Posts by user "Musician" [Posts: 83 Total up-votes: 0 Pages: 5]

Agreed.
Also, I expect the airport would've sent a car out to check the runway for evidence. Since we agree that the engine failure occurred near rotation, and that rotation occured well inside the runway ( see e.g. fdr here , or the granular ADS-B data), that car would've encountered a bloody mess, and we'd all know about it by now.

The problem with these reports is that the Indian AAIB and DGCA websites ( aaib.gov.in www.dgca.gov.in ) are mute on the subject of this crash, so even the DGCA inspection mandate quoted above is shakily sourced. On Friday, AvHerald had already updated with "On Jun 13th 2025 the DGCA reported, that initial preliminary findings rule out a bird strike as no bird carcasses have been found." I searched for a source for this, and found an "exclusive" which read, "The initial probe report of the Ahmedabad Air India crash, accessed by CNN-News18, reveals key findings from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation\x92s assessment led by the director of security." Other media simply quoted News18. There are two reasons to be skeptical here:
\x95 first, we have seen fake reports circulating;
\x95 secondly, News18 rates badly on mediabiasfactcheck.com: "Launched in 2005, CNN-News18 (formerly CNN-IBN) is an English-language Indian news television channel based in India. We also rate them Questionable based on a poor fact-checking record with numerous false claims."
That leads me to consider that this "exclusive" might be sloppy reporting based on a fake\x97I have no way to know whether it is legitimate or not.

At this point, I feel we can only rely on information being official if it's published through an official website, or if there's independent reporting or a video clip from an official press briefing.

I do believe the accident was not caused by an animal strike, for many reasons.
But I wouldn't believe it based on unsourced reporting alone.

The AC does not cool the fuel tanks.

Quoting MR8, 15th Jun 2025 21:54 from the other thread:

The flight recorder on the 787 is called "enhanced airborne flight recorder" (EAFR), and it's a combination unit with CVR and FDR functionality. There are two on the aircraft, the one in the front has battery backup.
Since it has been reported that the "FDR" was found, they also have the "CVR".

Here's an answer from the other thread: Sailvi767 , 14th Jun 2025 18:00

Could you please elaborate on that?

FR24 did do that raw ADS-B data comparison. Remember the GPS position and barometric altitude are sent by the aircraft itself. The altitude is sent in 25 ft intervals, so a shallow curve that is smooth in reality looks janky in the data, due to the rounding of the numbers. From https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ :
The red line is the accident flight, and it covers approximately 4.3 seconds.
Obviously the altitudes are all uncorrected for barometric pressure, which would've varied with the weather on that day; you kind of have to mentally shift the lines vertically downward. Now I looked for, but couldn't find, the post in the old thread where the rotation was triangulated\xb9, but I remember that it was near the turnoff to the high-speed taxiway, so a few seconds ahead of this ADS-B capture. We only have the video to show us what occurred then.

That means the ADS-B data doesn't really tell us whether the first few seconds of the climb were normal or not.

When we compare the red line to the blue lines, the data tells us the climb rate had already decayed significantly before the accident aircraft passed over the end of the runway, because the red flight path is much more shallow than the blue flight paths.

Please correct me if I'm wrong: to my eye, the data alone does not show that the engines must have failed after rotation, because the data does not demonstrate a normal climb rate.

But likewise, the engines can't have failed much before rotation:
For completeness' sake: you can look at the CCTV video, consider the 787's wingspan a flying 200 ft yardstick, and hopefully agree that the aircraft did not get much higher than 200 ft AAL, if that.

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\xb9 I found one of them, anyway. The reference is the CCTV video:

Here's a source to (hopefully) put the 5G speculations to rest: Source: https://simpleflying.com/indian-auth...eter-upgrades/ (and others)

How many cycles are they rated for?

No, it's not. You got that value from ADS-B, which is barometric altitude at standard pressure, and when you correct for that, the highest value is ~100 ft. AAL.

Instead, look at the CCTV video, and consider that the wing span of the aircraft is ~200 ft. I hope you'll agree AI171 didn't come close to 400 ft. AAL at any point.

Draw your own conclusions.
Personally, I trust there were no issues.

You may be surprised to learn that aircraft sometimes need full thrust on the ground.
TCMA requires that the pilot pulls the thrust levers back to idle, and that the engine fails to spool down to idle as commanded. Only then will it shut off the engine (on the ground).
Pilots try to avoid pulling the thrust levers back to idle when they're taking off.
For that reason, TCMA has never triggered during take-off before.

Yes. I simplified. The point stands that the throttle needs to be pulled back, as it was in the ANA event, because that was a landing and not a take-off.

First, you posted a good summary. I'd have added "unanticipated hardware fault" and "unanticipated software fault" as generic causes.

Note that the thrust lever actuators are wired to the FADECs, and that the TCMA gets the T/L position from that. For TCMA to trigger, it has to determine that its FADEC (on that engine) failed to achieve a commanded reduction in thrust. So we're either looking at a weird, unprecedented edge case, or a FADEC failure, or both.

It has been mentioned before that this capability existed as part of the N2 overspeed protection: the FADEC would shut down a runaway engine by cutting its fuel before it disintegrates.
The thrust lever sensors are wired directly to the FADEC (and hence the TCMA). No data bus is involved with this item.

With a MCAS crash, it required a hardware problem with an AOA sensor, used as input to a correctly working MCAS, to cause the aircraft to behave erratically. With a correctly working TCMA, I believe it'd require two hardware problems to get TCMA to shut down the engine, as there'd have to be an implausible thrust lever reading, and a FADEC/engine failure to process it within the TCMA allowed range ("contour"?). On both engines, separately and simultaneously.

That leaves a software problem; it's not hard to imagine. The issue is, at this point it's just that: imagination. I could detail a possible software failure chain, but without examining the actual code, it's impossible to verify. We simply don't have the evidence.
I could just as well imagine a microwave gun frying the electronics on both engines. An escaped hamster under the floor peeing on important contacts. A timed device installed by a psychopathic mechanic. There's no evidence for that, either.

This process is a way to psychologically cope with the unexplained accident, but because it lacks evidence, it's not likely to identify the actual cause. We've run the evidence down to "most likely both engines failed or shut off close to rotation, and the cause for that is inside the aircraft". Since the take-off looked normal until that failure, we have no clues as to the cause hidden inside the aircraft. We need to rely on the official investigation to discover and analyse sufficient evidence. The post-crash fire is going to make that difficult.

"Both engines failed or shut off close to rotation" explains all of the evidence : it explains an unremarkable take-off roll, loss of lift, absence of pronounced yaw, loss of electrical power, loss of the ADS-B transponder, RAT deployment, the noise of the RAT banging into place and revving up, emergency signs lighting up, a possible mayday call reporting loss of thrust/power/lift, and a physically plausible glide from a little over 200 ft AAL to the crash site 50 feet (?) below aerodrome elevation .
It explains what we saw on the videos, what the witness reported, where the aircraft ended up, and the ensuing sudden catastrophe.

I don't believe we have evidence for anything else right now—I'd be happily corrected on that.

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Edit: the evidence of the crash photo with the open APU inlet door, and the main gear bogeys tilted forward, are also explained by the dual engine failure/shut off.

Both EAFR run on standby power, yes. In addition, the forward EAFR has its own battery backup. However, the number of devices that still send valid data to the EAFR during a power outage is diminished, of course.

The black rubber cap protects a multi-pin connector.

The white cylinder is an underwater location transmitter.

The forward EAFR has its own backup power.

Source: https://www.geaerospace.com/sites/de...rder-3254F.pdf

The Jeju Air recorders survived the crash, and their data was successfully downloaded. They simply stopped recording when the power failed. (And those recorders were also much damaged.)

Here, at least one EAFR has its own power source, and we're likely to see a record of the engine failures if those caused the power loss on AI171, so that's going to be more helpful.

It would definitely be nice to narrow that down; I can't do it, and your method is not convincing me.
The ADS-B datagrams sent by the aircraft show a much diminished climb rate with decaying speed, betraying insufficient thrust in that phase of the flight. That somewhat contradicts your assertions.

I also do not have faith in anyone's ability to watch the cctv video and confidently determine through mere eyeballing that the climb rate did not decay by 15% within the first 100 feet or so. (The ADS-B data suggests the speed diminished 7% for ~50 ft of climb.) Other than your stone, even a glider can convert speed to altitude.

So, "close to rotation" is the best I (personally) can do, based on what I know right now; or that I would trust myself to be able to convince others of.

Assume an object travels at 200 knots and its speed decays to 120 knots (100m/s to 60m/s). The kinetic energy lost thereby suffices to elevate that object by ~1000 ft. (320m) in a vacuum, i.e. disregarding drag. In other words, if 75% of the kinetic energy was lost through air resistance (drag), the aircraft could still climb more than 200 feet.

Thank you for your reply! There's a lot we agree on; unfortunately, I'll be cutting that from my response here.
Right. ADS-B is transmitted via radio, so reception can be patchy, or obstructed by someone else transmitting on the same frequency (e.g. other aircraft), so not every datagram that the aircraft sends gets received. When that happens, the live display of FR24 assumes the aircraft kept doing what it did, and when another datagram eventually comes in, it corrects the position. It also connects the locations of these datagrams, regardless of whether the aircraft actually went there. For example, in the AI171 there's a 4-minute gap between a datagram sent on the taxiway, and the next datagram sent when the aircraft was off the ground towards the departure end of the taxiway. FR24 then connected these points via the shortest route; but we know that the aircraft actually used the intervening 4 minutes to taxi to the approach end of the runway, where it then started its take-off run. So that was false. (Another source of errors is when different FR24 receivers don't have synchronised clocks, so a mixture of data from these can have weird artifacts as a result.)
However, the datagrams that FR24 actually received were correct. They contain the GPS position of AI171 and its unadjusted barometric altitude, as determined by its onboard instruments. This data is as reliable as the instruments themselves are. (An example here is that the NTSB wasn't sure that the altimeter on the Blackhawk that crashed at Washington-Reagan was accurate; if that is the case, the ADS-B data would also be affected.)

On their blog post at https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ , FR24 have published the data that they actually received.

Have you ever seen a parabolic trajectory from "the short end"?
Yes.

It's uncertain because the 787 rounds all altitudes it sends to the nearest multiple of 25. The altitudes sent were from 575 ft to 625 ft., but that's MSL and not adjusted for the weather: low air pressure makes that number higher than the actual altitude. FR24 adjusted this to 21ft climbing to 71 ft, but it could've been 30 to 60 or maybe 10 to 80, as it's rounded. I think it's fairly close to 50 feet of climb, though.

1) people taking the MSL altitude literally (625 ft)
2) people adjusting for airport elevation (189 ft), but not for pressure: 437 ft
3) people adjusting for pressure, some adjusting for temperature, get 71 to ~100 feet for the last recorded altitude.
But while ADS-B reception was lost then (or the transmitter lost power), the aircraft continued climbing; examine the cctv video, knowing the wingspan is ~200 feet, we see that the aircraft reached 200 feet but not much more.

The survivor likened the sound to a car engine revving up. If you've listened to a good version of the phone video, you'll have noticed the "vroom" sound at the start that some likened to a motorcycle. That sound is the RAT in action, and you can imagine what that would sound like when it rapidly spins up: like a driver stepping on the throttle with their car engine in neutral. The RAT deploying is a consequence of a dual engine shutdown. It says nothing about whether the TMCA was involved.

[Now I just hope your post is still there as I post this. ]

For comparison, the ADS-B data show the ground speed dropping off from 184 knots to 172 knots over 4.3 seconds as the aircraft climbs.

How did you determine that the path was parabolic?
By eyeball, did you measure something, did you have something to compare it to?

\x95 The aircraft was a 777 configured for landing (flaps 20 for the G/A attempt)
\x95 The crew pushed TOGA, but it didn't take, because the aircraft had technically landed already. This delayed pushing the throttle forward.
\x95 AI171, starting from 184 knots or more, had substantially more energy to work with.

That's a very useful document, and it answered some questions for me.


The area microphone connects to both EAFRs. The EAFR are normally powered via the left and right main 28v buses.

The RAT powers the backup bus.

The main L and R 28v buses do not receive backup power.

After electric power is lost, the aft EAFR is unpowered, and the front EAFR has 10 minutes power off its internal supply.