June 12, 2025, 21:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11899756
PPrune Mods.
As a 787 Crewmember, this thread is unreadable and useless. This site used to be a great resource for professionals worldwide to share info, not anymore.
Please create 2 threads, one for those that have some relevant aviation knowledge to this event and another for the endless SLF questions.
PPrune could probably get more site traffic doing so.
As a 787 Crewmember, this thread is unreadable and useless. This site used to be a great resource for professionals worldwide to share info, not anymore.
Please create 2 threads, one for those that have some relevant aviation knowledge to this event and another for the endless SLF questions.
PPrune could probably get more site traffic doing so.
Easy does it, eh?…There are no workable methods to “create two parallel threads”.
If you want a free and open forum, just give the Mods a break, and set anyone who apparently doesn’t know their stuff but chooses to post their nonsense anyway, to Ignore.
That’s what that tool is for, and it keeps one’s own reading of serious and informed contributions within reason.
Q.E.D.?
PJ2
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Condolences Thread Moderation
June 13, 2025, 19:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11900851
The only other way the RAT can be deployed is manually, using the p/b on the overhead panel. Almost certainly this is a highly unlikely action given time & distractions. But it is one possibility that needs examination and elimination in the data.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): RAT (All) RAT (Deployment)
June 14, 2025, 22:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11901926
This to me makes more sense; perhaps I`ve got it wrong but in the video the trailing edge flaps definitely look up. Maybe there`s more and they weren`t.
On a flap 5 takeoff the FMS could be programmed to select climb power at flaps 1 which would seem like an apparent loss of thrust. Same as for F15 to F5 or further.
I`m not sure if they would have cycled the FCS switches or not. But the airplane certainly would have experienced a loss of lift would the flaps been inadvertently retracted. As well as perceived loss of thrust.
OTOH any castastophic failure which left the gear down would have essentially left the flaps where they were. They are hydraulically activated with electrical backup but it`s wayyyyy slow.
On a flap 5 takeoff the FMS could be programmed to select climb power at flaps 1 which would seem like an apparent loss of thrust. Same as for F15 to F5 or further.
I`m not sure if they would have cycled the FCS switches or not. But the airplane certainly would have experienced a loss of lift would the flaps been inadvertently retracted. As well as perceived loss of thrust.
OTOH any castastophic failure which left the gear down would have essentially left the flaps where they were. They are hydraulically activated with electrical backup but it`s wayyyyy slow.
I believe this is the right wing, (the registration marking appears on the right wing in online photographs of the aircraft). These flaps look down (extended) to me. I believe the structure bottom left, aft of the markings is the right aileron. The flap structure is extended rearward past the aileron structure. You can just make out the rear edge of the LE slat, top right. It is deployed, not retracted.
I understand things “move” in an accident sequence. Verifying all this will be straightforward by examining the screw-jacks and of course, the flight data.
Subjects: None
June 15, 2025, 00:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11901983
TD, in this case, the RT call suggests we are a grand total of 1 choice, and that goes to a fair likelihood that a fleet wide grounding is in the offing. Adding system complexity dependent on sensor reliability has bitten us all in the past and will do again, and I have a bad feeling that is where we are at with this. The SSA guys will be working overtime, but this has had the hall marks of being a bad sensor/system event from the outset. Am laying bets that there will be a fleet wide grounding in the next 3-4 days, if not sooner. Inadvertent GA thrust after landing has occurred before, (had it on a B744 myself), and it is curious but straightforward to handle.
Yes.
Subjects: None
June 19, 2025, 19:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11906292
A word about the use of simulators. Simulators are training devices, not flight evaluation devices. Once you leave the centre of the operational envelope, you’re in uncharted territory. When simulators are used for investigations at high angles of attack, special software is written, and loaded, which accurately replicates the aircraft behaviour. It has very limited parameters. It is not possible to use a training simulator, for accident investigation purposes, outside the centre of the envelope.
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Parameters
June 28, 2025, 19:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11912634
That's exactly why I would really recommend reading through the NTSB FDR report on the 2013 JA829J Boston incident helpfully posted by
EDLB
. There's potentially a wealth of data concerning a to me at least surprisingly number of 2000 of parameters written on a 787 EAFR, that is that at least if there's elec power. Even the 10 min RIPS is useless if there's no data sent from electrically shut off systems.
Auxiliary Power Unit Battery Fire Japan Airlines Boeing 787-8, JA829J Boston, Massachusetts January 7, 2013
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): EAFR FDR NTSB Parameters RIPS
July 09, 2025, 16:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11918504
For info only - re-post of lever-lock fuel-switch design:
B787 Fuel Control Switches -
B787 Fuel Control Switches -
Last edited by PJ2; 9th July 2025 at 16:45 . Reason: Add image of B787 Fuel Control Switches
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Switches
July 09, 2025, 21:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11918651
A bit of a pedantic point, but the locking lever in the photo above is not the right action for the fuel cut off switches on the 787. The switch above has two locked positions and a biased further position. You could say ON-OFF-BIASSED. There are some photos earlier in the thread (assuming they are still there) of the correct Honeywell switch and its gate.
Edit: And here it is:
Edit: And here it is:
For those unfamiliar with cockpit controls in general, I\x92ll leave my \x93schematic\x94 image to show the principle of \x93lift-and-move\x94 the toggle vice just pushing the toggle in a desired direction.
Cheers,
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 9th July 2025 at 21:45 . Reason: for context
Subjects (links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context): Fuel (All) Fuel Cutoff Fuel Cutoff Switches Honeywell