July 18, 2025, 05:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924842
We're speaking here on the amount of luck available. As it turned out, even crashing into buildings, it sufficed for one passenger to survive. So there's more luck here than with a CFIT from cruise—and some bad luck in not missing the house they crashed into.
Last edited by Musician; 18th July 2025 at 06:46 .
Subjects: None
No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 18, 2025, 06:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924846
Thank you for your reply,
appruser
, and apologies fur cutting most of it:
1. I don't know that the transponder lost power, because I don't have knowledge which electrical bus it is powered from on the 787. It may well have been powered from the main battery the whole time. The FR24 receiver may have stopped receiving data because it could no longer "see" the aircraft‐‐we know there are issues because it didn't even see the eastern half of the runway.
2. Altitudes are rounded, so this could be close to 75 feet gain‐‐or a gain and decline, if the data covers the top of the trajectory.
3. The first reading is definitely in the air, after rotation. FR24 does not report the altitude when the ADS-B data indicates that the aircraft is on the ground, and their data download confirms that.
The best bet to establish timing is to use rotation as datum, and then match the altitude/time estimates from the CCTV with position/time from the ADS-B and the estimated ground speed of the aircraft.
The fact that the ground speed is declining throughout the data sequence strongly suggests that it begins some time after the point, or at the point, when thrust was lost. And we know that didn't begin to happen until the aircraft was 3 seconds into the air.
Big questions in my mind:
1. If the loss of ADSB corresponds to the E1/E2Fuel Cutoff switches being moved from RUN -> CUTOFF, why is the airspeed declining for the prior 4 seconds?
2. In 4 seconds, why is there only 50ft of altitude gain? that seems odd.
3. To account for only 50ft of alt gain, if we assume the 1st reading is on the runway just before rotation, the intermediate +25ft alt gain is at rotation (Nose up but MLG still on the runway), and the last 4 readings are in the air (nose up an additional 25ft), that means that 1 second or less after lift-off, ADSB was lost - this is before E1/E2 FCO RUN-> CUTOFF.
It's just weird .
1. If the loss of ADSB corresponds to the E1/E2Fuel Cutoff switches being moved from RUN -> CUTOFF, why is the airspeed declining for the prior 4 seconds?
2. In 4 seconds, why is there only 50ft of altitude gain? that seems odd.
3. To account for only 50ft of alt gain, if we assume the 1st reading is on the runway just before rotation, the intermediate +25ft alt gain is at rotation (Nose up but MLG still on the runway), and the last 4 readings are in the air (nose up an additional 25ft), that means that 1 second or less after lift-off, ADSB was lost - this is before E1/E2 FCO RUN-> CUTOFF.
It's just weird .
2. Altitudes are rounded, so this could be close to 75 feet gain‐‐or a gain and decline, if the data covers the top of the trajectory.
3. The first reading is definitely in the air, after rotation. FR24 does not report the altitude when the ADS-B data indicates that the aircraft is on the ground, and their data download confirms that.
The best bet to establish timing is to use rotation as datum, and then match the altitude/time estimates from the CCTV with position/time from the ADS-B and the estimated ground speed of the aircraft.
The fact that the ground speed is declining throughout the data sequence strongly suggests that it begins some time after the point, or at the point, when thrust was lost. And we know that didn't begin to happen until the aircraft was 3 seconds into the air.
Last edited by Musician; 18th July 2025 at 06:38 .
Subjects
ADSB
CCTV
FlightRadar24
Fuel (All)
Fuel Cutoff Switches
RUN/CUTOFF
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 18, 2025, 06:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924853
[...snip...]
We are not conducting either a criminal trial, or a civil trial here. I would rather call it (perhaps optimistically) a "scientific enquiry". I think the standard to be applied is whatever we (individually or collectively) think is reasonable, is order to fairly reach a meaningful conclusion. The standard for a criminal trial need not apply.
[...snip...]
We are not conducting either a criminal trial, or a civil trial here. I would rather call it (perhaps optimistically) a "scientific enquiry". I think the standard to be applied is whatever we (individually or collectively) think is reasonable, is order to fairly reach a meaningful conclusion. The standard for a criminal trial need not apply.
[...snip...]
The disconnect in the discussion stems partially from some speaking to what is " reasonable " while others talk about what is possible , given that we don't have all of the evidence yet.
For example:
Is it reasonable to assume the switch was defective? No .
Is it possible that it was? Yes .
Could future evidence change what is reasonable? Yes, but it probably won't. Wait and see.
So all of this can be true simultaneously, and if you don't pay attention to the context, that "yes" and "no" clash. (Can we call that a hamster fight?
)
Subjects: None
No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
August 09, 2025, 08:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11935586
Subjects
Fuel (All)
Fuel Cutoff Switches
Preliminary Report
Relight
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
August 09, 2025, 08:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11935588
It is reasonable to think that 3 seconds into that flight is where "positive rate" would've been evident.
Subjects
AI171
CCTV
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
October 03, 2025, 06:44:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11963525
Subjects: None
4 recorded likes for this post.Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
November 07, 2025, 19:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11984922
From the Reuters article:
Nov 7 (Reuters) - India's top court said on Friday that a preliminary report on an Air India crash that killed 260 people in June does not insinuate anything against the captain, but it will hear a plea from the pilot's father on November 10 for an independent probe.
So the question was:
did the preliminary report blame the Captain?
I agree with the judge that it did not.
It's a father who wants a court to tell everyone that his son did nothing wrong.
It's understandable, but I'd rather wait for the facts to emerge.
But given this legal climate, I fear the AAIB might withhold the final report, as they're likely to get sued over it if they publish.
Subjects
AAIB (All)
Preliminary Report
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
November 28, 2025, 13:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11997203
In Part 1, 2 and 3 of The Federal investigation into the Air India 171 crash, we looked at how core network degradation caused multi-component failure, and how the airline has been speeding up extensive D-check of its Dreamliners.
In part 4, we will look into how the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau's (AAIB) report mentions a stabilizer trim sensor issue on the previous flight (Al 423 Delhi-Ahmedabad) of the same plane, but does not mention a bigger problem with the stabilizer motor unit.
The Federal has gained access to the Aircraft Health Management (AHM) report that was sent to Boeing at 9.48 am IST (for Flight Al 423) that shows not only was the sensor showing stabilizer position malfunctioning but also the electronic control box that drives one of the tail-trim motors called the horizontal stabilizer electric motor control unit (EMCU). Both were replaced and the plane released for flight.
.
The Federal has gained access to the Aircraft Health Management (AHM) report that was sent to Boeing at 9.48 am IST (for Flight Al 423) that shows not only was the sensor showing stabilizer position malfunctioning but also the electronic control box that drives one of the tail-trim motors called the horizontal stabilizer electric motor control unit (EMCU). Both were replaced and the plane released for flight.
As yet unconfirmed.
Edit: I should probably explain that I posted this so we can reference what The Federal actually wrote, and don't need to discuss secondhand paraphrases of it. As long as it's unconfirmed, I don't believe any of it.
Last edited by Musician; 29th November 2025 at 09:00 .
Subjects
AAIB (All)
AI171
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
December 24, 2025, 08:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12010285
For the FDR to record the switch moving, while the engine responds to the switch moving, requires two different circuits on different poles of the switch to change state at the same time. This could only be achieved by flipping the switch.
I have also never heard of a solenoid (such as driving the fuel valve) to be actuated by solar radiation. I understand that the fuel cut-off part of the circuitry is entirely analog (happy to be corrected if not).
Subjects
FDR
Fuel (All)
Fuel Cutoff
Fuel Cutoff Switches
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
December 24, 2025, 11:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12010358
Hi @ all,
does someone has more information about the so-called 'Golden Chassis'? Does only Boeing has it or are there several of them, which are not owned by Boeing, worldwide available? How does this Chassis work and can the readout be counter-checked? And is it possible to manipulate them?
Regards
does someone has more information about the so-called 'Golden Chassis'? Does only Boeing has it or are there several of them, which are not owned by Boeing, worldwide available? How does this Chassis work and can the readout be counter-checked? And is it possible to manipulate them?
Regards
https://www.taxtmi.com/news?id=49252
Generally, data from damaged flight recorders is downloaded after sourcing Golden Chassis and relevant download cables from other accident investigation authorities.
In the current investigation, AAIB on Saturday said the Golden Chassis or the identical EAFR unit and download cables required to download data from EAFR were sourced from the US National Transport Safety Board (NTSB).
https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/a...-an-air-crash/
The crash-survivable memory unit (CSMU) is the most critical component, as it stores the valuable flight data. If necessary, specialists transfer data chips into a golden chassis, a specialized device that prevents further data loss while allowing a safe download. “We have in the laboratory every western-made flight recorder, ordered from the manufacturers with one simple modification: a modification that turns off any further writing of data,” Payne explained.
https://safetycompass.wordpress.com/...-recorder-lab/
[img alt="A shelf unit housing nearly every known type of flight data recorder.
These surrogate recorders are known as 'Golden Chassis'."]https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1280x2000/recorders_copy_d214c286ab80e3503be1845ff4dd875d18f362b1.jpg[/img]
A shelf unit housing nearly every known type of flight data recorder. These surrogate recorders are known as “Golden Chassis”.
I believe the French BEA have a similarly well-stocked store of flight recorders. Other agencies might, as well.
Subjects
AAIB (All)
DFDR
EAFR
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
December 24, 2025, 16:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12010436
The Landing Gear System I am familiar with determined and set WoW status, as well as computing aircraft weight from a load cell situated on the LG structure. Only one system, only one bit for WoW status, just one failure; then the TCMA does the rest. I read somewhere that the Pilots tried to do an engines restart by recycling the fuel cutoff switches, so I have no idea where the switches might have ended up - but TCMA does not care!
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1\x92s core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery.
Please do read the preliminary report, it is the best source we have, and any question you might have regarding what it says are on topic here. TCMA is not mentioned because none of the conditions it needs to trigger were part of the accident sequence (it's more than WoW).
Subjects
Fuel (All)
Fuel Cutoff
Fuel Cutoff Switches
Preliminary Report
Relight
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
December 24, 2025, 19:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12010507
The RAT was deployed after the switches transitioned.
This is because RAT deployment is automatic when both engines are shut down.
See https://paulross.github.io/pprune-th...oyment-10.html
This is because RAT deployment is automatic when both engines are shut down.
See https://paulross.github.io/pprune-th...oyment-10.html
Subjects
RAT (All)
RAT (Deployment)
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 22, 2026, 19:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12025353
The report is here:
https://avherald.com/files/Senate%20...12,%202026.pdf
https://avherald.com/files/Senate%20...12,%202026.pdf
➢
FAS analyzed >2,000 aircraft systems failure reports on 787 model airplanes
➢These reports cover a small fraction (18%) of the global 787 fleet of 1,235 airplanes
.
Some back-of-the-envelope maths:
If >2000 is 18%, the total number is >11,000.
The 787 fleet has an eyeballed average age of 8 years (going by delivery stats on Wikipedia), 1235*8 is about 10,000 aircraft-years.
This means there are on average, 1.1 "system failure reports" per 787 per year.
We don't get told whether these are major or minor occurrences, but the presentation cited only 2 major failures for VT-ANB.
1.1 failure report per year doesn't feel like a lot, but I have no context, and we really don't know what types of reports these are. How much is "normal" for other aircraft types?
Subjects: None
1 recorded likes for this post.Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 23, 2026, 02:00:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12025513
I thought we were discussing the Air India crash - not something that happened 15 years earlier during flight testing.
There is a reason they flight test new aircraft - to find problems like that.
Anyway, what's the relevance to Air India? It didn't lose power until the engines were shutdown...
There is a reason they flight test new aircraft - to find problems like that.
Anyway, what's the relevance to Air India? It didn't lose power until the engines were shutdown...
The problem is that that's not where the known evidence leads (as we know), and that "whistleblower" doesn't change that.
They're trying to portray the 787 as a fault-ridden aircraft that ought to not be allowed to fly, in spite of its long track record of flying safely (once the battery issues were solved). It's kind of like the people shouting "the vaccine is going to kill us all", despite a marked absence of dead bodies at scale 4 years later.
For that end, they're avoiding putting their facts in any kind of context, and instead peddle big numbers, "secrets", and an implied coverup, but there's no hard evidence for any of it (I don't think we get to see these 2000+ reports?).
So the evidence of the FDR must be wrong—otherwise their narrative doesn't work.
Why is it wrong? "Electrical problems", meaning "magic".
If you believe in magic, where a fault ex machina just so happens to achieve what you need it to achieve, as if reality was a cheesy Hollywood production, then the AI171 crashed all by itself.
Those of us who don't believe in electrical magic follow the evidence instead.
Subjects
AI171
Electrical Failure
FDR
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 23, 2026, 11:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12025706
You just have to want to believe!
Subjects: None
3 recorded likes for this post.Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 24, 2026, 09:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12026247
Very interesting article in the Daily Telegraph.
The over riding impression I get is one of vested interests protecting their own position rather than following the evidence.
https://apple.news/AHSrBmul0Tv-yToeImigXTA
The over riding impression I get is one of vested interests protecting their own position rather than following the evidence.
https://apple.news/AHSrBmul0Tv-yToeImigXTA
There's the old "the RAT deployed early" (assuming it always takes a full 6 seconds to spool up), the water leak, the "can't move both switches in a second", and new "the aft FDR looks like it burned before the crash". And this, which is as yet unsubstantiated, and is likely not relevant at all:
Just 15 minutes before take-off, the aircraft\x92s bus power control units (BPCUs), which manage the electrical systems, sent real-time signals to Boeing and Air India indicating malfunctions with both BPCUs.
In isolation, none of these problems is classed as major issues, but taken together, according to some experts they show a pattern of electrical problems that point to issues with the core network.
According to reports in India, in the minute before the aircraft took off, and almost certainly as it was heading down the runway, the 787\x92s aircraft communications addressing and reporting system sent a fault code to Boeing and Air India which indicated that the Fadec was receiving corrupted data from an engine monitoring probe.
Pierson says: \x93That aircraft was sending out fault messages before it took off. That is a big red flag. The aircraft health management system was also sending real-time data to Air India and Boeing so they had that information before the fires were even put out. None of that information was included in the preliminary report.
Last edited by Musician; 24th January 2026 at 11:14 .
Subjects
FDR
Preliminary Report
RAT (All)
RAT (Deployment)
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 25, 2026, 00:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12026674
More click-bait BS - the 787 has enhanced engine monitoring - GE specifically uses something called an "EMU" - Engine Monitoring Unit - a box on the engine separate from the FADEC that monitors and records 'engine health data'. The EMU records the data, and can also send out reports (via ACARS or WiFi type downlink) so that ground based assets can keep track of the engine health and direct the operator when to overhaul the engine or to remove an engine before a pending fault can result in a shutdown.
Most of the engine health monitoring sensors are not only not required for dispatch, there is no requirement to ever fix them if they fail (since they are not involved in the FADEC engine control algorithms) - the failure of an engine health monitor sensor only means you don't get as good of health monitoring data for that engine (and engine health monitoring is optional and not covered by the regulations).
It's possible - even likely - that the sensor had been faulted for months or even years before that flight.
Totally irrelevant to the accident.
These people are really clutching at straws in their attempt to make this Boeing's fault.
Most of the engine health monitoring sensors are not only not required for dispatch, there is no requirement to ever fix them if they fail (since they are not involved in the FADEC engine control algorithms) - the failure of an engine health monitor sensor only means you don't get as good of health monitoring data for that engine (and engine health monitoring is optional and not covered by the regulations).
It's possible - even likely - that the sensor had been faulted for months or even years before that flight.
Totally irrelevant to the accident.
These people are really clutching at straws in their attempt to make this Boeing's fault.
In the car analogy, this would be an "the ashtray is jammed" level of problem: no requirement to ever fix it.
Subjects
FADEC
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 25, 2026, 04:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12026729
The idea is to protect the engines against
inadvertant
dual shutdown in some way.
(There's always another way to deliberately crash an aircraft.)
The problem is, what do you do when the shutdown protection fails and doesn't let you shut down an engine you really need to shut down?
(There's always another way to deliberately crash an aircraft.)
The problem is, what do you do when the shutdown protection fails and doesn't let you shut down an engine you really need to shut down?
Subjects: None
2 recorded likes for this post.Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 25, 2026, 09:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12026812
The responses to the article are very interesting. And pretty much go to reaffirming my point about vested interests.
it was the same with the MH370 accident.
If you’re American or worked/flew Boeing aircraft you’re more likely to blame the pilots. If you’re Indian or Asian you’re more likely to blame the aircraft.
Unless someone produces a smoking gun, which is very unlikely, then the causes will always be up for debate.
Here in the U.K. we had the Chinook crash, where the pilots were instantly blamed. It makes me very uncomfortable to blame one individual for mass murder without a smoking gun as such.
it was the same with the MH370 accident.
If you’re American or worked/flew Boeing aircraft you’re more likely to blame the pilots. If you’re Indian or Asian you’re more likely to blame the aircraft.
Unless someone produces a smoking gun, which is very unlikely, then the causes will always be up for debate.
Here in the U.K. we had the Chinook crash, where the pilots were instantly blamed. It makes me very uncomfortable to blame one individual for mass murder without a smoking gun as such.
It's incorrect to say we're blaming the pilots; the prevailing opinion seems to be that ONE pilot (but we don't know who) inadvertantly flipped the switches in lieu of another task ("action slip").
It's incorrect to call this "mass murder", and I don't think anyone did (and stayed unmoderated).
It's also incorrect to say there's no smoking gun: the preliminary report is very clear that the fuel cutoff switches transitioned, i.e. somebody moved them such that one set of contacts was registered by the electronics and the FDR, and another set of contacts operated the fuel valve. The whole accident sequence follows from this logically and without contradictions.
It is clear that MH370 deviated off course intentionally, but we cannot say if a pilot planned this, or if the aircraft was hijacked.
It is false to say that the pilots were blamed "instantly" for the 1994 Chinook crash; the RAF board of inquiry did not do that. That ruling was overturned at first, but two subsequent inquiries re-overturned that, so that the pilots stand exonorated today.
Please do review the facts.
Subjects
Action slip
FDR
Fuel (All)
Fuel Cutoff
Fuel Cutoff Switches
Preliminary Report
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
January 26, 2026, 10:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12027399
Here's the moderation standard:
This statement has lots of merit.
Correct. And we're going to actively avoid getting near that theme in posts here. For reasons we can generally understand, the circumstances of this sad event have migrated away from being primarily aviation (the report does not suggest a defect with the airplane, and at least one pilot was obviously doing their very best). The report leads us into massive speculation territory, and outside the specialties of nearly all of us. None of us want to have PPRuNe become a source of information (correct, or otherwise) which may be used against a fellow pilot.
During a relaxing 36 hours away from the internet, away with Mrs. DAR, I reflected. I'm wondering to myself what this thread can continue to do [good] for we pilots, which it has not already done? It is now a repository of some good, and some less than good information. Are we contributing more to good outcomes for our industry by speculating, which theories may never be able to be validated?
Should we be closing this thread until something substantively new and authoritative can be added to the discussion? If keeping it open, what is served?
P.S.: After some very useful discussions, both with learned members of our group here, and some wise advisors outside this forum, I will take responsibility for now formally requesting of our members that future posts about this accident, or other [possible] intentional pilot act aviation crashes, not use the words: "suicide" nor "murder" at all - none, not at all, don't type the word.
A person may be described as "taking their own life" if that is a known intentional fact. For this event, the engines shutdown is not known to be a deliberate act. The two words now not to be used do have legal implications, and we're not going there. This is a pilot forum, not a legal forum. The accusation that a pilot intentionally shut down the two engines is not provable - it could have been a cockpit error. We may never know. It's time to stop talking this way.
I (and the other mods) are not going to go backward to sanitize what has gone before in these threads, it's just too much work, and trying to erase words is not really going to help. On the other hand, going forward, we're not going to perpetuate these words and theme.
If you have a genuine disagreement with me on this, I suppose I have to accept your PM on the topic. So far, I have replied every PM, out of courtesy. But I'd rather not explain again in a PM, what I have just explained here - 'cause that's all I've got. There's a line, we all know where it is, we're going to stay on the professional pilot peer side of it here - right?
So, as I have requested that these terms no longer be used, and I cannot imagine anything truly new to be discussed, I'm going to turn in, with the hope that posters might make the very bare minimum of meaningful posts, if any at all. No more questions about how the switches work, and speculated failure modes ('cause they've all been discussed far too much), no more medical speculation ('cause we have no facts, and this was a peer), and so on - you get the idea.... This, is moderation.
When a final report is released, we'll probably have more to discuss.
In the hours to come we mods will have given this all more thought, the thread may close - unless it does not have to.... please....
Pilot DAR,
One of your moderating team
Correct. And we're going to actively avoid getting near that theme in posts here. For reasons we can generally understand, the circumstances of this sad event have migrated away from being primarily aviation (the report does not suggest a defect with the airplane, and at least one pilot was obviously doing their very best). The report leads us into massive speculation territory, and outside the specialties of nearly all of us. None of us want to have PPRuNe become a source of information (correct, or otherwise) which may be used against a fellow pilot.
During a relaxing 36 hours away from the internet, away with Mrs. DAR, I reflected. I'm wondering to myself what this thread can continue to do [good] for we pilots, which it has not already done? It is now a repository of some good, and some less than good information. Are we contributing more to good outcomes for our industry by speculating, which theories may never be able to be validated?
Should we be closing this thread until something substantively new and authoritative can be added to the discussion? If keeping it open, what is served?
P.S.: After some very useful discussions, both with learned members of our group here, and some wise advisors outside this forum, I will take responsibility for now formally requesting of our members that future posts about this accident, or other [possible] intentional pilot act aviation crashes, not use the words: "suicide" nor "murder" at all - none, not at all, don't type the word.
A person may be described as "taking their own life" if that is a known intentional fact. For this event, the engines shutdown is not known to be a deliberate act. The two words now not to be used do have legal implications, and we're not going there. This is a pilot forum, not a legal forum. The accusation that a pilot intentionally shut down the two engines is not provable - it could have been a cockpit error. We may never know. It's time to stop talking this way.
I (and the other mods) are not going to go backward to sanitize what has gone before in these threads, it's just too much work, and trying to erase words is not really going to help. On the other hand, going forward, we're not going to perpetuate these words and theme.
If you have a genuine disagreement with me on this, I suppose I have to accept your PM on the topic. So far, I have replied every PM, out of courtesy. But I'd rather not explain again in a PM, what I have just explained here - 'cause that's all I've got. There's a line, we all know where it is, we're going to stay on the professional pilot peer side of it here - right?
So, as I have requested that these terms no longer be used, and I cannot imagine anything truly new to be discussed, I'm going to turn in, with the hope that posters might make the very bare minimum of meaningful posts, if any at all. No more questions about how the switches work, and speculated failure modes ('cause they've all been discussed far too much), no more medical speculation ('cause we have no facts, and this was a peer), and so on - you get the idea.... This, is moderation.
When a final report is released, we'll probably have more to discuss.
In the hours to come we mods will have given this all more thought, the thread may close - unless it does not have to.... please....
Pilot DAR,
One of your moderating team
Subjects
Thread Moderation
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.