power loss is to be focused on TMCA, FADEC and RATs being deployed. Anything else has already been discussed.

Last edited by Lookleft; 20th June 2025 at 05:57 .

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Dual Engine Failure  Engine Failure (All)  FADEC

Lookleft
June 20, 2025, 05:55:00 GMT
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Post: 11906614
I'm not suggesting you are wrong wheelsright, my post to you was in response to posts I have made about potential fuel contamination, being removed. A central point of failure is more likely than the simultaneous shutdown by systems on two separate engines at the point at which the aircraft left the ground. If what is being speculated on is possible then all ETOPs approval should be removed and the engine manufacturers told to start again.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All)

Lookleft
June 21, 2025, 04:58:00 GMT
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Post: 11907483
I can guarantee you that the investigation is way ahead of this thread as they won't be stuck on a hamster wheel of irrelevant theories. The investigators are under no obligation to keep the general public informed minute by minute of where the investigation is. They are obliged under annex 13 to release a preliminary report in 30 days of the accident then its every 6 months, if there is anything to report. Anything that is important to release to the engine and airframe manufacturers will be done as a separate part of the process. Having been involved in the investigation process I can tell you from first hand experience that pet theories, as expounded on these pages, are like trying to cure cancer with just a petrie dish.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Annex 13  Preliminary Report

Lookleft
July 14, 2025, 00:26:00 GMT
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Post: 11921800
Did Captain cut fuel, get challenged by FO, and then fuel turned back on too late?

Or did Captain cut fuel, accuse FO to get it on the record, and then fuel turned back on too late?

If FO cut fuel, would expect a more assertive comment and faster intervention.
Or did the F/O call for the gear up, the Captain still looking outside, did an action with his right hand, both pilots felt and heard the engines wind down, The F/O looking down realised what had happened, the Captain looked down and couldn't reconcile his intended action (bringing the gear up) hence the "I didn't do it " comment, then selected the FCO switches back to run but it was to late for the situation to be recovered. The only action they could take that they felt they had some control of was to broadcast a MAYDAY.

For me the prelim report just reveals an unintended consequence of relying on muscle memory to carry out an action that has been performed multiple times without confirmation. It happens a lot but rarely with such a tragic consequence. I have turned the ignition switch to Normal during an engine start when asked to set the park brake during a pushback. There have been multiple occasions where an A320 park brake was set when a flap setting was commanded. On more than one occasion the flaps have been raised when "gear up" was commanded. This may not have been the first time the FCO switches have been selected but definitely the first time it wasn't picked up early enough to reverse the action.

As to the CVR recordings, I will repeat what I have often stated previously. There is no inherent right of the public to receive a full transcript of the CVR in order for them to form their own opinion of what happened. It is up to the Indian AAIB to conduct an investigation under the requirements of Annex 13 and possibly a fuller transcript of the CVR will be published in the Final Report to help the reader gain an understanding of what happened.

My belief is that CVideoRs, with robust protections and legislation around their use, will help accident investigations immensely by answering some of the what questions that the FDR and CVR don't seem able to. It doesn't have to be set up like the many Go-Pro images that are on social media. All that is needed is an image of the center console and the engine display and EICAS/ECAM screens .There would be no need to have images of the pilots faces.

Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): AAIB (All)  AAIB (India)  Annex 13  CVR  FDR  MAYDAY  Muscle Memory  Preliminary Report